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ABSTRACT 
THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY IN TOBAGO; 
1838 TO 1900
This thesis examines the social structure of the 
Caribbean island of Tobago between 1838, the year of the 
Emancipation of the slaves, and 1900, the year after Tobago 
was united to Trinidad to form the Colony of Trinidad and 
Tobago. One chapter gives the background to this period, by 
analysing the major social groupings, cleavages and conflicts 
of the slavery era, particularly of the years just prior to 
the Emancipation.
The study has two main objectives. Firstly, it describes 
and analyses the changing class/colour configuration of 
Tobago, and the way in which gender was constitutive of the 
structuring of access to land, occupations and social 
mobility. This is done both on the period before the collapse 
of the sugar economy in the 1880s and on the restructuring of 
the society after 1884.
Secondly, this case study in historical sociology is 
placed within the framework of the theoretical literature on 
the sociology of development. It seeks to explain the acute 
economic crisis which Tobago underwent in the 1880s, which led 
to the collapse of both its sugar economy and its viability as 
a separate government. Within the matrix of Tobago's 
dependence in the global capitalist system, the study shows 
the critical explanatory factors to be the source and 
deployment of capital, the social structure of the island, and 
the outcomes of intra- and inter-class struggles.
The analysis is multi-faceted, using a variety of sources 
to understand the demographic, political, economic and social 
dimensions of societal structure and change. Since metayage 
(sharecropping) was the dominant relationship of production 
after 1848, theories on metayage are examined and related to 
the Tobago evidence. The Caribbean debate on the 'flight from 
the estates' after Emancipation is also considered, and new, 
fruitful lines of analysis are explored. Directions for 
future research, particularly on Grenada, are given.
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CHAPTER ONE 
IN SEARCH OF A METHOD
What we need, in effect, is a form of 
structural history that is rarely 
practiced, which finds in each successive 
state of the structure under examination 
both the product of the previous struggles 
to maintain or to transform this structure, 
and the principle, via the contradictions, 
the tensions, and the relations of force 
which constitute it, of subsequent 
transformations.
[P. Bourdieu and L. J. D. Wacquant,
An Introduction to Reflexive Socioloav. 
p. 91]
I.l INTRODUCTION
This study was birthed from three premisses. First is 
the conviction, following E. H. Carr, that 'the more 
sociological history becomes, and the more historical 
sociology becomes, the better for both' [1961:84]. Second is 
the paradox that, although theories, explicit or implicit, 
must guide all attempts at understanding the structures and 
processes that shaped Caribbean societies over time, the task 
of historical reconstruction is a major route whereby the 
creative work of macro-sociological theory construction will 
advance. The neglect of Tobago in the literature led to our 
burning desire to write on her history, and to the third 
conviction, that the Tobago story would shed light on the 
history and sociology of other Caribbean societies.
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This thesis has two broad objectives. Firstly, within the 
limitations imposed by time, space and the data available, it 
analyses the changing social structure of Tobago between 1838, 
the Emancipation of the slaves, and 1900, the year after the 
island was fully united with Trinidad. Although our focus is 
from 1838 to 1900, because there is no study on Tobago in the 
1830s, Chapter 2 is devoted to the slave society, particularly 
on the eve of Emancipation.
Tobago is here treated as a case study, an example of a 
peripheral Caribbean economy which, particularly from the 18th 
century, was integral to what Immanuel Wallerstein has called 
'the European world-economy'. Our second objective is to test 
an hypothesis to account for the severe economic and social 
crisis that Tobago experienced, particularly in the decades of 
the 1880s and 1890s, which led to its annexation to Trinidad. 
It is cast within the problems and foci of the sociology of 
development, while seeking to avoid the errors noted in the 
literature.
Historical reconstruction is not without its perils. The 
theoretical and methodological concerns of the study are 
therefore now discussed. The major argument of this chapter is 
that the main streams of criticism of the modernization, 
dependency/world system and Marxist approaches to development, 
as well as the growing literature on historical sociology, all 
converge on one point of agreement: the need for macro-
sociological studies of the trajectory of societies through 
time, of the kind which is conducted here.
22
1.2 TOBAGO IN THE CARIBBEAN IN THE WORLD
The production of sugar, largely on the basis of slave 
labour, to which most of the Caribbean region was devoted from 
the mid 17th century until well into the 19th century, was 
integral to European expansion and the development of the 
modern world economy. Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific 
(the latter through the transfer of economic plants such as 
the sugar cane, the breadfruit etc) were linked on the soil of 
the Americas. The Caribbean played an important role in the 
developing world economy, as sugar was a valued commodity; it 
dominated world production for over two hundred years, and was 
the object of keen competition among the European powers 
[Tomich 1990:2].
Tobago lies at the southern end of the Caribbean 
archipelago, to the north-east of Trinidad. It was sighted by 
Columbus on his third voyage in August 1498, and the Spaniards 
named it after the abundance of tobacco which the indigenous 
people smoked by pipe [Boomert 1990].
As the contest between the European powers for supremacy 
in the region developed in the 16th and 17th centuries, the 
Amerindians (accounts differ as to whether they should be 
called Caribs or not [Dauxion-Lavaysse 1813, 2:2]) resisted 
attempts by rival groups of Spanish, Dutch, English, French 
and Courlanders to settle Tobago. However, there were 
settlements by the Dutch and the Courlanders in the 17th 
century; and Deerr states that during their continuous 
occupation between 1632 and 1666, the Dutch established sugar 
estates and 6 well-equipped factories [Deerr 1949, 1:178;
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Fowler 1774]. From 1690 Tobago was 'neutral' territory until 
the Treaty of Paris (1763) when, inhabited by a small number 
of French turtlers and some 300 Amerindian families, it was 
ceded to Britain.*
Thus, Tobago was virtually virgin territory at the time 
of its cession to Britain, after which it was incorporated 
into the global economy as a producer of commodities for the 
world market. Its history after 1763 is shaped by the fact 
that it was a colony of the foremost imperial power in the era 
when capitalism was ascendant in Europe.
In the period 1765-1771, the island was surveyed and 
carved up by the Commissioners for the Sale of Lands into lots 
for plantations and poor settlers; and reserves for the 
protection of the rain forests, for towns, fortifications, and 
other uses of the Crown. In 1770, sugar was first exported 
under British rule. Tobago was thus a relative latecomer to 
the sugar plantation economy which, by the 1760s, had passed 
what historians normally call its Golden Age [Ragatz 
1928/1977; Dunn 1973; Pares I960].
From 1763, Tobago formed part of a single administration, 
with Grenada, the Grenadines, Dominica and St Vincent. 
Dominica became a separate colony in 1771, and in 1781, Tobago 
was conquered by the French until 1793, when it reverted to 
Britain, but as a separate colony. The year 1802 saw its 
return to France until 1803, when it was made, again, a
* See Archibald [1987], Young [1812], Coke [1810, 2], 
Nardin [1969]; also the repts. on the population in 
C0285/2: Drummond to Holburne, 18 Apr. 1751; Tyrrell to 
Moore, 19 Oct. 1757, in Pinfold to Board of Trade, 7 Jan. 
1758.
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separate British colony. It remained British thereafter. In 
1833, Tobago became, with Grenada, St Vincent and Barbados, 
part of the Windward Islands, whose seat of government was at 
Barbados; St Lucia was added to the Windward Islands 
administration in 1838. Tobago remained part of the Windward 
Islands until 1889, when it was annexed to Trinidad.
By 1815, Britain was established as the leading imperial 
power. By 1860, it was the foremost industrial nation, the 
financial centre of Europe, and the major centre of the world 
market in important commodities, especially sugar [Chalmin 
1983]. Tobago experienced greatest prosperity in the 1790s, 
when the slaves in Ste Domingue (Haiti), the jewel in France's 
crown, revolted, decimated sugar production, and destroyed 
France's competitive edge, which allowed Britain the 
undisputed leadership in the production and marketing of 
sugar. In the 1790s, the expression 'as rich as a Tobago 
planter' became a byword in wealthy London circles. However, 
competition between France and Britain for control over Tobago 
made it a precarious place for British investors, and by the 
early 19th century, Tobago producers were also adversely 
affected by the rising costs of supplies and slaves.
Tobago's prosperity as a sugar producer was brief. The 
global forces that catapulted it into importance also 
contributed to its decline as a sugar colony. Tomich writes 
that after 1815 the world economy was qualitatively and 
quantitatively reshaped, and the place of the British West 
Indies (BWI) in the British empire and in the world economy 
was redefined.
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Britain's position in the world economy 
put it on the path toward a policy of 
free trade. To the extent that it came 
to control commerce outside the bounds of 
its own empire, Britain became relatively 
indifferent to formal colonialism as the 
means of defining the nature and direction 
of commodity flows and the division of 
labor between core and periphery.
[Tomich 1990:26]
Thus, as the East India colonies became more important, like 
the older colonies, Tobago was affected by the decline of the 
West Indies within the British empire, and by what Gallagher 
and Robinson [1953] termed 'the imperialism of free trade' 
which, from the 1840s, dismantled the mercantilist props that 
sustained the BWI sugar industry.%
Competition in the British market from slave-grown sugar 
from Cuba and Brazil, and the increased production of bounty- 
fed European beet sugar combined in the last decades of the 
19th century to cause a sharp fall in world prices. The Sugar 
Depression of the 1880s and 1890s eliminated most Tobago 
producers from the world market, and inaugurated new social 
and political relations within the island.
Thus, Tobago's trajectory as a marginal sugar colony for 
the period of our study cannot be understood apart from the 
global processes which we have sketched above. Our study 
analyses, through time, the interolav of metropolitan and 
global forces and actors, on the one hand, and structures and 
actors in the local setting, on the other.
 ^For a useful discussion on free trade policies in the 
trajectories of Britain and other European powers, see 
Senghaas [1985]; on British 19th century imperialism, 
Eldridge [1984].
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1.3 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON TOBAGO AND JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE STUDY
The Caribbean presents a range of island and mainland 
territories with a variety of cultural, linguistic, racial and 
economic differences. Although the entire archipelago, Belize 
and the Guianas had been incorporated into the global economy, 
with the Sugar Revolution being the major formative factor 
(though a few places such as Curaçao were not producers in the 
plantation economy), this took place in different territories 
at differing points in time, under varying conditions and with 
diverse consequences. There was a marked lack of uniformity 
within the region during the period of slavery and throughout 
the latter part of the 19th century, according to the options 
and possibilities available to different classes. We must 
therefore recognize that unless the range of sub-types, both 
spatially and over time, are identified and studied, every 
attempt at generalization is rendered woefully inadequate.
In 1982, reviewing the six available 'images' of 
Caribbean societies in the sociological literature^, we argued 
that there was still no sociological theory on the region. We 
stated that the available conceptions offered useful insights, 
that Marxism, stripped of its dogmatic and mechanistic 
connotations, could provide a useful method for analysing 
class structures,* but that ethnic, cultural and sexual
 ^Craig [1982]. This chapter does not repeat the points in 
that sustained review. See also Sankatsing [1989].
* Cf. Mouzelis, who argues for a 'pragmatic' approach to 
Marxism, and sees some of its fundamental insights as 
necessary to 'any serious, non-empiricist attempt to ex­
plain how total societies persist and change' [1990:3, 
156].
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cleavages must be integrated into the analysis, as must the 
oral tradition. We also argued that the old paradigms had to 
be transcended, but that the imaginative leap required would 
be facilitated by (though not automatically inferred from) 
more social histories on the range of sub-types within the 
region. Such work should be holistic, multidisciplinary, and 
simultaneously concerned with the interpenetration of global, 
regional and local factors. This study is conceived as a 
modest contribution to this genre of writing.
The second reason for this work is that Tobago, like many 
of the smaller Caribbean territories, has been particularly 
neglected in the historical and sociological literature. As 
far as its sociology is concerned, it is almost virgin 
territory. Most of the social science writing on Trinidad and 
Tobago wrongly assimilates Tobago's history and social 
structure to Trinidad's, or ignores Tobago altogether. The 
study of its social history in the century since Emancipation 
is now a matter of urgent academic and social necessity.
Apart from the reports of Commissions of Enquiry, the 
most easily available historical sources on Tobago in the 19th 
century are the observations and handbooks produced by 
resident government officials such as Young [1806; 1807; 1810; 
1812], Woodcock [1867/1971] and Hay [1884; 1899]. Of these, 
only the work of Hay gives information for the period after 
1865. The account of Fowler [1774] and the studies of Nardin 
[1966; 1969] are on the late 18th century. Academic theses 
apart from Nardin's are those by Ince [1984], Douglin [1987],
B. Marshall [1972], W. Marshall [1963], and Rogers [1970];
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none goes beyond 1877. All of these dissertations, except 
Douglin's, consider Tobago as part of the Windward Islands, to 
which it was constitutionally linked, though they are not 
based on any formally comparative research design. Douglin 
studies mainly the constitutional and economic history from 
1815 to 1854; and only the two Marshalls discuss the social 
structure in detail. Maynard [1968] considers the Moravian 
Church in Tobago as part of the Eastern Caribbean Province.
The remaining analyses of any significance on 19th 
century Tobago are Niddrie [1961], Carmichael [1961],
Williams [1962, Chs. 10, 11] and Ottley [1965/1973]. The first 
is an important study of settlement and land use patterns; the 
latter works focus on the broad outlines of its economic and 
constitutional history. Niddrie [1963] discusses some of the 
reports of Kaye Dowland, a very meticulous Stipendiary
Magistrate, in the period 1835 to 1848.
Two recent studies, on the 1802/3 slave conspiracy 
[Laurence 1982], and on the 1876 uprising of estate workers 
[Brereton 1984], as well as Laurence [1983] on the strategies 
of the Colonial Office and the local dominant class at the end 
of the 18th and the turn of the 19th centuries, are all 
useful.^
For the early 20th century, the literature is sparse.
Besides the annual reports and bulletins of government
departments and brief sections in the annual yearbooks of the 
colony, there are handbooks written to attract settlers to
 ^Laurence has also written a study of Tobago in 1815 (in 
press).
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Tobago [Imperial Department of Agriculture for the West Indies 
1906; Collens 1912a] and the accounts of resident parsons 
[Hammond 1910; Davies 1926]. There are also periodic reports 
in the missionary journals of the Moravian Church,* visitors' 
accounts [Clifford 1905; Bowman and Bowman 1939] and general 
books such as Alford [1939]. No Tobago newspapers survive for 
the 20th century until the 1930s, and even the reporting in 
the Trinidad newspapers on Tobago was negligible. The only 
academic research is that of Pemberton [1984] on the 
characteristics of the smallholders, and Isaac [1979]. The 
significance of the oral tradition for the social structure 
has been analysed for one village by Elder [1972a], who has 
several unpublished papers on the subject, and tangentially by 
Meikle [1955].
Useful though the available literature is, even when we 
piece it together, there is no clear answer to important 
sociological questions. What were the main classes and ethnic 
groupings, and how did they evolve in the 19th century? What 
were their economic, social, cultural, political strategies, 
practices and conflicts? What was the sociological 
significance of internal and external migration? Was the 
post-Emancipation experience of Tobago comparable to that of 
other Caribbean colonies? Did a peasantry emerge, and when? 
What strategies for survival were employed by the various 
social groupings during and after the crisis of the 1880s? 
How were they transformed in the process? To these questions.
* The reports by the Methodist missionaries are not 
preserved after 1885; the Anglican records are even 
thinner.
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the literature offers no consistent analysis, since no careful 
study of the social configuration throughout the 19th century 
has been undertaken.
Although share systems were one of many means by which 
labour was employed and surplus appropriated throughout the 
BWI after 1838 (share cropping existed in Grenada, St Vincent, 
St Lucia, Dominica, Montserrat, Nevis, and the Bahamas), 
Tobago was one of the few places where it became the dominant 
relationship of production between 1850 and 1900. Only 
Marshall [1963; 1965] examines its workings in some detail, 
but his study stops at 1865. Williams discusses it in general 
outline [1962], as does Taylor [1966], who saw a limited 
number of sources. Integral to the analysis of this thesis 
(Ch. 5) will be a careful theoretical and empirical 
examination of metayage, which was central to the dynamics of 
class conflict and accommodation in Tobago.
The crisis of the 1880s, in which Tobago's sugar economy 
collapsed, led to its annexation to Trinidad in 1889 and to 
formal Union with the latter in 1899. This relationship is 
today, nearly one hundred years later, a source of 
considerable political friction between the islands, but the 
most comprehensive analyses are those of Williams [1962:140- 
151], Premdas and Williams [1992], and Ryan [1989, Ch. 13], 
none of which explores the dynamics of class and power that 
were involved in the decision to unite the colonies. The 
politics of the twin-island state can only be fully understood 
if the historical roots of the Union and the subsequent 
transformation of Tobago are adequately analysed. This thesis
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(Chs. 7 and 8) is a contribution to our national understanding 
of the Union.
Implicit in the questions we have raised above is the 
view that there is need for a history of the social relations 
of the major class/colour groupings in Tobago, not as 'events' 
only (for events and individuals are sometimes necessary to 
our understanding of the 'long term'), but in what LeRoy 
Ladurie calls the 'event-structure mode', or the interaction 
between structures and particular events which have 
consequences (intended and otherwise) over a longue durée 
[1973/1979:120-131; cf. Braudel 1958/1972]. Such a history 
must offer a holistic view of the changing social structures 
and major processes in the society over time. It must do so 
within a clear explanatory framework with a view to answering 
the questions that are significant to today. As Lucien Febvre 
put it:
History is a way of organizing the past 
so that it does not weigh too heavily on 
the shoulders of man. ... For history does 
not present man with a collection of iso­
lated facts. It explains them and so, in 
order to explain them, it arranges them 
in series to which it does not attach 
equal importance. For history has no 
choice in the matter, it systematically 
gathers in, classifies and assembles 
past facts in accordance with its present 
needs. It consults death in accordance 
with the needs of life.
[1973:41]
This kind of writing, in spite of the contributions of 
Best and Levitt [1969],  ^Fog Olwig [1985] and Henry [1985], is
 ^Best has, in his annual lecture to the students of 
Caribbean Sociology at the UWI, St Augustine, begun 
to develop a useful framework for understanding Caribbean 
societies through time. The Best/Levitt work examines
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rare in the English-speaking Caribbean. Thus, the
justification for this work is not simply that it fills needed 
gaps on Tobago, but that, taking the points of departure 
indicated above, it hopes to enhance our understanding of the 
structures and processes that were transformed in the 19th 
century to leave legacies and constraints on the reality that 
Caribbean people confront today. In asking questions of the 
data, we also hope to shed light on certain theoretical issues 
in the sociology of development [cf. Higman 1985/86].
1.4 THE THEORETICAL IMPASSE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT
1.4.1 Debates on Deoendencv and Marxism
Tobago is one of the societies whose 'underdevelopment' 
has consumed much time, thought and temper in the sociology of 
development. We do not attempt here a full review of the 
literature. This has been competently undertaken by several 
authors [Palma 1978; Bernstein 1979; Roxborough 1979; Goodman 
and Redclift 1981; Henfrey 1981; Blomstrom and Hettne 1985; 
Munck 1984; Booth 1985]. Our task is only to point to some of 
the key issues raised by the dependency and Marxist 
'schools',* in order to indicate the path we choose, and why.
The critique of structural/functionalist theories of 
modernization by writers using the dependency framework was 
convincingly accomplished in the 1960s and early 1970s. But 
the dependency 'school' was hardly established before it too
Caribbean economies at three points in time, but has no 
mechanism for explaining the changes over time.
* We recognize that there are several variants of each 
approach considered.
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was subjected to telling criticism. The most important 
arguments of their critics are well known: the circularity and 
over-simplicity of Frank's thesis [1969; 1978]; his preclusion 
of historical specificity within the 'Third World'; his 
emphasis on capitalism as a system based on the international 
circulation of commodities, and not as a mode of production; 
the failure of these writers to make a genuine theoretical 
break with the underlying assumptions of the modernization 
paradigm; the tendency to replicate and invert the conceptual 
polarities of the modernization school; the over-emphasis on 
external factors as explanations for underdevelopment; the 
failure to give sufficient attention to classes as historical 
actors. And if 'development' is not a process which 
automatically occurs once the linkages to the metropolis are 
severed, then dependence alone cannot be the sole explanation 
for underdevelopment. Some writers also questioned whether it 
is possible to construct a global theory of underdevelopment 
[Bernstein 1979; Roxborough 1979; Mouzelis 1980].
The 'world-system' variant of dependency theorizing, 
based on Wallerstein's magisterial work [1974a; 1980; 1989], 
has been rightly criticized for its reductionist explanations, 
which see economic conditions and world market developments as 
the prime causes of events in the periphery; human agency, 
local groups and classes, and national states are deprived of 
efficacy [Skocpol 1977; Stern 1988a; 1988b]. A similar point 
was made about Amin's circular thesis on peripheral capitalism 
[1974; 1976] by Smith [1980]. Indeed, Stern argues that local 
conditions, including the resistance of the oppressed classes,
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at times have considerable weight in determining how 
capitalism was instituted historically in Latin America. 
Local initiatives, intra-regional differentiation, and 
cultural resistance in contemporary Guatemala and the 
Caribbean are stressed by Smith [1985] and Mintz [1977], 
respectively.
The dependentistas did have certain achievements. They 
laid to rest diffusionist and 'dualist' strategies of 
development. They successfully demolished all Eurocentric 
theories which posited a unilinear, teleological evolution of 
society, whether towards 'modernity', or economic 'take-off' 
through various stages of growth, or via successive modes of 
production to socialism. They also demolished the Marxist 
view of capitalism in the periphery as inherently 
'progressive'; and Marx's schema of modes of production, which 
was largely derived from the European experience, was shown to 
be inadequate for other regions.* In particular, the construct 
of an 'Asiatic mode of production' had little value in 
analysing Asian and other 'Third World' societies.
The major achievement of the dependency school was to 
offer, not a theory of underdevelopment, but what Cardoso and 
Faletto [1979] called a framework for analysing concrete 
situations of dependence. Dependency writers pointed to the 
historical and imperialist nexus in which the economies and 
social structure of the periphery are involved, and rightly
* Marx [n.d./1982] recognized this more than many of his 
disciples. As we show below, there is renewed questioning 
of Marx's outline in his 1859 Preface to A Contribution 
to the Critique of Political Economv as it applies to 
Europe.
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argued that the insertion of peripheral societies in the 
global capitalist system, and the contemporary dynamics of 
that system, must constitute the matrix for understanding 
peripheral social formations. If many of these writers failed 
to integrate the 'internal' with the 'external' as explanatory 
factors, or to pose the question of class in terms other than 
regional or national differences, this is not necessarily 
given by their perspective, but reflects a failure to move 
from the economic to the specificity of social cleavages and 
alliances, and to avoid overarching generalizations [cf. 
Henfrey 1981:27]. Indeed, the 'school' presented a range of 
positions on these matters [Blomstrom and Hettne 1985, Ch. 3].
Cardoso and Faletto emphasized, not only transnational 
relations of dependence, but also the interaction between 
these and internal factors, all of which influenced the shape 
and direction of contemporary development. They stressed the 
natural resources, the formation and practice of social 
classes, socio-political alliances, the role of the state, and 
the form in which all these have been constituted and 
articulated historically, as the key factors which determine 
and differentiate Latin American societies today. Rejecting 
Frank's stagnationist view of Latin America, Cardoso also 
noted what he called 'dependent development' [1972; 1973b], 
since in Brazil and Mexico, for example, which have undergone 
considerable industrialization, peripheral capitalism exists, 
but in dependent forms, with specific consequences for class 
alliances, political structures and development strategies 
[cf. Hoogvelt 1982; Evans 1979].
36
While the emphasis of Cardoso and Faletto on the 
historical specificity of each situation is a welcome advance 
on the a-historical theorizing of Frank and many of the 
Marxists in the debate, their work is descriptive, without any 
explicit analytical apparatus for explaining the differences 
between countries [cf. Henfrey 1981]. Such a theory may be 
implicit, since they make clear explanatory statements that 
take them beyond a conceptual framework. However, it would 
need to identify the factors differentiating particular sub­
sets of societies, and would have to be sufficiently open- 
ended and 'middle range' in its focus to leave room for 
empirical investigation.^
In the absence of the type of theory that is needed, the 
present work will use Cardoso's basic approach, but will 
confine itself to testing our hypothesis on Tobago by offering 
the kind of analysis that Skocpol [1985] calls 'analytic 
historical sociology'. These points are developed in Section 
1.6 below.
The Marxist pole of the debate has not been more helpful. 
Too often, they have understood agrarian transitions in the 
periphery as simply the way one or more pre-capitalist mode(s) 
of production (MOP(s)) inhibit(s) or advance(s) the 
development of the capitalist mode of production (CMP) and its 
reproduction of cheap labour power. Thus, they too reproduce 
the teleological problematic of the modernization school. The
Mouzelis [1980:370] basically agrees with this, but argues 
that such a theory should be no more than a 'conceptual 
framework'. A theory, because it must have some explan­
atory power, is not a conceptual framework. This is pre­
cisely Cardoso's problem.
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warning that there are different agrarian systems and 
different processes of agrarian transition is therefore 
salutary [Duncan and Rutledge 1977, Ch. 1; Roxborough 1979; 
Goodman and Redclift 1981].
While Laclau [1971] and Brenner [1977] in the orthodox 
Marxist tradition [cf. Dobb 1946/1975; Hilton et al. 1978] 
stressed the importance of understanding capitalism, not 
simply in its 'circulationist' aspects, but as a mode of 
production, how to chararacterize peripheral MOPs has remained 
problematic. Laclau himself described the MOPs in Latin 
America as 'only formally capitalist', because the region 
participates in the general movement of the capitalist system 
without becoming fully capitalist. Although he spelled out 
four criteria with which to decide how to characterize a given 
MOP, ultimately, once the generalized employment of wage 
labour did not occur, he deemed the MOP 'semi-feudal'. 'Semi- 
feudal' is a disconcertingly residual category for whatever is 
not the CMP in the terms with which Marx described this for 
19th century western Europe.
In the last fifteen years, with the decline in influence 
of Althusserian structural Marxism and the collapse of 
communism in the Soviet bloc, there has been a marked 
departure from the basic tenets of Marxism by many erstwhile 
orthodox Marxists. Laclau now argues against the privileged 
position of the system of production in Marxist discourse, 
against the expectation of proletarian consciousness, and 
against the view that class positions are 'the necessary 
location of historical interests'. Describing his position as
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'post-Marxist', he advocates a 'radical and plural democracy' 
as the alternative for the Left [Laclau and Mouffe 1985:4, 
185] .
Because of the clear inadequacies of Marx's schema of 
MOPs, there have been similar radical departures from 
orthodoxy, even by former champions of historical 
materialism.^^ A far more pragmatic approach is taken by 
committed Marxists, some of whom [Callinicos 1989b; Burawoy 
1989] defend historical materialism as a set of analytical 
concepts on the ground of its usefulness, and argue that 
Marxism is a 'scientific research programme', in the sense 
that Imre Lakatos [1978] used the term, whose 'hard core' can 
be treated as if immune to empirical refutation, while the 
'protective belt' is subject to testing and refutation. 
Marxism's resilience may yet permit a thousand theoretical 
flowers to bloom.
In the meantime, the literature on modes of production 
and their 'articulation', which was often advanced (for 
example, by Taylor [1979]) as the answer to the weaknesses of 
dependency analysis, is fraught with inadequacies.
Attempts at identifying modes of production in the 
periphery have not been helpful. On the one hand, Alavi 
[1975] and Banaji [1972] advanced for India the concept 
'colonial mode of production', with Alavi also hinting at a 
'post-colonial mode of production'; but they did not define 
the construct in the same way and they both now distance 
themselves from their earlier views. Another attempt [Cardoso
“ For example, see most of the essays in Callinicos [1989a].
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1975a] at constructing the colonial MOPs in the Americas was 
preliminary and severely criticized [Munck 1984].
Further, since differing relations of production may 
indicate what Banaji [1977] calls 'forms of labour' and other 
Marxists 'labour processes', but not necessarily modes of 
production, at what point does a form of labour/labour process 
become a mode of production? The major difficulty is the 
level of abstraction and the formalism in the use of these 
analytical constructs.*^ How to characterize colonial MOPs, 
where wage labour is not the dominant or only mechanism of 
surplus appropriation; how to theorize the links between the 
forces and relations of production, the development of classes 
and other social groupings and the state; and what should be 
the appropriate empirical referents or units of analysis, 
remain unanswered questions. Implicit in this abstract 
formalism is what E. P. Thompson called the problem of 
theoretical 'closure', inherent in Althusserian structuralism, 
wherein the relationships between economy, social classes, and 
ideological, cultural and political practices are so 
mechanistically predetermined by the theory, as to leave no 
open-endedness to the historical process, no scope for human 
agency, and no necessity for empirical research [Thompson 
1978:167, author's emphasis; cf. Mouzelis 1980].
Marx's schema of MOPs and the historical materialism 
derived from it have long been questioned by European
Callinicos [1989b] argues that it is misplaced concrete­
ness to expect 'mode of production' to have an empirical 
referent; unless there are bridging concepts which allow 
for empirical testing, the construct is unhelpful.
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Marxists. Levine and Wright [1980], responding to Cohen's 
[1978] vigorous defence of historical materialism, argue that 
it is impossible to devise a theory of human history based on 
the interests of individuals or classes, since many factors 
mediate the translation of interests into social and political 
practices, and class interests do not necessarily determine 
class capacities. As a view of history based on the 'laws of 
motion' of successive MOPs, historical materialism is seen as 
both theoretically and politically inadequate. Cohen [1989] 
later questioned both Marx's anthropology and the validity of 
historical materialism.
Similarly, Hindess and Hirst [1975], who attempted to 
rescue MOP analysis from its Althusserian overtones, have 
abandoned the concept as a primary object of analysis [Cutler 
et al. 1977, 1:253]. They deny that a MOP can be a totality 
which has inscribed in its structure necessary effects, and 
reject the view of classes as 'impelled' to political unity 
and action because of their interests. They also argue for 
the specificity of the political sphere and for a non­
reductionist view of the state [Cutler et al. 1978, 2:241].
Wolpe [1985] admits that there is need for concepts to 
make specific analyses of the relationships between capitalist 
and non-capitalist MOPs, to understand the relationship 
between the forces and the relations of production within 
given MOPs, and to study units of production and their 
reproduction. In other words, as an analytical category, MOP 
needs to be amplified with precise conceptual tools if it is 
to be helpful in concrete historical analysis.
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Manicas also admits that Marxists have 'tried to make the
concept 'mode of production' bear an explanatory weight of
which it is incapable'. He argues that the orthodox view of
MOPs 'becomes explanatory only via an untenable reductionism
and functionalism' and concludes that 'the key variables
are the capacities and responses by various classes and class
fractions in nations within the orbit of these [global]
structures'.
In summary, then, we must distinguish 
between the structural constraints of the 
world states-system as it is presently 
constituted and the structural imperatives 
of monopoly capitalism. Neither are re­
ducible to the other and the causal per­
tinence, one to the other, will not be 
uniform through time and space.
He also calls for conjunctural analyses specifying the MOPs
observed, with theories giving the causally pertinent
structural determinants, strictly specified as to their causal
roles and weighted as regards their causal effects [1985:315-
321; author's emphasis].
These admissions, especially from Levine and Wright, 
Thompson, Hindess and Hirst, and Manicas, indicate the 
theoretical inadequacies of the 'hard core' of Marxism, and 
the need for macro-sociological studies, avoiding the pitfalls 
of system teleology and economic reductionism, which give due 
weight to human agency and to political dynamics. With the 
basic approach of Manicas, which coincides with Cardoso's, we 
agree. However, with qualitative data, multiple causation and 
conjunctural effects, it is impossible to weight factors and 
variables in the way Manicas requires.
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1.4.2 Marxist Debates on the Caribbean
Writers on the Caribbean debated at length the issue of 
small size [Demas 1965] and dependence, but the dominant 
conception was that of the 'plantation economy', showing that 
the mechanisms whereby dependence is constituted and 
maintained find new forms in each historical epoch [Best and 
Levitt 1969]."^ The 'modes of production controversy' 
[Foster-Carter 1978] also engaged their attention, but the 
focus was on the relationship between capitalism and slavery, 
with the implication that the capitalist mode of production 
(CMP) was instituted in the region only after Emancipation, 
when 'free' wage labour was possible. On the one hand, there 
was debate as to whether the CMP could have been instituted in 
the Americas by European powers that were not themselves 
capitalist in the 16th century [Laclau 1971; Mintz 1985:58]; 
for our study of Tobago after 1763, the question does not 
arise, since in the late 18th century capitalism was ascendant 
in Britain. On the other hand, is the question whether 
production by slaves can be seen as capitalist, which we now 
consider.
It must be remembered that except for the Guyanas, with 
their vast hinterlands, and the Spanish colonies, which were 
generally treated as military and strategic outposts by Spain, 
the Amerindian populations were systematically decimated, 
whether through disease or military defeat, exploitation and 
dispersion. From the 17th century, the Sugar Revolution
See further references in Craig [1982]; Blomstrom and 
Hettne [1985, Ch. 5].
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dismantled most forms of independent petty subsistence and 
commodity production and implanted the sugar plantation, with 
production based largely on slave labour in the mature phases 
of the system. Except in the Guyanese hinterlands, the pre­
colonial MOPs did not survive wherever the sugar economy took 
root, and the major alternative forms were the institutions 
created by the small pockets of Maroons, where these existed 
[Price 1973]. It is true that slaves had provision grounds on 
the plantations and developed extensive markets, but this 
activity cannot be considered a distinct MOP [cf. Mintz 1978]. 
In the 'sugar islands', therefore, there was one MOP.
It is widely recognized that to focus on the formal 
relations of production without understanding the total matrix 
of conditions and relationships within which production takes 
place can lead to serious error. Banaji [1977] shows that 
there were several forms of production within feudalism, and 
that Dobb's weakness [1946/1975] lay in part in failing to 
recognize this, which led him to characterize relations that 
were not serfdom as belonging to MOPs other than feudal. By 
the same token, the existence of slavery in the New World does 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a slave or pre­
capitalist MOP existed before Emancipation. Looked at in 
their global context, the sugar plantations, combining 
agriculture and industry on a large scale, with a high level 
of social and technical organization, were 'a pioneer 
institution of capitalist development' [Tomich 1990:2; cf. 
Mintz 1985:48-51]. Tomich puts the central issues well:
The development of colonial slavery in
the New World was predicated on European
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expansion and the formation of the modern 
world economy beginning in the sixteenth 
century. The world market, the world­
scale integration and divisioning of 
labor, and the level of global productive 
forces are constitutive of slave relations 
and shape their social-historical content.
... Conversely, as a form of commodity 
production, slavery finds its extension 
and completion in exchange relations.
Thus, neither the world market nor the 
relations of production can be treated 
as isolated phenomena. Rather, these re­
lations and processes of commodity pro­
duction and exchange should be understood 
as simultaneously and mutually formative.
... In this perspective, capitalism as a 
concrete historical phenomenon is not iden­
tified simply with production for the 
market, nor is it confined to the wage 
form of labor.
[1990:2; author's emphasis]
Slavery is thus seen, following Wallerstein [1974b], as 
one among many forms in which capitalists organized labour in 
the periphery, although wage labour emerged as the principal 
means by which labour was subordinated in the capitalist world 
economy.
Was there a slave MOP in the Americas? Hindess and Hirst 
[1975] made a case for its existence by assertion, since they 
admitted that the construct had no empirical referent [cf. Aya 
1976]. They themselves have now abandoned the MOP construct, 
as well as the view that the process of production is prior to 
and determinant of circulation and distribution [Hindess and 
Hirst 1977; Cutler at al, 1978, 2:241].
Other Marxists argued for a slave MOP. Post [1978:22-3],
Of. Beiguelman [1978:77], who argues that slavery was 'the 
form in which capitalism is realized in the colonial 
economy'. Padgug [1976] saw the links between New World 
slavery and European capitalism in the sphere of 
circulation; but production and circulation are part of 
the same cycle.
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studying Jamaica, said that slavery was a distinct MOP, while 
Robotham, avoiding the question of what did exist, saw 
Jamaican slavery as having 'semi-feudal features', because of 
the slaves' provision grounds [1977:47]. Capitalism for both 
Post and Robotham was a post-Emancipation development with the 
emergence of free labour. Cardoso [1975b] sketched the 
outlines of a 'colonial slave mode of production' in the 
Americas, but it is a tentative work that does not offer an 
analysis of the internal contradictions which supposedly led 
to the demise of slavery. Moreno Fraginals, in his classic 
work, noted that the Cuban 'sugarocracy' had bourgeois 
orientations and dealt in capitalist markets; but he could not 
identify production by slaves with capitalism.^
Quintero Rivera [1982] is rather more interesting. He 
argues, following Laclau and Dobb, that Puerto Rico in the 
19th century experienced a transition from being a society of 
dispersed subsistence smallholders to one in which a hacienda 
economy prevailed. But the internal market was still 
undeveloped and the circulation of commodities, including the 
sale of labour power as a commodity, was not widespread. The 
system of production, under these circumstances peculiar to 
Puerto Rico, was thus not capitalist. However, Mintz [1977] 
states that Puerto Rico's developments were a response to 
external needs and opportunities; it is therefore mistaken to 
conceptualize Antillean systems as unaffected by the CMP.
All the above writers have to contend with the question
Moreno Fraginals [1964/1976]; cf. critique by Tomich 
[1991b] and comments by Mintz [1991].
46
as to whether 'slave' or 'feudal' MOPs were transformed on 
Emancipation Day into the CMP, if the day before they were 
non-capitalist regimes [ibid.:264].
Other writers have been compelled by the evidence to see 
the Caribbean as capitalist from the slave era [Fraser 1981; 
Sebastien 1978; Banaji 1977]. Genovese, who insists that the 
slaveholding South of the USA was not a capitalist regime 
[1967:13-39], distinguishes it from the Caribbean where, 
especially in the BWI, 'the slaveholders ... or at least the 
richest and most powerful of them, were in fact English 
capitalists' and where the régimes 'should, for all practical 
purposes, be considered capitalist' [Fox-Genovese and Genovese 
1983:22-3].
Banaji [1977] contends that the slave plantation was
capitalist, but differed from classical capitalist enterprises
in its lower intensity of accumulation, in the constant
composition of its capital, and its declining levels of labour
productivity. Here, the ground of the argument is shifted
from the way in which the surplus was appropriated to the
efficiency of capital in expanding its own reproduction.
Banaji asserts that, since some of the surplus was spent on
'feudally-dominated habits of consumption and display',
the slave plantations were capitalist 
enterprises of a patriarchal and feudal 
character producing absolute surplus- 
value on the basis of slave-labour and a 
monopoly in land.
[1977:17; author's emphasis]
It is difficult to accept that the consumption patterns of the 
planters prevented 'the self-expansion of value' [ibid.:17] 
from becoming a compelling force in the career of the sugar
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plantations, and therefore prevented them from being genuinely 
capitalist. The historical record documents also the 
constraints of rising costs of supplies and slaves, falling 
prices for sugar, imperial restrictions, high commissions and 
charges from British merchants and the resistance of the 
slaves themselves, all of which made sugar production less 
profitable at the end of the 18th century, especially in the 
older colonies, where the soils had become exhausted [Ragatz 
1928/1977]. We have to conclude that the plantations were 
simply capitalist.
Marx himself, referring to the New World plantation
colonies, wrote:
In [this] type of colonies - plantations - 
where commercial speculations figure from 
the start and production is intended for 
the world market, the capitalist mode of 
production exists, although only in a 
formal sense, since the slavery of Negroes 
precludes free wage-labour, which is the 
basis of capitalist production. But the 
business in which slaves are used is con­
ducted by capitalists.
[Marx 1969b, 2:302-3; 
author's emphasis]
He insisted on the nexus between plantation America and the
world market, and argued that the planters in the Americas
were capitalists, though anomalies in a system based on free
labour [Marx 1980:119].
Patterson, arguing against Hindess and Hirst, states that
'no such thing as a slave mode of production exists'
[1979:52], and that there was no essential difference between
the Caribbean planter and the European capitalist.
The slave variant of capitalism is merely 
capitalism with its clothes off. This is 
clearly what Marx had in mind when he re-
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ferred to capitalism as wage slavery. ... 
Capitalism, which is exclusively a product 
of the modern world, has had two major 
variants: the 'free' variant characterized 
by the sale of the worker's labour on the 
labour market; and the slave variant found 
in the Americas up to the closing decades 
of the 19th century, in the Banda Islands 
south of Ceram in the Dutch East Indies 
between the late 17th and mid-19th centur­
ies, and in the Indian Ocean slave colonies 
of the 18th and 19th centuries.
[Ibid.:51-53]
We agree with Patterson. Considering that Tobago was
from 1764 established as a producer of commodities for the
global market; given that there is no dispute about the
dominance of capitalism in Britain in the late 18th century
and that the planters were capitalist entrepreneurs, using
slave labour to appropriate surplus; given that slavery was
one among many labour régimes used within the Caribbean for
the same purpose by the same class throughout the 19th
century, we treat Tobago as a society dominated by the
capitalist MOP from 1763 onwards. To quote Tomich again.
Slave labor is not regarded as capitalist 
simply because it entails production for 
the market, or as noncapitalist because it 
is not the wage form of labor. Rather, 
slave labor is conceived as part of the 
organization of social labor on a world 
scale. ... [Slave relations] constitute 
a specific form of commodity production 
that is related to other such forms 
through the world market and world-scale 
processes of integration and division of 
labor.
[1990:5]
The theoretical impasse on 'Third World' development is 
complicated by ethnic, racial, religious and other cleavages, 
which are of considerable importance, not to be dismissed as 
epiphenomena or superstructure, but not easily accommodated
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within the standard Marxist categories. Indeed, Mouzelis 
[1981:536] argued that this constitutes the 'crucial dilemma' 
for Marxism as a whole, the choices being either to explain 
such cleavages and structures in a reductionist (economically 
determined) way, or to analyse them in an ad hoc manner, 
borrowing concepts from a non-Marxist framework. A few 
Marxist Caribbeanists have felt it possible to combine Marxism 
with the study of ethnic, racial and religious phenomena 
[Rodney 1981; Post 1984; Mills 1987]. So far, however, apart 
from James [1938/1963], a successful portrayal of these 
factors in a single Marxist study of the processes of macro- 
sociological change in a given historical conjuncture has not 
appeared. Mills recently described his earlier [1987] views 
as verging on class reductionism, and called for a Marxism 
that would be 'feminist, ethnically sensitive, green and 
morally informed' [1991:47].
1.4.3 A Wav Forward
Is there a way forward? Booth, examining the crisis in 
development sociology, perceptively notes that it is at the 
level of meta-theory that both dependency and Marxism in all 
their varieties have failed. Dependency is flawed on logical, 
empirical and theoretical grounds; in particular, its 
reasoning is often circular. The modes of production approach 
is based on functionalist, and equally circular, arguments 
about the needs of capitalist reproduction. Booth argues that 
all development sociology is committed to explanations which 
show that the structures and processes of the Third World are
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'not only explicable but necessary under capitalism' 
[1985:81], the two variants of which are system teleology, and 
the 'reading off' of social and political structures from 
economic conditions.
Mouzelis [1988] considers some practical implications of 
Booth's argument. He calls for 'a historically oriented macro 
comparative approach', examining the trajectories of 
development in different societies, while giving due weight to 
the political (that is, avoiding the perils of economic 
reductionism). This approach - comparative research examining 
societies over the ^longue durée' - he regards as a way out of 
the theoretical impasse [cf. Mouzelis 1990; 1991].
All the major critiques of both 'schools' have argued for 
macro-sociological studies, over the long term, holistic in 
scope, which do not privilege the economic over other aspects 
of society, nor social class over other lines of cleavage. 
They indicate that due weight should be given to state 
structures and to the specificity of the political. The 
present work takes precisely that approach. And although it 
is a case study, as Section 1.5 below shows, it views Tobago 
in comparison with other Caribbean societies.
Firstly, it provides a socio-historical analysis of the 
changing social structure of Tobago between 1838 and 1900. 
Tobago is considered as inserted into, and penetrated by, the 
world capitalist system. Throughout, we discuss the interplay 
between the character of that system, the interests and 
actions of metropolitan powers and classes and the interests, 
capacities and actions of local classes, fractions and strata.
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As part of this analysis, we seek to answer one question 
on Tobago's development. Given the common features of
colonial domination and dependence in the BWI in the 19th
century, what accounts for the severe crisis of the Tobago 
sugar economy in the 1880s, vis-à-vis that of the more 
technologically efficient and profitable plantation colonies, 
such as Trinidad and British Guiana?
1.5 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
1.5.1 Objectives
1. To conduct a socio-historical study of the changing
social structure of Tobago in the period 1838-1900.
In the absence of any work analysing Tobago on the 
eve of emancipation. Chapter 2 studies the social 
structure from 1763 to 1838, with particular 
emphasis on the 1830s.
2. To test the hypothesis outlined below.
1.5.2 Definitions of Kev Concepts and Basic Assumptions
1. Social Structure
The configuration of social groups, classes, strata 
in a society; their composition, interrelationships 
and relative social power, as indicated by their 
access to, and control over, the major economic, 
cultural/ideological and political institutions.
2. Social Class
Social classes are groupings which form part of 
structured relations of domination and subordin­
ation. This study assumes that classes are struc­
tured and generated in the process of production and 
circulation of commodities.
Production and distribution are part of the same 
cycle. In Tobago, planters were often merchants 
and shopkeepers, while huckstering, market vending, 
trafficking and petty shopkeeping were activities of 
many labourers and metayers.
Therefore classes are identified by commonalities in
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their control over (or separation from) the major 
means and conditions of production and circulation, 
such that there was a structured capacity of control 
(or dispossession) in the hands of definite cat­
egories of agents [Cutler et al. 1977, 1:253].
We recognize that class consciousness may fail to 
occur among groups of people whose class position 
(degree of control over similar means and conditions 
of production and distribution) may be similar, and 
that individuals and groups may identify with 
classes to which they do not belong. How groups 
coalesced and acted as they perceived their 
interests is a matter for investigation.
Social classes are conceived of as being segmented 
into fractions and strata.
Social strata may exist without belonging to a 
specific class. In Chapter 7, the 'middle strata', 
a heterogeneous grouping of people from positions 
intermediate between those we have identified as 
the dominant class and the labouring class, are 
an example of this.
Temporary and shifting alliances may occur between 
classes, or between fractions and strata from within 
classes. They may also occur between all or part of 
the 'middle strata' and all or part of classes.
Since class is a historical concept, sections of 
classes or whole classes may rise and fall in the 
process of social mobility over time. Embryonic, 
emergent and declining classes, fractions and strata 
must therefore be delineated and understood.
In the Caribbean, race/colour, culture and class 
patterns overlap significantly, though their rela­
tionship is not isomorphic. Following Stuart Hall, 
we assume that 'It does not help ... to depress some 
factors of this matrix in favour of others ... since 
it is precisely the generative specificity of each, 
plus the over-determined complexity of the whole, 
which is the problem' [Hall 1977:154].
Thus, social class is given no a priori privileged 
status in this analysis, and throughout, the inter­
relationships between class, race/colour, culture 
and gender are analysed where possible. Their 
relative importance at any given historical moment 
is treated as a matter that must be assessed on the 
basis of available evidence [Thompson 1978:172].
Given the colonial situation of Tobago, the signi- 
cant historical actors and classes are not confined 
within its geographical boundaries.
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3. The Crisis of the 1880s
The explanandum of this study is the definitive 
collapse of the sugar economy in the 1880s. As 
Chapters 4, 5, and 7 show, production and exports of 
sugar declined dramatically, as did imports and 
revenue. There was little money circulating and 
transactions were done in kind. This caused a mass 
exodus of labourers (Ch. 6). The failure of the 
revenue, even at minimal levels of expenditure, led 
to the abolition of the Tobago Government and the 
annexation of Tobago to Trinidad. This was a short­
term 'event', explosive, and striking, both to 
contemporaries and in its socio-political effects on 
Tobago [Braudel 1958/1972:14]. Thus, no justifica­
tion is needed for defining it ostensively.
1.5.3 Working Hypothesis
This study argues that the crucial factors which account 
for Tobago's crisis of production and trade in the 1880s, in 
which the sugar economy proved to be less resilient than that 
of neighbouring colonies, were not simplv either the dependent 
status of Tobago, both as a colony and a peripheral economy, 
or its insertion into the capitalist world system.
Although these are the main alternative hypotheses 
offered by the literature on development, since they have been 
shown to be inadequate on their own, we do not examine them. 
Instead, we amplify them, by taking them as necessary 
conditions, integral to the analysis, and by advancing 
additional factors which might have been sufficient to 
determine the crisis of the 1880s. Therefore we have no 
alternative hypothesis, nor could we glean one from the Tobago 
data.
We advance the hypothesis that, within the matrix of 
Tobago's insertion as a dependent colony into the global 
capitalist system, the factors which determined the crisis of
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the 1880s were, not British capital per se, but the source and 
deployment of capital invested on the island; and secondly, 
its social structure, in particular the absence of a class or 
classes able, either to supply capital for the upgrading and 
restructuring of the sugar industry, or to diversify the 
economy away from sugar production, or both.
We recognize that what are here identified as causal 
'factors' are themselves the products of social action and 
processes, which are analysed in the study. Such processes 
are likely to be the results of the action of social classes, 
fractions, and their alliances. However, because class 
conflicts are not privileged in our presuppositions, the 
question is left open at this point.
The rationale for our hypothesis is as follows. If we 
conceive of the Caribbean colonies in the late 19th century 
along a continuum distinguishing the most capitalized, 
technologically advanced and profitable sugar producers from 
the least in these respects, Tobago would lie at the moribund 
pole of the spectrum; Cuba, British Guiana and Trinidad at the 
most advanced end of it.
The two British colonies mentioned, British Guiana (BG) 
and Trinidad, are distinguished from Tobago in the following 
respects:
a. large tracts of virgin, fertile soil available 
for plantations;^
b. large capital investment in the most modern tech­
nology for sugar growing and processing, supported
But, as in Tobago, there was oligarchical control over the 
best lands, achieved via (i) restricted access to Crown 
lands, (ii) prohibitive prices for land and (iii) 
restrictions on squatting.
55
by state investment in roads and railways;
c. continuous state-aided immigration schemes,
especially of indentured labour for the plantations.
The availability of all the above factors - land, capital and
labour - was mediated by the policies of the colonial state,
over which the 'planting interests', metropolitan and local,
had great influence.
Tobago had 57,408 acres of alienated land, of which at
most, only 10,000 acres were under canes and provisions during
the period of our study. Large tracts of land were abandoned,
and cultivated estates under-utilized from the 1840s (Tables
8, 9). Tobago did not have continuous immigration. The
planters' most crucial need was for capital in sufficient
quantities to allow them to install the latest technology, to
pay wages, and to import labour, where necessary.
Although Tobago differed from Trinidad and BG in the
above resource endowments, it was like them in one crucial
respect: their sugar industries were largely controlled by
British merchants.^ Why, then, did the domination of
Trinidad and BG by British merchants result in technological
advance and a sugar industry in which, although some planters
succumbed to the Sugar Depression, the industry survived,
while in Tobago similar domination resulted in the stagnation
of its sugar industry and its demise in the Depression?
The argument is further advanced by considering, within 
the confines of 19th century thinking and possibilities, what 
the available options were, if Tobago was to avoid succumbing
See Sebastien [1978] and Adamson [1972] for Trinidad and 
BG, respectively.
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to a Depression, such as that of the 1880s. There were two 
basic options, which were not mutually exclusive.
a. Option 1
This would entail the estates' breaking out of their 
chronic indebtedness and encumbrances, so that they 
could attract large inputs of capital for modernizing 
sugar production. However, investors were more likely to 
invest in the newer, larger, more fertile colonies.
b. Option 2
To diversify out of sugar.
Option 1 did not occur. Although many of the Tobago 
estates were sold and freed of encumbrances in the Encumbered 
Estates Court after 1862, they remained heavily indebted and 
controlled, via the system of advances, commissions and 
consigneeship, by a few British merchant houses. Tobago never 
attracted large sums of foreign capital and there was no local 
class capable of making the necessary investment. The reasons 
for this are fully explored in Chapter 7.
Option 2
The option of diversification away from sugar could have 
meant two basic possibilities, which were also not mutually 
exclusive.
Option 2A; the emergence of a class of estate owners,
(whether local or foreign-based) or owners of 
tracts of land over 10 acres** in extent, who 
were not able to compete in sugar or who were 
not 'interested' in sugar as a commodity;
Option 2B; the emergence of a class of smallholders 
producing crops other than sugar for sub­
sistence and/or export.
** Ch. 4 shows that 10 acres constituted a critical 'thres­
hold' in Tobago; the owners of holdings that size and 
above were planters, professionals, the more prosperous 
shopkeepers and merchants; not peasants or labourers.
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For Option 2A. the study examines whether and why such 
groups of estate or land owners did/did not emerge (Chs. 4,
7) . It also seeks, within the available data, to know whether 
the sources of capital tied planters, who may have wished to 
diversify, to sugar production (Ch. 7).^
For Option 2B. Chapters 3 and 4 examine whether a 
peasantry, as defined in Chapter 3, emerged between 1838 and 
1884. The composition and differentiation of the agrarian 
labour force are also understood in the light of the metayage 
system (Ch. 5) and of the demographic and occupational data 
available from the censuses (Ch. 6).
The work is multi-faceted, but the insights from Chapters 
3 to 7 are summarized in Chapter 7. Our conclusions on these 
questions for the period 1838-84 are consistent with the data 
on the restructuring of the society between 1884 and 1900 (Ch.
8), and a full summary of the findings are in Chapter 9.
Given that our observations on Trinidad and BG note the 
importance of the colonial state in the provision of land, 
labour and capital, this study examines carefully the role of 
the state and of the relative power of various classes and 
other groupings over its policies, particularly on land, 
immigration and taxation (Chs. 3, 5, 7).
Our hypothesis would be tenable if, in exploring the
Green [1986:155] argues that 'the appeal of alternative 
staples in the decade after emancipation turns out to be 
a mirage', and that an inter-island trade in foodstuff 
and stock could only be premised on a division of labour 
within the region, with some islands continuing to pro­
duce commodities for the world market. Some islands did 
produce other staples - bananas, arrowroot, pimento, 
cocoa - in the 19th century, so there was no necessitv 
for Tobago to remain monocultural.
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extent to which Options 1, 2A and 2B occurred in Tobago, we 
find data that are valid and reliable in support of it, and if 
the contradictory evidence is not overwhelming. It would 
receive stronger support from a series of strict comparisons 
with other Caribbean countries.
Trinidad and BG are cases unlike Tobago in their size and 
initial resource endowments, especially land; they also 
enjoyed the technological advantage of entering later than 
Tobago into sugar production. Since they are not strictly 
comparable to Tobago, we have used these contrasting examples 
onlv as points of orientation in searching for explanatory 
clues.
A more appropriate comparison is that between Tobago and 
the neighbouring island of Grenada, which are similar in size, 
topography, resource endowments, stage of transformation into 
full-blown sugar colonies and political administration. 
Nevertheless, Grenada, because it no longer grew sugar for 
export, was the onlv island expected by the 1897 Royal 
Commission to escape suffering if sugar completely failed. 
Besides Grenada, only Jamaica and Trinidad, which had 
undergone a measure of diversification from sugar, were 
expected to recover from the Depression without imperial 
aid. 20
If our hypothesis is tenable, we expect to find, for 
Grenada, that the factors posited for Tobago's crisis were
20 WI Roval Com. Rent. . 1897, pp. 3, 7, 66-7, 69. Successive 
Tobago Lt.-Governors and Administrators after 1870 urged 
the planters to diversify as their Grenadian counter­
parts had done.
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either different, in the case of the source and deployment of 
capital and the ability of the estates to modernize (Option 
1) , or present, in the case of the diversifying class or 
classes which we identify for Options 2A and 2B. (We recognize 
that differences found may be of degree and not of kind.) We 
would also need to look for conditions and processes unique to 
Grenada which may have contributed to, or which would better 
account for, its greater prosperity in the 1880s and 1890s.
In other words, employing Mill's 'Method of Difference', 
which, he argued, was a far stronger tool than his 'Method of 
Agreement' in identifying causal factors [Mill 1843/1965:255- 
266, 287], we shall consider two cases alike in all relevant 
respects, in which the outcomes were very different. While 
this procedure would strengthen our hypothesis if it confirms 
it, like Mill, we recognize the plural and conjunctural nature 
of social causation, which may confound even the modest aims 
of this work [cf. Ragin 1987]. Since we are unable to examine 
the primary sources for Grenada as for Tobago, the argument is 
sketched in Chapter 9 as a subject for future research.
1.6 THE CHALLENGE OF HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION
1.6.1 The Research Design
We assume that history is not a succession of heroes, of 
exceptional figures, although great men and women are made by, 
and can have a decisive impact on, their time. The historical 
process is open-ended, contingent. It is made and remade by 
the day-to-day creations, reactions and struggles of ordinary 
men and women as individuals and as collective actors. 'Men
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make their history', Marx wrote, but they do not make it just 
as they please. They make it under conditions given and 
encountered from the past. The social historian's task is to 
unearth and understand this process of acting and of being 
acted upon in the production and reproduction of institutions 
and societal structures, which enable, sustain, disable and 
constrain human action. It is also to understand the intended 
and unintended consequences of human action, and the often 
unrealized intentions which inspire it.
This study belongs to the genre of social history that 
Lloyd [1988:280-4] calls the 'relational-structurist 
tradition'. By that, he means an approach based on a 
structural methodology balanced by 'agentialist' explanations 
of change. Society is seen as a historical structure, whose 
production, reproduction and change occurs in a continual 
process of structuring by social actors, particularly social 
classes. Abrams [1982] and Burke [1980] define the best 
social history in similar terms. The Genoveses [1983, Ch. 7], 
criticizing approaches to social history which minimize social 
class and power relations, advocate the same holistic, 
structural approach. This is also the tradition appealed to 
by Cardoso [1973a:22], Manicas, Mouzelis, Ladurie, Braudel and 
other writers cited above.
Our research design is now considered. Skocpol [1985] 
argues that there are three basic research designs used in 
historical sociology, although in practice they may overlap. 
First, there is the application of a general model to one or 
more historical instances, for example, Smelser's Social
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Change in The Industrial Revolution [1959]. The second 
strategy, 'interpretive historical sociology', applies 
concepts, but not general models, to arrive at the culturally 
embedded intentions of individuals and groups in their 
historical settings. An example is E. P. Thompson's The 
Making of the English Working Class [1966]. Within this 
strategy, comparisons are used to highlight particular 
features of individual cases, and the researcher will choose 
cases which maximize the possibility of drawing contrasts.
The third strategy, 'analytic historical sociology', is 
to search for causal regularities by applying alternative 
hypotheses to account for a well-defined outcome or pattern in 
history. Here, the researcher may use only a single case, but 
is normally led to comparative studies as the most appropriate 
means to explore the validity of alternative explanations. An 
example of this is her own work. States and Social Revolutions 
[1979]. In an earlier paper, Skocpol and Somers [1980] had 
called this approach 'macro-causal analysis'.
This thesis fits the third design. It analyses the 
social structure of Tobago, while using the data to test an 
hypothesis. In one respect, the lack of an alternative 
hypothesis, in the light of the weaknesses of the background 
literature, we fall short; but textbook prescriptions are not 
always met in actual research. We are led to comparing Tobago 
with Grenada in Chapter 9.
Such historical reconstructions present the problem of 
understanding, not only discrete events, but social processes 
and the weight that should be given to each of the complexity
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of factors that 'determine' - set limits and exert pressures 
on - human action and its consequences [Thompson 1978:159]. 
Comparative methods may, in principle, be helpful, but one 
cannot fully isolate, control, nor measure the strength of, 
the variables under study; nor can we ensure that the cases 
being compared are 'pure' - alike in all but the critical 
variables under study, or totally unlike in the variables that 
are presumed to be absent. Ragin [1987:47-8] points to the 
problem of 'illusory commonalities' between cases: common
appearing characteristics may disguise underlying differences, 
and vice versa. He also notes that this 'case-oriented' type 
of research works well only when the number of relevant cases 
and variables is relatively small. Thus, there are obvious 
pitfalls in such procedures, including the fact that the 
researcher is limited to relatively simple hypotheses which 
may not approximate the complexity of the historical 
conjunctures under study. This fundamental problem applies to 
both comparative and non-comparative designs.
The researcher using a comparative design may rely 
heavily on secondary sources, with the danger that the study 
may reflect particular historiographical gaps, fashions and 
biases. In the case of Grenada, we suggest, along with 
careful use of the secondary sources, a return to the primary 
sources, because the secondary material does not allow us to 
see clearly the social configuration over time.
To what extent is such research applicable beyond the 
historical cases given in the study? Skocpol and Somers
[1980:195] assert that because such causal arguments are
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inductively established, they are not easily generalized. But 
the analytical process is an inseparable blend of induction 
and deduction, neither of which precludes probabilistic 
generalizations to appropriate cases. Skocpol [cf. Ragin 
1987], also argues that 'The practice of analytical historical 
sociology forces a more intimate dialogue with historical 
evidence than either interpretive historical sociology, or the 
application of a model to a historical case' [Skocpol 
1985:385; author's emphasis]. This implies that more than in 
the other two designs, the creative insight of the researcher 
and his/her judgement are decisive.
1.6.2 General Limitations of the Sources
In Chapters 3, 4 and 6, we discuss the limitations of the 
data used for the analyses therein. Above, we outlined the 
major pitfalls of the research design. It remains now to make 
some general remarks on the sources used.
This study draws on virtually all the available written 
sources on Tobago for 1838 to 1900: censuses, assessment
rolls, official despatches and reports. Blue Books, official 
handbooks. Sessional Papers, official Gazettes, records of the 
Encumbered Estates Court; newspapers; yearbooks of the colony; 
missionary records; plantation records; historical works; 
eyewitness observations; deeds and wills. It also draws on 
oral material, collected by the author from some of the oldest 
residents of Tobago, mainly on the period 1900 to 1938, 
particularly for songs which give insight into the culture and 
ideology of the labouring class in the 19th century.
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Our knowledge of the past is a knowledge of the 'tracks' 
[Bloch 1963] which people leave. The first issue is that one 
is dealing with the enslavement and domination of the majority 
by the minority, and with the legacies of this past. The 
fundamental problem with most of the written documents is not 
simply that they cannot always answer the questions we ask, 
but that the majority of the population did not write the bulk 
of the written record. Since the primary documents colour and 
circumscribe secondary works, the problem is acute for all 
historians, regardless of their theoretical predilections.
Therefore, the written documents bear no intrinsic 
superiority over other sources; they are themselves the 
products of a series of a priori choices and selections which 
have entered into both their creation and their preservation 
[Thompson 1986:97].
Thus, it is vital to observe the normal caveats for using 
historical documents: establishing their authenticity, along 
with the context, motives, audience and purpose of the writer; 
establishing internal consistency and, where possible, 
external corroboration for the evidence; conducting a 
meticulous search for all available sources on the subject.
As regards the oral tradition^ used here to complement 
the written one, we note that the oral record is no panacea
Henige [1982:2] defines two styles of oral historiography 
- 'oral history', the study of the recent past by means 
of life histories or personal recollections, and 'oral 
tradition', recollections of the past that are commonly 
or universally known in a given culture. See Craig [1978] 
for her experience of doing oral historical research in 
Trinidad and Tobago.
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for the limitations of the written. Indeed, it is highly 
fragmentary, both on the period of the lived experience of the 
respondents, and on the oral tradition which they transmit. 
For example, two respondents sang songs which they had learnt 
from older folk, but of whose context and significance they 
were completely unaware. Were it not for the written record, 
the meaning of such material would be lost.
'History is no more than the calculation of
probabilities' [Vansina 1973:185]. The oral sources, like the 
written, have come through the seive of a web of perceptions 
and selections, the researcher's being only the final one. We 
have treated them as part of the hypothesis to be tested, 
rather than disregarding them a priori [Vansina 1985:196].
To make visible the institutions, practices and 
perspectives of the ordinary men and women who also made 
Caribbean history, one is involved in a reading of the texts, 
with a conscious search for the standpoint of all the
historical actors, but without 'reading back' into the past
the perceptions of the present, and without arguing from the
silence of the record. Here, the dialogue with the evidence 
and the researcher's discrimination are crucial.
1.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter reviewed the literature on Tobago, and on 
the sociology of development, to shed light on the problems of 
conceptualization and method with which we are concerned. It 
outlined our objectives, central concepts, working hypothesis, 
research design, and the limitations of our procedure.
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We argued that the currents critical of four broad areas 
of writing - modernization, dependency/world system analysis, 
Marxism and historical sociology - converged in stating the 
need for more macro-sociological studies, understanding with 
clarity the interrelation between social structure and human 
agency, global forces and local processes, between economic 
and non-economic spheres of social life. Within this genre of 
writing, which belongs to the classical tradition of 
sociology, and to the best modern history, we take our stand.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FORMATION OF SOCIETY IN TOBAGO: 1763-1838
11.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the features of Tobago society 
between 1763, the beginning of British colonization, and 1838, 
the Emancipation of the slaves. It provides a socio- 
historical background, which facilitates our understanding of 
the major issues of the post-Emancipation years. Tobago is 
located in its global and Caribbean context, before the 
population and social structure are described in Section II. 3. 
Because the provision grounds and internal markets were vital 
to the strategies of the labourers, before and after 1838, 
they are discussed in Section II.4, which is linked to Section 
II.5 on the dynamics of social conflict in the transitional 
period of Apprenticeship (1834-1838).
11.2 THE GLOBAL AND CARIBBEAN CONTEXT OF COLONIZATION AND 
SLAVERY IN TOBAGO
II.2.1 General Features of the Sugar Plantation Svstem
By 1763, the older BWI colonies had reached what
historians call the Golden Age of the Sugar Revolution, based
on slavery, imperial military protection, and preferential
markets under the mercantilist system, which was regulated by
a series of Navigation Acts. Their profits, according to Adam
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Smith [1789/1937:366], exceeded those of any other cultivation 
in Europe or America.
In the full-blown plantation colonies, a general tendency 
was established. Small planters were superseded by large 
investors; tobacco, cotton, and other crops by sugar; forced 
Amerindian and indentured European labour by African slaves.
A pattern of trade developed, in which British ships took 
British manufactures to Africa, and took African slaves and 
British goods to the West Indies, whose sugar and by-products 
were sent to British merchant houses. The mercantile system 
spanned the North and South Atlantic: the BWI could specialize 
in sugar production because they depended on British North 
America for lumber, foodstuff etc., in exchange for molasses, 
sugar and rum.
Sugar plantations required large outlays of capital, and 
a large, skilled labour force, carefully supervised. 
Initially, British capital financed these enterprises, but via 
goods and slaves, not specie. Shortages of coin were common. 
Sugar, rum and other produce were used as legal tender; and 
Spanish and Portuguese coins were, in many British colonies 
including Tobago, the major currency [Mintz 1964a:248-9].
Tobago became a full-fledged plantation economy in the 
Silver Age of sugar (1763-1776). After that, several factors 
combined to place the BWI sugar industry, except for the newer 
colonies with large tracts of fertile land, in prolonged 
difficulty. From the American Revolution (1776) to the Battle 
of Waterloo (1815) there was chronic warfare. The American 
Revolution led to high costs of supplies; costs for food and
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lumber trebled [Pares 1960], and slaves died in the British 
Windwards, including Tobago, because foodstuff was scarce 
[Marshall 1972; Sheridan 1976]. Increased duties, insurance 
and freight; attacks from American privateers; and the 
rigorous enforcement of the Navigation Acts after 1776, 
combined to keep costs high.
The high prices for sugar and coffee occasioned by the 
Haitian Revolution temporarily offset the rising costs of 
production. The abolition of the slave trade in 1807, high 
costs during the Napoleonic Wars, restrictions on trade with 
the USA between 1815 and 1830 [Benns 1923/1972], and 
competition from the East India colonies, Cuba and Brazil, 
dealt serious blows to the West India planters. By the 1820s, 
'bankruptcy was general throughout the British Windward 
Islands' [Marshall 1972:109].
Relief for the planters came through two measures passed 
by the British Parliament in 1822;* but it was too little and 
too late. The pressure for emancipation, both from the slaves 
[Williams 1964; Craton 1987; Beckles 1985] and from the 
British abolition movement, and the dismantling of the 
mercantilist system after 1846, removed the major props to the 
old plantation system.
The characteristic features of the British sugar colonies 
have been described in the standard texts on the subject 
[Brathwaite 1971; Burn 1937; Dunn 1973; Goveia 1969; Green 
1976; Patterson 1967; Pitman 1917; Ragatz 1928/1977; Sheridan
* The Colonial Trade Act and The West India and American 
Trade Act [Ragatz 1928/1977, Ch. 10].
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1974]. These features were all important in Tobago: large
estates (often heavily encumbered), monoculture, slavery, 
rigid social stratification, absenteeism of the largest 
landowners (although some resided in other West Indian 
colonies), and labour-intensive methods of production.
We now highlight the relationship between the growing 
indebtedness of the planters and their absenteeism, insofar as 
it bears on the recurrent intra-class conflicts among the 
upper strata of whites, which are described in this thesis.
II.2.2 Planters. Merchants and the Colonial Power Structure
As the BWI sugar economy developed, relationships between 
the planters and the merchants who supplied the plantations 
changed in the last decades of the 17th century to a pattern 
which became institutionalized in the 18th century. Merchants 
resident in the West Indies declined, except in Jamaica, 
Barbados, and Martinique [Pares 1960:33]. Local merchants 
tended to be factors, selling North American produce on 
commission.
European merchants ceased to be entrepreneurs sending out 
cargoes and taking back produce on their own account.% 
Instead, the planter sent his produce to be sold on commission 
by the merchant as his factor; the factor bought, on 
commission, plantation stores at the planter's request. Many
 ^Pares [1960] is unable to explain the differences in the 
degree to which these conditions varied in the North 
American, French and British West Indian colonies. See 
Davies [1952], Davis [1972], Ragatz [1928/1977], and 
Sheridan [1974], for discussions on the West India trade 
in the 17th and 18th centuries.
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of the British consignees were ship owners. They met the 
expenses of shipping, customs, and other charges, and often 
became the planters' bankers and personal representatives. 
These arrangements allowed the merchants high profits on their 
West India business.
The colonies were drained of specie through the buying of 
slaves and North American supplies, since the Americans bought 
most of their tropical produce more cheaply from the French 
colonies [Ragatz 1928/1977:89; Pitman 1917:138].  ^ Coupled 
with the exceptional dependence of the planters on their 
merchant factors, lack of specie meant that there was little 
money in the hands of most planters; and it vitiated the 
creation of a West Indian loan market. Ragatz called it 'a 
barter economy, which bred wastefulness and extravagance' 
[1928/1977:101-102].
Near the end of the 18th century, the English courts 
'appear to have ruled that a factor who had effects of the 
planters in his hands could pay himself what they owed him 
without their special order, but could not pay a debt to 
anybody else without it' [Pares 1960:48; Beachey 1957]. Thus, 
the merchants enjoyed both their commission and security of 
mortgage. By 1815, 'the greater part' of the West India 
properties were in the hands of British merchants [Ragatz
 ^To prevent this illicit trade and to assert British
military mastery over the French, the Molasses Act (1733) 
and the Sugar Trade Act (1764) were passed by the UK 
Parliament, with the support of the West India lobby. But 
the Acts ironically contributed to the rebellion of the 
American colonies, and threw the BWI sugar economy 
into greater peril [Williams 1964, Ch. 6; Pitman 1917, 
Chs. 11-14].
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1931:7]. In 1838, much of the £20 million compensation paid 
by the British Government to the planters went directly and 
indirectly to the merchants.
Increasing ownership of the BWI plantations by British 
merchants was only one aspect of the widespread absenteeism. 
Absenteeism had begun in the 17th century with the system of 
proprietary patents, whereby Europeans could purchase tenure 
of colonial offices, to which they sent deputies [Hall 1964; 
Murray 1965]. Legacies and annuities also creamed off the 
region's wealth and many properties were inherited by people 
who knew nothing of the Caribbean. Even planters resident in 
the West Indies normally spent long periods in Europe, 
attending to their business or their health.
Thus, many estates were under the care of attorneys 
(agents with the power of attorney). Having no vested 
interest except in their commissions and stipends, they 
commonly ill-treated and brutalized the slaves/* and 
disregarded costs to the owners. Some supplied the estates 
under their charge with goods and services, including the 
labour of jobbing slaves, at exorbitant prices, so 
accumulating the capital to become planters themselves.
Absenteeism also affected the working of the Old 
Representative System (ORS) which, before 1838, was the usual 
form of government in the BWI, except for St Lucia, British
* For Tobago, see Rept. of the Committee of Council and 
Assembly ..., 1799. Before slave evidence was admitted in 
1823, it was the practice of cruel managers to send all 
whites and free persons off the estates and to ill-treat 
the slaves with impunity. C0318/59: First Rept. of the 
Com. of Enquiry into the Administration of Civil and 
Criminal Justice in the WI, Tobago, 1825.
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Guiana and Trinidad, which were Crown Colonies. Under the ORS, 
there was a nominated Legislative Council, which advised the 
Governor, and which also served as an upper house to the lower 
chamber, the House of Assembly, elected from among the local 
white proprietors. Slaves could not vote and free coloureds 
were conceded the franchise only in the 1830s [Wesley 1934; 
Cox 1984]. The Assemblies had the power of taxation and the 
exclusive right to initiate money bills.
At the top was the Governor (or Lt.-Gov. where several 
islands were administered by a Governor-in-Chief), who, in 
theory, had wide executive powers. As the sovereign's 
representative, he could summon and address the Assembly, 
prorogue and dissolve it; he could veto legislation, make 
permanent appointments to certain posts and temporary ones to 
those which were the Crown's prerogative; he could raise a 
militia, and was President of the Court of Appeal for civil 
cases, having also the power to pardon.
But the Governor's power was circumscribed. To certain 
executive acts, the assent of the Legislative Council was 
necessary; all colonial laws were subject to review by the 
Colonial Office, and needed royal assent. Moreover, the 
Assemblies used their power over finance to frustrate public 
business by refusing to vote supplies, by voting them late, 
and by adjourning sine die.^ By 1800, the colonists ruled 
themselves [Murray 1965].
In practice, therefore, colonial Governors were hemmed in
 ^The power to adjourn was an executive prerogative which 
was usurped by the Tobago Assembly from the 1820s [Douglin 
1987].
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by the lack of independent ministry, patronage and funds. The 
limited patronage at their disposal made them dependent on the 
few on whom they could rely. The power to suspend officials, 
to veto legislation and to dissolve the legislatures was for 
extreme situations and Governors were constrained by the small 
number of whites with education and property, who were also 
the judges and magistrates, although they generally had no 
legal training. Tobago was a particularly backward example of 
this.*
The leading attorneys dominated public life in Tobago. In 
1828, there were only 3 proprietors, of whom one was 
Christopher Irvine, the Speaker of the Assembly, who, as 
attorney for several estates, had considerable influence over 
managers, overseers and merchants. For years, Irvine led the 
Assembly in hostility to the Governors.? In the 1830s and 
1840s, Alexander Gairdner, the leading attorney, exercised 
similar influence.
Thus, a peculiar combination of factors guaranteed 
monopoly over West Indian trade to metropolitan merchants; 
formal control, protection of strategic interests, revenues 
and duties to the metropolitan state; and oligarchical self- 
government to the colonists. Inordinate political power was 
exercised by attorneys and managers by the 1820s.
* 00318/59: First Rept. of the Com. of Enquiry into the 
Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice in the WI, 
1825.
 ^C0285/35: Blackwell to Murray, 25 Sept. 1828; C0285/30: 
Robinson to Bathurst, 18 Feb. 1825. Irvine and T. Chadband 
were attorneys of three-quarters of Tobago estates in 1829 
[McTear 1831]. Cf. Ragatz [1931].
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II.2.3 The Tobago Economy and Its Social Implications
Between 1765-1771, Tobago was surveyed by the 
Commissioners for the Sale of Lands in the Ceded Islands; 
57,408 acres were alienated to private owners. By early 1768, 
77 individuals, mainly Scotsmen, had bought land, but only 20 
resided locally. Of the remaining 57, four resided in Britain, 
the others in the BWI [Marshall 1972:120]. Sugar was first 
exported by Gedney Clarke jun., the son of a Barbados slave 
merchant,* in 1769 via Barbados; and direct shipments from 
Tobago began in 1770.
From 1765, the natural vegetation was destroyed for 
estate cultivation. The terms of Tobago's insertion into the 
global economy placed a distorted emphasis on the production 
of a few primary exports. Its cocoa, cinnamon, nutmegs, 
pimentoes, and even its tobacco, after which it was named, 
swiftly became insignificant.
Initially, cotton was the major crop; and Tobago became 
famous in the 1790s for its superior, fine cotton which sold 
at 20 guineas per lb in Glasgow [Woodcock 1867/1971:188]. 
Indigo and sugar cane were also grown (Tables 1, 2).
The French occupation (1781-93) was initially a time of 
'stagnation' [Nardin 1966:53], owing to the commercial chaos 
occasioned by the change of régime; but the high prices of 
sugar during the Haitian Revolution brought temporary
The Clarkes went bankrupt in 1774, Clarke sen. owing 
nearly £50,000 to the London merchant house of Lascelles, 
while his son, a partner in Lascelles, owed £25,000 
[Pares 1961:203, 223]. Clarke jun. was one of the 
largest proprietors in the Ceded Islands, owning 2192 
acres in Tobago [Sheridan 1974:449].
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prosperity. In the 1790s, the expression 'as rich as a Tobago 
planter' became a byword in wealthy London circles. However, 
the French recapture of Tobago in 1802-3 made it a risky place 
for British investors, and the trade disputes between Britain 
and the USA down to 1830 brought distress to many planters 
[Douglin 1987].
Monoculture, under-utilization of land, and economic 
decline marked the early 19th century. In 1812, 20,000 acres 
were unexplored, and two-thirds of the eastern (windward) 
parishes abandoned [Young 1812]. The maximum export was 8,890 
tons of sugar in 1799; in 1834, it was 3,951 tons [Deerr 1949, 
1:179, 202].
Distorted cultivation begat a skewed population 
distribution. The first capital was Georgetown, situated at 
Barbados Bay (Studley Park), with relatively easy access to 
the windward parishes; but, as the centre of economic activity 
shifted to the south-west, which was most suited to sugar, the 
capital was moved westwards to Scarborough (formerly Port 
Louis) in 1769, to provide shops and warehouses nearer to the 
estates.
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TABLE 1
Tobago. Population and Produce: 1771-1775
YEAR WHITE S L A V E S P R O D U C E
PERSONS Men Women Children Total Sugar Rum Cotton Coffee Ihdigo
1771 284 3064 1447 517 5028 965 411 - - -
1772 317 3444 1885 540 5868* 2792 653 - - -
1773 431 4269 2291 626 7192* 3038 920 - - -
1774 367 4376 2569 690 7635 5656 1712 96,500 - 3600
1775 391 4634 3059 942 8643* 4550 3247 258,031 650 4623#
MILLS. 1775
Water Mills 9
Wind Mills 23
Cattle Mills 52
On about 80 84"
{ Estates ___
NOTES: 1. * As in original.
** Not clear on microfilm.
2. Quantities of produce: Sugar (hhd=13 cwt); Rum (Puncheon=120 gals); Cotton (lbs); Coffee 
(cwt); Indigo (lbs).
Source: C0285/13: Young to Castlereagh, 25 Apr. 1808, 'A Statistical Rept. of the Island 
of Tobago', Table 1.
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TABLE 2
Land Use in Tobago: 1782-1790 (Acres)
Year Suaar
Cane
Cotton Indiao Coffee Cocoa Total
Export
Crops
Food
Crops
TOTAL
UNDER
CROPS
Pasture Woods TOTAL
1782 - - - - - 16,131 3,804 19,935 4,071 15,693 39,699
1785 4,241 12,491 30 - - 16,778%* 3,877 20,655 5,526 29,870 56,052
1786 3,458 15,699 47 2% % 19,207 3,769 22,976 5,882 26,026 54,884
1787 2,941 16,320 51 5 - 19,317 3,841 23,158 5,141 24,419 52,734*
1788 2,747% 16,874 85 15% 2% 19,724% 4,180 23,904% 5,464% 11,365% 40,734%
1790 4,878% 14,436 - 134% 2% 19,451 4,842 24,293 5,356 11,497 41,146
NOTE; * Total and sub-total as in the original. 
Source: Adapted from Nardin [1966:52], Table 7.
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The abandonment of large acreages in the Windward 
District, and low population density there, produced a 
distinction between the Windward and Leeward parts of the 
island ('Top Side' and 'Low Side' in the local vernacular), 
which remained basic in the formation and evolution of its 
society (Figure 2).
FIGURE 2
Slave Population Density in Tobago: 1819
[-300
- m
-100
Slaves oer square mile
T O B A G O  1 8 1 9
Source : Higman [1984a:89]
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II.3 THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF TOBAGO; 1763-1838
II.3.1 Demographic Patterns
The demographic configuration of the BWI was largely 
determined by the exigencies of the sugar economy. Planters 
preferred able-bodied males for agricultural labour; age and 
sex ratios were consequently disproportionate among slaves. 
Table 1 indicates the decision to improve the slave sex ratios 
from approximately 2 males to every female in 1771, to 3 males 
to 2 females in 1775.
Since single males were often recruited as managers and 
overseers, concubinage with black or coloured women became the 
norm for white men, and sex ratios for the whites were also 
unequal. For the whites, the pattern persisted in extreme 
form down to the 1830s (Tables 6, 7), whereas for the slaves, 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807 tended to lead to more 
evenly balanced sex ratios. The slave sex ratios in 1819 and 
1832 were 97.14 and 86.4 males per 100 females, respectively, 
indicating that females exceeded males by those dates [Higman 
1984a:116].
The relatively short period between colonization and the 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807 meant that the majority 
of the slaves over 30 in Tobago were African-born in 1819, the 
first year of slave registration (Table 3) . In 1819, the 
African-born constituted 65.5% of the slaves aged 35-39, and 
over 90% of each cohort aged 50 and over. This high proportion 
of African-born must have had profound effects on child 
rearing and cultural transmission, although the diverse 
origins of the slaves obliged them to orientate themselves to
81
their new milieu, as they selected from their past to 
'remodel' and create institutions in their present [Mintz and 
Price 1992].
According to Higman, all the British Caribbean slave 
populations, except that of Barbados, failed to reproduce 
themselves between 1807 and 1834, largely because of harsh 
labour régimes, poor diet and, consequently, low birth rates 
[cf. Morissey 1989]. In 1819, Tobago slaves had the lowest 
rate of natural increase in the BWI (-32.5 per 1000) and the 
highest crude death rates, with 'extreme mortality levels in 
almost all age groups among both males and females.' Between 
1807 and 1834, its slave population fell by 38.7%, from 18,845 
to 11,545 [Higman 1984a:319, 417-8, Ch. 9] . His data also 
suggest that slave mortality peaked at certain seasons. (Cf. 
Table 4).
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TABLE 3
Age
Group
A F R I G A N S
Maies
C R E O L E S TOTAL %
African
%
CreoleMaies Females Total Females Total SLAVE POP'N
0- 4 714 793 1507 1507 100
5- 9 - - - 802 790 1592 1592 - 100
10-14 1 - 1 743 715 1458 1459 .07 99.9
15-19 12 5 17 579 584 1163 1180 1.4 98.5
20-24 60 63 123 438 472 910 1033 11.9 88.1
25-29 263 227 490 394 471 865 1355 36.2 63.8
30-34 471 384 855 312 377 689 1544 55.4 44.6
35-39 576 476 1052 253 301 554 1606 65.5 34.5
40-44 550 488 1038 127 174 301 1339 77.5 22.5
45-49 383 371 754 56 69 125 879 85.8 14.2
50-54 291 325 616 23 42 65 681 90.4 9.5
55-59 193 246 439 12 14 26 465 94.4 5.6
60—64 206 230 436 10 13 23 459 95.0 5.0
65—69 80 98 178 5 10 15 193 92.2 7.8
70+ 65 88 153 2 6 8 161 95.0 5.0
Unknown 1 1 2 2 - 2 4 50.0 50.0
TOTAL 3152 3002 6154 4472 4831 9303 15457 39.8 60.2
Source; Adapted from Higman [1984a:467], Table S4.1, 'Age by Colony'.
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TABLE 4
Slave Population in Tobago; 1819-1832
No. of Slaves Registered Increase bv Birth Decrease bv Death Decrease
bv Manumission
Year Males Females Total Males Females Males Females Males Banales
1819 7633 7837 15470
1820 7381 7679 15063 141 163 416 384 1 5
1821 7107 7474 14521 178 155 370 306 1 2
1822 6952 7363 14315 159 158 367 303 10 12
1823 6812 7263 14074 151 167 232 211 5 16
1824 6558 7098 13656 166 157 371 290 9 14
1825 6532 7151 13683 154 157 213 191 4 2
1826 6391 7034 13428 168 160 362 328 7 10
1827 6138 6861 12999 170 163 213 185 3 7
1828 6088 6807 12895 178 191 289 249 4 7
1829 5966 6757 12723 178 196 283 248 2 6
1830 5872 6614 12556 165 155 288 220 4 12
1831 5769 6601 12370 170 171 274 241 4 11
1832 5603 6488 12091 145 161 298 253 13 21
NOTE; 'The large proportion of deaths to births throughout the whole 
remarkable' [Martin 1843:37].
. period is very
Source: Martin [1843:37].
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TABLE 5
Estimated Slave. Freedman, and White Populations. 
Windward Islands: 1810 and 1830
PERCENTAGE SLAVE PERCENTAGE FREEDMAN PERCENTAGE WHITE TOTAL POPULATION
COLONY 1810 1830 1810 1830 1810 1830 1810 1830
DOMINICA 83.7 77.4 10.6 18.9 5.7 3.7 22700 19000
ST LUCIA 84.8 72.8 9.2 21.7 6.0 5.5 21800 18400
ST VINCENT 91.8 82.5 4.4 12.5 3.8 5.0 29850 28000
GRENADA 92.5 84.1 4.9 13.4 2.6 2.5 32450 28400
TOBAGO 91.8 88.7 4.1 8.1 4.1 3.2 19600 14150
Source; Taken from Higman [1984a:77], Table 4.2.
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TABLE 6
P G F U L A T I O N B I R T H S D E A T H S
YEAR Maies Females Total Males
W H I T
Females 
E S
Total Males Females TotaJ
1825 270 52 322 2 2 4 16 16
1826 273 59 332 1 2 3 20 2 22
1827 276 59 335 - 1 1 17 - 17
1828 269 56 325 - - - 19 - 19
1829 264 57 321 1
FREE COLOUREDS
1
AND BLACKS
2 22 1 23
1825 412 602 1014 17 32 49 9 5 14
1826 431 639 1070 31 27 58 8 7 15
1827 458 661 1119 24 15 39 13 11 24
1828 470 666 1136 27 33 60 9 12 21
1829 477 686 1163 10
S L A V E S
11 21 11 14 25
1825 6446 7053 13499 152 159 311 209 196 405
1826 6385 7006 13391 163 155 318 370 317 687
1827 6172 6839 13011 176 159 335 211 190 401
1828 6137 6811 12948 175 196 371 293 244 537
1829
N OT E : *
6001 
Not given.
6747 12748 * * * * * *
Source: C0285/36: 'Return of the Population ...', Enc. in Gairdner to Murray, 28 Dec. 1829 *
86
TABLE 7
Population. Marriages. Births and Deaths: 1830
WHITES FREE BLACKS S L A V E S T O T A L
PARISH M F M F M F M F Births Marriages Deaths
St David 47 9 47 73 1401 1565 1495 1647 91 - 122
St Patrick 35 4 8 20 1144 1326 1187 1350 72 - 116
St George 29 7 30 31 717 734 776 772 41 - 62
St Mary 18 1 0 4 418 520 436 525 30 - 40
St Paul 20 0 12 13 526 560 558 573 28 - 42
St John 13 1 1 4 397 442 411 447 20 - 24
St Andrew 103 35 379 542 721 864 1203 1441 30 - 46
Slaves not attached to plantations 556 670 556 670
Plant'n 
Slaves 312 
27
Whites 3 
Free
Coloured 26 2
452
24
27
21
TOTAL 265 57 477 687 5881* 6681 6622 7425 368 2 524
NOTE; * As in original.
Source: C0290/14: Blue Bk., 1830.
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Explanations for the remarkable failure of Caribbean 
slave populations to grow by natural increase have been many. 
Curtin [1969] argued that natural growth was a function of the 
proportion of Creole slaves in the population. The greater 
the proportion of African-born, the lower the rate of natural 
increase, since the African-born would have been predominantly 
male. James McTear, a physician on 39 Tobago estates between 
1825-30, made similar observations. McTear felt that ill 
health and disproportionate sex ratios among imported slaves 
had effects through succeeding generations, since the African- 
born were affected by the onerous conditions of the early 
period of settlement. Although he provided no evidence, he 
noted that wherever Creoles predominated, there was natural 
increase, and the estates with higher proportions of African- 
born slaves had decreases, because the African slaves tended 
to be ageing [McTear 1831].*
Kiple [1984, Chs. 8, 9] emphasizes, not so much 
fertility, as infant and child mortality. He argues that high 
proportions of stillbirths and of infants with low birth 
weights, plus the high incidence of tetanus, locked jaw, and 
neonatal tetany, resulting from poor nutrition, converted many
 ^McTear adduced other contributory factors, such as
promiscuity, prolonged lactation etc. He observed that 
decreases among slaves were also due to undocumented 
sales; new owners would resist registering them to avoid 
the poll tax of £1 per head; they would thus be deemed 
free by report and by omission from the registry. 
McTear's point was corroborated to some degree by W. R. 
K. Douglas, owner of Woodlands and Buccoo estates. 
Douglas showed the increased population of Woodlands, 
which had imported no slaves since 1798, unlike that of 
Buccoo, which had imported up to 1807. Rept. from the 
Select Committee .... 1832, pp. 79-81.
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births into deaths. All these factors may have been important 
in Tobago, high infant mortality continuing throughout the 
19th century.w
The white population also experienced extraordinary death 
rates. Kiple [1984, Ch. 10] highlights the differential 
mortality rates of the European-born whites and the blacks in 
the West Indies, and the importance of immunological factors. 
Europeans succumbed to yellow fever and malaria, while Creole 
whites developed immunity against them. Tobago had the highest 
white mortality rate in the Eastern Caribbean. From 1817 to 
1836, the death rate per thousand per annum among Tobago 
troops was 153 for whites, 34 for blacks [cf. Buckley 1979].
High mortality rates were only one of the reasons for the 
decline of the whites. The contest between France and 
Britain, which imperilled production and commerce, and 
discouraged settlement, was another. Yet another was the high 
cost of supplies caused by the disrupted trade with the USA.
The abolition of the slave trade in 1807 was also 
significant. Many whites, attracted to the BWI as overseers, 
bookkeepers etc., often used the buying and hiring of slaves 
as an avenue to fortune. After 1807, there were frequent slave 
auctions, because such speculation had been given up as 
hopeless. Small planters were willing to sell their slaves, 
because of the higher values (in 1805, able-bodied field
Bush [1990] rejects most of these explanations and 
stresses the women's role in controlling reproduction 
through contraception, abortion and infanticide, but her 
evidence is not convincing [cf. Brereton 1990].
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labourers cost £60-£70; in 1811-12, £100).“ McTear [1831]
stated that the 'middle class' of whites who had previously 
owned jobbing slaves was 'nearly extinct, and these negroes 
are now principally possessed by coloured families'.
While slaves and whites suffered heavy numerical decline, 
the free people of colour increased in numbers and in their
proportion of the population (Tables 6, 7). Between 1808 and
1833, 525 manumissions took place [Higman 1984a:691].
Manumission affected the sex ratios among the freedpeople, 
because black women who were 'housekeepers' to planters 
wanting to have free children, were often freed, since their 
children derived their status from their mothers. The ratio of 
females to males manumitted between 1808 and 1833 was 2:1. By 
1830, there were 687 free coloured women and 477 men, a ratio 
of approximately 3:2.
In sum, between 1808 and 1830 there were dramatic
population changes, typical of the BWI colonies. In 1808,
there were 439 whites; in 1811, there were 583“; their 
numbers fell to 322 in 1830, a decrease after 1811 of 45%. 
The slaves declined by 26% from 17,009 in 1808 to 12,562 in
1830. And the free people of colour, 253 in 1808“, increased 
by 360% to 1164 in 1830 (Table 8).
“ C0285/18: Young to Bathurst, 1 Oct. 1811, 'Rept. on the 
Heads of Inquiry ...'.
“ C0285/16: Young to Liverpool, 12 Oct. 1811, 'Rept. on 
Matters of Enquiry ...', Table 1. A revised copy of the 
same rept. dd. 2 Nov. 1811 gives 575.
“ C0285/13: Young to Castlereagh, 25 Apr. 1808, 'A Statist­
ical Rept. of the Island of Tobago', Table 12. Table 2 
gives the figures for whites and slaves.
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II.3.2 Class. Colour and Gender Relationships
A pattern of class, colour and gender relationships, that 
was typical of the British sugar colonies, developed in 
Tobago. The whites, free coloured and enslaved were the basic 
status groups. The principal class cleavage was that between 
planters and slaves, which was mainly, though not exclusively 
(because a few coloureds owned estates in the early 19th 
century), between white and black. The planters used their 
political power to reinforce their economic domination and to 
impose legal disabilities on freedpeople and slaves. None of 
these groupings was homogeneous; and often the mores went 
counter to the racially ascribed norms.
There were nice gradations of colour and status. In
1809, Isaac Purkis, the London Missionary Society (LMS)
missionary, reported:
The different classes of which the in­
habitants are composed are as follows - 
Black and White are the radicals - the 
derivatives are 1st between a white man 
and black woman a Mulattoe - 2d between a 
white man and a Mulattoe - a Mestee[;] 3d 
between a white man and a Mestee - a 
quadroon - these differ in honour as they 
differ in shades of colour ... They are 
very tenacious of their different shades 
of respectability and will use any means 
to appear a class higher ... The dis­
tinctions of colour are almost the only 
distinction that is observed ...
An anonymous British seaman recalled that in 1802, 'the 
bitterest mouth-missive inflicted on any one suspected of the 
slightest taint of Africanism is, "Ah, he has cousins on the
LMS: Folder 2, Jacket C, Purkis to Bogue, 1 Nov. 1809. 
The child of a mulatto and a white man was a quadroon, 
while a mustee was the child of a quadroon woman and a 
white man. On this point, Purkis was inaccurate.
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coast”' ['A Recollection 1838:175]. In the same letter,
Purkis felt that the wisest planters wanted to relax the 
social distinctions, but deferred to the opinions of white 
women ('from jealousy'), poor whites 'and halfwitted 
Creoles'.
II.3.2.1 The Whites
At the top of the social hierarchy were the whites. In 
the 1820s, the first social rung consisted of the Governor, 
the officers at the garrison, the members of the legislature, 
and the few professionals. Next were the remaining planters 
and below them the white overseers, petty shopkeepers, clerks 
etc. [McTear 1826].
There was a process of upward mobility among the whites. 
By 1811, 'Two Thirds' of the planters had risen from the 
position of overseers, which they or their fathers had held.^ 
By the 1830s, there were few resident planters and a 
preponderance of attorneys, managers and overseers, many of 
them colonists of long standing, with their own ambitions and 
interests, which often conflicted with those of the 
proprietors whom they represented, and with the positions of 
the Governors and the Colonial Office.
In spite of their small numbers, the upper strata of 
whites were divided, although these secondary cleavages never
Heuman [1981] notes for Jamaica that the increase of 
resident white women after 1838 meant greater social 
exclusion of the coloureds.
16 C0285/18: Young to Bathurst, 1 Oct. 1811.
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overrode the primary conflict between themselves and the 
enslaved. There were recurrent conflicts between the Governor 
and some of his officials, on the one hand, and the leading 
factions of the Assembly, on the other, which led to the 
crippling of public business. Superimposed on this was the 
division between English and Scottish, with its accompanying 
religious differences - Anglicans v. Scottish Presbyterians.
Within the upper strata of whites there were also 
conflicts between local merchants and planters. The planters 
were at the mercy of both the local traders in North American 
supplies and their British consignees. Sir William Young 
described how the local merchants increased the debt burdens 
of the planters. Because of the scarcity of specie, goods were 
sold by the merchants, 'in proportion for cash at 10, for the 
Substituted medium [rum] at 15.'
If the planters did not have enough rum in hand, they 
paid by 'Rum at credit to be delivered' at even higher 
interest. 'I have known Flour the Barrel sold for Cash at 12
Dollars, for Rum to be delivered at 20 Dollars the Barrel!'
According to Young, virtually every planter became ensnared in 
this system of procuring supplies;
& the prices of Articles paid actually
in Tobago may be taken at one third more
than ... at Cash Price ... .
The lack of specie and the high cost of imported goods
C0285/13: Young to Castlereagh, 25 Apr. 1808, enc. 
'Statistical Rept. of the Island of Tobago'; author's 
emphases. Although Young had inherited flourishing 
estates in Antigua, St Vincent and Tobago, he was deeply 
indebted to Joseph Robley, the Tobago planter, shipowner 
& merchant [Murray 1965, Ch. 2; Marshall 1972:218-9].
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were recurrent issues before and after 1838. High costs were 
partly due to the fact that most of Tobago's imports were 
transhipped from Barbados. Another contributory factor was the 
lack of a single legal currency. Further, shortages of coin 
were created by the merchants, who withdrew currency from 
circulation to pay for imports or to speculate.In 1835, 
even Lt.-Gov. Darling was 'frequently' indebted for small 
articles, because of the lack of specie.^
In addition to these cleavages within the upper strata of 
whites, there were social barriers between the poorer and 
wealthier whites. The franchise laws, dating from 1794, 
debarred from voting and from the Assembly those whites who 
did not fulfil certain property requirements.^ But the 
existence of slavery united all whites in avoiding menial 
labour, and bound rich and poor whites by common interests and 
aspirations, since it offered the possibility of upward 
mobility to the poor whites.
The fear of black revolt and coloured political power was 
the most powerful factor uniting the whites. This was 
illustrated when the Act to remove the disabilities of the
C0285/34: Brasnell to Goderich, 17 July 1827; cf. 
C0285/47; Stip. Mag. Child's rept. in MacGregor to 
Glenelg, 9 July 1838. The Agent for Tobago warned that 
in the BWI there was no defined standard of value, a dire 
shortage of coin and British currency, and need for a 
legal coin as circulating medium for paying wages. 
C0285/47: Letters of P. M. Stewart to Glenelg & Chanc. 
of the Exch., 21 May 1838.
00285/42: Smith to Glenelg, 25 Nov. 1835, enc. Darling to 
Smith, 7 Sept. 1835.
20 C0287/2: Act No. 1, An Ordinance for Regulating the 
Elections for the General Assembly of Tobago and Its 
Dependencies, 1794.
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coloureds was passed in 1831.^^ Gov. Blackwell observed that
the franchise 'must have consequently fallen into the hands of
Coloured people entirely.' The Assembly therefore, in the
same Act, reduced the voters' and candidates' qualifications
and provided for managers, overseers and professionals to
become Assemblymen, which had existed de facto for many years.
Blackwell stated:
... it may not therefore surprise Yr 
Lordship that in extending the Elective 
franchise to those of the white [sic], in 
order to act as a check upon the over 
numerous coloured Class, it should fall 
upon persons ... probably paying no part 
of the Public money which they have to 
vote away.^^
In 1838, the qualifications for voters and candidates were
further lowered to include certain lessees of estates, again
widening the white constituency.^
In spite of these attempts to close ranks against the
coloureds in the 1830s, the ambivalent gender relationships
typical of the slave colonies prevailed. McTear stated:
The coloured ladies ... are a most unfor­
tunate race. A white man is scouted by all 
society if he marries one of them, but if 
he keeps one of them as a mistress, or 
housekeeper as it is termed here, he is 
still deemed an upright, honourable, decent 
man.
[McTear 1826:70; author's emphasis] 
In Darling's administration (183 3-45), however, white men.
C0287/7: Act No. 260, An Act for the Relief of Certain 
Classes of His Majesty's Subjects within This Govt. ...,
1831.
22 C0285/38: Blackwell to Howick, 14 Apr. 1831.
23 C0285/47: MacGregor to Glenelg, 28 Nov. 1838, enc. Act No.
318, An Act to Qualify Certain Lessees to Serve in the 
House of Assembly ... .
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even the most prominent, were marrying the most accomplished 
coloured women. One noteworthy example was James Henry Keens, 
Police Magistrate, and leading merchant and planter; he 
'endured obloquy' for his marriage to Frances Collier, the 
daughter of James M. Collier, a former Solicitor General, who 
had educated her in England [Horsford 1856:363]. Darling noted 
'several instances' of white men marrying their mistresses by 
1842.* The rigid racial barriers, long breached in private, 
were slowly being transformed in public.
II.3.2.2 The Free Coloureds and Blacks
As in most BWI colonies, the free coloureds and blacks 
were heterogeneous. They were largely urban; 156 out of 350 
(45%) lived in Scarborough and Plymouth in 1811.* Some were 
descended from families which had enjoyed two or more 
generations of freedom by the 1830s; others were freed during 
Apprenticeship. They varied in colour, social honour and 
wealth. They varied also in the intimacy with which they 
related to whites and to slaves, the free blacks being closer 
to the slaves than the coloureds.
In 1811, there were 350 free coloureds (92 men, 153 
women, 105 children) . Of the men, none was an official, 
professional or merchant. There was only one coloured 
planter; 10 of the 23 0 overseers and 4 of the 70 clerks were 
coloured. The majority of the coloured men (48 or 52%) were
* C0285/51: Grey to Stanley, 3 Dec. 1842, enc. Darling's
1842 Blue Bk. Rept.
* C0285/16: Young to Liverpool, 2 Nov. 1811, 'Revised Rept.
on Matters of Enquiry ...', Table 1.
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artisans, and another 18 (19.6%) were tailors, sadlers, 
fishermen, bakers etc.; 66 or 72% were concentrated in the 
lower occupational grades.
There are no statistics on the economic activity of the
free women. Young noted:
... a full third of the Retail Trade 
... is carried on by Mulatto Hucksters, 
mostly women, - Having white men (for 
their sleeping Partners) who order out 
their assortment of Goods. - their smart 
servant black Girls, visit in Turn every 
plantation, - with varieties suited to 
allure purchasers, white or Black.^
The freedpeople suffered several legal disabilities. 
They were disenfranchised and ineligible for public office; 
their evidence was not accepted in court against that of 
whites; they formed separate companies in the militia, but 
were precluded from holding commissions.
By the 1830s, most of the owners of slaves hired out as 
jobbers or tradespersons were free coloured; free coloureds 
were seldom field labourers and often worked in skilled 
trades, or as clerks, teachers, bookkeepers, overseers, 
shopkeepers, mariners and hucksters; a few, like Robert Crooks 
(b. 1810) who inherited Belmont estate in 1826 on the death of 
his father, were planters.^
Although the coloured planters had the same class 
interests as the white, racial considerations led whites to 
refuse to work for them. In 1819, Gov. Robinson reported that
00285/16: Young to Liverpool, 2 Nov. 1811, 'Revised Rept. 
on Matters of Enquiry . . . ', Table 2.
^ 00285/18: Young to Bathurst, 1 Oct. 1811.
2* 00285/61: Crooks to Grey, 31 Jan. 1849.
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'White Men would not remain with Mulattoe Planters'. An Act
was passed to allow the coloured planters serving in the
militia to keep their own relatives as overseers, so relieving 
them from the penalties for a deficiency of whites on their 
estates.^
In 1823, the Tobago coloureds contributed to the vigorous
representations made by the freedpeople in the BWI for
equality with the whites; 89 of them signed a memorial,
arguing that they composed 'about 3/4ths of the free
population' and paid an equal proportion of taxes as the
whites, without equal benefits. They claimed substantial
investments :
And out of about One Hundred and Twenty 
houses, the number in the principal Town 
of the Island ... and its suburbs, full 
three fourths are belonging to free 
persons of Colour; There are also a great 
number of Slaves belonging to us and 
several valuable Estates.
They stated that coloureds were employed in responsible
private positions - as clerks to the senior officials - since
they had been 'educated in some of the best Seminaries &
Academies in Britain.'^® The legal disabilities were removed
in 1831.
Marriage was as rare for the coloureds as for the whites. 
The first one recorded after 1808 was in 1812 and only 9
2’ 00285/24: Robinson to Goulborn, 6 Apr. 1819, enc. An Act 
to Increase the Effective Strength of the Militia.
00318/76: Free People of Colour, Disabilities and 
Grievances, Tobago Papers, 1823.
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marriages occurred by 1821 Coloured men, rejected by the 
whites, pursued 'licentious', 'promiscuous' relationships with 
female slaves [McTear 1826:71]. The wealthier coloured women 
were educated at boarding schools in Barbados and were 
accomplished in music, dancing and fashionable dressing. But 
contemporary white observers regarded all coloureds, with few 
exceptions, as promiscuous and dissolute.
The predominant orientation among the coloureds was to be
socially and politically accepted by the whites. Many were
slave owners; 'derision, hostility and antipathy' marked their
relationship with slaves [Marshall 1974:24]. They were
committed to the defence of the system, within which they
aspired to wealth and honour. In 1823, the memorial of the
coloureds stated:
We are not appointed to fill any, not 
even the lowest Public Situation, the 
Consequence of which is, that the Slave 
Population do not pay all of us that re­
spect which persons who have to assist in 
protecting the Colony from the most 
serious of Dangers, that of internal 
tumults, demand.^
Little is known about the free blacks, but there is more 
information on those who bought their freedom during the 
Apprenticeship. In March 1838 (Windward District), of thirty- 
nine Apprentices who had purchased their discharge since 1
C0285/27: Robinson to Bathurst, 30 Jan. 1822, enc. 
Return of Marriages among Free Blacks & Coloureds from 
1 Jan. 1808.
C0318/76: Free People of Colour, Disabilities and 
Grievances, Tobago Papers, 1823. The wealthier Tobago 
coloureds never had the economic power of the coloureds 
in Barbados, many of whom were prosperous merchants 
[Sturge and Harvey 1838], in Jamaica [Heuman 1981], St 
Kitts or Grenada [Cox 1984].
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August 1834, thirty-four were females, the majority of whom 
had been domestics.^ Most of the field labourers buying 
their discharge were female; in almost every case, they had 
borrowed money for their freedom and were bound to work for 
the lenders until the sum was repaid.* Some of the estate 
Head Men, though still apprenticed, purchased their wives' 
freedom.*
The free blacks maintained ties of kinship, friendship 
and economic partnership with the enslaved or apprenticed. For 
example, McPherson, attorney of Concordia estate, found around 
'every House' 'a number of Hogs; some Negroes possessed four 
to six pigs, which ... were taken in to be fattened for free 
People, not connected with the Estate'.* The free women 
hucksters also had 'generally' a reputation for receiving 
stolen goods.*
The free people of colour formed, in their many 
gradations, a buffer between the whites and the slaves. 
Whites and coloureds mingled in informal and intimate social
* C0285/47; Darling to MacGregor, 24 Mar. 1838, enc. Child's
rept.
* C0285/47: MacGregor to Glenelg, 9 July 1838; Sub-Enc.,
Child, 31 May 1838. C0285/45: MacGregor to Glenelg, 31 
Aug. 1837, Sub-Enc., Child, June 1837.
35 Lt.-Gov.'s Letters, 1836-8: Darling to MacGregor, 25 Jan. 
1838.
* C0285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 3 May 1838, enc. Darling
to MacGregor, 19 Apr. 1838.
* C0285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 10 Apr. 1838, enc.
Sol.-Gen. Sanderson to Darling, 20 Dec. 1837; cf. Handler 
on Barbados [1974:125-6]. Genovese, citing the Caribbean 
and Brazilian literature, states that stealing was 
'ubiquitous' among slaves [1976:602].
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intercourse. There was considerable social intercourse between 
free people and slaves, particularly in the towns. In 1823, 
the Slave Court and Slave Act forbade free people to allow any 
slaves but their own to dance in their houses or on their 
premises.^ The 'violence to the society's implicit premises' 
[Hall 1980:30] at night was part of the cultural interchange 
between white, coloured and black. Enslaved and free also met 
in the Nonconformist chapels.
There were limited educational opportunities for free 
children. In 1823, there were 3 schools in Scarborough, each 
with about 20 students; there was also a Methodist school at 
Plymouth, run by 2 coloured women.^ In 1828, the Church of 
England, at the planters' request, started a Free School in 
Scarborough for coloured children, the teachers being Thomas 
and Harriet Homeward, a coloured couple. From 1829, the 
Assembly maintained it, and C. J. Latrobe, in 1838, described 
it as 'one of the most effective schools of the class in these 
islands'. Both male and female graduates entered the skilled 
trades and domestic service.^
II.3.2.3 The Slaves
At the base of the social pyramid were the slaves. 
Residence (town/plantation), skill, occupation, gender.
C0285/28: Robinson to Bathurst, 28 Sept. 1823, enc. Tobago 
Slave Court and Slave Act.
39 C0285/28: Robinson to Bathurst, 29 Sept. 1823.
C0318/138: C. J. Latrobe, Rept. on Negro Education in 
the Windward & Leeward Islands, 14 Apr. 1838. Ad. by 
the Homewards in Tobaao Chronicle and Roval Gazette. 7 
Nov. 1839, p. 4.
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colour, religion and origin (African/Creole), were factors 
differentiating the slave population. There were also, 
because of the large numbers of Africans, significant 
linguistic differences, noted by some of the missionaries.^ 
However, the common condition of slavery overrode these 
differences, and often it was the most 'trusted' - drivers, 
rangers, watchmen and domestics - who were the most 
insurrectionary.
Gender-related occupational and skill differences were 
important in the life history of the slaves. Jobbing slaves 
often did the most laborious tasks such as 'holing' cane 
fields and were among the most ill-treated; down to the 1830s, 
they were the most likely to be sold. Field slaves, especially 
those in the first or 'great' gang, most of whom were women in 
the 1830s,^ also performed the most onerous tasks.
Drivers, boilermen, cattlemen, and master 'mechanics' 
(artisans) were the most prized in the planters' hierarchy 
[Pitman 1926]. The most skilled females were seamstresses, 
nurses, and cooks. The herbal and medicinal knowledge of the 
nurses and midwives, though undervalued by the planters, was 
important for the survival of the slaves [Dadzie 1990]. McTear 
describes how chigoes affected slaves, who sometimes needed 
amputations to prevent the disease from spreading; the women.
Montgomery, Periodical Accts. 1 (1790):68. LMS: Folder 3, 
Jacket B, Purkis to Hardcastle, 14 May 1810. The 
Methodist missionaries also commented on the poor grasp 
of English in the 1820s.
Table 10 shows that women outnumbered men among the 
praedial slaves in 1838; Darling in 1836 stated that 
this prevailed generally. C0285/44: Smith to Glenelg, 9 
May 1836, enc. Darling to Smith, 19 Apr. 1836.
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however, who were 'very expert' at removing the whole nests, 
had to remove one from his finger [1826:122]. Long after 
slavery, illiterate midwives served the blacks, without 
training from the doctors (Ch. 6) . The skilled male slaves 
accumulated more cash during slavery, and they were among the 
first to purchase freeholds after 1838 (Ch. 3); men were thus 
at an advantage, since their skills were the most valued [Mair 
1987].
Place of birth was a significant differentiating factor.
McTear observed marked differences between Africans and
Creoles in their religious beliefs, marital mores and in their
response to illness.
The Koromantyn negroes are much the worst 
Patients of any - They appear to retain 
the remembrance of their native land un­
faded by years of slavery and exile - They 
think that death will again restore them 
to the land of their birth, and they covet 
the condition of those who die. ... Very 
few Africans have been baptized in this 
or the other islands, although the Creoles 
mostly are[.] The former think that if 
they are baptized, they can never return 
to their own country after death, but go 
to the place assigned for the Buckras, 
who would still hold them in slavery.
[McTear 1826:148-9]
Further, he stated that the unbaptized Africans, while 
rejecting Christianity, allowed their children to be baptized, 
as did some of the unbaptized adult Creoles [1831; 1826:200; 
cf. Walker 1818:123]. John Smedley, the Methodist missionary, 
noting these beliefs, felt that the Africans had 'some notion 
[of] the ... transmigration of souls.
One of the practices which the missionaries sought to
WMS: Box 117, File 3, Smedley's journal, 7 Nov. 1822.
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eradicate was polygamy, which they perceived to be widespread, 
down to the 1830s.* However, according to McTear, 'The union 
of one man with one woman permanently, is the most common 
connection ... polygamy still exists among some of the 
Africans, especially among the Eboes, but very few cases are 
to be found among the Creoles' [1831].
Within the slave communities, there was an authority 
structure which was independent of the planters and the 
leadership roles fostered by the dominant system. Belief in 
the power of the obeah men, who were skilled in herbalism, in 
'protection' against evil, divination and various magical 
rites, was widespread, but again, the leaders were usually 
African-born men and women [McTear 1831; Goveia 1969].
European superstitions were also practised by the slaves, 
indicating syncretism in this domain. In 1843, Magistrate 
Dowland, who had arrived in 1835, observed that 'Turning the 
Bible and Key', a practice of 'Wise Men' in England, to 
discover thieves, was coming into disuse.*
Religion was clearly important in the process of cultural 
resistance, adaptation and creation by the slaves. Ince 
[1984], Douglin [1987], Marshall [1972], and Maynard [1968] 
documented the activities of the missions in detail. Here we 
outline briefly the socio-political factors which affected the
* WMS: Box 117, No. 7, Nelson and Powell to Secs. 5 May
1824; Box 119, No. 197, Extracts from the Journal of 
John Nelson, 30 Dec. 1823. For the Moravians, J. Light, 
Periodical Accts. 13 (1834-6): 293.
* C0285/52: Grey to Stanley, 7 Dec. 1843, enc. Dowland's
rept.
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response of the slaves to the missionaries.^
The missionaries compromised with the planters by staying 
clear of the subject of slavery, and by emphasizing the
Biblical teachings on submission to authority. This was a 
major hindrance to their work, as they were regarded with 
suspicion. Resistance to the missionaries was therefore 
cultural and political resistance. Smedley observed that 
whenever the slaves held a grievance against the planters, 
they 'avenge[d] themselves by refusing to attend Church 
Service.
A fundamental obstacle to reaching the slaves was the 
Sunday market; after its abolition in August 1823, slaves
could worship on Sundays without being materially
disadvantaged. Within a fortnight of its abolition, the
churches in Scarborough were overflowing with people.^
Also important were the work regimes of the slaves and 
the lack of church buildings. In the crop season, slaves 
worked from 5.00 a.m. to 8.00 p.m. or later, often without 
intermission. On many estates the missionaries were refused 
permission to preach during crop. Often, the preaching would
^ The dates of the missions were as follows. Moravians: Apr. 
1790-June 1791, Jan. 1799-1802, 1827 onwards; LMS: 1808- 
1813; Methodists: 1818 onwards; Church of England: 1815 
onwards.
WMS: Box 119, No. 13, Extract from Smedley's Diary, 15 
July 1823. In Jamaica, the independence of the Baptist 
and Wesleyan missions contributed to their success among 
the slaves [Reckord 1968].
C0285/28: Robinson to Bathurst, 29 Sept. 1823; cf. 
Robinson to Bathurst, 30 Oct. 182 3, which states that 4 
more churches and 2 chapels would be equally well 
attended.
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take place after 8.30 p.m., in the managers' halls, and
sometimes in the boiling houses of the estates, there being 
few independent places of worship.
Without systematic teaching, there were few converts. In
1810, Purkis predicted that 20 years of the same procedure
would produce few results.^* Eighteen years later, the
Methodist missionaries questioned the usefulness of
... Preaching to a few, fatigued, sleepy 
Negroes in Managers' houses at from % past 
8 or 9 o clock on week Evenings, from 
which, on all the Estates we have ever 
visited in the Island, but 30 Slave members 
of Society have been obtained ...
With the increased liberty of the slaves after 1834, and 
the attraction of the schools, the Moravian and Methodist 
missionaries reported an 'ardent' 'spirit of enquiry and 
desire for religious instruction.
Except for the rudimentary teaching of the missionaries, 
education was virtually unavailable to slaves before the 
1830s. From 1834, there was a concerted effort by the churches 
to conduct and build schools. By April 1838, there were 12 
day, 3 evening and 110 Sunday schools; 10 of the 16 teachers
LMS: Folder 3, Jacket B, Purkis to Hardcastle, 14 May 
1810.
WMS: Box 127, No. 43, Cheeswright to Morley, 3 Oct. 1828; 
author's emphases. The Methodists organized their 
converts into 'societies'.
WMS: Box 135, File Oct.-Dec. 1834, No. 32, Vigis to Secs., 
31 Oct. 1834 & ibid.. No. 76, 30 Dec. 1834. The Moravians 
testified to a 'concourse' of hearers in the chapels & 
Sunday schools. Periodical Accts. 14 (1836-9):67, 69,
502.
106
(6 males, 4 females) were coloured.^ The Mico Charity opened 
2 schools between 1838 and 1842, when their mission ceased.^ 
If there were increasing opportunities for acculturation 
through churching and schooling in the 1820s and 183 0s, 
especially among the Creole slaves, there was also concerted 
resistance to slavery. Throughout the slave era, marronage was 
frequent, and slaves who had so liberated themselves often 
escaped to nearby territories.
The first slave revolt occurred in 1770, and it was 
followed by rebellions in 1771, 1773 and 1774. At Christmas 
1801, another uprising was planned on 16 leeward estates, led 
by 'drivers, tradesmen or other "principal people"'. Their 
military preparation was great. The rebels were organized 
into companies and trained under appointed officers; they met 
under cover of working their provision grounds and at funeral 
wakes. Although a few free coloureds participated, their aim 
was to end slavery by exterminating the whites and free 
coloureds [Laurence 1982:5-7].*
Although there were no major revolts or conspiracies 
after 1801, resistance to slavery permeated the life of the 
slaves: escape, work stoppages, feigning illness or stupidity, 
sabotage, poisoning, suicide, stealing, cultural resistance.
C0318/138: Rept. from C. J. Latrobe on Negro Education in 
the Windward and Leeward Islands, 14 Apr. 1838.
* Rhodes House Lib.: MSS Brit. Emp. S.20. El/10, Anti-
Slavery Papers, Tobago Letters, 1838-42.
* Cf. MMS: Diary of the Negro Congregation at Tobago, July
1800-Apr. 1802, entry for 25 Dec. 1801, which said it was 
'confirmed' that the intention was to murder all whites, 
mulattoes and free blacks.
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all were forms of self- and group assertion. As Genovese 
states, accommodation and resistance were two forms of a 
single process, by which slaves accepted what could not be 
avoided, while fighting for their moral and physical survival 
[1976]. The provision ground/internal marketing complex is an 
apt example of this, and was crucial to the strategies of the 
enslaved both before and after 1838.
II.4 THE PROVISION GROUNDS AND THE INTERNAL MARKET
By the 1790s, a flourishing Sunday market existed in
Scarborough. Gilbert Francklyn, a planter, testified in 1790
that three-quarters of the poultry and pork consumed by the
planters were bought from their slaves and that 'almost all
the small current coin of the Island is in the possession of
the Negroes' [Lambert 1790/1975:86, 95-6].
By 1807, the income from their produce had become so
important to the slaves that, in militant protests, they
defied the highest authorities to secure justice at the
markets. The protests occurred at a time of scarcity of North
American supplies, because of trade restrictions.
Since slave evidence was not admissible in the courts
before 1823, many slaves were defrauded and robbed by whites
and mulattoes. As a result, after Gov. Young's arrival in
April 1807,
Negroe slaves in gangs of from 40 to 60, 
and many armd with cutlasses, came to me,
- appearing to insist upon, - rather than 
to beg, - a redress of their Grievances ...
How Earnest and dangerous these People were 
in their proceedings, will appear from the 
statement, that on one occasion, myself 
being 25 miles to windward inspecting the
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Batteries at Queensbay etc, 60 Slaves from 
an Estate in St. Patrick's Parish 10 miles 
distant took possession of Mt William in 
my absence, and remained there, three days, 
whilst a deputation of eight stout, and 
Armd Negroe Men, followed me to the distant 
Estate I was on Visit to.^
Several armed gangs from many estates kept up the marches 
until October 1807, when the Assembly passed the Police Act to 
prevent 'such lawless and tumultous vagrancy'. The Act 
contained clauses intended to protect the slaves' interests.^
Provision lands were trebled in 1807; slaves were allowed 
as much ground they desired and, during the half-year out of 
crop, they were granted every Thursday free, as well as 
Sundays. In 1811, the slaves enjoyed a complete monopoly over 
the local market for pigs, poultry, cows, fruit and 
vegetables.^ From September 1823, Thursday was market day, 
instead of Sunday.
As elsewhere in the region, the provision ground/internal 
marketing complex was central to a many-faceted process of 
accumulation and inheritance among the slaves. Slaves 
bequeathed their property by oral wills, which were made with 
'much decorum' [McTear 1831]. The income from the produce, and 
from the proceeds of employment in skilled trades, was used.
C0285/18: Young to Bathurst, 1 Oct. 1811. Mt William, 1% 
mis north of Scarborough, was the Governor's official 
residence.
C0285/18; Young to Bathurst, 1 Oct. 1811. 'An Act for the 
preventing Slaves absenting themselves in Numbers from 
the Plantations' was also passed, forbidding even 2 
slaves from being together out of the district road to 
the market, without a ticket of leave. C0285/2; Young 
to Castlereagh, 6 Nov., 16 Nov. 1807.
C0285/18: Young to Bathurst, 1 Oct. 1811 & 00285/12: 
Young to Castlereagh, 27 Aug., 10 Oct. 1807.
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not only for consumption, but was also invested in various 
ways. Sometimes, savings were used to purchase the freedom of 
the slave or that of his/her relatives, but manumission was 
not always chosen by slaves who could afford it. Some chose 
to invest in hiring, and even buying, other slaves whom they 
hired out, as jobbers, so employing the same strategy that the 
whites and coloureds used in the process of accumulation.^
McTear cited the case of Kitty, an old woman on Concordia 
estate, who bought her daughter's freedom, and owned three or 
four slaves whom she hired out to labour on Concordia and 
other estates. For reasons not given, she remained enslaved, 
as did her sons, who were tradesmen, who could afford to buy 
their freedom [1831].
McTear also explained that the slaves invested their
money by hiring free labourers or paying a hire for their own
labour, to huckster imported goods. Thus, in the 1820s, the
slaves had muscled into the huckstering and retail trade in
foreign goods which, in the towns, was largely controlled by
free coloured women.
It is not uncommon for negroes who have 
money to hire others to huckster for 
them, or to pay a hire for themselves 
for that purpose. They go about estates 
with baskets of printed goods, handkerchief 
[sic], sewed dresses etc. or with pork, 
beef or other salt provisions and bread, 
and make a profitable trade of it - So 
prevalent is this custom, that there is 
scarcely an Estate where some of these 
hucksters will not be found during the 
hours of noon, sitting under some shady
58 For similar occurrences in Martinique, see Tomich 
[1976:220-1]; for St Vincent and Trinidad, Carmichael 
[1833/1969, 1:283; 2:231]; for Jamaica, Barclay 
[1826:271-3].
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tamarind among the dwellings of the negroes 
disposing of their merchandise - upon 
which people there is neither restraint 
nor tax of any kind, altho' the merchant 
has to pay £30 per annum for a license.
[Ibid.; emphasis added]
It is likely that females slaves were active in advancing the 
huckstering trade, which was dominated by women after 1838.
These data show that the rigidities of slave society were 
softened and breached in the practices and strategies of its 
members. The provision ground/internal market complex was the 
principal socio-economic leverage of the slaves; it was 
important for kinship, inheritance, religion, burial 
practices, cuisine and culture building; and it laid the 
foundations for the growth of the peasantry after 1838 [Mintz 
and Hall 1960; Mintz 1978]. The activities of this 'proto­
peasantry' bedevil every attempt to view slavery as a mode of 
production. The informal activity of the slaves was bound to 
sugar production in ways that were 'simultaneously dependent 
and antagonistic' [Tomich 1991a:69]. Mintz thus correctly 
argues that the 'peasant breach' in the system of slavery 
forces us to reconsider our conception of 'resistance' to 
slavery [1978].
The Tobago evidence supports Craton's hypothesis that the 
late slave rebellions were inspired by the desire of the 
'proto-peasants' to be free 'to enjoy the life of peasants.'^ 
Young, writing privately, revealed that the protesting slaves 
knew about the British abolition movement; they complained of
Craton [1979; 1980; 1982] uses the examples of Jamaica, 
1831-2, Demerara, 1823, Barbados, 1816, and Tobago, 1807. 
The quotation is from [1980:1].
Ill
'Over work', under the impression 'that I was come from the 
Palaver of the Great Country - authorizd ... to exonerate Them 
from Labor for their masters, three davs in each week. - which 
They were to work, - or not as They pleasd, for Themselves.' 
This idea was 'very generally entertaind' by the slaves.^
The freedom to produce and to control the income derived 
therefrom was central to the political, economic and social 
aspirations of the slaves. This was particularly clear from 
1807, when the abolition of the slave trade coincided with a 
shortage of imported provisions, which enhanced the bargaining 
power of the slaves relative to that of the planters. It is 
also clear, from the demands of the slaves, that the provision 
around/internal marketing complex shaped their conception of 
what Emancipation should entail. We do not know whether there 
were other demands and perceptions among the slaves, or 
whether and how these may have changed by the 1830s. By then, 
the slaves had used their monopoly over the production and 
marketing of local goods to make significant inroads into the 
retailing of imported goods.
II.5 APPRENTICESHIP AND EMANCIPATION; THE DYNAMICS OF
SOCIAL CONFLICT
Between 1800 and 1838, the West Indian legislatures lost 
some of their autonomy through being forced to accept the 
abolition of the slave trade, amelioration and Emancipation. 
The Windward Islands were consolidated in 1833 and local 
legislatures were not allowed to offer purses or stipends to
“ C0285/18: Young to Bathurst, 1 Oct. 1811, author's
emphases; C0285/2: Young to Castlereagh, 16 Nov. 1807.
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the Lt.-Governor and the Governor-in-Chief, to ensure the 
independence of the executive.
The central class conflict was between planters and 
enslaved. The debates surrounding Apprenticeship and 
Emancipation are important for the development of class 
relationships after 1838, and they are now examined.
Apprenticeship, which began with the legal termination of 
slavery on 1 August 1834, was an unsatisfactory half-way house 
to the slaves, who wanted freedom. It was used to lay down 
'the social and economic machinery that would perpetuate the 
established order after 1840' [Green 1976:130]. Since the 
system was regulated by colonial legislatures, its sanctions 
were 'largely in the hands of the class against whose power it 
was directed' [Burn 1937:163]. Therefore, the Stipendiary 
Magistrates (Stip. Mags.), who were to supervise the 
regulation of labour on the estates, the Governors and the 
Colonial Office were very important in the balance of 
political forces/"
From 1 August 1834, all children under 6 were freed and 
entrusted to the care of their mothers. Those born after that 
date were free, as well as slaves who had at any time been in 
the UK with the consent of their masters. Apprentices above 
age 6 were classified as praedial attached, praedial 
unattached, or non-praedial, depending on whether they lived 
on estates and on the type of work they had been doing for the 
12 months preceding the passing of the Abolition Act. Praedial
" For the constraints on the independence of the Stip. 
Mags., see Burn [1937]; Green [1976].
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slaves were to serve until August 1840, while all others would 
be free in 1838. Out of crop, every field apprentice was to 
have free time equal to 14 working days deducted from the 45- 
hr work week. Houses and other allowances were to continue.^ 
Between 1834 and 1838, labour relations were the arena of 
a series of conflicts, as the planters and apprentices 
consolidated their opposed positions.
First, the planters defined the customary allowances to 
the labourers as 'indulgences'. Women who had borne 6 or more 
children and had been exempt from labour, were required to 
serve. On some estates, medical attention to the free children 
was withdrawn, to induce the mothers to work extra days for
these services. Most women refused to do so and the
proprietors eventually instructed the managers to offer the 
service without cost, unconditionally.^
Secondly, the mothers refused to allow their free 
children to work. Many mothers so feared the re-enslavement of 
their children, that they let them suffer for lack of medical 
attention, rather than accept anything which could put them 
under future obligations. Some women sent their children off 
the estates and refused even to present them to the
Magistrates for inspection. Without the labour of the free
children, the estates had to use adults for the lighter tasks. 
Material inducements from the planters failed to persuade the
2^ C0285/41: Darling to Spring Rice, 22 Aug. 1834, enc. 
Darling's Proclamation, 25 July 1834; Green [1976].
“ C0285/42; Smith to Glenelg, 25 Nov. 1835, enc. Darling to 
Smith, 30 Oct. 1835; C0285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 23 
May 1838, enc. Darling to MacGregor, 18 Apr. 1838.
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mothers, and only one woman offered to indenture her child,
because he was 'incorrigibly bad'.^
The third issue was the liberty of the apprentices to
dispose of their own time. In most districts, they commanded
wages varying from Is to Is 4d to 2s per day for field labour,
and 2s to 3s per day for skilled tradesmen.^ Often, they
worked for wages reluctantly, or in June and July, 'the hungry
time', when their crops were not yet ready.* Even Darling
had difficulty getting apprentices to do 'the lightest work'
on his grounds, 'no party having come a second time to work
for Sixteen Pence and two Glasses of Rum a day'.^
In 1834, the Assembly, seeking to make the apprentices
more dependent on the estates, passed a Market Act to fix at
a low rate the prices of bread and fresh commodities.* The
labourers simply withheld supplies until the law was rescinded
[Capadose 1845, 2:233]. An anonymous complaint stated:
... the people have forsook [sic] the 
market & the town of Scarboro starves, no 
not even milk to be got for Breakfast.*
* C0285/47: Darling to MacGregor, 25 Jan. 1838. The same
attitude was displayed by the Jamaican mothers, who 
allowed only 9 children to work for the estates [Mair 
1987:10-11]; in four of the Windwards, including Tobago, 
only 6 children were apprenticed [Marshall 1985:211].
* C0285/45 & C0285/47: Stip. Mag. Repts. for 1837, 1838,
respectively.
* C0285/45: MacGregor to Glenelg, 31 Aug. 1837, enc. Stip.
Mags. Child and Dowland, June 1837.
* C0285/47: Darling to MacGregor, 25 Jan. 1838. Lt.-Gov.'s
Letters, 1836-38: Darling to MacGregor, 15 Aug. 1836; 
author's emphasis.
* 00285/44: Darling to Glenelg, 17 Sept. 1836.
* 00285/43: 'An Emancipator' to Aberdeen, 22 Feb. 1835.
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Another area of conflict was cane stealing. As 
Apprenticeship drew to a close, hundreds of people were 
punished by whipping for destroying and stealing canes; in 
January 1838, of 422 recent punishments, 166 were for stealing 
canes. Managers testified under oath to basketfuls, mule 
loads and cart loads of canes removed. Men and women, 
including watchmen and rangers, were involved.^®
Even though the termination of slavery was inevitable, it 
took considerable pressure from the UK, and much politicking 
and personal influence from the Governor-in-Chief, for the 
local legislatures to agree to emancipate on August 1st, 1838, 
rather than in 184 0, as had been originally intended [Marshall 
1971].
In Tobago, Apprenticeship ended in 1838, only because the
legislature had no choice, once the other Windward Islands had
capitulated to British pressure. The Legislative Council
unanimously refused to introduce the measure, and stated their
displeasure at having to agree to emancipation in 1838:
... we must ... candidly admit, that the 
Board assented to the measure with much 
reluctance, considering it a case of 
great hardship and injury to the propri­
etary of this Colony ...
The Assembly declared that the Emancipation Bill was a measure
'of necessity' to which they acceded only because they
anticipated 'that most illegal and unconstitutional Act, for
amending the Abolition Act, forced upon the colony by the
C0285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 3 May 1838, enc. 
Darling to MacGregor, 19 Apr. 1838.
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British Parliament'.^
Central to the resistance to early Emancipation was the
fact that the leading attorneys and managers had recently
invested in estates and hoped to profit before slavery ended.
Particularly important were the mechanics and tradesmen, whose
skills were valuable. Since non-praedials were expected to be
freed in 1838 and praedials in 1840, the 1834 Tobago
Classification Act considered domestics and mechanics to be
praedials, contrary to the intention of the Imperial Act for
the Abolition of Slavery.^
In May 1838, the legislature sent Darling a joint
address, disagreeing with the interpretations of the British
officials on classification, and predicting 'ruin and
bloodshed' after August. By June, however, after the
neighbouring islands had reluctantly agreed to emancipate, the
legislature capitulated. Darling explained their concerns;
... Mr Gairdner and others, having since 
the 1st of August 1834 purchased Estates 
in this Island, at very low prices, on 
the speculation of realizing the purchase 
Money by the labour of the Apprentices by 
the Year 1840. ... [They] will not there­
fore relinquish the opportunity of making 
the utmost farthing while they are pos­
sessed by legal authority, of the services
C0285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 31 July 1838, Enc. 3, 
Leg. Co. to Darling, 11 July 1838; Enc. 4, Assembly to 
Darling, 11 July 1838. The Imperial Act to Amend the Act 
for the Abolition of Slavery in the Brit. Colonies was 
passed on 11 Apr. 1838.
72 C0285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 22 June 1838, & Encs. 
There were 395 Head Tradesmen and 272 Inferior 
Tradesmen, 7.3% of the 9078 effective apprentices in 
July 1838 [Martin 1843:38].
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of their Apprentices.^^
The planters prepared to meet the new epoch with laws to 
entrench their position. A police force and public prisons 
were established. Sundry Acts were passed, regulating 
punishment by hard labour; appointing rural constables; 
preventing the clandestine departure of labourers, artisans 
etc.; suppressing vagrancy, and regulating the wage contract. 
All these measures were disallowed, because of their severity 
and discriminatory tendency.^
Once the planters were defeated on the issue of early 
Emancipation, they tried to secure the attachment of the 
freedpeople to regular estate labour for low wages, using the 
houses and garden grounds as the leverage in bargaining. From 
May 1838, we see a series of strategic moves by both opposed 
parties, which laid the bases for the struggles to come.
In May 1838, Magistrate Child observed in the Windward 
District:
... at no former period have I seen the 
Apprentices so intent on repairing & 
building habitations on their respective 
plantations. It would seem as if The 
heads of families (Apprentices) enter­
tained no intention of leaving their 
present employers ... otherwise they would 
not bestow so much time & labor on render-
00285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 11 June 1838, enc. 
Darling to MacGregor, 19 May 1838. In St Vincent,
Stip. Mag. Colthurst noted that the desire of the 
attorneys and managers to become owners or lessees of 
their emolovers' estates was the strongest reason 
for their conflicts with the Stip. Mags. [Marshall 
1977:224] .
00285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 10 Apr. 1838; 4 Sept. 
1838; 19 Sept. 1838; Glenelg to MacGregor, 23 June 1838, 
27 Nov. 1838, 1 Jan. 1839, 21 Jan. 1839; Stephen's 
minute, 23 May 1838.
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ing comfortable the cottages which must 
so soon be relinquished.^
Marshall [1985:215-6] argues that these preparations revealed
a resolve by the apprentices to distinguish between plantation
residence and plantation labour; 'occupation' of the houses
and grounds was to replace 'occupancy'. The planters, however,
sought to establish an intimate link between labour, residence
and provision grounds, via the system of located labour.
Glenelg commented on the Tobago Emancipation Act that the
planters saw the labourers, not even as tenants at will, but
as 'mere trespasser[s], who might be dispossessed by the order
of a magistrate, without any notice to quit, or other
formality.
Wednesday 1st August 1838 was a day of thanksgiving and
celebration. The Churches were crowded with freedpeople, and
no further work was done that week. On 7th August, Darling
wrote of the Leeward District:
The negroes ... will neither work for the 
estates nor give up their houses; in other 
quarters they say they will work their 
provision grounds for a month to come, 
and insist upon maintaining possession 
in spite of the managers.^
The offer for field work ranged from 3d to 8d per day, with
houses, medical attention and grounds free. On 18th August,
Darling wrote:
Great repugnance was for some time shewn
00285/47: MacGregor to Glenelg, 9 July 1838, enc. Child, 
May 1838.
76 C0285/46: Glenelg to MacGregor, 15 Oct. 1838.
^ C0285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 23 Aug. 1838, enc. 
Darling to MacGregor, 7 Aug. 1838, & Encs.
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by many of the Negroes to return to work, 
for the wages, that the Managers can 
afford ... [T]here was as well organized 
a combination from one end of the Island 
to the other, to strike for Wages, as 
ever took place in England, but conducted 
with more secrecy nor would the Labourers 
for some time listen to the Stipendiary 
Magistrates ... The Certainty however that 
they would be ejected from their dwellings, 
and deprived of their Provision Grounds 
if they refused to work for the Estate, 
brought to light the great estimation in 
which they held their Lands; the Pecuniary 
Nature of which I find to be far greater 
than I have imagined.^
For months the strikes continued. In December 1838, 
labourers on five leeward estates agreed to accept rates 
ranging from 5d to 8d per day for ordinary labour, with houses 
and provision grounds secured.^ The leeward labourers may 
have been the first to capitulate because, the district being 
the driest, with a dense population, they could not sustain 
themselves for long periods on their produce alone. Throughout 
Tobago, the houses and provision grounds became the major 
inducement to labour for the estates.
II.6 CONCLUSION
The composition of Tobago society, particularly in the 
183 0s, and the central class conflict between planters and 
would-be planters, on the one hand, and enslaved, on the 
other, were described. The interests of the leading whites, 
their alliances and conflicts with absentee merchants and
C0285/46: MacGregor to Glenelg, 4 Sept. 1838, enc. 
Darling to Macgregor, 18 Aug. 1838, & Encs.
C0285/47: MacGregor to Glenelg, 21 Dec. 1838, Sub-Enc., 
McIntosh to Darling, 11 Dec. 1838.
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planters, and the role of the imperial state were discussed. 
Whites, free coloureds and blacks, and slaves were the three 
major status groups, and the secondary lines of cleavage and 
differentiation within each group were analysed. Gender 
relations were included; but class, race/colour, legal status 
and gender overlapped and mutually reinforced each other, 
since slavery was not simply a system of property relations, 
but a complex of social and political symbols and 
institutions, which formed the basis of the social order.
Race and colour, mediated by gender, determined the
system of honour and degradation and often overrode all other
considerations. Yet two contradictorv tendencies were
simultaneouslv at work. On the one hand, the mores of the
whites and the coloureds, and the cross cutting ties between
enslaved and free, combined to soften the distinctions of
colour and legal status, as interculturation inevitably
occurred [Brathwaite 1974]. The paucity of white women and
the increase of the free coloureds contributed to this. On the
other hand, this erosion of barriers made the leading whites
strive to preserve their social and political hegemony. The
slaves perceived the coloureds, most of whom identified with
the whites, as the class allies of the planters. A folk song,
dating from August 1838, states:
Fus' of August come at las'
All dem mulatto have to eat long grass 
Fus' of August come at las'
All dem mulatto have to ketch dem ass
All dem black Neger have to ride white horse.^
Mrs Dorcas Henry, (1916- ), Interview with author, 9 July 
1992, and Mr George Leacock (1916- ), Conversation with 
author, 3 Feb. 1994.
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Important though race and colour were, it was the 
struggle in the sphere of production between planters and 
labourers that provided the contours within which new 
alignments took place after 1838. The contending classes 
entered the new era trailing vestiges of the old. Emancipation 
meant, not unconditional freedom, but such degrees of freedom 
as the labourers could continue to wrest, as their conflict 
with the planters took new shape. Central to the transition 
from slavery was the provision ground/internal marketing 
complex, through which the enslaved asserted their humanity, 
enterprise, dignity and desire to accumulate. In the 
attachment to the provision grounds and the markets, we 
discern the desire for a new order struggling to free itself 
from the integuments of the old.
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CHAPTER THREE 
SMALLHOLDERS AND THE DIVERSIFICATION 
OF AGRICULTURE IN TOBAGO: 1838-1855
111.1 THE PROBLEM STATED
111.1.1 Introduction
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the agrarian structure and the 
emergence and development of smallholders between the 
Emancipation of 1838 and the economic collapse of the 1880s. 
In keeping with our hypothesis, our aim is to discover whether 
any class of estate owners, of landowners with more than 10 
acres, or of smallholders with less than 10 acres, emerged 
with the capacity to upgrade the sugar industry or to 
diversify away from sugar. This chapter considers the 
smallholders up to 1855; Chapter 4 considers the agrarian 
structure by the 1880s.
Chapter 2 demonstrated that the provision ground/internal 
marketing complex established customary rights, expectations 
and living standards which the ex-slaves wished to consolidate 
in the era of legal freedom [Foner 1983:19]. Where a peasantry 
emerged after 1838, it was 'reconstituted' out of the 
experience of the 'proto-peasants' of the slave plantations 
[Mintz 1974a:146-157].
We now focus on access to land, whether by acquisition or 
by other forms of tenure, because, in an agrarian society such
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as Tobago, the land was, for the overwhelming majority of ex­
slaves and their descendants, the place of work, the object of 
labour, a means of production [Trouillot 1988:6], a symbol of 
social status, and an avenue to full citizenship, since the 
franchise was always based on the possession of property. 
Access to land was also a key factor in determining the 
relations of production.
Furthermore, land ownership was of immense symbolic 
importance in the culture created by the ex-slaves. This is 
reflected in the practice of burying the dead on their own 
property, rather than in public burial grounds and Church 
yards, which persisted down to the 1880s.^ It is seen, too, 
in the custom, common in Tobago and in other parts of the 
Caribbean, of burying a child's umbilical cord on the land of 
its parents and planting a tree to mark the place. These 
practices symbolized the linking of the continuity of the 
family line with the high value placed on the land [cf. Besson 
1988]. The strategic importance of land ownership is also 
reflected in the customary tenure and transmission of 'family 
land', which evolved, in most parts of the region, in the 
post-Emancipation years, as a means of securing land in the 
hands of the descendants of the ex-slaves in the long term, 
and with which family life was intimately connected [Besson 
1979; 1984; Besson and Momsen 1987; Clarke 1957]. Secure land 
tenure, therefore, had economic, political, symbolic and 
cultural significance, far beyond what is apparent in the
 ^The Medical Ordinance, 1882, forbade 'promiscuous burial'. 
C0321/59: Robinson to Kimberley & Encs., 19 Oct. 1882.
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small size of the holdings.
III.1.2 The Debates in the Literature
There are two major debates in the literature on 
smallholders in the Caribbean, which are pertinent to this 
study. The first is on the conceptualization and definition 
of the 'peasantry', in the light of the ambiguity of the 
concept [S. Silverman 1979; Saul and Woods 1976], and the 
multiplicity of occupations in which Caribbean smallholders 
were always engaged [Comitas 1973]. Some writers. Le Franc 
[1981], for example, have therefore chosen to avoid the term, 
because of its indiscriminate and imprecise application. This 
issue, labyrinthine in its scope, has been well summarized by 
Mintz [1973], and will only be briefly discussed here.
One school of thought stresses that the peasantry is a 
social grouping for which the household is a unit of 
production and consumption of subsistence goods; its 
involvement in a market economy is therefore expected to be 
minimal. This is the viewpoint of Fraser [1981] who follows 
the approaches of Shanin [1976] and Chayanov [1966], and 
argues that, outside of Haiti, no peasantry emerged in the 
Caribbean, because of the pervasiveness of the CMP and the 
involvement of all rural groups in the market economy. It 
would be difficult for Fraser to respond to the objection that 
the Haitian peasants were also integrally involved in 
capitalist markets, both local and foreign [cf. Mintz 1964b].
On the other hand, are writers like Marshall [1968], 
Lewis [1936], Mintz [1974a, 1979, 1983], Farley [1953/54],
125
Paget [1964], Hall [1959/1990], Handler [1971], and Trouillot 
[1988], who all recognize the necessary and widespread 
involvement of the Caribbean peasantry in wage labour, and in 
internal and external markets. The Caribbean, from the 
inception of the sugar economy, depended on external sources 
for clothing, breadstuff, salt provisions, machinery, hardware 
and ironmongery; and Caribbean peasantries have always had a 
basic need for cash (or quasi-barter, where specie was scarce) 
to procure these items. Indeed, Mintz argues that these 'deep 
and ancient involvements' in local and international markets 
are a feature which makes all Caribbean peasantries 'somewhat 
contrastive with peasants elsewhere' [1983:10].
By implication, much of the Caribbean literature, 
especially Trouillot [1988], touches tangentially on the 
debates on the distinctions between 'primitive', 'peasant' and 
'simple commodity' production [cf. Bernstein 1977; 1988;
Chevalier 1983], on household production [Friedmann 1980; 
Bennholdt-Thomsen 1982], and on the 'modes of production 
controversy' [Foster-Carter 1978; Fraser 1981; Robotham 1977]. 
Anthropologists now commonly regard peasants as integrally 
involved in the capitalist economy, producing both their own 
subsistence and commodities for sale in internal and external 
markets [cf. Dalton 1967; 1969]. Peasant production is
regarded by a wide range of theorists as either part of, or as 
'articulated' with, the CMP [Foner 1983:35]. Bernstein, after 
summarizing the attempts of modern Marxists to reconcile the 
existence of peasants and other petty producers of commodities 
with mature capitalism, argues that peasants must be
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understood as being petty commodity producers. As such, they 
are capitalists employing themselves, and they form an 
integral part of the CMP as a petty bourgeoisie, in the 
literal sense of the term [1988:265-269].
In keeping with the premisses of Chapter 1, we consider 
that, in Tobago, the smallholders, the planter class and its 
representatives formed part of a single, capitalist, economic 
system. They were involved in complex, often antagonistic, but 
symbiotic, relationships, as each broad grouping struggled to 
maximize control over, and optimize the use of, land, labour 
power and capital, in its own interests. Therefore, in our 
view, it is impossible to distinguish for Tobago a non- or 
pre-capitalist 'peasant mode of production' from the CMP, as 
Post [1978] did for Jamaica.
The wisest way out of the definitional impasse is to 
abandon the search for universal definitions of the 'essence' 
of 'peasant' economy, society, or modes of production, and to 
assume a plurality of agrarian systems, within each of which 
peasants would be defined [Roxborough 1979:95; Dalton 1974]. 
As Mintz has cogently argued, with such definitions, 
typologies, 'marked by both parsimony and adequacy', could be 
developed 'to facilitate controlled comparisons of peasantries 
in time and space' [1973:102; cf. Padilla I960].
We agree with Hobsbawm [1973; cf. Mintz 1974b; Wolf 1966] 
on the need to distinguish between various forms of family- 
based agrarian production, and also to differentiate between 
rural proletarians, commercial farmers and peasants. In his 
classic study of Jamaica between 1838 and 1865, Hall
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[1959/1990:158] identifies three broad agrarian categories: 
'small farmers', who owned and worked freeholds without giving 
labour to the estates; 'peasants', who combined occasional 
wage labour with the working of their freeholds; and 
'labourers', who rented provision grounds and cottages, while 
continuing to serve as estate labourers. Hall's categorization 
of peasants is tied to the ownership of freeholds. We accept 
his outline of the rural groups but, while the data on 
freeholds will be carefully assessed, the multiplicity of 
tenures in which the Tobago ex-slaves participated requires a 
focus on access to land, if the smallholding sector is 
adequately to be understood.
A distinctive recent contribution to the conceptual 
discussion comes from Trouillot's study of Dominica, in which 
he delineates 'the peasant labor process' as 'an 
institutionalized process through which a household performs 
agricultural labor on a unit over which it exerts a form of 
control that excludes similar groups, with instruments of work 
which it also controls in an exclusive manner and which 
generally represent less of an input than the labor itself' 
[1988:4]. Trouillot argues that not all smallholders who 
produce commodities are engaged in a peasant labour process. 
The latter is distinguished by (a) the importance of the 
domestic group, which is both a unit of production and of 
consumption; (b) rudimentary technology, which gives priority 
to living labour over dead labour; (c) the consequent salience 
of kinship, clientelistic, and other personal ties; and (d) 
the centrality of the land [ibid.:5-6, 12].
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This construct, together with our focus on access to 
land, allows us to understand the category that Hall called 
'peasants', in the context of the involvement of many ex­
slaves in a multiplicity of tenures. It allows us to identify 
a 'peasant labour process', in which crops were grown by 
domestic units for both subsistence and the market, local and 
foreign, using rudimentary technology, but where freehold 
tenure was one among many, even for the same individual, and 
where the relations of production in which an individual 
participated might be equally varied.
Our task, then, is to ascertain whether 'small farmers' 
and 'peasants', with or without freehold title to land, 
emerged in Tobago by 1855, and what their economic and 
political significance might have been.
The second major Caribbean debate concerns whether and 
why a 'flight' of the majority of the ex-slaves from the 
estates occurred in the decades after 1838. In 1978, Hall, 
reconsidering his own views on the labour history of the early 
years after 1838, identified two main explanations for the 
withdrawal of many ex-slaves from the plantations. One view 
is represented by Farley [1953/54; cf. Riviere 1972], who 
stresses the desire for liberty and land, the so-called 'pull' 
factors; the contrary view is represented by Paget [1964], who 
argues that the ex-slaves were willing to continue to occupy 
their old homes and provision grounds, but were 'pushed' by 
the strategies of the planters into seeking land and 
livelihood off the estates. Hall himself, using certain 
Stipendiary Magistrates' reports and the admittedly limited
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evidence presented to the British Parliament's 1842 Select 
Committee, argues that the strategies of the planters, in 
exacting high rents for houses and grounds, and in permitting 
occupation of these only if daily labour was given, should be 
given most weight in any explanation of the exodus of labour.
In this. Hall has been followed by Marshall [1979a; 
1979b], who doubts that the mere availability of land provoked 
an exodus from the estates in the Windward Islands in the 
early post-Emancipation years. Marshall highlights the 
complexity of the process of 'negotiation', rather than the 
attitudes ascribed to planters and ex-slaves by the 
protagonists in the debate [1979a:244-245].
In response to Hall and Marshall, Trouillot [1984a] 
questions the assumption that there was homogeneity of 
experience and belief among the ex-slaves, or that this 
involved a commitment to wage labour. Instead, he calls for a 
greater understanding of the varying socio-economic conditions 
of which the plantations formed part. He also stresses the 
importance of the 'peasant labor process', which had been 
established on the slave provision grounds, and which led to 
a preference for flexible work regimes, and independence in 
the allocation of time and other resources. Trouillot's 
[1988] data for Dominica between 1838 and 1842 suggest a 
preference for sharecropping and labour-rent, rather than for 
wage labour, among freedpeople on a sample of 41 estates.
Higman, confining himself to the issues as defined in the 
literature, demonstrates, in his case study of a Jamaican 
estate between 1838 and 1845, a process of negotiation between
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the planters and the former slaves, which involved a rapid 
series of shifts in an unstable transitional situation, whose 
outcomes were often unforeseen and not pre-determined 
[1990:17]. Thus, like Wilmot [1986], he lends support to the 
'push• explanations.
Another aspect is explored in the debate between Green 
[1984; 1986] and Holland [1981; 1984]. Green maintains that, 
ultimately, it was population density and the availability of 
land which determined the emergence of the peasantry. 
Holland, basing his inferences on Helize, a territory of 
extremely low population density, stresses instead the 
exercise of political domination by a planter class that, by 
the truck system and various forms of direct and indirect 
coercion, so limited the available options, that a peasantry 
could not emerge.
Some of the positions in the 'flight from the estates' 
debate are not new. Marshall [1991:3-4] observes that the 
'pull' interpretations, whether in the population density 
variant or in the variant stressing the disinclination to 
labour for others in open-resource situations, were inspired 
by earlier observers, particularly Merivale [1861], Wakefield 
[1849], Nieboer [1910/1971] and Domar [197 0].^
So far, only Marshall [1991], among the historians, has 
seriously questioned the terms within which the debate has 
been conducted. He calls for greater precision and clarity
 ^These writers sought to explain various forms of
servitude, but Merivale and Wakefield were particularly 
concerned with colonization. See also Curtin [1977], 
Patterson [1977] and Engerman [1977].
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about several matters: the nature of the labour problem; the 
size of an adequate labour force; the demands of the ex­
slaves; the reasons for their apparent militancy; and the 
relative weight, and possible interrelationship, of 'push/ and 
'puli' factors. Land availability should also be seen, not 
simply as the man/land ratio, but in terms of the land 
available for alienation, the motivations of the sellers, and 
the operations of the market in land.
Marshall is correct. The search for explanations within 
the restricted boundaries of the debate must now be abandoned. 
The reconstruction of the post-Emancipation experience 
requires a multi-faceted approach. One has to understand 
several distinct, parallel, but interrelated processes:
1. the movement to villages, hamlets and other 
settlements for residence and cultivation on land 
that may have been owned, rented, or squatted upon;
2. acquisition of freeholds;
3. access to land on the basis of non-freehold tenure;
4. withdrawal from regular, steady, wage labour on the 
estates;
5. the ability to survive in agriculture independently 
of the estates;
6. the ability to survive in non-agricultural employ­
ment independently of the estates;
7. emigration to agricultural or non-agricultural 
pursuits ;
8. regional variations within each territory.
All of these need to be considered over time. Regional 
variations were, in turn, conditioned by the availability of 
land for sale to the freedmen, and by geographical factors, 
particularly the proximity to markets.
This chapter discusses (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) in the
light of (8) . The data on number (6) are fragmentary. The 
seventh factor, emigration, was negligible up to 1855, but 
became significant thereafter.
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The central question which this chapter addresses is 
paradoxical. From 1838 to 1893, not more than 10,000 acres of 
the 57,408 alienated were cultivated (Table 8). Tobago had a 
low population density (114 persons per square mile at Census 
1844), large tracts of idle and uncultivated land, even on 
occupied estates (Table 9) , and a 'secession' from estate 
residence and from located labour, by the freed slaves, on the 
one hand; but there was very little squatting, and minimal 
acquisition of freeholds, on the other hand. The reasons for 
this are herein analysed.
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TABLE 8
Estimates of Cultivated Acreage. Tobago: 
1838-1893
Y e a r A c r e s
in
S u g a r
A c r e s
in
P r o v i s i o n
T o t a l
A c r e a g e
u n d e r
C u l t i -
v a t i o n
A l i e n a t e d
L a n d s
1841
1842 
1844
1852
1853 
1856**
1857
1858
1859 
1871
1884
1885 
1887# 
1888 
1893
4183
4000
2700
2800
3000
3000
5232
1500
3700
3800
5100
2301
1500
6486*
5413%
5462%
7883
7800
7800
7533
10000
8000
8000
8000
6500
11.3
9.4
9.5 
13.7
13.6
13.6
13.1
17.4
13.9
13.9
13.9 
8.9
NOTES ;
1. * Excludes pasture land.
2. ** Calculated from the figures in Sewell [1862/1968:92]. 
The 1856 Blue Bk. also gives 2700 acres as the acreage in 
canes.
3. # In 1887, there were 4000 acres under coconuts, 500 in 
pasture and 50 in cocoa.
Sources: CO290: Blue Bks. for 1841-88, except 1856; C0300/104: 
1893 Blue Bk.
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TABLE 9
Ownership and Acreage of Sugar Estates by Parish: 1855
P a r ­
i s h
T o t a l  
N o . o f  
E s t a t e s
N o . o f
S u g a r
E s t a t e s
A c r e a g e
o f
S u g a r
E s t a t e s
A c r e s
in
S u g a r
A c r e s
i n
S u g a r
%
N o .
t e e
Qcas
7
7
9
18
10
9
11
2
6
7*
15*
8
6
11
1626
3020
4137
6737
4892
2774
4754
78
358
305
601
317
345
706
4.8 
11.8
7.4
8.9
6.5 
12.4 
14.8
TOTAL 71 55 27940 2710 9.7 41
NOTES ;
1. Parishes numbered 1 to 7 are, respectively, St John, St 
Paul, St Mary, St David, St George, St Andrew and St Patrick.
2. * One estate was leased in St Mary and 3 in St David.
3. There were 43 sugar estates owned by 25 absentees, and 12 
owned by 13 residents.
Source: C0285/73: Hincks to Labouchere, 7 July 1856, enc. Blue 
Bk. Rept., 1855, and Apps. Compiled from App.
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III.2 LAND AND LABOUR IN TOBAGO; 1838-1855
III.2.1 The Context of the Struggles
After 1838, as obtained throughout the BWI, the 
managers/attorneys/planters (hereafter referred to as 
planters) employed a panoply of weapons to control the options 
available to the labourers. The planters did not always act 
in concert. Many, whose estates had good provision lands, 
sought to 'grasp' labour from neighbouring estates, by 
offering Is per day for field labour (the regular wage was 8d 
per day) for 40 days work per year, with the 40 days often at 
the end of the year. This practice of attracting 'strangers' 
helped to raise wages; it unsettled families; and it led some 
workers to seek short-term employment on several estates, with 
a commitment to none. Lt.-Gov. Darling complained of varying 
systems and hours of work, which made it difficult for the 
Stipendiary Magistrates to settle disputes. The results were 
often counter to the planters' interests, and tended to 
encourage task, rather than day, work.^ In spite of these 
intra-class conflicts, the planters used their legislative 
power to the utmost to secure their advantage.
The Assembly, having the power over taxation and 
supplies, often tied controversial legislation to the Supply 
Bill, to force the Colonial Office not to withhold dissent, if 
only to save the supplies (Ch. 7). The planters' strategies 
must be understood within this context.
 ^C0285/48: MacGregor to Normanby, 15 Aug. 1839, enc.
Darling to Assembly, 30 July 1839; C0285/50: MacGregor to 
Russell, 18 May 1841, Dowland's rept.; C0285/52: Grey to 
Stanley, 7 Dec. 1843, De Gourville's rept. Marshall 
[1979b].
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The franchise was kept deliberately restricted. In 1840, 
Darling asked the legislature to widen it. Both houses rudely 
declined, the Assembly declaring of the freed slaves that 
'their rise in the Social Scale, will be better marked by 
their reaching up to the qualification, than by bringing it 
down to them.'* By 1854, only 43 freeholders qualified to 
vote, many of them not ex-slaves. To keep wages down and 
labour continuous, the planters pressed for immigration, to be 
paid for as far as possible from the labourers' taxes.^ The 
burden of taxation was borne by the labouring class (Ch. 7).
As happened elsewhere in the Caribbean, punitive laws 
were passed. The framework for the laws on the access of the 
freedmen to land was set by an 183 6 Order-in-Council, devised 
during the tenure of Glenelg as Secretary of State, which 
advocated high prices for Crown lands, to prevent the ex­
slaves from having any alternative but to labour on estates to 
produce exportable staples.* Act No. 330 of 1839, which 
extended the provisions of an earlier Act (No. 324), to punish 
'lawless intruders' on land, provided for the summary eviction 
of tenants holding over after the expiration of their tenancy. 
Tobago's Solicitor General Wattley supported it. R. Boucher 
Clarke, the Barbados Solicitor General, said it subjected the 
labourers resident on estates to 'caprice', and 'would operate 
very oppressively and unjustly' on them. The Act was
* C0285/49; MacGregor to Russell & Enc., 30 Sept. 1840.
 ^C0285/49: MacGregor to Russell & Enc., 29 Sept. 1840.
* PP. 183 6, Vol. XLVIII, Circular Despatch, Glenelg to
Governors of the West India Colonies, 3 0 June 183 6,
pp. 58-60.
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disallowed.7 However, the Magistrates and the Colonial Office 
never succeeded in modifying the implied contracts and the 
conditional tenancy of the located labour system [Marshall 
1979b;20].
In this context, the power of the Colonial Office to act 
as a 'third force' [Green 1986], though important, was 
circumscribed. The land question was largely an internal 
struggle for power between the planters and the freedmen.
A crucial factor in the negotiation between the planters
and labourers over wages and access to land was the high cost
of imported goods (Ch. 2) and local food. Rev. John Horsford,
head of the Methodist Circuit from 1850-52, stated that
imported goods were dearer than elsewhere,
and the labouring population - prompted 
by the necessity under which the merchants 
are inevitably placed to dispose of their 
stock at a higher rate than elsewhere,
... - bring their provisions to the market 
in Scarborough at an exorbitant price.
[Horsford 1856:361]
A newspaper editorial in 1839* stated that yams were Is per 
lb, or 4 times the price of English potatoes, while the 
average wage was 8d per day. Ten years later. Chief Justice 
Sanderson argued that the high cost of imports caused the 
labouring class, to 'supply just enough to keep prices up to 
the prices of imported food.'*
 ^C0285/48: MacGregor to Russell & Enc., 14 Nov. 1839; 
C0285/49: MacGregor to Russell & Enc., 15 July 1840; 
C0285/66: Colebrooke to Newcastle & Enc., 30 July 1853.
8 The Tobago Gazette and West Indian News. 12 Aug. 1839.
* CO285/60: Colebrooke to Grey, 27 Mar. 1849, enc. Sanderson 
to a Committee of the Leg. Co., 9 Feb. 1849.
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Also relevant to the process of negotiation between 
planters and labourers was the establishment of shops by 
managers and owners on or near estates, so encouraging the 
truck system. Darling wrote in 1842 that this was 'very 
generally adopted', so causing part of the labourer's wage to 
return 'to the Source from which it flowed.
The labourers would have taken into account their 
expectations and standards of the years preceding 1838, their 
conception of freedom, and the realities of the new situation. 
They would have considered the real wage, given the high 
taxes, licenses, and prices of local and imported goods [cf. 
Hall 1959/1990:157-9]; they would have assessed the advantages 
of being producers, in the light of their needs for cash at 
different times of the year.
III.2.2 The Movement to Villages and the Acquisition 
of Freeholds
In the early years after Emancipation, there was some 
exodus by labourers from the plantations into villages, some 
acquisition of freeholds, and some permanent withdrawal from 
estate labour. The first progressed; the second was not as 
extensive as it first appeared; and most freeholders did not 
enjoy complete independence of the estates. There were also 
variations in the options available to labourers in the 
districts - Windward, Middle, and Leeward - into which the 
island was divided. The first two of these processes are here
0^ C0285/51: Grey to Stanley, 3 Dec. 1842, enc. Darling's 
1842 Blue Bk. Rept.; cf. The Tobaao Gazette and West 
Indian News. 24 Dec. 1839, p. 2.
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examined.
Table 10 shows that, in the first 5 years of freedom, 
2348 out of 7141 effective labourers (32.8%) no longer 
remained on the estates' pay lists. Some were women who 
looked after their homes and their provision grounds. Others 
found employment as hucksters, fishermen, etc. Many were 
children. Darling wrote of the 'total inutility' of a law 
preventing children under 16 from working on the estates, 
'when so general and decided an aversion to apprenticing their 
children ... has been shown by the negroes'." In the 1840s, 
some of the older boys were allowed to accept estate labour, 
usually to tend the stock and the carts. Therefore, if we 
assume with Marshall [1979b] that one-third of the labourers 
defected, many would have been children; for the majority of 
the remainder, it is doubtful that independent landowning was 
a feasible option.
" C0285/48: MacGregor to Normanby, 8 May 1839, enc. 
Darling to MacGregor, 19 Apr. 1839.
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TABLE 10
Labourers on Estates: 1838-1843
No. of Praedial 
Apprentices 
31 July 1838
%
Males
3677
46%
Females
4304
54%
Total
7981
100%
No. of Labourers 
on Estates' Pay 
Lists
30 June 1843
Decrease 
% Decrease
2718
57%
959
26%
2075
43%
2229
48%
4793
100%
3188
40%
NOTE;
Non-effectives in 1838 were approx. 840. Therefore, 
decrease in effective labour was 2348. No breakdown 
of the effectives by sex is given.
Source: C0285/52: Grey to Stanley, 7 Dec. 1843, enc. 
Stipendiary Magistrates' Repts.
III.2.2.1 Windward District: 1838-1855
Although the Windward District always had the lowest 
population density and the largest acreage of abandoned land, 
it had no independent villages before 1855. In 1843, 
Stipendiary Magistrate De Gourville reported that there were 
6 freeholders and 27 renters, 'and from every information I 
have been enabled to procure, their settlements are well 
cultivated, while, at the same time, they offer fully the same 
labour to the Estates as those located on them. ... There are
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neither villages nor Hamlets in this District.'^ On one
estate, Delaford, which had been abandoned since the 1820s,
the labourers from adjacent plantations were permitted by the
planters to squat, but all continued to offer their labour to
the adjacent estates.^
One effective deterrent to those wishing to buy land was
said by De Gourville to be
the frequent illegal Sales of land, by 
persons who either had [?] no legal 
title to the same, or authority to dis­
pose of it, and many labourers after 
having paid as high as £20 Sterling per 
acre, have been left without land or Money, 
while others again have only been able to 
obtain redress by incurring further 
expenses.w
The Windward District experienced heavy population loss
to the Middle and Leeward Districts in the first 15 years
after Emancipation (Table 11). This was so, firstly, because
little land was available for purchase, although provision
grounds for located labour with conditional tenancy were
generously granted; and, secondly, because poor communications
with the local market hindered the trade in provisions;
There is a great scarcity of labour in the 
Windward District, many of the Labourers, 
with their families having left that 
Quarter, and settled nearer to 
Scarborough, where, in general, they 
chiefly occupy themselves in growing pro­
visions for the Scarborough market.^
2^ C0285/52: Grey to Stanley, 7 Dec. 1843; De Gourville.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1850, Consolidated 
Tables.
C0285/53: Grey to Stanley, 23 Aug. 1844, enc. Stip.
Mag. Repts.; cf. CO290/4: 30 June 1848, Pringle.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1850, Consol. Tables.
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TABLE 11
Population by District/Parish: 1844-1871
Y e a r D i s t r i c t M a le s F e m a le s T o t a l
1844
1851
1861
1871
1881
W in dw ard
M id d le
L e e w a r d
T o t a l
W in dw ard
M id d le
L e e w a r d
T o t a l
W in dw ard
M id d le
L e e w a r d
T o t a l
W in dw ard
M id d le
L e e w a r d
T o t a l
W in dw ard
M id d le
L e e w a r d
T o t a l
1227
2439
2486
6152
1205
2866
2878
6949
1358
2995
3080
7433
1559
2835
3868
8262
2041
2853
3800
8694
1364
2955
2737
7056
1144
3287
2998
7429
1321
3398
3258
7977
1572
3079
4141
8792
1987
3219
4151
9357
2591
5394
5223
13208
2349
6153
5876
14378
2679
6393
6338
15410
3131
5914
8009
17054
4028
6072
7951
18051
20
41
39.5
100
16
43
41
100
17
42 
41
100
18 
35 
47
100
22
34
44
100
Sources ; Tobago Censuses for given years.
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The huckstering trade, conducted largely by itinerant
women, brought foreign goods and redistributed, to the urban
consumer, the produce of those who remained at Windward. In
1842, De Gourville reported:
The internal traffic consists principally 
of cotton, and the lighter kind of British 
manufactured goods, and which is effected 
through the medium of licensed Hucksters, 
who are satisfied in default of money to 
receive in payment from the Labourers their
ground provisions, pigs, poultry eggs and
dried fish, and which they carry to town 
and sell in the Market.^
The Windward District suffered an acute labour shortage,
which is why 186 of the 292 liberated Africans who arrived in
1851, were sent there. In addition, between 1845-52, it
received 255 Barbadian migrants. Some of the latter returned
to Barbados, and unknown numbers joined the exodus to the
south-west. In December 1852, only 191 migrant labourers were
at work on windward estates.^ Ironically, the presence of
immigrants accelerated the withdrawal of native labour from
the estates, in order to grow provisions to feed the
Barbadians.^ Thus, migrant labour produced no increase in
the labour supply available to the estates. Its introduction
was, in the words of Stipendiary Magistrate Hall Pringle,
'pursuing a shadow'.^
In 1852, the Magistrates reported that there were still
C0285/51: Grey to Stanley, 28 Dec. 1842, enc. Stip. 
Mag. Repts., De Gourville.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1852; Pringle, 
Table A.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1853.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Rept., 30 June 1847.
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no villages at Windward; instead, there had been 'a decrease
in such settlers' since 1842. There were scattered houses,
... for the most part built on land rented 
from the Sugar Estates, the House being 
built by the renter with the privelege [sic] 
of removing his materials at the termina­
tion of the lease or otherwise disposing 
of it, but this seldom occurs.
Pringle counted 20 small freeholds, while there were 892
labourers, 601 males and 291 females.^
After the 1847 hurricane, a list was made by the
Stipendiary Magistrates of all the sugar estates and the
damage incurred.^ Thirteen of the 18 sugar estates listed in
1847 for the Windward District were sold in the Encumbered
Estates Court, along with Goat Island and Little Tobago (two
offshore islands), and a few blocks of timber land. We
calculated, from studying the plans, particulars, affidavits
and other documents submitted to the Court, the acreage sold
to labourers between 1838 and 1885, when the estates of the
biggest planters (the McCall/Gillespie partnership and Thomas
Reid and Co.) were sold. From the 17 large parcels of land,
14,717 acres of which were sold by the Court, only 107 acres
were identified as having been sold to labourers, with one
additional smallholder, (acreage not given) , claiming title to
a part of Campbelton Estate (Table 18).
The majority of the freedpeople remaining at Windward
were tenants. Some rented house lots and garden grounds;
20 C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1852, Consol. Tables,
Child; 31 Dec. 1852, Table A, Pringle.
21 C0285/57: Reid to Grey, 23 Oct. 1847, & Encs., Consol­
idated Return of Stip. Mags, and Supt. of Police Rept.
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others were located labourers under conditional tenancy; yet 
others were tenants at will. By 1852, 208 of the 892 estate 
workers were also metayers, cultivating 200 acres of estate 
cane lands. The Stipendiary Magistrates commented that most 
forms of tenancy in the Windward District were 'based upon the 
most unjust principles, the tenant having no security or 
certainty of possession.' The tenants were also 'rapidly 
withdrawing themselves from agricultural labour for hire', 
because of their access to provision and metayer grounds.^
III.2.2.2 Leeward and Middle Districts; 1838-1855
In the more populous and better cultivated Leeward and 
Middle Districts, there was great eagerness among the freed 
people to acquire land. However, many of the plots bought in 
the first flush of freedom were lands of poor quality, without 
good access, and sometimes without title, because the buyers 
could not afford the cost of the survey and the registration 
fees. In that period, there was no professional surveyor in 
Tobago, and plots were arbitrarily measured.
Several new villages appeared in the Leeward District in 
the early 1840s - Signal Hill, Patience Hill, Hopeton, Milford 
Village, and Montgomery 'Moravian Establishment', followed by 
Bethel, Bethlehem, Black Rock and other settlements.
By 1844, the largest number of lots sold was on Prospect 
Estate, where, according to Dowland,
22 C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1849, Le Plastrier; 
30 June 1848, 30 June 1849, 30 June 1852, 31 Dec. 1852, 
Pringle. The quotations are, respectively, from the 
second and third of Pringle's repts.
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the Proprietor commenced his Sales 
early in the day at £20 an Acre and by 
which, I believe, he raised a Sum Equal 
to what he had paid originally for the 
whole Estate, which is an extensive one 
with a Steam Engine upon it.
An old woman, called Bonny, bought an acre at Prospect for
which her costs were:
Land £20. 0. 0
Surveyor 1. 12. 0
Drawing deeds 2. 1. 8
Register 2. 5. 0
TOTAL £25. 18. 8
Dowland described her plot as follows:
It is indifferent hilly land, far from 
water, and has a bad sufference [sic] 
road to it. Bonny is now assisting in 
cleaning the liquor at the Sugar Mill at 
Prospect, at 6d a day.^
By 1845, Prospect Estate had sold 81 acres to labourers; yet,
there were only 17 freeholders with title.^ Down to the
1880s, it remained unrivalled in the high acreage it sold as
a means of attracting labour (and adding to its profits)
(Table 18).
A similar picture is drawn in the reports for the Middle 
District. Land was quickly bought 'with avidity at the rate 
of £20 an acre', but it was 'frequently of very inferior 
soil'.^* The districts near to Scarborough, which had been 
settled mainly by free coloureds and blacks during slavery -
23 C0285/53: Grey to Stanley, 23 Aug. 1844, Dowland. Cf.
C0285/52: Grey to Stanley, 7 Dec. 1843, Dowland. Both 
despatches enclose Stip. Mag. Repts.
24 C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 3 0 Sept. 1845, Dowland.
23 C0285/51: Grey to Stanley, 3 Dec. 1842, enc. Darling's 
1842 Blue Bk. Rept. The quot. is Darling's. Grey to 
Stanley, 28 Dec. 1842, enc. Stip. Mag. Repts., Child.
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Calder Hall, Rockly Vale, Monkey Town (today Morne Quiton) - 
became heavily populated. New villages - Mason Hall, Elsinore 
(also spelt 'Elsineur'; later part of Mt St George) - were 
opened up in 1841; Mt Grace, Cinnamon Hill, St Cecilia, 
Hooghly Bush (near Moriah; also called 'Ugly Bush'), and 
Parlatuvier began to develop in 1842. Mason Hall and Mt St 
George/Elsinore were built around the Methodist chapels, and 
Moriah developed on lands bought from Indian Walk estate, near 
the large Moravian Church which was built in 1842. Whether 
the missionaries took any initiative in acquiring these lands 
for the people, as happened in the 'Church-focussed' villages 
of Jamaica and elsewhere, is not clear from the available data 
[cf. Mintz 1987].
The first accurate enumeration of the population in
villages was done after the 1847 hurricane. The village
movement advanced rapidly in the Middle and Leeward Districts
(Table 12) . The Stipendiary Magistrates accounted for this
contrast with the Windward District as follows:
In the Middle and Leeward Districts the 
Encrease [in the village population] 
has been very great, in consequence chief­
ly of their contiguity to the Markets of 
Scarborough and Plymouth. In these two 
Districts the tendency of the Peasantry 
is to settle themselves in Villages - each 
Cottage having in general a plot of land 
attached to it. On many of these lots, 
there are several Cottages built on 
sufferance.^
The redistribution of the population into village settlements, 
based on manv tvpes of land tenure, was, therefore, heavily 
influenced by a desire for land and markets.
CO290/4: Stip. Mag. Reports, 30 June 1852, Consol. Tables.
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stipendiary Magistrate Child observed that 'Not one half' 
of these land transfers were legally registered. By 1843, 
both Dowland and Child reported that the rush to acquire 
freeholds had abated, many having realized that 'every 
possible advantage is taken of their ignorance'.^ (Tables 13 
to 15) .
Many of the freeholders were obliged to continue working 
for the estates. The average size of holding, apart from the 
small lots sold in Plymouth Town, was one acre, or just under. 
Such small plots could not usually support whole families, 
especially as, in some cases, the original lot was subdivided 
and rented to other labourers. Subdivision by relatives 
following the death of the original purchasers was also 
frequent. In 1845, Child reported that most of the renters in 
his district rented from small freeholders. 'To obtain a 
livelihood therefore the Small Free-holders and renters must 
still afford to the community a large proportion of their 
labour'
Not everyone could afford to buy land. Dowland in the 
Leeward District observed in 1845 that the cost of an acre 
'was too much money for the generality to raise. Those 
parties who have settled themselves as independent freeholders 
are for the most part Carpenters, Masons, House Servants, 
Grooms etc. and they generally continue to earn their
^ C0285/52: Grey to Stanley, 7 Dec. 1843, enc. Stip.
Mag. Repts., Child & Dowland. The second quot. is 
Dowland's.
Ibid., Child. C0285/54: Grey to Stanley, 21 July 1845, 
enc. Stip. Mag. Repts., Child.
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livelihood by working on the Plantations in their 
Neighbourhood.' Again, in 1847, he reported that the villagers 
were 'principally Artisans (and their families) who are 
employed on the adjoining Estates.'^
The first year in which freeholds were assessed for land 
taxes - and the last year of the Magistrates' reports - was 
1853, when the number of freeholds assessed was 966, but only 
the gross figure for the island is given.^ It seems that the 
majority of the freeholds were in the Middle District, which 
extended northwards from Scarborough and its suburbs to the 
coast at Parlatuvier. This district is wetter and hillier than 
the Leeward, and had more lands which were marginal to sugar 
production. In 1852, the magistrates estimated 1020 
freeholds, usually one acre or less - 20 at Windward, 700 in 
the Middle District, and 300 in the L e e w a r d . I f  there were 
966 freeholds, assuming few cases in which one owner had 
several plots, then freeholders constituted only 12% of the 
1851 adult population (aged over 20) of 7982.
When we compare the 1847 list of sugar estates with the 
records of sales in the Encumbered Estates Court for the 
Middle District (Table 18), we find, interestingly, that, of 
the 21 estates listed for 1847, only 5 came before the Court.
C0285/54: Grey to Stanley, 21 July 1845, Dowland; 
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1847, Dowland.
The Stip. Mags.' figure is here given. The 1853 Blue Bk. 
gives 866 freeholds, but the data on freeholds in the 
Blue Bks. seem implausible. For 1854 and 1855 the figures 
are 694 and 710, respectively. C0290/37, /38, /39: Blue 
Bks. for 1853, 1854 and 1855.
CO290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June, 31 Dec. 1852; 30 June 
1851, Consolidated Tables.
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The Middle District had, numerically and proportionately, the 
largest population in villages (Table 12), and it was 
estimated to have the largest number of freeholds. It is 
possible that more of its estates may have been leased or 
bought by resident proprietors after the 1840s. This is an 
area for further research, especially since, in 1843, 
Stipendiary Magistrate Child wrote of 'upwards of 3000 acres 
of fertile land offered for Sale or Lease in lots of one acre 
or upwards', while only 960 acres were cultivated in the 
district. Child also explained that many of the estates, 
'hampered by debt', were 'falling into the hands of residents 
at very low prices.'^
2^ C0285/52: Grey to Stanley, 7 Dec. 1843, Stip. Mag. Repts., 
Child; cf. Niddrie [1965:272].
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TABLE 12
Village Population in Tobago: 1847-1853
District
Population
of
District
No. in
Villages
Built
Since
1838
&
Population
1847
(31 Dec.)
Windward
Middle
Leeward
TOTAL
Windward
Middle
Leeward
TOTAL
2314
5558
5336
13208
2349
6153
5876
14378
*
1736
575
2311
1853
(30 June)
300
4000
2372
6672
31.2%
10.8%
17.5%
12.8%
65.0%
40.4%
46.4%
NOTES ;
1. The district population figures are from the censuses of
1844 and 1851, respectively.
2. * No discernible settlements; only scattered houses.
3. The figures for the village population exclude the
residents of suburbs of Scarborough.
Sources; C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1847 and 30 June 
1853; Censuses, 1844, 1851.
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TABLE 13
Freeholders in Leeward District: 1 Sept. 1843
Place
Milford*
Grafton*
Signal
Hill*
Plymouth
Prospect
Hill
No. of 
Allot­
ments
5
5
18
28
50
Land
sold
4 acres 
5h "
21 '•
29 town 
lots
42 acres
No. of 
Families
5
5
18
28
50
No. of 
Inhabi­
tants
23
8
64
106
no houses
NOTE;
* 'The purchasers of these small plots of Land are mostly 
employed directly or indirectly, on estates, as Coopers. 
Carpenters. Masons etc.'
Source: C0285/52: Grey to Stanley, 7 Dec. 1843, Stip. Mag.
Dowland; author's emphasis.
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TABLE 14
Freeholders in Middle District: 1 Aug. 1843
Place
Mt St George 
Wesleyan Land 
Elsinore 
Mason Hall 
Belmont* 
Calder Hall 
Rockley Vale 
Mt Grace 
Ugly Bush
TOTAL
No. of 
Allotments
50
16
5
16
11
65
29
19
7
218
Land Sold 
(Acres)
52
17
5
21
11
70
29
17
7
229
NOTE;
* Leased for 20 years.
Source: As for Table 13; Stip. Mag. Child.
TABLE 15
Freeholders in Tobago: Aug. 1838-Aug. 1843
Freeholds Long Leases
No. of No. of
District Lots Acres Lots Acres
Windward 6 6 27 27
Middle 207 218 11 11
Leeward 106 106
— —
TOTAL 319 330 38 38
Source: As for Table 13; summary report.
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In the Leeward District. 14 of the 32 sugar estates 
(according to the 1847 list), along with Pigeon Point, then a 
coconut estate, passed through the Court. These 15 properties, 
at the time of their sale, comprised 5586 acres. By 1885, 
their owners had sold 180 acres to labourers (Table 18).
Where the records on land transactions with labourers are 
more detailed, there is a consistent picture of small-sized 
holdings. A schedule of the lands sold to labourers, for 
Grafton, Old Grange, New Grange, Buccoo, Hampden (Leeward), 
and Kendal Place (Windward) is given for the years 1840-64. 
At Grafton, 47 labourers bought (35 of them doing so in 1843) . 
With 6 exceptions, each buying 1 acre, the labourers bought 2 
roods (% acre) or less. There were 10 buyers at Old Grange, 
18 at New Grange, 22 at Buccoo, and 4 at Kendal Place. The 
modal size of holding was % acre on the first 3 properties, % 
acre for Buccoo, and 1 acre for Kendal Place. All but three 
labourers bought their land in the 184 0s.”
III.2.2.3 Summary on the Village Movement and the Acquisition 
of Freeholds
The data show that there was a rapid movement into houses 
built off the estates, particularly in the Middle and Leeward 
Districts. In the Windward District, the movement into homes 
off the estates was more limited by 1855, but most workers 
built their homes on rented land on the estates. The 
acquisition of homes is thus distinct from, though related to, 
the movement into independent settlements. Island-wide, 712
” C0441,5/9: Re Leith ex parte Davidson, Schedules K, L, M, 
filed 12 Dec. 1864.
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houses of freeholders and renters were returned in 1843; by 
1847, the number had doubled to 1445.*
In 1855, Dowland, then Acting Colonial Secretary, 
distinguished between the movements into homes and into 
villages:
... I should say that the majority of the 
Laborers are living in houses erected by 
themselves since the period of Emancipa­
tion but they are not clustered into 
Villages built since that period. Within 
the last three years the increase of new 
houses has been very trifling on account 
of the scarcity of money and difficulty 
of finding employment.*
Considerable effort was invested in homes and freeholds.
Child, reporting on the Leeward District for 1855, remarked:
The fact that a great majority of the 
negro population - whether plantation 
labourers or otherwise - have ... ac­
quired residences of their own ... may 
be taken as prima facie evidence that 
they are industrious and saving ... .*
While the island-wide movement into independent homes was 
very advanced by 1855, the growth of villages was most 
pronounced in the Middle and Leeward Districts. The 
acquisition of freeholds was slower but, again, was most 
apparent in the Middle and Leeward Districts. Access to land, 
however, was widespread throughout the island. Holdings, 
whether rented or bought, were generally less than 5 acres.
For Tobago as a whole, another source which permits an
* C0285/58: Reid to Grey, 26 Mar. 1848, enc. Memorial of 
House of Assembly, 21 Mar. 1848.
35 C0290/39: Blue Bk., 1855.
* C0285/73: Hincks to Labouchere, 7 July 1856, enc. 1855 
Blue Bk. Rept.; Child, Memo, on Leeward District, 16 June 
1856.
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understanding of land tenure in the mid 1850s is the 1856 
Valuation Roll, on which all properties (including buildings) 
were assessed. The figures here are an over-estimate of the 
number of freeholds, since land and buildings occupied by 
tenants were not distinguished; but they give a good picture 
of the unequal distribution of property in 1856. Eighty-one 
per cent of the properties were assessed at less than £5 per 
annum; 90% at less than £10 per annum; and fully 56% were 
valued at less than £3 per annum, £1 being taken as the 
rateable value for one acre of land (Table 16).
TABLE 16
Distribution of Assessed Property in Tobago: 1856
Assessed No. of Per Cent
Value of All Properties of
Properties Properties
£
< 1} 10} .4}
1 < 2} 610} 24.0}
2 < 3} 0 < 5 821} 2072 32.1}
3 < 4} 425} 16.6}
4 < 5} 206} 8.1}
5 < 10 214 8.4
10 < 15 72 2.8
15 < 20 27 1.0
20 < 30 52 2.0
30 < 40 27 1.0
40 < 50 12 .5
50 <100 29 1.1
100+ 45 1.8
TOTAL 2550 99.8%
Source: C0285/75: Hincks to Lytton, 24 July 1858, enc. 1857 
Blue Bk. Rept.; calculated from Appendix.
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III.2.3 The Relations of Production: 1838-1848
The Stipendiary Magistrates' Reports for 1838 to 1848 
reveal a complex range of relationships between labourers and 
planters, though precise figures on the number of persons in 
each category are not available. Sugar estates so dominated 
the economy that the statistics on 'labourers at work for 
hire' refer exclusively to estate labour. Wages and access to 
land were closely connected.
First, there was the located labour system, by which 
workers occupied a house and provision grounds of % acre or as 
much land as the worker wished, usually with medical 
attention, as payment in kind. The money wage of a first 
class labourer under this system varied from estate to estate, 
and over time; but, on average, it was 8d per day, for 5 days' 
work per week. Second class labourers earned 6d to 8d per day; 
and third class, 3d to 6d. Such tenancy was based on an annual 
or 'general' hiring; the contracts were often implied - that 
is, assumed to be in force unless otherwise stated. Annual 
contracting for labour usually means that there is no mid­
season reservoir of unemployed workers on whom planters can 
draw [Shlomowitz 1984:4]. Therefore, especially on an island 
of low population density, the threat of dismissal was much 
reduced, while fines, charges against labour, the truck 
system, punitive taxes and other forms of direct and indirect 
pressure assumed more importance.
Secondly, there were, particularly in the Leeward and 
Windward Districts in the early post-Emancipation years, 
tenants with obligation - people attracted by good provision
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lands, who rented 1 acre for 40s per annum, the rent to be 
paid in kind by 40 days' labour (labour-rent) , usually at the 
end of the year. The planters hoped to secure the continuous 
service of the workers during the entire year.
Thirdly, there were tenants without any obligation to 
labour for the estates. They rented land under lease, usually 
written, often for 2 to 3 years.
Fourthly, there was an increasing number of residents of 
villages, hamlets and other settlements, with freeholds or 
rented lands, who offered their labour power to the estates 
for wages ranging from 8d or 9d to Is 2d per day. To these 
part-time wage labourers, estate land was available for rent 
from 24s to 32s per acre per annum.
Fifthly, there were 'Freeholders and renters, and their 
numbers are increasing, cultivating small patches of canes 
which are made into sugar on stipulated terms at the works of 
some neighbouring Estate.' Child reported that, in the Middle 
District, the sugar was shared between grower and 
manufacturer.^ This arrangement was different from metayage 
contracts. It involved a clear division of labour between the 
cultivation of the canes and the manufacture of the sugar. It 
also involved a clear separation of ownership of land and 
machinery, for the growers were producing on lands no longer 
part of the estates on which the sugar was made.
In the Windward District, there were also many tenants at 
will, occupying estate lands on sufferance.
37 C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1848, Consol. Tables 
& Child, for Middle Dist.
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From the late 1840s onwards, metavaae (sharecropping) 
'contracts', often unwritten, were prevalent. The terms of 
these contracts varied from estate to estate, but all were for 
the production and manufacture of sugar on estate lands, using 
estate carts, mills, machinery and curing houses, with half 
the sugar going to the metayer. Most metayers were themselves 
employers of labour, for which payment was in cash or in kind.
The eighth category is those who permanently withdrew 
from the estate labour force. The Magistrates observed that 
married women were likely to be numerous in this group, 
usually working in partnership with their spouses as 
'Domestic, Gardener, and Marketeer'.^ However, we should not 
suppose that a high proportion of women among those 
withdrawing meant that most females left field labour.^ In 
general, it was clear that 'the growing of Market Vegetables, 
burning Charcoal, and planting Canes on their own account is 
considered more pleasant, independent, and profitable than 
consecutive Cane Cultivation on a plantation.'^* Thus, there 
was a marked preference for the independence and rewards of 
the peasant labour process.
Many freedmen were at once metayers, renters, day 
labourers, freeholders and cane farmers. Correspondingly, many 
planters were, at once, landlords receiving rent in cash or in
38 C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1850, Dowland.
In 1851, Sir William Colebrooke, the Gov.-in-Chief, wished 
that more women had withdrawn from field labour, because 
of the widespread neglect of young children. PP. 1851, 
Vol. XXXIV, Annual Repts. for 1850, Colebrooke to Grey, 
27 Aug. 1851, p. 56.
^ C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1849, Consol. Tables.
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kind, employers of labourers who were paid in cash or in kind, 
and parties to metayage and other crop-sharing contracts.
Thus, there was no agro-proletariat, dependent on wages
and completely devoid of access to land, in Tobago. The
nominal wages (usually 8d per day) which, from the 1840s, were
lower than those paid elsewhere in the Windward Islands, must
be understood within this context of widespread access to
land, indirect coercion and remuneration in kind. Planters,
frequently unable to find cash, resorted to giving rum and
other ardent spirits as part-payment for labour, and this
persisted even after 1848, when it was abolished by law. A
considerable part of this rum was re-sold by the labourers.^
Lt.-Gov. Graeme frankly reported in 1847:
It is an error to suppose that in Tobago 
we give a high rate of wages: The price
of field labor varies from six pence to a 
shilling per diem according to age for 
attached Negros [sic]; that is, for such 
as have houses and grounds: but one shill­
ing and four pence is demanded on Saturdays, 
which is still ... considered as a day of 
exclusive freedom, and of exemption from 
Estates' employ. ... The charge in Slavery 
for preparing and opening an acre of land 
in this island by the employment of a Task 
Gang, was eight pounds sterling. The same 
amount of work was performed very recently 
for El. 19. 10 upon a Saturday too, when 
the people as stated above, demand the 
higher rate of wages: The Gang consisted
of twenty six men and women, with four 
water carriers: each person opened 100 
four feet cane holes, which very nearly
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1847, 31 Dec. 1847, 
31 Dec. 1848. The Liquor Act was revised in 1853 and 
1858. The 1858 law permitted the issue of liquor in 
lieu of wages. C0285/75: Hincks to Stanley & Encs., 7 
May 1858.
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cover the surface of an acre of ground.^
The labour described - 'holing' - was one of the most arduous 
of plantation tasks. As the 1840s progressed, task work, 
ending by 11.00 a.m., was increasingly preferred to day work.
Dependent capitalism in Tobago produced a class of 
capitalists with minimal capital and a class of labourers for 
whom the wage was not a wage, in the Marxian sense of the 
term. The nominal wages, which Lt.-Gov. Graeme so innocently 
described, continued into the succeeding decades. In 1858, 
Gov. Hincks reported, after visiting Tobago, that, while the 
ordinary wages paid by the planters were 8d per day, the 
metayers 'have frequently to employ additional hands and they 
are ready to pay ls/4d or double the rate allowed by the 
Planters.'^ Most labourers had several sources of income, of 
which the wage was only one. Low wages were premised on the 
availability to virtually every labourer of additional sources 
of income from provision grounds, metayage, freeholds, fishing 
etc., and this persisted well into the 20th century.*
The pattern of landholding and the range of relationships 
outlined do not suggest a definitive 'flight' from the estates 
or an independence of estate labour on the part of the free
C0285/56; Reid to Grey, 18 May 1847, enc. Graeme's 1846 
Blue Bk. Rept.
43 C0285/75: Hincks to Stanley, 26 May 1858.
* See the Turpin Family Papers on Charlotteville Estate, 
which they have owned from 1884 to the present. Cyril to 
Charles Turpin, 14 Apr. 1926: 'The villagers may say what 
they like but the fish will always hold them on the 
spot.' Also, C. A. Turpin (Uganda), Conf., 'Memorandum 
on the Administration of Charlotteville Estate, Its 
Cultivations etc.', 25 Dec. 1929.
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people, although their priorities were always given to their 
own holdings, or to their rented provision grounds. The 
estates' pay lists increasingly reflected a commitment to 
labour that was honoured, because of high rates of absenteeism 
from regular work, more in the breach than in the observance. 
Within the context of part-time or occasional wage labour in 
which even freeholders were involved, the labourers maximized 
their economic leverage and their degrees of freedom.
III.2.4 The Labourers' Options in A Period of Rapid Change;
1848-1855
The 1850s mark a turning point in the relations of 
production in Tobago. From that time, metayage became the 
dominant relationship between planter and labourer. Metayage 
was related to the labourers' access to land and patterns of 
land acquisition. We now examine these processes.
The late 1840s were a critical period for the BWI sugar 
economy. The introduction of the Sugar Duties Act, the 
depression in sugar prices, the financial crisis in the UK, 
the failure of the West India Bank (the only one in Tobago) in 
November 1847, and the inefficient system of production, were 
aggravated by a devastating hurricane in October 1847. Many 
absentee owners abandoned or sold their lands; and the number 
of working estates owned by residents rose from 3 or 4 (out of 
72) in 1838 to 38 (out of 61) in 1858, a process that 
continued well into the 1860s. Most consignees became 
unwilling to advance money for Tobago estates. The threat of 
abandonment hung like a heavy pall over many estates until 
well into the 1850s.
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The amount of coin in circulation fell drastically. 
Planters could not pay wages on time, because of the lack of 
cash and falling production on many estates; some could not 
pay at all. Those planters who obtained money from the local 
merchants paid a large premium and could get it only at 
uncertain periods. Free medical attention to located labourers 
was stopped on some estates. During 1848, 10 of the 30 or so 
Leeward estates abandoned cultivation.
Therefore, at the start of the 1848 crop, the planters 
waged 'a protracted and injurious Struggle'^ to reduce the 
wage, which was bitterly resisted by the labourers, who went 
on strike. In the Windward District, where the reduction in 
wages was accomplished through the intervention of Magistrate 
Hall Pringle, was there no strike/* As late as February 
1849, Graeme reported that 'one third of the usual number 
continued to hold out in the expectation that as the crop 
season advances the former wages will be given. So serious 
was the strike, that James Ewing and Co., Glasgow merchants 
who owned four Tobago estates, wrote to the Colonial Office, 
asking for an early supply of liberated Africans. Ewing and 
Co. also noted that because the labourer was able to 'dictate' 
his own time of work, estates were barely making one-third of 
the crop produced during slavery.* William Cruickshank, one
* C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 Dec. 1848, Dowland.
* C0285/63; Pringle to Grey, 23 Nov. 1850, & Encs.
* C0285/60: Colebrooke to Grey, 14 Feb. 1849, enc. Graeme
to Colebrooke, 1 Feb. 1849, & Stip. Mag. Repts.
* C0285/59: James Ewing and Co. to Grey, 7 Nov. 1848.
164
of three brothers who leased the leeward estates of Ellice, 
Kinnear and Co., British merchants, saw a desperate need for 
3000 Africans if the estates were to be saved from a 
'lamentable state of ruin', owing to the high rates of 
absenteeism of labourers and the lack of unanimity among the 
planters. His brother, Cosmo, manager and lessee of Amity 
Hope, a property of 400 acres, reported that 56 acres were 
cultivated, of which only 8 acres were newly planted.^
The year 1848 marks the turning point as regards the 
workers' willingness to continue as located labourers. In the 
face of irregular wages, which were reduced by 20% after the 
crop, many of the located labourers left their houses and 
provision grounds on the estates and resorted to the 
independent villages, especially during the strike. Indeed, 
Child said that most of the strikers were residents of 
villages.^
In order to avoid the insecurity of conditional tenure
for houses and grounds, and wages that were often paid in
arrears, and to avoid eviction for refusal to work, many of
the located labourers in the Leeward District changed their
status to that of renters on estate and other lands.
Unfortunately, there are no statistics on resident estate
workers, but Dowland reported in June 1848;
The Labourers are fast quitting their 
attached position on an Estate, and are 
renting land & becoming independent
Ellice Papers, Ms. 15137, No. 182-3, Wm. Cruickshank to 
Ellice, 21 July 1848; No. 189, Cosmo Cruickshank to 
Ellice, n.d.
0^ C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1848, Child.
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Cottagers, their labour is precarious, and 
becoming more so every day.
In December, he wrote that 'very few' labourers were attached
to estates, and that many were enlisting their names on the
books of several estates at once. So rapid was the movement
to rented land, and so serious the defection from regular
estate labour because of the threat of reduced wages, that, in
June, Dowland felt obliged to remark;
I have acted in the capacity of Special 
Justice in this Island thro' thirteen 
Crops, and I have never had so many gen­
eral complaints of injurious annoyance to 
the Planter.
By December 1853, the report for the whole island stated:
No Labourer will occupy an Estate Negro 
house, if he can get a piece of land and 
has the means of erecting a cottage.^
In 1849, Dowland wrote that 'generally the planters now
have neither Capital, nor credit', and therefore estates
suffered from lack of labour. The delaying of wages,
sometimes up to 3 months in arrears - ' (a practice which could
not obtain in England) ' - had led to 'a feeling of want of
confidence' among the labourers.^
There was also increased migration to Scarborough; and a
stringent Suppression of Vagrancy Bill was passed, but it was
disallowed. By December 1852, there were very few located
labourers in the Middle and Leeward Districts. By 1854,
migration from the Windward District was great enough to cause
5^ C0290/4: Dowland, 30 June 1848, 31 Dec. 1848.
5^ C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1853, Consol. Tables. 
55 C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1849, Dowland.
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the Methodist missionary to consider abandoning their most
easterly stations.*
Parallel to the movement out of located labour was the
increased refusal to work for wages on the estates. The
Stipendiary Magistrates usually reported the actual number of
workers to be two-thirds of those registered. By 1852,
sometimes not even 20 out of a gang of 70 would be at work in
the Middle District. Irregular, low wages, especially on the
more decrepit plantations, and rising prices for the
necessities of life, drove workers to an increasing dependence
on other resources, even in the Windward District where there
were few freeholds [cf. Hall 1978].* However, the decline in
the number of workers on the estates' lists cannot be taken as
evidence of increased independence of the estates, since there
was a marked increase in metayage and piece-work by jobbing
gangs (Table 17) .
Jobbing gangs, which did piece work for the estates, were
formed by the labourers from 1848 onwards:
... the "Head man" receives 1/- per diem 
for each labourer he brings to the field, 
of which he retains 2d as his own profit, 
in addition to his days [sic] hire. These 
Head men are negroes possessed of some 
little capital, & having considerable 
influence in the labour market. A La­
bourer hired on a plantation cannot leave 
without giving a months [sic] notice, - 
but the jobbing Labourers are under no 
such restriction.*
* C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1852, Consolidated
Tables. WMS: Box 143, File 1854, No. 103, Rev. D. Barley 
to General Secretaries, 7 Dec. 1854.
* C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1852, Child; Pringle.
* C0290/4: Child, 30 June 1853; cf. Dowland, 31 Dec. 1848.
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TABLE 17
Labourers Registered with Estates: 1846-1853
Year/Month Labourers Year/Month Labourers
31 July 1838 7141
(effective
apprentices)
1846 {31 March 5280
{31 Dec. 4977
1847 {30 June 4761
{31 Dec. 4264
1848 {30 June 4325
{31 Dec. 2984
1849 {30 June 2334
{31 Dec. 3331
1850 {30 June 
{31 Dec.
1851 {30 June 
{31 Dec.
1852 {30 June 
{31 Dec.
1853 {30 June 
{31 Dec.
3446
3368
3542
3529
3311
3765
3889
3861
Sources: C0290/4: Stip. Magistrates' Repts. for given dates.
In the new situation, the option which came to be most 
frequently accepted, both by the planters who were unable to 
pay money wages, and the wage labourers/tenants/jobbers cum 
freeholders, was metayage. In 1855, 13 out of 55 estates were 
partially cultivated by metayage. By 1857, 'there was scarce 
an Estate on which the share system had not been introduced to 
a greater or less extent, many of them, even some of the 
larger, being entirely worked by Metayers.'^ By 1866, the 
system obtained 'universally'.^ In the 1840s and 1850s, 
metayers were usually wage labourers on the estates from which
C0285/75: Hincks to Lytton, 24 July 1858, enc. Drysdale's 
1857 Blue Bk. Rept.
38 00290/50: Blue Bk., 1866.
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they got metayer lands, except where the properties were
wholly cultivated on the share system.^
The report of the Magistrates for the whole island stated
in December 1848:
... Cultivation of the Cane by small 
Freeholders, Renters, and 'Metairie'
System Planters, has received an impulse 
owing to the reduction of wages, whilst, 
on the other hand. Estates have been 
falling off, and unusually fine as the 
Season was, few planters could take 
advantage of it by inserting a 'Fall 
Plant'; - Never was a remarkably fine 
Season so sacrificed to the want of labor 
at a fair rate of wages.^
The withdrawal from regular estate labour, which was
accentuated in the late 1840s and early 1850s, was in part due
to the failure of the planters to pay prompt and adequate
wages, because of declining advances from absentee owners and
creditors, falling profits and scarce specie. However,
independence of steady wage labour did not mean independent
freeholding, but rather a multiplicity of activities that
might/might not, but often did, involve freedpeople in a
dependent relationship with the estates. Child observed:
The great bulk of the Labouring Class 
grow provisions, for which they have a 
monopoly -, cultivate Metayer canes, 
job all about, and occasionally work on 
Sugar Estates/"
59
60
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1852, Windward Dist., 
Table A; 30 June 1853, Richardson, Leeward Dist.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 Dec. 1848, Consol. Tables.
" C0290/4: Child, 31 Dec.1851. C0285/70: Colebrooke to 
Russell, 7 Aug. 1855, enc. Shortland's 1854 Blue Bk. 
Rept.
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III.3 THE LAND QUESTION AND THE DOMINANCE OF METAYAGE
The remarkable spread of metayage to become the dominant
relationship of production from the 18 60s onwards must now be
briefly discussed, since the system is examined more fully in
Chapter 5. In effect, it symbolized a narrowing of the
labourers' options after 1855.
Initially, metayage was not popular with the workers. It
had been tried by two labourers, one a Barbadian, on Prospect
and Mary's Hill estates, in 1842. Both grew healthy crops of
corn between the growing canes. Within a year, the grower at
Mary's Hill opted out of the scheme. In 1843, it was tried at
Betsy's Hope on a limited scale, but was regarded as not
promising.“ The 'contracts', usually unwritten, were highly
inequitable to the metayers who, after their first experience
of them, clearly described all their disadvantages to Dowland
(Leeward District) in 1849:
The Metairie System is about being given 
up by the Laborers on some Estates on the 
ground that it does not answer. Their 
objections are that their [sic] is not a
fair division of expense, and of produce, 
between themselves and the Proprietor.
That their Canes are sometimes left too 
long when ripe on the ground (this to en­
able the proprietor first to take off his 
own Crop) to the injury of their Cane 
Stools. That as Estates are becoming 
abandoned, they fear that their canes 
would not be ground within a reasonable 
distance of their place of growth.
The price they received for their sugar locally was l%d per
lb, which did not compensate for their labour, and they
C0285/51: Grey to Stanley, 28 Dec. 1842, Stip. Mag. 
Repts., Dowland. C0285/52: Grey to Stanley, 7 Dec. 1843, 
Stip. Mag. Repts., De Gourville.
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complained of losing their share of the molasses or the rum, 
depending on which was manufactured. Dowland again returned 
to the subject in December 1849, in a long critique of the 
written metayer contracts, arguing that the planters who 
adopted metayage 'calculate best for their own interests', 
while the metayers were 'very much open to the will and 
caprice of the Landlord'.^
Le Plastrier (Windward District) also wrote a long 
critique of the abuses inflicted on the metayers, through 
unwritten contracts without witnesses. He asked for 
legislation to protect the metayers.*
Child (Middle District) saw metayage as highly profitable 
to those who invested only occasional labour, if they were not 
otherwise earning money, but as unprofitable to the person who 
engaged in it as the major deployment of his/her time and 
resources. He also noted that it was 'occasionally a means of 
oppression.
The planters were equally vehement in their complaints 
against metayage, although it allowed them to preserve their 
estates in cultivation, without a great outlay of cash for 
wages. Increasingly, they saw it as disadvantageous, 
particularly because of the neglect of the canes in favour of 
the crops which were planted between the cane rows.
Why, then, did metayage, which was optimal for neither
CO290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1849, 31 Dec. 1849, 
Dowland.
* 00285/62: Colebrooke to Grey, 7 March 1850, enc. Le 
Plastrier, 'Remarks on Metairie Contracts'.
CO290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1853, Child.
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planters nor labourers, become the dominant relationship of 
production from the mid 1850s onwards? The reasons are 
clearly, but subtly, linked to the popular desire for land 
ownership, and the planters' determination to prevent this.
Firstly, in the context of reduced or delayed wages, 
high costs of imports and unjust taxes, metayage offered the 
possibility of using estate lands to grow both provisions and 
canes. Metayers were also favoured with lands for pasture on 
the estates, sometimes free of rent. The testimonies before 
the 1890 Metairie Commission* suggest that considerable 
amounts of food crops were grown between the canes, often 
before the canes were planted. Metayage was, thus, a half-way 
house, affording to the planter, labour, and to the labourer, 
land. Short of emigration, to which the labourers 
increasingly resorted from the 1860s, it was the least 
objectionable option in a situation where freehold land, 
employment for wages and specie were all 'scarce'.
Secondly, metayage gave a twofold advantage to the 
planters. In spite of the inefficiency and poor husbandry 
into which the system rapidly deteriorated, it allowed failing 
estates, short of cash for investment and wages, to continue 
in cultivation. Moreover, it confined labour to the estates 
and to lands nearby.
For an understanding of how the latter was accomplished, 
we must go to the records of the 1880s, when the sugar economy 
toppled with the collapse of A. M. Gillespie and Co. and 
Thomas Reid and Sons, the two largest absentee owners. By
66 Met. Com. Rent.. 1891.
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then, there was such large-scale emigration, that the planters
desired, as a matter of urgency, to create a peasantry on the
lands which should have been escheated to the Crown decades
before. E. D. M. Hooper was invited to survey the forests in
1887. He estimated that a third of the island - 25,000 acres
- was under forest. Hooper observed, as our data indicate,
that, along the road connecting the western end of the Main
Ridge to Scarborough (the Middle District), the properties
were more broken up into allotments than elsewhere, 'where
there has been co-operation among owners to resist the
breaking up of estates'. With perspicacity, he wrote:
The demand for land has been met by the 
subdivision of estates and the continua­
tion of the system of métairie has kept a 
portion of the population stationarv that 
would otherwise have wandered to other 
more distant parts of the island.^
It is not hard to see why the legislature took little interest
in developing good roads.
But there is a third important factor. Metavaae could 
have been the instrument for confining labourers to estate 
lands, onlv because thev had restricted access to other lands. 
How this was accomplished is described below.
After the majority of labourers withdrew from residing as 
located workers on the estates in 1848, the planters imposed 
a tax of 5s per acre on provision grounds in 1849. In 1852, 
they introduced a Land Tax Act, imposing 4s per acre on 
cultivated land, and 6d per acre on uncultivated lands, 
whether occupied or not. This Act was objectionable in many
C0321/104: Hooper [1887]; emphasis added.
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respects, not least because, at the same time, the Assembly 
passed another Act to appropriate half of the land taxes so 
raised, to aid immigration. Not only owners of freeholds, but 
also tenants of land, metayers, located labourers, and all 
users of land were required to pay the assessment on lands 
they occupied. President Yeates remarked that 'every labourer 
occupying the smallest fraction of land shall contribute his 
or her quota to the introduction of competitors in the Labour 
Marker [sic] . The Assembly also abolished the export
duties on plantation produce.
The Act provoked a riot in Scarborough on 22 November 
1852. 'Seventy to Eighty persons armed with bludgeons' went 
to the Treasurer's Office and threw down their tax schedules, 
refusing to pay. An angry crowd threw missiles through the 
windows of the Court House - the building which also housed 
the Assembly rooms - and fought with the police and government 
officials. The crowd dispersed only when a detachment from the 
garrison was summoned.
President Yeates exercised considerable political skill, 
in frustrating the purposes of the planters who dominated the 
Assembly. He issued Instructions that the Act should be 
interpreted as exempting renters, located labourers and 
metayers from paying taxes as occupiers of lands, and as 
requiring the emplovers or owners to pay the impost - to the 
prolonged annoyance of the Assembly. Plots of less than 1 
acre were deemed not subject to any tax. Garden lands and
00285/65: Gaskin to Pakington, 2 Nov. 1852, Enc. 11, 
Yeates to Gaskin, 24 Sept. 1852.
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provision grounds under mixed cultivation were treated as 
uncultivated land, paying only 6d per acre.^
Child, who, in June 1850, had recommended the escheat to
the Crown of the seven-tenths of the island's area which was
uncultivated, exploded;
It is not a Tax; - it is either robbery 
or confiscation, - and the harder to 
bear in-as-much [sic] as no attempt seems 
to be made to extend the operation of the 
Land Tax to abandoned Estates.^
Child's comments hit the nub of the matter. In 1852, the 
Blue Book estimated only 7883 acres of cultivated lands, out 
of 57,408 acres alienated. In 1856, more than a third of the 
island was unclaimed, yielding no taxes to the revenue.^ 
Clauses 39 to 45 of the Land Tax Act provided for a survey 
and, after due process, for the escheat of all unoccupied 
lands. However, the escheat of lands was never implemented. 
The turn of events is noteworthy and, once again, the records 
of the 1880s are pertinent.
In 1887, Administrator Llewellyn wrote:
Possibly the Land Tax Commissioners of the 
day, who were planters and also Members 
of Council, in the researches they made 
in the office of the Registrar of Deeds 
to discover Owners of Land ... found out 
where the unoccupied lands were situated
C0285/65: Colebrooke to Pakington & Encs., 9 Dec. 1852; 
C0285/66: Colebrooke to Pakington & Encs., 4 Jan. 1853.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1850, 30 June 1853, 
31 Dec. 1853, Child. The quot. is from the last rept.; 
author's emphasis; cf. Pringle, 3 0 Dec. 1852.
C0290/36, /37, /40: Blue Bks. for 1852, 1853, 1856.
In the 1856 Blue Book, the Col. Sec. remarked on the 
'frequent application' to the executive, which had been 
made by squatters in the Windward District for permission 
to use, and for legal possession of, abandoned lands.
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and I am afraid turned that information 
to their own account.
The Commissioners had placed on the valuation rolls only the
properties which were occupied, so forfeiting the revenue from
the unassessed lands. In 1856, a new Land Tax Act was passed,
without provisions for the escheat of lands. Llewellyn
continued:
Very shortly after the act of 1856 was 
passed the Records show that several large 
transfers of properties were made, between 
the very men who had been Land Tax 
Commissioners and the Conveyances which are 
recorded are most vague; in many instances 
no acreage, boundaries or Parishes are ever 
given, but at the end of a long deed there 
is added "All the Plantations Estates,
Lands and Hereditaments, if any, which 
were or have been annexed thereto and now 
form part thereof"; and that annexing was 
pretty extensive, as without any acreage 
tax it cost nothing for Taxes, to claim 
and occupy Land which was looked upon by 
the assessors as valueless, because no 
Sugar Cane was on it.^
Abandoned estates (as well as Poor Settlers' Lots, some
of which had already been annexed to the estates) were thus
systematically appropriated by the planters over time. In
1886, Llewellyn told the Legislative Council that
large tracts of land quite unnecessary as 
an appendage to a Sugar Estate had been 
attached for the purpose of preventing 
other persons from occupying them or for 
some other selfish motive entirelv opposed 
to the general welfare of the communitv.^
In one instance, Pulteney Hill - 700 acres - was 'annexed' to
C0321/103: Sendall to Holland, 29 Mar. 1887, enc. 
Llewellyn to Sendall, 11 Mar. 1887.
C0321/103: Sendall to Holland, 1 Mar. 1887, enc. Leg. Co. 
minutes, 8 Dec. 1886; emphasis added.
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Richmond and other estates.^ And the Poor Settlers' Lots 
were a rich source of conflict between the planters and the 
villagers at Charlotteville, down to the 1880s.^
The interpretation offered here is borne out by a 
confidential despatch of Lt.-Gov. Ussher, who mentioned the 
misappropriation of land by the planters, and who stated in 
1873:
The difficulties under which labourers 
are placed here, with respect to owning 
or renting land for their own purposes 
appears [sic] to be loosely analogous to 
those in St. Vincent ... The Consequence 
is the prevalence of the Metayer System 
to a considerable extent ... .
Ussher observed that the lands bordering the sea 'are all in
the hands of planters ... and although a proportion of them
were doubtless obtained in a questionable manner, the rights
of their present owners are too firmly established to be
contested.
Llewellyn summed up the situation of the labouring class:
Hitherto in Tobago there has been great 
difficulty for persons to acquire small 
Lots of Land and the Proprietors, who 
have absorbed and annexed vast tracts of 
unowned Lands as well as their own, have 
prevented in every possible way the en­
couragement of a small Peasant
74 C0321/103: Sendall to Holland & Enc., 12 Dec. 1887.
In Gov. Young's time (1807-15) , the lands had already been 
'usurped' by the planters [Young 1810:78]. See the 
controversy on the Poor Settlers' Lots when, in 1878, the 
villagers claimed that they belonged to the Crown. 
C0321/25: Chairman, West India Committee to Hicks Beach, 
12 Dec. 1878, & Encs. Admin.'s Despatches, 1882-5: 
Carrington to Robinson, 6 Oct. 1883; The News. 10 Oct. 
1883. Table 18.
C0285/91: Rawson to Kimberley, Conf., 4 June 1873, 
enc. Ussher to Rawson, Conf., 16 May 1873.
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Proprietary.^
The planters, it would seem, succeeded in selling 
relatively little of their own lands. By 1885, only 1.5% of 
the land of estates sold in the Encumbered Estates Court had 
been sold to labourers (Table 18). In addition, they 
confiscated and 'annexed' lands of other people and of the 
Crown. But in 1887, there were still 13,000 acres not 
'annexed', because they were not suited for sugar. With very 
few exceptions, these holdings were the same as those for 
which taxes had not been paid for 1852 and 1853; for most of 
them, the owners were unknown.^ Little wonder that Llewellyn 
reported:
... and it is for the possession of these 
lands that the Peasantry are now most 
anxious. 7*
III.4 CONCLUSION
We examined one segment of our hypothesis. Option 2B. the 
emergence of a class of smallholders able to diversify the 
economy. We considered this for the period 1838-55, in the 
context of the debate on the 'flight from the estates' after 
1838 and in the framework of the eight (8) issues which we 
posed in Section III.1.2.
We conclude that, by 1855, the overwhelming majority of 
the freedpeople had established a measure of independence from
^ C0321/98: Sendall to Stanhope, 31 Aug. 1886, enc. 
Llewellyn to Sendall, 13 May 1886.
C0289/5: Tobago Gazette. 18 Mar. 1887.
C0321/103: Sendall to Holland, 29 Mar. 1887, enc. 
Llewellyn to Sendall, 11 Mar. 1887; emphasis added.
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the planters by acquiring their own homes, on land held
freehold, or under various types of rented tenure. Home
ownership symbolized a minimal degree of autonomy, both from 
the planters and for the creation of their own lifestyles
[Mintz 1974a, Ch. 9]. The evidence made clear the importance
of this point, which had not been anticipated. There are 
therefore nine factors to be considered, of which this is the 
first.*"
The movement into villages and other settlements off the 
estates (1) was more uneven. In the Middle and Leeward 
Districts, it advanced considerably, but in the Windward 
District, this was not so.
The acquisition of freeholds (2) progressed, but far more 
slowly than the village movement. The size of holdings was too 
small to permit a significant stratum of 'small farmers', 
independent of the estates, to develop.** We also cannot 
discern the contours of a 'peasantry' cultivating its own or 
rented lands and offering occasional labour to the estates. 
Rather, there emerged a complex set of relationships between 
planters and labourers, although the metayage system 
predominated from the mid 1850s onwards. We argue, therefore, 
that the 'peasant labour process' was carried out by several 
means, in a multiplicity of tenures and relationships of 
production; but a peasantry did not exist by 1855.
The numbering of the factors is kept the same for easy 
comparison with the earlier text.
** Riviere [1972:21] states that, for the BWI, only in St 
Vincent and Jamaica did 'small farmers' emerge in this 
period.
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It would be inappropriate to consider the metayage system 
as a 'major victory' for the peasant labour process, whereby 
it challenged the estates on their own ground, as Trouillot 
argues for Dominica [1988:84], given that it was the option to 
which the labourers, at first reluctantly, gravitated, when 
the alternatives were less profitable to themselves. 
Metayage, in the context which we have described, symbolized 
a narrowing of the labourers' options; but in the new 
situation, both protagonists sought to increase their 
advantage.
In the context of irregular, falling wages, of widespread 
access to provision grounds on the basis of non-freehold 
tenure (3), by labourers who had built their own homes, there 
was a marked withdrawal from steady, regular, wage labour on 
the estates (4) . However, this was accompanied by an increase 
in metayage, which tied labour to the estates and exposed the 
metayer to the caprice of the planter (5).
Our sixth factor - the ability to survive independently 
of the estates in non-agricultural employment (6) - cannot be 
fully answered by the available data. A stratum of artisans, 
fishermen and petty shopkeepers emerged by 1855, but the 
predominance of the sugar economy meant that their ultimate 
survival hinged on the prosperity of the estates [cf. Wilmot 
1986]. Our seventh factor, emigration (7), was negligible up 
to 1855. The paradox with which this chapter began, of 
abandoned land, irregular estate work and minimal acquisition 
of freeholds, has been fully explained, and we noted the 
regional variations (8) in the unfolding of these processes.
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The questions raised by the historians' attempts to 
reconstruct the history of this period cannot be settled only 
by using statistics on the number of freeholds, of persons in 
villages and of those on the estates' pay lists. Above all, we 
must avoid the spurious choice between 'push' and 'pull' 
factors and the confusion between motive and outcome which are 
implicit in some of the literature. The Tobago data 
demonstrate the importance of understanding the complex and 
changing network of relationships and land tenures [Cooper 
1981] which enmeshed the planters and the freedpeople, as each 
broad grouping exercised the degrees of freedom available to 
it in the changing circumstances of the time. On this, the 
perceptions of Higman [1990] and Marshall [1979a] are correct. 
Our story also highlights the creative process by which the 
ex-slaves constantly negated the restrictions which the 
planters imposed, and forged for themselves a greater measure 
of autonomy.
The multiplicity of relationships of production do not 
indicate several modes of production. The planters could not 
succeed in creating a proletariat in a situation where capital 
for investment and wages was scarce, where lack of investment 
fostered a reliance on labour-intensive methods, and where the 
available labour could use its bargaining power to gain access 
to land, under various forms of tenure. The ex-slaves could 
not easily succeed in becoming independent peasants near to 
the estates; and, with poor communications, to have possessed 
remote land, far from access to essential services and to 
markets, both local and overseas, would have been counter-
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productive to the establishment of a peasantry. The divers 
relationships were produced by compromises which both classes 
made in the unfolding circumstances.
Population density was a fundamental conditioning factor, 
within which the struggle for resources took place, but it did 
not determine the outcomes of the contest. The link between 
access to land and wages in the Windward Islands indicates the 
centrality of the land in the aspirations of both planters and 
freedpeople. But land hunger and withdrawal from regular wage 
labour in an island of low population density, with large 
tracts of abandoned land, did not automatically imply the 
flowering of a peasantry; the most abandoned district 
(Windward) had fewest smallholders and no 'free' villages. We 
therefore agree with Holland that 'The availability of land is 
primarily determined by the power structure' [1984:125].
The historians' debate raises theoretical questions, 
about the relationship between motives, structures and human 
agency in the shaping of history, which continue to bedevil 
the social sciences.^ Structures enable, disable, sustain 
and constrain, but the human actors, metropolitan and local, 
as they aligned themselves to secure their perceived 
advantage, produced the outcomes in a process that was 
inherently political, open-ended and indeterminate.
For a recent discussion on the need for an appropriate 
'paradigm' in the Caribbean, see Best [1991].
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TABLE 18
Labourers  ^Freeholds on Tobago Estates 
Sold in the Encumbered Estates Court
Windward District
File Estate Date
Proceed­
ings.
Begin
Acres
for
Sale
Acres
to
Labour­
ers
Remarks
5/9
5/9
5/9
5/9
3/9} 
9/2} 
18/1} 
Pt. 2} 
19/1}
8/8
8/8
3/9}
9/2}
19/2}
HERMITAGE
CAMPBELTON
1864
1864
300
320
KENDAL PLACE 1864
ROSEBANK
KINGS BAY
KINGS BAY 
and Depend­
encies
1864
1869
1885
225
300
476
943
23
1%
MONTROSE 
LOT 51
LUCY VALE
C.1868
C.1868
1870
LITTLE TOBAGO 1870
3/9} DELAFORD 
9/7}
1872
300
300
290
240
490
One labourer 
claiming 
purchase. 
Coastal lands 
reserved ty the 
Crown annexed.
Four labourers^  
all buying in 
1845.
Timber only.
23 acres sur­
veyed for sale 
to workers c. 
1848. Part of 
Crown reserve 
annexed.
943 acres acc. 
to E. Smart's 
plan,18.6.1885. 
1& acres laid 
out for sale 
in 1885.
Timber.
Abandoned c. 
1828. 7Js acres 
surveyed for 
sale to 4 
workers c.1854.
Offshore 
isle; pasture. 
Files as for 
Lucy Vale.
Abandoned in 
1820s.
Annexed Poor 
Settlers' Lot.
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TABLE 18 continued
Windward District continued
File Estate Date
Proceed­
ings
Begin
Acres
for
Sale
Acres
to
Labour-
ers
Remarks
18/1 CHARLOTTE­
VILLE
1885 1833 21h Annexed Poor 
Settlers' Lot.
18/1}
18/1}
Pt.2}
18/1}
18/1}
Pt.2}
18/1}
18/1}
Pt.2}
19/1}
18/1
GOLDSBOROUGH> 
GOODWOOD}
1885 2391 say
9
LURE
RICHMOND) 
GLAMORGAN) 
BUSHEY PARK)
1885
1885
969
1918 27h
SPEYSIDE) 
TROIS) 
RIVIERES) 
and Depend­
encies)
1885 1781 Ih
Worked as 1 
Property. A 
small plot 
leased to heirs 
of Benj. Elder 
for 99 yrs, c. 
1840. Five 
workers bought 
land.
Sold to 'sundry 
labourers'.
Annexed 
Pulteney Hill, 
700 acres Crown 
land, 0.1871. 
16 acres bouc^ 
by 'sundry' 
labourers owing 
£156 on pur­
chase, 1885.
Worked as one 
estate.
18/1}
Pt.2}
19/2}
BETSY'S
HOPE
1885 1317 say
10
13 acres sold, 
incl. land to 
Wesleyans (2 
acres) and to 
Anglicans, & 
lot 'Seciforth'.
SUB-TOTAL 14.717 107%
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TABLE 18 continued
Middle District
File Estate Date
Proceed­
ings
Begin
Acres
for
Sale
Acres
to
Labour­
ers
Remarks
10/2 HIGHLANDS
3/9} HOPE 
10/11}
1872
1874 1070
3/9 RUNNEMEDE/**
KING PETER'S 
HILL
11/3 INDIAN WALK**
13/2 STUDLEY PARK
1876
1872
1878
430
750
3 1 h
No infonnaticn.
Parts of estate 
occupied by 
labourers 
claiming title. 
Poor Settlers 
Lot annexed.
No information.
Moriah Village.
No recorded 
sales of land, 
though there 
were 'lessees, 
tenants and 
occupiers'.
SUB-TOTAL* 1180 31h
NOTES;
* Using only estates for which there is information.
** Where the population censuses give a clear indication (the 1871, 1881 
and 1891 censuses), Runnemede and Indian Walk are taken to be in the 
Leeward District. However, the Stipendiary Magistrates' reports for 1838- 
1853 placed them in the Middle District, and they are here included.
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TABLE 18 continued
Leeward District
File Estate Date
Proceed­
ings
Begin
Acres
for
Sale
Acres
to
Labour-
ers
Remarks
5/9 GRAFTON 1864 287 26%
5/9 OLD GRANGE 1864 252 9*
5/9
5/9
NEW GRANGE
BUCCOO
1864
1864
241
8h
47 labourers 
(Schedule K) ; 
surveyor's plan 
dd. 22 Oct.1864 
shows 50 claim­
ants because 
of sub-division 
after sale. 
Only 14 had 
valid title. 
9 other 
claimants.
12 buyers; 3 
had valid 
title. *Using 
list of sales; 
other docu­
ments say 5 
acres sold.
17 buyers; 6 
had valid 
title.
22 buyers; 6 
had valid 
title.
5/9 HAMPDEN 1864 128 1 buyer; valid 
title.
5/9 PIGEON POINT 1864
8/8 CROMSTAIN 1864
13/1 COURLAND C.1878
60
240
860 say
12
13/5
18/1}
19/1}
18/1}
Pt.2}
CARNBEE
PROSPECT/
ORANGE
VALLEY
1878
1885
218
519 81**
Ooocnut estate.
14 acres sold; 
acres to la­
bourers not 
given. Part of 
this estate is 
in the Middle 
District.
**Includes 
acres 'sold 
or occupied'; 
considered 
here as sold.
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TABLE 18 continued
Leeward District continued
File Estate
18/1} AUCHENSKEOCH/ 
CARNBEE 
APPENDAGE
18/1 WHIM
18/1}
18/1}
Pt.2}
Date
Proceed­
ings
Begin
1885
1885
Acres
for
Sale
610
Acres
to
Labour­
ers
28
Remarks
395
18/1 MARY'S HILL 1885
18/1 ORANGE HILL & 1885
AMITY HOPE
BURLEIGH
CASTLE/
SPRING
GARDEN
SUB-TOTAL
1885
270
400} 764 
364}
733
5586
Acres sold are 
Lambeau 
Village.*
4 labourers 
bought; 2 
other acres 
sold to the 
Anglican 
Church.
29% acres sold 
in 1857 to 
Robert Gordon, 
planter.
Some labourers 
lived on Amity 
Hope without 
title; both 
worked 
together.*
33 acres sold, 
none to la­
bourers. *
179%
NOTE;
* Lambeau, Orange Hill, Amity Hope and Burleigh Castle are regarded as part 
of the Middle District in the 1871 census, but in 1881, Orange Hill and 
Amity Hope are treated as Leeward estates, while Auchenskeoch, Lambeau and 
Burleigh Castle are in the Middle District. The Stipendiary Magistrates 
(1838-1853) reported on them as part of the Leeward District, and we so 
regard them for the period 1838-1855.
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TABLE 18 concluded
SUMMARY - for estates on which there is information
District
Windward
Middle
Leeward
TOTAL
Acres
for
Sale
14,717
1,180
5,586
21,483
Acres
Sold
to
Labour­
ers
107%
31%
179%
318%
Col. 3 
as % 
of
Total
.7
2.6
3.1
1.5
Total
14,824
1,212
5,766
21,802
Source; C0441: Files as given.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AGRARIAN STRUCTURE. SMALLHOLDERS AND 
THE DIVERSIFICATION OF AGRICULTURE IN TOBAGO: 
1856-1888
IV.1 INTRODUCTION
In keeping with our hypothesis, we examine the agrarian 
structure to see whether any class of landowners, large, 
medium or small, who could have diversified the economy, 
emerged by 1884 (Options 2A, 2B) . Our first task is to
estimate the number of smallholders for the period 1856 to 
1875, using reports based on the Valuation Rolls for property 
and on the voters' registers derived from the Rolls. 
Secondly, we analyse the data from the Assessment Roll for 
1881/1882, which has survived in its entirety. Although there 
were often complaints about the over-valuation of small 
properties and the under-assessment of large ones for 
taxation, we used the data yielded by this source as the best 
approximation of the number, distribution, and pattern of 
ownership of holdings, by 1884. Thirdly, consideration is 
given to the extent of diversification of the economy away 
from sugar and its by-products, as this is reflected in the 
exports. Fourthly, we offer some reflections on the nature 
and trajectory of the smallholders and peasants in the period 
1838-1888.
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IV.2 SMALLHOLDERS IN TOBAGO; 1856-1875
The 1856 Valuation Act provided the first uniform 
valuation of properties for determining taxation and 
eligibility to vote. Table 19 gives summary statistics on the 
assessed properties in 1856 and 1861. There was a net
increase of 437 properties, of which 428 were not sugar 
estates; but there was an increase of 450 properties valued 
under £10. The growth in the latter, which exceeded the total 
net increase in all properties, could have been the result of 
several factors: more efficient procedure for registration; 
subdivision of properties sold earlier; the current 
acquisition of small properties. In 1856, 90%, and in 1861, 
92%, of all properties, were valued at less than £10 per 
annum. Ten pounds per annum therefore were a 'threshold' 
which relatively few property holders surmounted. We have 
seen (Table 16) that, in 1856, 81% of all properties, and 91% 
of the properties valued less than £10, were assessed at less 
than £5 per annum. This suggests that, in the 1850s, the 
annual value of £5 per annum was almost as difficult to reach 
as that of £10.
In 1871, Lt.-Gov. Kortright noted a growing 'class of 
Freeholders', with property assessed between £5 and £10 per 
annum, to whom the privilege of the vote should be extended.^ 
Attorney-General Cadiz estimated that the number to be added 
to the voters' list by such a change, excluding those known to
 ^00285/89: Rawson to Kimberley, 29 April 1871, enc. 
Kortright to Legislature, 14 Mar. 1871.
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be dead or non-resident, would have been 217.  ^ This estimate 
refers only to male owners, since women could not vote; some 
men voted 'in right of wife'. If we assume that the 
proportion of properties owned by females in 1871 and assessed 
between £5 and £10 was roughly the same as that of 1882 
(21.5%), then, based on Cadiz's assessment, we estimate the 
total number of properties in this category to have been 273. 
The fragmentary data on properties assessed under £10 per 
annum are given in Table 20.
TABLE 19
Assessed Properties in Tobago: 1856. 1861
YEAR
1856 1861 Increase/
Decrease
Total No. 
of Properties 
Returned
2550
(99.9%)
2987
(100%)
+437
No. of Properties 
Valued < £10
2286
(89.6%)
2736
(91.6%)
+450
No. of Properties 
Valued > £10
264
(10.3%)
251
( 8.4%)
-13
No. of Sugar Estates 60 69 +9
No. of Other 
Properties
2490 2918 +428
Source; 00285/80; Walker to Newcastle, 30 June 1862; extracted 
from 'Comparative Abstract of Valuation Roll' in Drysdale's 
1861 Blue Bk. Rept., enclosed.
2 00285/89: Rawson to Kimberley, 15 Aug. 1871, & Encs., esp. 
Cadiz' rept., 3 June 1871.
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TABLE 20
Properties Assessed between £5 and £10: 1856-1871
Assessed Value 
of Properties
£5-£10
< £10
1856
214
2286
1861
not
known
2736
1871
273
(estimate)
not
known
Sources : As for Tables 16 and 19; for 1871, estimated from 
A.-G. Cadiz' rept. cited above.
The latest voters' list which survives is for 1875. The 
minimal voter's qualification was the ownership or possession 
of real property assessed at £5 or more per annum. The 
voters' registers could be an under-estimate of the 
smallholders if they were not regularly revised and if there 
was little vigilance from the electorate over the registration 
process. Persons qualifying to vote also had to possess their 
properties for 12 months prior to the elections, so recent 
owners or tenants were excluded. Because some individuals 
were eligible to vote in more than one district, it was 
necessary to adjust the 1875 totals to give the actual number 
of persons qualified to vote. We have no information on the 
size of smallholdings, but are able, by deducting those 
planters, merchants and professionals who held small 
properties, to calculate the owners and tenants of properties 
less than 50 acres in extent in 1875.
Table 21 estimates 177 owners and occupiers of properties
192
which were not estates, who satisfied the voter's 
qualifications in 1875. Again assuming that 21.5% of all 
persons in this category were females, the estimated number of 
such owners/occupiers in 1875 would be 223.
Three inferences are suggested by the fragmentary and
unsatisfactory data for 1856 to 1875. Firstly, the
overwhelming majority of holdings valued under £10 were
assessed below £5 per annum, and therefore were less than 5
acres in extent, considering that many properties had houses
and tenements on them. Secondly, while in 1854 only 43
persons possessed 10 acres or property valued at £30 per annum
or more, twenty years later, with the required annual value of
property being only £5 regardless of tenure, approximately 177
persons, who were not planters, merchants or professionals,
qualified to vote. Thirdly, the small stratum of just over
two hundred persons, of whom these voters are indicative, was
perceived, in official circles, to have gained a measure of
independence from the estates by the 1870s. In 1873, Lt.-Gov.
Ussher reported:
A small but independent and comparatively 
wealthy class of negro is already to be 
found in Tobago, possessed of comfortable 
houses, and small lots of land.^
The most detailed information on land ownership survives 
for the 1880s, and these data are now examined.
 ^C0285/91: Rawson to Kimberley, 4 June 1873, enc. Ussher to 
Rawson, Conf., 16 May 1873.
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TABLE 21
Qualifications of Voters by Parish and Town: 1875
(1)
Place Proprietors 
of Estates 
& Land 
> 50 Acres
St John 
St Paul 
St Mary 
St George 
St Andrew 
St Patrick 
St David 
Plymouth 
Scarborough
Total
Adjusted 
1875 Totals*
6
6
5
14
12
8
13
64
46
(2)
Other
Land­
owners/
Tenants
13
8
3
18
53
29
23
11
36
194
177
(3)
Managers
and
Over-
seers
18
18
(4)
Lessees
of
Estates
(5)
Tenants 
& Owners 
of Houses 
or Shops
1
1
10
6
4
1
12
35
31
(6)
Clergy
(7)
Total
23
18
10
37
79
47
44
12
49
319
280
(8)
No.
Regis»
tered
1874
14
14
10
36
81
42
55}
}
47
301
NOTE; * The 1875 totals were adjusted to exclude multiple ownership/tenure in cols. (1) and 
(5) and 17 plots of land owned or rented by merchants, planters and professionals in col. (2).
Sources : C0289/1: Tobago Gazette. 30 July 1875, compiled from 'Revised List of the Names of 
Persons on the Register of Voters for the Towns and Parishes of the Island'; C0290/58: Blue 
Bk., 1874.
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IV.3 LANDOWNERS IN TOBAGO. 1881/82
IV.3.1 A Note on the Assessment Roll, 1881/82
In 1881, when the economic crisis deepened owing to 
droughts in the late 1870s and the falling price of sugar, 
the Tobago administration revised its procedures for 
property valuation. For each parish or town, properties 
assessed at sums less than or equal to £2 10s per annum 
were listed separately from those valued above that sum, 
but only for the latter were the actual values of the 
properties given. Whereas in the 1850s 1 acre of land was 
assessed at £1,* in the 1880s, judging from the acreages 
occasionally entered on the Assessment Roll, one acre of 
land was assessed at 10s. It is therefore probable that the 
size of holdings assessed under £10, and the meaning of the 
statistics, may have changed. The 1881/82 statistics also 
cannot strictly be compared with earlier data, since the 
boundaries of both Middle and Leeward Districts changed 
over time.
In the tables below, the data for the districts, each 
comprising two or three parishes, are given. Plymouth, 
though officially the second town, had dwindled in 
importance, and is considered, with all the settlements 
except Scarborough, as rural.
The assessment lists for each parish give two
 ^The officials said in 1858 that the average annual rent 
of 1 acre of land was 'about twenty shillings sterling'. 
C0285/76: Hincks to Lytton, 10 Aug. 1858; Hincks' 
emphasis. Hincks doubted that the value of land was that 
high in the outer districts, but the 1858 Franchise Act 
gave sanction to the local official view.
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categories - those with property assessed at or below £2 
10s and those assessed above £2 10s. There are three basic 
ways of classifying the persons owning more than one 
property: those holding more than one in each major
category, and those holding properties in both. In 
addition, some persons owned property in more than one 
parish or district. It was only possible to investigate 
this last group in the case of owners of estates and those 
possessing property valued £10 or more: the identities of 
these larger landowners are familiar from other sources in 
the records, and the risk of confusion between persons with 
the same names is smaller. Therefore, the analysis of 
smallholders who may have owned property in more than one 
parish or district was not undertaken, and there may be a 
few such persons who have been counted more than once. 
Within each parish, the persons whose names appeared more 
than once were taken to be owners of more than one 
property, unless there were remarks indicating that 
different persons had the same name. Those with properties 
valued both above and below £2 10s were also counted.
The owners of large acreages and estates are 
considered separately. Our final totals are adjusted to 
take account of multiple ownership by the same person(s) 
within and across parishes and districts.
We used the gender of proprietors as one basis of 
classification, and tried to interpret the data without 
'reading back' into the past the perceptions of the 
present. Apart from inheritance, women, regardless of
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conjugal status, acquired real property, although they
could not vote. In 1879, Lt.-Gov. Gore endorsed the
Married Women's Property Ordinance, which guaranteed women
the income or savings from any employment in which they
were engaged separately from their husbands, to protect
wives whose husbands were of 'wandering dispositions'.
Gore noted in his 1878 Blue Book Report that there were
'several cases',
in which a husband who had deserted his 
wife and family for years had returned 
... to take possession of her savings or 
any other little property she might have 
acquired by her industry during his 
absence.^
Given this law and the centrality of property in the 
distribution of power, status, comforts and freedoms, we 
treated gender as a key factor in the analysis.
Several limitations of the Assessment Rolls as sources 
of data on Caribbean smallholders are outlined by Satchell 
[1990:32-33]. Firstly, the assumption is that only 
peasants were owners of small plots. This objection is 
valid, since teachers and others were petty landowners. 
However, the number of such persons in Tobago was very 
small, as Chapter 6 shows; we also do not equate landowning 
with the existence of a peasantry (Ch. 3). Second, is the 
objection that the land on which taxes were paid was not 
always rural land. Fortunately, the Tobago data distinguish 
urban land. Third, is the assumption that the lands listed
 ^C0321/32: Strachan to Hicks Beach, 3 May 1879, enc. Gore 
to Legislature; PP. 1880, Vol. XLVIII, 1878 Blue Bk. Rept., 
p. 153.
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were all freeholds or lands in secure tenure. The Tobago 
Rolls give the names of the proprietors and occupiers of 
the properties, but we do not make security of tenure a 
necessary assumption in the analysis of the data. Another 
major objection is to the view that the number of plots 
corresponds to the number of owners, and that the level of 
fragmentation and, hence, the number of occupiers is 
unimportant. Fortunately, the Tobago Rolls allow us to 
identify both the landholdings and the landowners, and we 
can identify those in each parish with more than one 
property. Most small plots had one or two named occupiers, 
and a few were listed as occupied by 'various persons'. 
But the actual number of occupiers must remain unknown, and 
the same applies to the properties which Satchell examined 
from the deed books.
For two reasons, we could not use the deed books as a 
source of information, as Satchell recommends. Firstly, the 
registration of deeds by freedpeople was often neglected, 
because of the cost. As ex-slaves who had bought land died 
intestate, leaving unregistered property, the Magistrates 
wrote of the increasingly precarious title of the plots 
which were being subdivided by their heirs. There were also 
never more than 3 barristers in Tobago between 1838 and 
1884; sometimes, only 1. In 1858, when the only barrister 
was S. H. F. Abbott, the Attorney-General, Lt.-Gov. 
Drysdale himself examined 97 deeds of conveyance, all drawn 
by non-professionals; many were unrecorded, having been
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drawn incompetently/ In 1883, C. L. Abbott, son of the 
barrister mentioned above, himself a barrister, testified 
to the Royal Commission that the high fees discouraged the 
registration of deeds and the making of wills, so that 'if 
matters were brought to law almost one third of small 
properties at this moment would be escheated.Secondly, 
low registration is compounded by an incomplete record: 
only two deed books for the 19th century (1842-68; 1889-90) 
survive in the Red House, Port of Spain, the official 
depository of deeds.
IV.3.2 Summarv Distribution of Properties
There was a marked variation between the districts in 
the proportions of properties which were landed (Table 22). 
A substantial minority and, in the case of the Windward 
District a majority (58%), of the properties assessed < £2 
10s were houses alone. The incidence of landed property was 
greatest in the Leeward District (72% of properties) and 
lowest in the Windward (42% of properties). If, as Chapter 
3 shows, the acquisition of a house alone was the first 
rung on the ladder of property ownership, by 1882, a 
significant proportion of property owners were still at the 
very base. Below them was the stratum, unrecorded in these 
data, of those who owned no property at all.
 ^C0285/75: Hincks to Lytton, 24 July 1858, enc. Drysdale 
to Hincks, 22 May 1858.
’ Rent, from the Roval Com.....  1884, p. 413.
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TABLE 22
Distribution of Properties by District and Gender
(Properties ^ £2 10s)
WINDWARD DISTRICT
Male
Houses Only 304
Landed Properties 217
Other (shops, shops 
& houses)
Total
1
522
Houses Only 
Landed Properties
Male
314
497
Other (shops, shops 
& houses) 11
Total 822
Houses Only
Landed Properties
Other (shops, shops 
& houses)
Total
Male
336
906
8
1250
Female Total k
84 388 58
65 282 42
— — 1 .1
149 671 100.1
MIDDLE DISTRICT
Female Total k
125 439 37
238 735 62
1 12 1
364 1186 100
LEEWARD DISTRICT
Female Total &
173 509 28
402 1308 72
- 8 .4
575 1825 100.4
Source; C0289/3: Tobago Assessment Roll, 1881/82, in sundry 
issues of The Tobago Gazette.
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TABLE 23
Distribution of Properties by District and Gender
(Properties > £2 10s)
WINDWARD DISTRICT
Houses Only
Landed Properties
Other (shops, shops 
& houses)
Total
Male
23
85
6
114
Male
Houses Only 27
Landed Properties 184
Other (shops, shops 
& houses) 4
Total 215
Male
Houses Only 35
Landed Properties 216
Other (shops, shops 
& houses) 17
Total 268
Female Total &
4 27 20
19 104 76
- 6 4
23 137 100
MIDDLE DISTRICT
Female Total &
6 33 12
47 231 85.5
2 6 2
55 270 99.5
LEEWARD DISTRICT
Female Total &
8 43 13
47 263 81
3 20 6
58 326 100
Source: Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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TABLE 24
Distribution of Properties by District
and Gender (Proportions Only)
WINDWARD DISTRICT
< £2 IPs 
Male Female Male
> £2 10s
Female
Houses Only 78 22 85 15
Landed Properties 77 23 82 18
Other (shops.
shops & houses) 100 — 100 —
Total 78 22 83 17
MIDDLE DISTRICT
< £2 10s > £2 10s
Male Female Male Femai
Houses Only 71.5 28 82 18
Landed
Properties 68 32 80 20
Other (shops.
shops & houses) 92 8 67 33
Total 69 31 80 20
Male
< £2 10s
LEEWARD DISTRICT
Female
Source: Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
Male
> £2 10s
Female
Houses Only 66 34 81 19
Landed Properties 69 31 82 18
Other (shops,
shops St houses) 100 — 85 15
Total 68 32 82 18
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The gender distribution is also interesting - for 
houses alone and for landed properties, the proportion 
owned by females was lowest in the Windward District, and 
highest in the Leeward. In all districts, the owners of 
shops were virtually all male. Men greatly outnumbered 
women as property owners, by a ratio of over 2:1 in all 
districts, with the greatest disparity (3.5:1) in the 
Windward. Thus, there was differential ownership of 
property in houses and land between the districts, the 
Windward offering fewest opportunities for landowning. 
Gender was an important factor in these processes.
At the level of properties assessed > £2 10s per annum 
(Table 23), the proportions of properties which were houses 
alone are far lower (ranging from 12% to 20%), but the 
Windward District again had the highest, and the lowest 
percentage of landed properties. The ability of women to 
acquire properties at this level was also more 
circumscribed than for properties assessed < £2 10s, and 
this is quite consistent in all the districts, only 17% to 
20% of properties being owned by women (Table 24).
Table 25 gives, for each district, the summary 
distribution of landed properties according to their 
assessed value and the gender of their owners.
203
TABLE 25
Distribution of Landed Properties by District. 
Assessed Value and Gender of Owners
Numbers Proportions
V a l u e  ( £ ) M a le F e m a le T o t a l M a le F e m a l e T o t a l
WINDWARD DISTRICT
S 2.10s 217 65 282 72 77 73
> 2.10S-5 41 12 53 13.5 14 14
> 5- 10 17 3 20 6 4 5
> 10- 15 7 1 8 2 1 2
> 15- 20 3 1 4 1 1 1
> 20- 50 5 2 7 2 2 2
> 50-100 1 - 1 .3 - .2
> 100 11 - 11 4 - 3
T o t a l 3 0 2 84 3 8 6 1 0 0 . 8 99 1 0 0 . 2
MIDDLE DISTRICT ( e x c l .  S c a r b o r o u g h )
< 2.10s 497 238 735 73 83.5 76
> 2.10S-5 102 29 131 15 10 13.5
> 5- 10 34 14 48 5 5 5
> 10- 15 4 1 5 .6 .3 .5
> 15- 20 4 - 4 .6 - .4
> 20- 50 22 1 23 3 .3 2
> 50-100 12 1 13 2 .3 1.3
> 100 6 1 7 .9 .3 .7
T o t a l 6 8 1 285 966 1 0 0 . 1 9 9 . 7 99.4
LEEWARD DISTRICT
< 2 . l O s 906 402 1308 81 89.5 83
> 2.10S-5 159 32 191 14 7 12
> 5- 10 18 3 21 2 .6 1
> 10- 15 7 3 10 .6 .6 .6
> 15- 20 2 - 2 .2 - .1
> 20- 50 6 7 13 .5 1.5 .8
> 50-100 9 - 9 .8 - .6
> 100 14 2 16 1 .4 1
T o t a l 1 1 2 1 449 1 5 7 0 1 0 0 . 1 9 9 . 1 99 .1
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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The proportions of landed properties assessed at £5 or 
under ranged from 87% in the Windward District to 95% in 
the Leeward. Although the Leeward District had 54% of all 
landed properties, only 5% of them were above £5 in value.
In general, the percentage of properties owned by 
women which were assessed at the lowest values exceeded 
that for men; but the differences are not significant. Men 
outnumbered women as owners of landed property in all 
districts, but in the Windward this was greatest; 78% of 
the properties belonged to men, whereas the comparable 
figures for the Middle and Leeward districts were 70% and 
71%, respectively.
These summary distributions give a rough indication of 
the type of properties and the gender of the owners. The 
distribution of propertv owners for each district was also 
calculated. Table 26 shows the property owners who were 
landless and, of these, those who owned only a house.
In every district, the proportion of landless property 
owners is significantly higher for those assessed at or 
below £2 10s per annum than for those assessed above it. In 
the Windward District, the proportion landless at the lower 
level more than doubles the percentage at the higher level 
(58% and 22%, respectively) . In the Middle District, the 
comparable figures are trebled (36% and 12%, respectively). 
In the Leeward District, the difference is least marked 
(28% and 17%, respectively).
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TABLE 26
Landless and Those with One House Only 
as Proportion of Property Owners 
by District. Gender and Assessment Category
N Ü M B E R % PROPERTY OWNERS
WINDWARD DISTRICT
< £2 lOs
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Landless 272 80 352 58 58 58
1 House Only 268 79 347 57 57 57
Property Owners 472 138 610
> £2 lOS
Landless 23 4 27 23 18 22
1 House Only 21 4 25 21 18 21
Property Owners 99 22 121
MIDDLE DISTRICT
< £2 IDs
Landless 268 115 383 37 34 36
1 House Only 257 115 372 35 34 35
Property Owners 731 341 1072
> £2 IDs
Landless 21 7 28 11.5 13 12
1 House Only 17 5 22 9 9 9
Property Owners 182 54 236
LEEWARD DISTRICT
< £2 lOs
Landless 281 151 432 27 29 28
1 House Only 272 149 421 26 28 27
Property Owners 1035 524 1559
> £2 lOS
Landless 39 9 48 16 18 17
1 House Only 29 7 36 12 14 12.5
Property Owners 238 50 288
NOTE; Those with property in both major categories are 
included > £2 10s.
Source: Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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The between-district variations are as striking as 
those within them. More than half of the property owners 
at Windward were landless (58%); more than a third of those 
in the Middle District (36%) , and just over a quarter of 
those in the Leeward District (28%). For owners of 
properties assessed over £2 10s per annum, the Windward 
District had the highest incidence of landlessness (22%), 
followed by the Leeward (17%) and the Middle (12%). Since 
a few of the landless property owners were owners of shops, 
which offered the possibility of accumulation, the numbers 
and proportions of property owners with one house only were 
calculated. These follow closely the pattern for the 
landless. Among the landless, there were no marked 
differences between males and females: the proportions are 
very close.
The opportunity to advance beyond acquiring only a 
house increased as one moved away from the Windward 
District, where the possibility of land acquisition was 
particularly restricted. The ability to acquire land also 
increased among those with property assessed above £2 10s 
per annum.
Tables 27 and 28 should be taken together. In the 
former, the population of Tobago by district at Census 1881 
and the numbers aged 20 and over are given; the latter 
expresses the property owners as proportions of the adult 
population of each district and of Tobago.
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TABLE 27
Tobago Population and Population Aged 20 and Over 
by District: 1881
District Peculation Peculation > 20
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Windward 2041 1987 4028 1036 1045 2081
Middle (excl.
Scarborough) 2502 2717 5219 1244 1494 2738
Leeward 3800 4151 7951 1763 2188 3951
Tobago (excl.
Scarborough 8343 8855 17198 4043 4727 8770
Source: Tobaao Population Census, 1881.
Table 28 shows a remarkable similarity in the pattern 
of property and land holding in the Middle and Leeward 
Districts, as compared with the Windward. For the latter, 
we infer that 65% of the adults owned no real property, 
while 52% was the figure in the former two districts. In 
both the Middle and Leeward Districts, 26% of the adult 
women were property owners, while of adult men, over 70% 
owned property. At Windward, only 15% of the adult women 
and 55% of the men owned property. Row 4 of each section 
of the table allows us to infer that 83% of the adults at 
Windward owned no land, whereas the comparable figures for 
the Middle and Leeward Districts, respectively, were 67% 
and 65%. It also shows that the proportions of landowners 
in the Middle and Leeward Districts roughly doubled those 
in the Windward.
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TABLE 28
Property Owning by District. Gender and Proportion of 
District/Island Population Aged ^ 20
N u m b e r % District/Island 
Population > 2 0
Male Female Total Male Female Total
WINDWARD DISTRICT
Property Owners 571 160 731 55 15 35
Landless Property
Owners 295 84 379 28 8 18
1 House Only 289 83 372 28 8 18
Owning Land 275 79 354 26.5 7.5 17
MIDDLE DISTRICT (excl. Scarborough)
Property Owners 913 395 1308 73 26 48
Landless Property
Owners 289 122 411 23 8 15
1 House Only 274 120 394 22 8 14
Owning Land 622 271 893 50 18 33
LEEWARD DISTRICT
Property Owners 1273 574 1847 72 26 47
Landless Property
Owners 320 160 480 18 7 12
1 House Only 301 156 457 17 7 11.5
Owning Land 959 408 1367 54 19 35
ISLAND OF TOBAGO (excl. Scarborough)
Property Owners 2757 1129 3886 68 24 44
Landless Property
Owners 904 366 1270 22 8 14
1 House Only 864 359 1223 21 8 14
Owning Land 1856 755 2611 46 16 30
Sources ; Assessment Roll, 1881/82; 1881 Population Census
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The disparity, both within and between districts, when 
gender is taken into account, is also noteworthy. A half 
or more of the adult males in the Middle and Leeward 
Districts were landowners, while, for the adult females, 
the proportions were only 18% and 19%, respectively; in the 
Windward District, only 26.5% of adult males, and a mere 
7.5% of the women, owned land. The proportions of landless 
female property owners were roughly the same in all 
districts (7% or 8%) ; but, although the percentages are 
higher for men, landlessness decreases as one moves away 
from the Windward to the Middle and Leeward Districts.
IV.3.3 Ownership of Homesteads (Persons with 
One Propertv Onlv)
We have seen that noteworthy proportions of those who 
owned propertv in each district were landless, almost all 
the landless being owners of one house only. Of those who 
owned land, the proportions owning onlv one house on a plot 
of land were remarkably high. In each district, persons 
owning land assessed < £2 10s who also had property
assessed above that sum were excluded temporarily from the 
analysis; the statistics on homesteaders given in Table 29 
therefore indicate those who owned one propertv onlv.
In the Windward District, of the landed owners, 79.5% 
of those assessed < £2 10s were owners of a house and land. 
Since the value of the house formed part of the assessment, 
these persons probably held less than 5 acres of land, the 
maximum acreage in this category, assuming assessment at 
10s per acre. In two out of the three parishes in the
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district (St John and St Mary) , all the persons with 
property assessed above £2 10s and under £10 were
homesteaders. Only in St Paul was this not so - for just
3 persons. The pattern is clear and uniform: the
overwhelming majority of those who owned land valued less 
than £10 were owners of single homesteads.
In the Middle District, those assessed at less than or 
equal to £2 10s had the highest percentage of homesteaders 
(85.5%). In St Andrew, one of its two parishes, were 
located the suburbs of Scarborough, which grew after 1838, 
because of the availability of land and markets (Ch. 3) . 
The 'residential' aspect of dwelling near the capital may 
also have reinforced the tendency to have a homestead.
In the Leeward District, the proportion of landowners 
assessed at or under £2 10s, who had one homestead alone, 
was 69%; but it was close to the figures for the other
districts for the smallholders assessed above £2 10. This
suggests a greater possibility for diverse and multiple 
holdings in the Leeward District, but only for the owners 
of the smallest properties.
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TABLE 29
Persons Owning One Homestead Only, as
Proportion of Landowners, by District and Gender
(Properties < £10)
< £2 103 
F T
> £2 IPs < £5 
M E T
£5 < £10 
M E T
1 Home­
stead
Total
Land­
owners
% Land­
owners
152
198
77
WINDWARD DISTRICT
53 205 32 11 43
60 258 34 11 45
88 79 94 100 95.5
16 3 19
16 4 20
100 75 95
1 Home­
stead
Total
Land­
owners
% Land­
owners
MIDDLE DISTRICT
385 198 583 66 15 81
462 224 686 70 19 89
83 88 85 94 79 91
48 16 64
53 18 71
90.5 89 90
1 Home­
stead
Total
Land­
owners
% Land­
owners
504 275
LEEWARD DISTRICT
779 124 26 150
757 365 1122 134 27 161
66.6 75 69 92.5 96 93
34 6 40
39 6 45
87 100 89
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82
212
The data on homesteaders, and those without land but 
with one house only, were expressed as percentages of the 
property owners in two categories: < £2 10; and over £2 10 
but less than £10. Tables 30 and 31 show that, for Tobago, 
83% of the proprietors assessed at < £2 10s had one house, 
or one homestead. The same figure (83.5%) obtained for the 
smallholders assessed above £2 10 but less than £10. This 
demonstrates impressively that most property owners had 
climbed only the bottom rungs of the ladder of property 
acquisition by 1882.
The variations between the districts are interesting, 
however. In the Windward District, the landless with just 
a house far exceeded the homesteaders (57% vis-à-vis 34%); 
but this was reversed in the Middle District, where 
homesteaders were 54% and house owners without land, 35%; 
the comparable figures for the Leeward District were 50% 
and 27%. Table 30 also reinforces the inference made from 
Table 29 that, of all the districts, the Leeward afforded 
most opportunity for the smallest property owners to 
acquire more than one house or one homestead, 2 3% being in 
this group, vis-à-vis 9% and 11% in the Windward and Middle 
Districts, respectively. In general, higher proportions of 
the female property owners were among those with one house 
or one homestead only, but the differences between males 
and females are not significant.
Table 31 shows that, for proprietors assessed above £2 
10s, the Windward District again had the highest incidence 
of landlessness, the Middle District the lowest.
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TABLE 30
Landless Persons and Homesteaders: Numbers and
Proportions of Property Owners by District and Gender
(Properties Assessed ^ £2 10s)
Number
Landless 
Landless - 1 
House Only 
Homesteaders 
No. Property 
Owners
Landless 
Landless - 1 
House Only 
Homesteaders 
No. Property 
Owners
Landless 
Landless - 1 
House Only 
Homesteaders 
No. Property 
Owners
Landless 
Landless - 1 
House Only 
Homesteaders 
No. Property 
Owners
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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Male Female Total Male Female Total
WINDWARD DISTRICT
272 80 352 58 58 58
268 79 347 57 57 57
152 53 205 32 38 34
472 138 610
1 House, or 1 Homestead Only: 89 95 91
MIDDLE DISTRICT fexcl. Scarborough)
268 115 383 37 34 36
257 115 372 35 34 35
385 198 583 53 58 54
731 341 1072
1 House, or 1 Homestead Only: 88 92 89
LEEWARD DISTRICT
281 151 432 27 29 28
272 149 421 26 28 27
504 275 779 49 52 50
1035 524 1559
1 House, or 1 Homestead Only: 75 80 77
ISLAND OF TOBAGO
822 346 1168 37 34 36
797 343 1140 36 34 35
1041 526 1567 46.5 52 48
2238 1003 3241
1 House, or 1 Homestead Only: 82 86 83
TABLE 31
Landless Persons and Homesteaders: Numbers and
Proportions of Property Owners by District and Gander
(Properties Assessed > £2 10s and < £10)
Number % Property Owners
Male Female Total Male Female Total
WINDWARD DISTRICT
Landless 22 3 25 27 16 25
Landless - 1
House Only 20 3 23 25 16 23
Homesteaders 48 14 62 59 74 62
No. Property
Owners 81 19 100
Proportion with 1 House, or 1 Homestead Only: 84 90 85
MIDDLE DISTRICT fexcl. Scarborough)
Landless 20 7 27 13 15 13
Landless - 1
House Only 17 5 22 11 11 11
Homesteaders 114 31 145 73.5 67 72
No. Property
Owners 155 46 201
Proportion with 1 House, or 1 Homestead Only: 84.5 78 83
LEEWARD DISTRICT
Landless 39 9 48 17 20 18
Landless - 1
House Only 29 7 36 13 16 13
Homesteaders 158 32 190 70 73 70
No. Property
Owners 226 44 270
Proportion with 1 House, or 1 Homestead Only: 83 89 83
ISLAND OF TOBAGO
Landless 81 19 100 17. 5 17 17.5
Landless - 1
House Only 66 15 81 14 14 14
Homesteaders 320 77 397 69 71 69.5
No. Property
Owners 462 109 571
Proportion with 1 House, or 1 Homestead Only: 83 85 83.5
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82
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Table 32 demonstrates that the overwhelming majority 
of property owners assessed above £2 10s were assessed
under £10. It also shows that, although the Leeward 
District offered greatest opportunities to smallholders, 
only 6% of its proprietors crossed the £10 'threshold', 
while the comparable figure for both Windward and Middle 
Districts was 15%.
We now examine those who owned more than one property.
IV.3.4 Ownership of More than One Propertv
Since our interest is in ownership of land, the 
classification of landowners by assessment category for 
each district is given in Tables 33 to 35. In the Windward 
and Middle Districts, 95% and 97% of the smallest 
landowners had only one plot, whereas the figure for the 
Leeward District was slightly lower - 90%. In the category 
above £2 10s, the figures are also close (89%, 93% and 91%, 
respectively). What distinguishes the Leeward District is 
the larger proportion of the < £2 10s category with more 
than one plot of land, and the number (58, or 56% of those 
similarly placed in the island) of those who owned property 
both above and below £2 10s in value.
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TABLE 32
Property Owners with Property Assessed > £2 10s per annum. 
by District and Gender
Number % Property Owners
Assessed
Value Male Female Total Male Female Total
WINDWARD DISTRICT
> £2 10s < £10 81 19 100 84 86 85
> £10 15 3 18 16 14 15
Total 96 22 118 100 100 100
MIDDLE DISTRICT fexcl. Scarborough)
> £2 10s < £10 155 46 201 85 87 85
> £10 28 7 35 15 13 15
Total 183 53 236 100 100 100
LEEWARD DISTRICT
> £2 10s < £10 226 44 270 95 88 94
> £10 12 6 18 5 12 6
Total 238 50 288 100 100 100
ISLAND OF TOBAGO
> £2 10s < £10 462 109 571 89 87 89
> £10 55 16 71 11 13 11
Total 517 125 642 100 100 100
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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TABLE 3 3
Windward District: Ownership of Land by Gender. 1881/82
< £2 lOs
No. of Persons 
Owning
Hale Female
Plot
Plots
or more 
Total
187
10
1
198
59
1
60
Total
246
11
1
258
% Owners
95
4
.4
99.4
No. of 
Plots
246
22
3
271
> £2 IDs
Plot
Plots
or more 
Total
59
5
1
2
67
14
1
15
73*
6*
1
2*
82
89
7
1
2
99
71
10
3
6
90
BOTH CATEGORIES
1 Plot 4 1 5 36
2 Plots 5 2 7 50
3 1 1 2 14
4 or more
5 
14
6
Total 10 4 14 100 25
WINDWARD DISTRICT
1 Plot 250 74 324 91.5 322
2 Plots 20 4 24 7 46
3 3 1 4 1 12
4 or more 2 - 2 .6 6
Total 275 79 354 100.1 386
NOTE : * Includes joint owners.
Source: Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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TABLE 34
Middle District: Ownership of Land by Gender. 1881/82
No. of Persons 
Owning
Plot
Plots
or more 
Total
< £2 IPs 
Male Female Total
450
8
4
462
218
5
1
224
668
13
5
686
% Owners
97
2
.7
99.7
No. of 
Plots
668
26
15
709
> £2 IDs
1 Plot 123 39 162 92.6 162
2 Plots 6 2 8 5 16
3 3 - 3 2 9
4 or more 2 - 2 1 13
Total 134 41 175 
BOTH CATEGORIES
100.6 200
1 Plot 10 1 11 34 11
2 Plots 13 4 17 53 34
3 3 1 4 12.5 12
4 or more — — — — -
Total 26 6
MIDDLE
32
DISTRICT
99.5 57
1 Plot 583 258 841 94 841
2 Plots 27 11 38 4 76
3 10 2 12 1 36
4 or more 2 — 2 .2 13
Total 622 271 893 99.2 966
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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TABLE 35
Leeward District: Ownership of Land by Gender. 1881/82
< £2 103
No. of Persons Male Female Total % Owners No. of
Owning Plots
1 Plot 675 338 1013 90 1013
2 Plots 72 26 98 9 196
3 8 1 9 1 27
4 or more 2 - 2 .2 9
Total 757 365 1122 100.2 1245
> £2 lOs
1 Plot 139 31 170 91 170
2 Plots 11 2 13 7 26
3 1 1 .5 3
4 or more 2 Ï 3 2 15
Total 153 34 187 100.5 214
BOTH CATEGORIES
1 Plot 10 3 13 22 13
2 Plots 33 5 38 65.5 76
3 4 1 5 9 15
4 or more 2 - 2 3 8
Total 49 9 58 99.5 112
LEEWARD DISTRICT
1 Plot 824 372 1196 87 1196
2 Plots 116 33 149 11 298
3 13 2 15 1 45
4 or more 6 1 7 .5 32
Total 959 408 1367 99.5 1571
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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Female ownership within each assessment category declined 
sharply as the number of plots increased; also, above £2 10s 
per annum, only 18% to 22% of the landowners were women. Men 
exceeded women among the landowners by a ratio of 7:3 in the 
Middle and Leeward Districts; at Windward, it was 3.5:1. 
Although gender was contributory to the pattern of land 
ownership, these data show that the overwhelming majority of 
both men and women who could buy land had only one plot.
The persons owning landed properties assessed both below 
and above £2 10s were also studied. Since the value of the 
land valued under £2 10s is not given, only the values of the 
plots assessed over £2 10s could be analysed. The data are 
presented in Table 36, which shows that 89% of the landed 
properties owned by these persons were valued at £10 or below. 
The Leeward District had the highest proportion so valued 
(95%), although the number of persons was larger than in the 
other districts, where the comparable proportion was 83%. 
Where gender was concerned, the pattern was as one would 
expect: very few women owned land above the lowest assessment 
category and only 17% of these landowners, for Tobago as a 
whole, were women.
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TABLE 3 6
Persons with Land in Both Major Categories: 
Assessed Value of Landed Property > £2 10s 
by District and Gender
WINDWARD DISTRICT
Value fEl
2.10-5 
5- 10 
10- 15 
15- 20 
20- 50 
50-100 
>100 
Total
2.10-5 
5- 10 
10- 15 
15- 20 
20- 50 
50-100 
>100 
Total
2.10-5 
5- 10 
10- 15 
15- 20 
20- 50 
50-100 
>100 
Total
2.10-5 
5- 10 
10- 15 
15- 20 
20- 50 
50-100 
>100 
Total
18
1
4
24
38
5
1
1
45
59
9
5
1
2
1
77
Number
Females Total
3 6
1 4
- 1
— 1
4 12
MIDDLE DISTRICT
4 22
1 2
- 4
- 1
5 29
LEEWARD DISTRICT
6 44
- 5
1 2
-
1
7 52
ISLAND OF TOBAGO
13 72
2 11
1 6
- 1
- 2
_ 1
16 93
% Properties 
Owned bv
Males Females
37.5
37.5
12.5
12.5 
100
75
4
16.6
99.6
84
11
2
2
99
77
12
6
1
3
1
101
75
25
100
80
20
100
86
14
100
81
12.5
6
99.5
Total
50
33
8
99
76
7
14
3
100
85
10
4
2
101
77
12
6
1
2
1
99
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82
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IV.3.5 Persons with Landed Property Assessed at Exactly £10 
Except for Tables 25 and 36, we have consistently 
distinguished the persons whose land was assessed below £10 
from those with land valued £10 or more. It is therefore 
useful to examine those who owned properties valued at £10, in 
order to justify this procedure. There were only 18 persons 
in this category (Table 37).
TABLE 37
Owners of Land Valued £10. by District and (render
District Male Female Total No. of Properties
Windward 6 1 7  8
Middle 7 3 10 10
Leeward 1 - 1  1
Total 14 4 18 19
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
In the Windward District, John Me Call who, until his 
death in March 1879, was the largest resident landowner, was 
still recorded as owner of Little Tobago, an offshore island, 
and Lucy Vale, an abandoned estate. The acreage of Little 
Tobago and Lucy Vale together was 530 acres (Table 18) but 
their assessed value was £10. Me Call was listed as 
owner of Irvine Hall, valued at £10. Thomas Blakely jun., 
coloured merchant and planter, owned Parrot Hall estate. 
Perhaps because it was not cultivated in sugar. Parrot Hall 
was valued at £10.
The other proprietors in the Windward District were as 
follows. Dublin Kerwood was a Roxborough shopkeeper with four
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properties, of which one was a coconut walk of 6 acres. Peter 
McKenna was also a shopkeeper. Dublin Murphy sen. was the 
owner and occupier of land assessed < £2 10 as well as land 
valued at £10. There were also Louisa Thomas with Leith's 
Grant, and James Davis.
In the Middle District, 9 of the 10 owners lived in St 
Andrew's parish, adjoining Scarborough; 8 possessed house and 
land. Among these properties was Deal Fair estate, owned by 
the heirs of Robinson Scobie, a black merchant; it later 
became the Botanic Station. These owners included Elizabeth 
and Nancy Panting, who belonged to a coloured merchant family; 
Frances Collier, of another coloured merchant family; James 
Crooks, from a coloured family of planters and lessees of 
estates; and Thomas Bowles of Riseland, who owned two plots of 
land with houses, and was joint trustee for two more similar 
properties and a shop. At least 6 of these 10 properties were 
in the hands of people from the coloured or black middle 
strata, involved with business and planting, or from the 
dominant class.
In the Leeward District, the only proprietor was Dr 
William A. Purser, an Irish doctor, whose house and land at 
Moriah, called 'Babylon', is so recorded.
Therefore, the owners of properties valued £10 were not 
largely the rising peasant proprietors. A few certainly were, 
acquiring their properties via petty shopkeeping or 
agriculture; but many were either planters, or scions of 
families involved in business and planting. Our examination 
of these owners bears out what the voters' registers and the
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statistics clearly indicated: £10 constituted a 'threshold' 
which most of the small proprietors were unable to attain. We 
are therefore justified in considering the smallholders to be 
those with property valued under £10. Our data also bear out 
Lt.-Gov. Kortright's perception in 1871, that the rising 
'class of Freeholders' consisted of those 'whose property is 
of an annual value or rental of £5 - and under £10. 0. 0.'*
IV.3.6 Landowners with Prooertv Assessed over £10
There were 78 owners of landed properties which were not 
estates, 61 (78%) of whom possessed properties valued under 
£30. In the Windward District, none of these persons held 
property above £30. For the island as a whole, women were 
outnumbered by a ratio of 3:1 in most assessment categories. 
If the planters and lessees (some 3 0% of these proprietors) 
are excluded, the number of these landowners with tracts 
larger than 5 or 10 acres was approximately 56, as shown in 
Table 38. The gender disparity among the owners declines as 
one moves away from the Windward District, where the ratio of 
males to females was as high as 5:1.
We now examine the owners and lessees of estates. The 
concentration of estates in few hands was most pronounced in 
the Windward District. There were 16 estates, worked as 13, 
with 7 owners, of whom 4 were joint owners. Ownership was 
almost entirely white and exclusively male. The mean value of 
the properties was £215 (Table 39).
* 00285/89: Rawson to Kimberley, 29 Apr. 1871, & Encs., esp. 
Kortright to Legislature, 14 Mar. 1871.
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TABLE 38
Owners of Land other than Estates. Assessed > £10. 
by District and Gender: 1881/82 
(Owners and Lessees of Estates Excluded)**
WINDWARD DISTRICT 
Assessed Value (£)
10-19 20-29
M P M E
10 2 2 1
Total 12 3
30-39 
M F
3* - 
3
40-49 
M F
50-59 
M F
60+ 
M F
Total 
M F
- - 15 3
18
* 2 are joint owners. No. of Plots = 17 
No. of Owners= 18
10-19 
M F
a 5
Total 13
MIDDLE DISTRICT (excl. Scarborough
20-29 
M F
6 1 
7
30-39 
M F
40-49 
M F
50-59 
M F
60+ 
M F
1 - 
1
Total 
M F
17 6
23
No. of Plots = 23 
No. of Owners= 23
10-19 
M F
7 3
Total 10
20-29 
M F
2 2# 
4
LEEWARD DISTRICT
30-39 
M F
# 1 owned in 2 categories.
40-49 
M F
50-59 
M F
60+ 
M F
Total 
N F
9 7 
16
No. of Plots = 15 
No. of Owners= 15
ISLAND OF TOBAGO
10-19 
M F
25 10
Total 35
20-29 
M F
10 4
14
30-39 
M F
4 1 
5
40-49 
M F
50-59 
M F
60+ 
M F
1 - 
1
Total 
M F
41 16
57
No. of Plots = 55 
No. of Owners= 56
NOTE: ** Excludes Ann Groom, owning 2 abandoned estates 
Source: Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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TABLE 39
Windward District: Owners and Value of Estates. 1881/82
Owner/s
J. G. & R. B. Anderson
John McCall
John and James McCall
Brutus Murray
R. H. Pile
J. H. B. Thomas
Total
No. of 
Estates
3 (2)
7 (5)
1
2
2
16 (13)
Mean/ 
Assessed 
Value (£)
120
125
308
150
275
95
215
Remarks
Physicians, druggists 
and merchants; white 
residents.
Resident white 
merchants, planters 
/attorneys.
Black planter; 
illiterate.
White; Barbados 
resident.
Resident white.
NOTE: Numbers in brackets indicate the consolidation of holdings into fewer 
units.
Sources; Assessment Roll, 1881/82; sundry records.
In the Middle District, the number of estates was 21 
(worked as 21) ; there was no consolidation of holdings. 
Whereas the mean value of the Windward estates was £215, in 
the Middle District it was £126 (Table 40) . This suggests 
estates of smaller size and lower capitalization than those at 
Windward. Two females are listed, one a joint owner.
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TABLE 40
Middle District: Owners and Value of Estates. 1881/82
Owners No. of Mean/
Estates Assessed 
Value (£)
Thos. Blakely jun. 1 100
Craig Castella/
Elizabeth Boggett 1 130
Robert Crooks 1 35
A. M. Gillespie & Co. 2 75
William Gordon 1 100
James Hackett 1 100
Robert Hutchinson 1 80
Walter Irvine 1 200
Hrs. of Frederick Keens 1 70
James Kirk sen. 3 150
Estate of Mary Kitson 1 70
John McCall and others 3 283
Hrs. of Piggott 1 60
Thomas Reid & Co. 1 100
Hrs. of Robinson Scobie 1 10
Estate of William Ward 1 150
Total 21 126
Remarks
Coloured merchant. 
Blacks; Castella, 
former merchant's 
clerk, also 
owned Providence 
Estate.
Coloured; also owned 
Milford Est. 
British merchants.
Black carpenter who 
became a planter; 
also owned Les 
Coteaux estate. 
Leeward District. 
UK resident.
UK resident. 
Deceased white 
resident.
Resident white; b. 
1800, Dumfries; 
d. 1874; owned 12 
tracts of land, of 
which 5 were estates. 
Deceased white 
resident.
British merchants.
Deal Fair estate. 
Scobie was African- 
born Scarborough 
merchant; d. 1856. 
Coloured.
Sources; Assessment Roll, 1881/82; sundry records.
In the Leeward District, there were 35 estates worked as 
33. Only on the estates (9 worked as 7) owned by Gillespie 
and Co. was there amalgamation of holdings. The mean value of 
the Leeward estates was £121 10s (Table 41).
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TABLE 41
Leeward District: Owners and Value of Estates. 1881/82
Owners No. of 
Estates
Mean/ 
Assessed 
Value (£)
Remarks
George Agard 1
Benjamin Alleyne sen. 1
Craig Castella 1
Robert Crooks 1
Davidson and others 4
Mary Ann Des Vignes 1
A. M. Gillespie and Co./
A. M. Gillespie et al. 9 (7)
James Hackett 1
Frances Keens 5
James Kirk 2
John James Kitson 1
Hrs. of Gordon 
Turnbull Macdougall 1
Duncan McGillivray 1
Thomas Reid & Co. 2
T. L . Rowe 1
John Spicer 2
Tom and others 1
Total 35 (33)
250
40
150
75
84
60
177
200
76
115
100
180
SO
110
280
120
40
121.5
Coloured merchant.
Aberdeen lawyers. 
Resident coloured. 
Also owned Crocnstain 
Estate, not in 
cultivation. Value 
of one estate, 
Roselle, not given.
Coloured; widow of 
James Henry Keens, 
English merchant and 
Pres, of Leg. Co. who 
died 1878.
Coloured heirs of 
Scots planter. 
Scots attorney for 
Gillespie & Co.; 
resident white.
Resident white. 
Resident white. 
Blacks; Golden Lane 
estate.
NOTES t
1. Numbers in brackets indicate the consolidation of holdings into fewer 
units.
2. Where information on a planter is given in Tables 39 or 40, it is not 
repeated here.
Sources ; Assessment Roll, 1881/82; sundry records.
229
Table 42 summarizes the data on estate owners; it 
includes joint owners where these are given. Where the owners 
are heirs, or are a group of persons such as a company, the 
property is counted under the name of the person bequeathing, 
or under the principal of the company or group. The ownership 
of 24 estates, one-third of the total, by John and James 
McCall (with 13) and Gillespie and Co. (with 11) is 
remarkable.
Many of the owners, both resident and absentee, did not 
occupy their estates. Lessees therefore deserve attention. 
Some of them, like J. H. B. Thomas, Thomas Reid and Co., R. B. 
Anderson, and James McCall, owned estates. Leasing was an 
important stepping stone to ownership of estates for people of 
all colours. Among these aspirants were Ebenezer Henderson, 
a coloured merchant leasing Courland; John McKillop, from 
Britain, who began in 1863 as engineer on Castara estate and 
leased Bacolet in 1880; Walter Sladden, another Briton, who 
began in 1845 as overseer on Orange Valley and became lessee 
of Shirvan and Cromstain; Alexander Nora Henry, a black 
bailiff, who was joint-lessee of Golden Lane (Table 43).
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TABLE 42
Tobago: Ownership of Estates by Colour and Gender. 1881/82
N o . o f
E s t a t e s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
T o t a l
N o . E s t a t e s
A b s e n t e e  
W h ite  
M F
2
1
1
1
R e s i d e n t  
W h ite  
M F
6 1
2
2
11
C o lo u r e d  
M F
3
1
B l a c k
N
3
2
N o t  
Known 
M I
4
M
18
6
1
1
1
T O T A L
F
3
2
30
22 28 10
4
72
T
21
6
1
1
2
2
34
M ean V a lu e  
(£) 138 175 102 111 91 142
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TABLE 43
Lessees of Estates by Colour and Mean Value of 
Estates: 1881/82
Absentee Resident Coloured Black Not 
White White Known
Total
No. of
Lessees 1 5 5 5* 9 25
No. of 
Estates 2 5 7 5 9 28
% Lessees 4% 20% 20% 20% 36% 100%
Mean Value 
of Estates(£) 225 121 99 80 101 111
NOTE: * Includes 2 joint-lessees.
Source: Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
As regards both owning and leasing estates, the 
properties invested in by the whites were the most valuable. 
The pattern of female ownership was consistent throughout: as 
the number of properties and their value increased, the 
ownership by women decreased. Therefore, there were only 4 
female estate owners; and all the lessees were male. With the 
exception of Frances Keens, the widow of James Henry Keens, 
deceased merchant, planter and President of the Legislative 
Council, no woman owned more than one estate.
IV.3.7 The Windward District and the McCall/Gillespie Estates 
The McCall/Gillespie estates were a single entity. When 
they were sold in the Encumbered Estates Court, the 
Commissioners ruled against a petition from William and John 
George McCall, who wanted the Windward estates to be kept
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separate from the Leeward, and the losses of some not to be 
put against the profits of others.* The Windward estates of 
John and James McCall had been financed by the Gillespies, 
who, from 1863, were their consignee. John and James McCall 
were part-owners of the Leeward estates listed as owned by the 
Gillespies, John being their attorney. The McCalls were also 
shareholders in the Gillespie vessels.^ Table 44 gives the 
McCall/Gillespie estates, from the records of the Encumbered 
Estates Court in 1885. Adventure, Roselle and Cromstain, 
which the Gillespies had owned, were not mentioned in the 
Court's 1885 records; nor was Riseland, a McCall estate.
* C0441,18/1 Pt. 2: Judgement on petition of William and 
John George McCall, 30 Nov. 1885.
C0441,18/l: N. F. Robarts' Affidavit, 24 Nov. 1885, 
Bundle marked 'N'. N. F. Robarts' Affidavit, 24 July 1885
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TABLE 44
The McCall/Gillespie Estates: 1885
Windward Estates 
Name of Estate Acreage Owners and Remarks
Betsy's Hope 
Charlotteville 
Goldsborough & Goodwood 
King's Bay 
Lure
Richmond, Glamorgan 
and Bushey Park 
Speyside and 
Trois Rivieres 
(incl. Goat Island and 
Little Tobago)
1317
1833
2391
943
969
1918
2021
JOHN
AND
JAMES
McCALL
Dr Patrick 
Mitchell 
McKenzie had 
been part- 
owner of 
Betsy's Hope, 
Richmond, 
Glamorgan & 
Goldsborough, 
but sold his 
shares to 
John McCall.
Leeward Estates
Auchenskeoch & 
Carnbee Appendage 
Prospect &
Orange Valley 
Mary's Hill 
Whim
610
519
270
395
Ownership in undivided 
shares: 5/12 by John 
McCall; after his death 
by his trustees; 2/12 by 
James McCall; 5/12 by 
Alexander M. Gillespie & 
his sons, William and 
Colin Gillespie.
Orange Hill G 
Amity Hope 
Burleigh Castle G 
Spring Garden
764
733
21 Estates 14,683 Acres
Ownership in undivided 
shares: 1/4 by John McCall; 
1/8 by James McCall; 1/2 
by Alexander, William and 
Colin Gillespie; 1/8 by 
Alexander K. McKenzie, 
John McCall, James McCall 
G William McCall, exors. 
of Patrick McKenzie, dec.
NOTE; John McCall devised all his real estate to his exors. 
and trustees - James, William and John George McCall, and 
William Gillespie.
Sources: The Tobago Chronicle and Roval Gazette. 16 Apr. 1869, 
for Voters' List giving the estates part-owned by McKenzie; 
C0441/18/1 Pt. 2 for the Particulars and Deeds of Conveyance, 
& Affidavit of William and Colin Gillespie, 20 July 1885.
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The Windward District was crucial to the rise of the 
McCalls and the consolidation of their power, particularly 
through the energy of John McCall (c. 1824-1879). McCall began 
in 1843 or 1844 as overseer on one of the estates which he 
subsequently owned. By 1860, he was 'Attorney for several of 
the largest and best Estates'", and agent for Phoenix Fire 
and Life Assurance Co. With the help of the Gillespies, he 
and his brother, James, bought many of the estates which they 
managed in the Windward District. Shortly before his death, 
he declared himself to be 'the owner or attorney of 33 
Estates'.^ McCall resided at Betsy's Hope (Windward), one of 
the best estates. His Windward properties were higher in 
assessed value and far more profitable than many of the 
Leeward estates, which is why his heirs protested against 
combining the accounts. In 1883, in spite of the Sugar 
Depression, Betsy's Hope made a profit of 'over £10,000', 
Richmond and Glamorgan, £6429, Goldsborough, £4922 and Lure 
'over £431'; King's Bay lost over £2000."
The exceptional level of propertylessness and 
landlessness in the Windward District, the paucity of 
opportunities for those who acquired land to own large or 
multiple holdings, and the high concentration of estates in 
the hands of a few planters are related factors, which
" C0285/78: Hincks to Newcastle, 28 Apr. 1860, enc. Drysdale 
to Hincks, 16 Apr. 1860.
" McCall to Dundas, 23 Sept. 1878, The Barbados 
Agricultural Reporter. 22 Oct. 1878.
" C0441/18/1: Affidavit of William McCall and John George 
McCall, 2 Oct. 1885.
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reinforce the picture of the district shown in Chapter 3.
Why was the control of the planters so much greater there 
than in the other districts? Perhaps, the answer lies, 
firstly, in the relative lack of alternatives for those 
remaining at Windward. The bargaining power of the labourers 
in the Middle and Leeward Districts was enhanced by their 
ability more effectively to combine other options with wage 
labour.
Secondly, the Windward District relied heavily on 
Barbadian labourers from the 1840s to the 1880s, in addition 
to receiving two-thirds of the 292 Liberated Africans imported 
in 1851, and 83 of the 225 arriving in 1862. The exact extent 
of this Barbadian recruitment is unknown. Between August 1834 
and April 1843, 6 Barbadians migrated to Tobago; between 1845 
and 1846, there were 600; another 600 arrived in 1847, and 
over 200 in 1 8 5 2 . In 1871, Lt.-Gov. Kortright stated that 
the 834 Barbadians reported in the census had been introduced 
in the last decade; in 1870, he estimated that 500 Barbadians 
had been imported in the previous 2 or 3 years. Another 200 
were imported in 1875.^ The efforts of a Mr Chandler, 
appointed recruiting Agent for Tobago in Barbados in 1870, 
were unsuccessful, but private recruitment continued, and in
C0285/52; Grey to Stanley, 10 May 1843, enc. Dowland to 
Darling, 27 Apr. 1843; C0285/56: Reid to Grey, 18 May 
1847, enc. 1846 Blue Bk. Rept.; C0285/58: Reid to Grey, 
12 May 1848, enc. 1847 Blue Bk. Rept.; C0290/36: 1852 Blue 
Bk.
C0285/90: Rawson to Kimberley, 2 May 1872, enc. Kortright 
to Leg. Co., 10 Oct. 1871; C0285/88: Kortright to Rawson, 
27 Aug. 1870, enc. 1869 Blue Bk. Rept.; PP. 1877, Vol. 
LIX, 1875 Blue Bk. Rept.
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1877, of 131 Barbadians arriving, 80 went to Windward, 10 
having been imported by J. H. B. Thomas, and 70 by John 
McCall.^ It is reasonable to infer that Windward planters 
resorted to migrant labour, given the district's chronic
labour shortage, and that this helped to account for the 
enhanced ability of the planters to control ownership of land.
The relative landlessness of the labourers contributed to 
the May 1876 rebellion at Windward, in which Corporal James 
Henry Belmanna was brutally murdered, and other police 
officers injured, in revenge for the killing of a Barbadian
protester, Mary Jane Thomas, and the injury of a Barbadian
man. The Roxborough court house was stoned, and damage done 
to Roxborough and other estates. So great was the planters' 
fear for their lives and property that, like the Jamaican 
planters after the Morant Bay rebellion of 1865, they
surrendered the representative constitution in favour of Crown 
Colony government, hoping for a stronger imperial presence. 
The 'Belmanna War', as Tobagonians call it, followed closely 
on news of the 1876 Confederation Riots in Barbados. Lt.-Gov. 
Harley stated that the rioters were not the migrants who had 
arrived from Barbados in 1876, but 'Creoles and immigrants of 
former years'. Thus, the roots of the rebellion were in the 
local conditions: among them, low wages, the truck system, an 
oppressive system of medical care from the unpopular Anderson
C0321/24: Strahan to Hicks Beach, 22 March 1878, enc. Lt.- 
Gov. to Leg. Co., 25 Feb. 1878; Tobago Archives: S. J. 
Fraser to Byng, 24 Jan. 1878, Return of Immigrants to 
Windward Dist., 31 Dec. 1877; cf. The Barbados Globe. 11 
Oct. 1877.
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brothers, and the land question.
According to Harley, the rebellion showed that among the
Negroes there had been 'secret plans', 'by which to possess
the lands themselves, and this the disclosures in connection
with the recent riots make but too c l e a r . I n  his 1876 Blue
Book Report, he plainly stated:
... the subsequent events disclosed 
that a latent feeling of discontent had 
existed in the District, for some time, 
and there was sufficient evidence to show 
that there was a plot to effect a rising 
and get rid of the Whites and seize the 
Estates.^
The evidence for the plot is not given, but Harley reported 
that 'some two or three' to whom he spoke during the riots 
wanted Crown lands for rent or purchase.^® In the light of 
the statistics, and given that the rebellion was planned in, 
and confined to, the Windward District, the desire for land 
cannot be dismissed as a contributory factor.
IV.4 AGRARIAN STRATIFICATION BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT ROLLS
The picture that emerges is that of a steep pyramid. At 
the apex was the McCall/Gillespie combine, whose ownership of 
24 working estates was enhanced by the social and economic 
power which the McCalls exercised as the leading merchants.
C0321/13: Hennessy to Carnarvon, 31 May 1876, & Encs.; 
Brereton [1984]; Levy [1980].
C0321/13: Hennessy to Carnarvon, 10 June 1876, enc. Harley 
to Hennessy, 6 June 1876.
C0321/17: Dundas to Carnarvon, n. d. , (1877), enc. 
Harley's 1876 Blue Bk. Rept.
20 C0321/13: Hennessy to Carnarvon, 11 May 1876, enc. Harley 
to Hennessy, 9 May 187 6.
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insurance agents, attorneys and planters. The Gillespies were 
the prime source of advances to most of the planters, 
consignees to many, and, with the McCalls, the main shippers 
to and from Tobago. The McCalls also worked, under lease, 
estates which they did not own. Below them were the other 
influential whites, resident and expatriate, along with a 
significant group of coloureds and blacks, who owned and/or 
leased estates - in all, some 59 persons. Many planters owned 
large tracts of land, the size of estates, which were 
abandoned, or used as pasture and provision grounds.
A further 56 persons, who were not planters or lessees, 
owned large properties whose assessed value fell, with few 
exceptions, between £10 and £60. When we add to them the 14 
persons, not planters or lessees, who owned property valued at 
£10, we discern a small emergent petty bourgeoisie of 
shopkeepers, smaller merchants and landlords. Among them were 
Peter McKenna, Dublin Kerwood and Dublin Murphy (Section
IV.3.5); David Cowie and Kent Hector (Section IV.5.1). There 
was also Christmas Murphy, a black shopkeeper, who owned 
property valued at £30 at Parlatuvier, which became known as 
Parlatuvier estate. The Bennetts, a black family, owned 
property valued at £25 at Bloody Bay.
Below these two strata were the 96% of proprietors with 
properties assessed at less than £10. At the very base were 
the landless, owning only a house, and these numbered 1223. 
Above them were the landless who owned one or more shops or 
more than one house; there were 47 such persons. Next, there 
were 397 persons who had acquired land alone, without
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buildings. Above them we place the 1841 persons owning a 
single homestead valued less than £5. Homesteaders with 
property valued between £5 and £10 numbered 123. Ownership of 
more than one landed property was the privilege of 253 persons 
at most, but this figure included planters and other large 
proprietors. If we deduct the planters, lessees and other 
owners of property over £10, we are left with approximately 
123 smallholders who owned more than a single homestead. Such 
persons were most frequent in the Leeward District, but the 
value of the properties was usually below £5, and nearly 
always less than £10. Table 45 sums up these findings. The 
dotted lines between strata indicate what we assume to be main 
lines of cleavage. Statistical aggregates are not dynamic 
groups, but they are a first approximation in understanding 
the class, race and gender relations, and the differentiation 
within Tobago society, which are fully explored in Chapter 7.
Gender was a significant factor among others determining 
the process of stratification. In the Middle and Leeward 
Districts, access to real estate was greater than in the 
Windward District, and female ownership of the smallest 
holdings was similarly greater. In the Windward District, 
both males and females were grossly disadvantaged; however, 
women were among the most disadvantaged, for there the 
disparity between male and female ownership was the most 
acute. In all the districts, female ownership declined 
steeply as the number of plots or the value of the holdings 
increased, with few female plantation owners and no lessees.
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TABLE 45
Strata of Property Owners in Tobago: 1882
Persons & Property 
Values (£)
Number % Property 
Owners
Planters
Lessees (estates)
34}
25} 59
.87}
.60} 1.5
Owners of Property > £10 
Owners of Property = £10
56}
14} 70
1.4 }
.36} 1.8
Owners of > 1 Plot 
Homesteaders £5 < £10
123}
123} 246
3.16}
3.16} 6.3
Homesteaders < £2 10s < £5 1841}
Owners of 1 Plot (no house) 397} 2238
47.4 }
10.2 } 57.6
Landless (shops, > 1 house) 47}
Landless (1 house only) 1223} 1270
1.2 }
31.5 } 32.7
Total Propertied 
Propertyless Adults
3883**
4887
99.9
NOTES ;
* Dotted lines indicate assumed main lines of cleavage. 
** The number of proprietors in Tables 26 and 28 is 3886
Source; Assessment Roll, 1881/82.
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Given that access to land is not determined only by 
ownership, we briefly consider the other opportunities for 
occupancy that were available to the landless and the 
smallholders in the 1880s. The evidence before the 1890 
Metairie Commission attested to the importance to the metayers 
of growing crops between the canes. Some were metayers on 
more than one estate; some combined metayage with renting or 
owning provision grounds; and those who were day labourers 
often had access to provision grounds as part-payment of their 
wages.Officials  continued to complain that one cause of 
unreliable labour was the allowance of abundant provision 
grounds to labourers, who gave their own cultivation 
precedence over estate work.^ In 1881, Administrator Laborde 
noted that the relative absence of squatting on the abandoned 
land was due to easy access to 'lands of the most fertile 
quality ... in places less remote, on the easiest terms.' The 
best land was rented at £1 per acre per annum; 'the owners are 
careless of measuring out the quantity to their tenants, who 
commonly cultivate more than the acre or two for which they 
pay rent.
However, as regards facilitating ownership of land by the 
labourers, the planters remained obdurate. In 1880, Lt.-Gov. 
Gore reported the rejection by the Legislative Council of his 
proposal to sell Crown lands in 10-acre lots to labourers.
Met. Com. Rept. , 1891, esp. pp. 212-3; 225-6.
PP. 1875, Vol. LI, Pt. Ill, 1874 Blue Bk. Rept., Lt.-Gov. 
Ussher, p. 89.
2^ PP. 1881, Vol. LXIV.II, 1880 Blue Bk. Rept., p. 83.
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because it would be 'diminishing the planters' command of 
labour'
The perception of the officials, which is supported by 
our data, is that a stratum of 'respectable' peasant 
proprietors, independent of the estates, had emerged by the 
1870s. S. J. Fraser, a magistrate, observed in 1883 that 'the 
island was gradually passing into the hands of the black 
population' and that 'a strong class is rising in the shape of 
a well-to-do peasant proprietary body. In the absence of 
direct measures, we must therefore assess the export data, to 
make inferences about the size and significance of the surplus 
which they produced for external markets.
IV.5 EXPORTS FROM TOBAGO: 1838-1897
IV.5.1 A Note on the Recorded Exports
It is difficult to trace the exports of smallholders in 
the records, because they produced the major plantation crops. 
From the 1850s, metayers contributed at least one-third of the 
sugar exported.
Coconuts which were second in importance, were also grown 
by both smallholders and estates. Some estates had 'coconut 
walks', either worked by the proprietors or leased to renters, 
often from among the strata of shopkeepers cum landowners. 
For example, David Cowie, a Scots shopkeeper, rented part of 
Cour land estate as a coconut walk at £4 0 per annum; Kent 
Hector, owner of 2 plots valued above £10, one of which was
^ PP. 1880, Vol. XLVIII, Pt. II, 1879 Blue Bk. Rept.
Reot. from the Roval Com...... 1884, p. 409.
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occupied by 'various renters', rented a coconut walk at 
Studley Park for £45 per annum in 1879.^ According to Hay 
[1884, App.], in 1884 there were three coconut estates, and a 
fourth with coconuts in mixed cultivation; but many sugar 
estates exported coconuts.^ However, coconuts reached only 
5.4% of export value by 1888.
The third export crop was cotton, which was revived in 
the 1860s, under the stimulus of the Civil War in the USA. 
Much of it was grown by 'small Proprietors, of the class of 
Labourers'.^ Cotton production lasted a decade (1863-73), 
and never exceeded 2% of export value.
In addition to smallholders being producers of the major 
plantation crops, some of Tobago's minor exports to 
neighbouring colonies were sent clandestinely from Plymouth, 
by small vessels. Plymouth was an official port of entry and 
exit until 1881, but poor administration gave 'undue 
facilities for smuggling' from the late 1840s to the 1880s.^ 
By 1880, when, to protect the revenue, it was proposed to make 
Scarborough the sole port of entry and exit, the McCalls and 
Gillespies were implicated in the smuggling. Acting Attorney 
General, Albert Lewis, accused the McCalls of selling
C0441, 13/1: Particulars of Cour land estate. Re estate of 
Thomas M. Sealey ex parte Thomas Reid; 13/2: Particulars 
of Studley Park estate. Re James Kirk ex parte Thomas 
Reid.
^ For example, Charlotteville, Speyside, Betsy's Hope, 
King's Bay, Studley Park. C0441: Files 18/1 Pt. I, & 13/2.
2* C0285/84: Walker to Caldwell, 2 Apr. 1866, enc. Kortright 
(quoted) to Legislature, Sub.-Enc. to Enc. A.
C0285/64: Colebrooke to Grey, 15 May 1851, enc. Yeates' 
1850 Blue Bk. Rept.
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uncustomed goods in their Windward shops, a view which the 
Treasurer, L. G. Hay, endorsed.^®
We do not know when the trade in minor crops and animals 
from Plymouth began. In 1887, according to John McKillop, a 
planter, it had started legally, between the northside of 
Tobago and Trinidad 'many years ago', using the Royal Mail 
steamers; British Guiana was also a destination of Tobago 
e x p o r t s . T h i s  trade with other BWI colonies was therefore 
an organic, popular movement, reflecting the enterprise and 
interests of the smallholders. However, by 1879, Lt.-Gov. 
Gore reported considerable smuggling of stolen stock, such 
that the official statistics on Tobago's exports to Trinidad 
for 1874-78, were 'altogether illusory'.^
Even when the trade was legal, the produce was under­
estimated in the exports, because the quantities were not in 
standardized units and they were regarded by Customs officials 
as difficult to enumerate.^
To sum up, both smallholders and planters produced the 
major crops exported. The extent to which the former were 
able to diversify the economy is reflected in the minor
3° C0321/41: Gamble to Kimberley, 24 July 1880, & Encs., esp. 
Lewis to Gore, 5 May 1880. C0321/49: Robinson to 
Kimberley, 14 Jan. 1881 & Encs., esp. Hay to Laborde, 5 
Oct. 1880. McCall, Gillespie and the West India Committee, 
London, were the most vehement opponents of the proposal 
(Ch. 7).
3^ C0289/5: Tobaao Gazette. 28 Jan. 1887, Leg. Co. Minutes, 
19 Jan. 1887.
32 C0321/33: Strahan to Hicks Beach, 19 Nov. 1879, Enc. 2.
33 C0289/7: Tobaao Gazette. 1 Mar. 1895, Com. L. G. Hay in 
Financial Board minutes, 4 Feb. 1895.
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exports, much of which went to the neighbouring colonies; but 
clandestinity, inefficiency and the human factor in compiling 
the statistics make the data on the inter-colonial trade 
under-estimates of the actual trade. Given the implication of 
the largest planters in smuggling, and the fact that sugar 
exports were subject to duty, it may also be that the 
principal crop was under-estimated. The statistics are 
therefore taken as indicative of trends in production and 
exports, rather than of precise quantities.
IV.5.2 The Recorded Exports
The diversification of Tobago's recorded exports was 
gradual. In 1838 and 1839, the exports were only sugar, 
molasses and rum. In 1843, 175 cords of fuel wood were sent to 
the BWI, and this is the first indication of local 
smallholding enterprise, for Barbados, an island almost 
entirely cleared of forest, was a market for fuel wood, 
exported by smallholders throughout the Windward Islands 
[Marshall 1963]. The wood probably came from the northern 
village of Parlatuvier, which was founded in 1842; in 1843, 
there were 13 families, '... who principally support 
themselves by cutting fuel wood for the Barbados market.'^
In 1856, for the first time, the value of each item 
exported is given. Table 46 presents the value of exports for 
1856 to 1888, the last year of Tobago's separate 
administration, and also for 1890. Table 47 shows the
^ C0290/22-27: Blue Bks., 1838-1843. C0285/51: Grey to 
Stanley, 28 Dec. 1842, & C0285/52; Grey to Stanley, 7 Dec. 
1843, enc. Stip. Mag. Repts., Child (quoted).
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rapidity of the increase in stock, poultry and local food 
exports in the 1890s, once sugar had collapsed and Union with 
Trinidad inaugurated.
From 1856 to 1875, the share of the value of exports 
accounted for by sugar, molasses and rum ranged from 95% to 
98.5%. Animals, vegetables, fruit and wood products accounted 
for less than 1%. In 1880, the value of animals, vegetables, 
fruit and wood reached 4.2% of the exports. After the crash 
of 1884, which was exacerbated by drought in 1885/86, many 
labourers and smallholders exported animals, partly because 
they were unable to upkeep them. However, stock and poultry 
rearing became important by 1897, accounting for 44% of total 
exports (Table 47).
In 1888, the share of sugar and its by-products fell to 
78% of the value of exports, while the value of animals, 
poultry, hides, vegetables, fruit and wood products rose to 
14.6%. By 1897, although the vegetables and fruit exported to 
Trinidad were under-enumerated, these products constituted 55% 
of the exports. Sugar and its by-products fell to 28.6% of 
export value in 1897. An increasing share of exports went to 
Trinidad in the 1890s: 52% of the value in 1894, rising to 78% 
in 1897.
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TABLE 46
Numerical and Proportionate Value of Tobago Exports: 1856-1890
1856
EXPORTS Value
£
59,615}
1,009}
17,622}
694
Sugar 
Molasses 
Rum
Sugar (semi-fluid)
Shrub
Coconuts
Animals (incl.eggs)
Hides & shells 
Vegetables, fruit (incl. 
pickles, preserves)
Wood, woodfuel 
(incl. charcoal, 
sticks, etc.)
Cotton -
Cocoa
Other (incl. veg. 
manufactures)
Produce of Tobago 79,410
Produce of Other
Countries 379
Total 79,789
30
311
68
56
% Value
Tobago
Produce
98.5
.006
.87
.03
.4
.08
.07
99.96
1860
Value
£
54,492}
326}
10,493}
8}
5
638
8
199
30
296
3
66,498
626.8s
67,124.8s
% Value
Tobago
Produce
98.2
.007
.96
.01
.3
.04
.44
.004
99.92
1865
Value
£
35,929}
1,222}
5,886}
1,023
97
161
49
1,015
22
45,404
1,358
46,762
% Value
Tobago
Produce
94.8
2.2
.2
.3
.1
2.2
.05
99.85
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TABLE 46 continued
Numerical and Proportionate Value of Tobago Exports: 1856-1890
1870
EXPORTS
Sugar
Molasses
Rum
Shrub
Coconuts
Value
£
68,848}
2,985}
9,268}
16
Animals (incl. eggs)
Hides & shells 
Vegetables & fruit (incl. 
pickles & preserves)
Wood, wood fuel (incl. 
charcoal, sticks, etc.)
Cotton
Cocoa
Other (incl.veg. 
manufactures)
1,316
8
107 
27 
34 
268
Produce of Tobago 
Produce of 
Other Countries
Total
82,377
239
82,616
% Value
Tobago
Produce
97.8
.02
1.6
.01
.13
.03
.04
.32
99.95
1875
Value
£
76,498}
3,347}
8,016}
3,347
298
328
20
41
37
91,932
83*
92,015
% Value
Tobago
Produce
95.6
3.6
.32
.36
.02
.04
.04
99.98
1880
Value
£
66,516.10s} 
2,964} 
1,778}
12
2,815
2,429
82. 4s
73.16s
731.10s
99
60.10s
77,561.10s
53.10s**
77,615
% Value
Tobago
Produce
91.8
.01
3.6
3.1
.1
.09
.9
.1
.08
99.7
NOTES; *Includes £23 for old metal, which the Blue Bk. mistakenly treats as Tobago produce.
**Blue Bk. gives £65.10s as figure here, but only £53.10s (old metal) are accounted for in the listing.
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EXPORTS
Sugar
Molasses
Rum
Shrub
Coconuts
TABLE 46 concluded
Numerical and Proportionate Value of Tobago Exports: 1856-1890
1885
Value
£
25,269}
2,364}
2,200}
% Value
Tobago
Produce
78.2
1,987.IBs.5d 5.2
1888
Value
£
28,016. 5s} 
1,325}
930}
% Value
Tobago
Produce
78.4
2,098. Os.9d 5.4
1890
Value
£
12,702. 7s.6d} 
736}
372.10s}
1,672. 9s
% Value
Tobago
Produce
76.3
8.6
Animals (incl.eggs) 5,301.13s
Hides & shells 84.17s.6d
Vegetables & fruit (incl.
pickles, preserves) 
Wood, wood fuel (incl. 
charcoal, sticks, etc.)
Cotton
Cocoa
Other (incl. veg. 
manufactures)
Produce of Tobago 
Produce of 
Other Countries
Total
45. 7s 
607. 5s
223. 2s.lOd
13.9
.2
.1
1.6
.6
52.12s. 6d .1 
38,135.15s.lid 99.9 
301. 0. 0
38,436.15s.lid
5,233. 8s 
16.12s
78.10s
348. Os.Od
551. 5s
38,597. Os.9d 
300. 0. 0 
38,897. Os.9d
13.5
.04
.2
.9
1.4
99.8
2,251. 8s.4d 
25
74
1,429. 5s 
108.10s
19,371. 9s.lOd
11.6
.1
.4
7.4
.6
100
Sources: CO290 series: Blue Bks. for 1856-1888; C0300/101: Trinidad and Tobago Blue Bk., 1890.
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TABLE 47
Numerical and Prooortionate Value of Tobago Exnorts: 1894. 1896. 1897
1894 1896 1897
EXPORTS Value
£
% Value
Tobago
Produce
Value
£
% Value
Tobago
Produce
Value
£
% Value
Tobago
Produce
Sugar, molasses.
& rum 8420. 5s 37.36 6423 30 5304. 5s 28.57
Coconuts 1284.11s.2d 5.7 911.13s 4.3 910. ls.7d 4.9
Animals and poultry 9720 43 7768 36.3 8123. 2s.4d 43.8
Hides and shells 200. 5s .88 11. 5s .05 60 .3
Vegetables, fruit 98.12s .4 2399 11.2 412. 5s 2.2
Vegetable manufactures 
Wood fuel, wood
932 4.36 487. 18s.4d 2.6
products 1797.15s 8 1148 5.36 1218. 18s 6.56
Cocoa 1011 4.48 1542 7.2 1698 9.1
Other - - 245 1.1 346 1.9
Total Tobago Produce 22532. 8s.2d
Animals, hides 
vegetables etc. and 
wood as % Tobago
99.82 21379.18s 99.87 18560. 10s.3d 99.93
exports • 52% • 57% • • • 55%
% Exports Sent
to Trinidad . « . 52% . . 56% . . . 78%
Sources: C0289/7: Tobago Gazette, 11 Jan. 1895; C0300/107, /109: Trinidad and Tobago Blue Bks., 
1896, 1897; C0298/61: Council Paper No. 77, 1898.
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IV.6 CONCLUSION
A stratum of smallholders with properties between £5 and 
£10 in assessed value had emerged by the 1870s. However, the 
preponderance of homesteaders among the owners of the smallest 
holdings, and the continued dependence of hundreds of 
propertyless and landless adults on the estates led to an 
exodus of workers from Tobago. Beginning in the 1860s, 
emigration grew to such a mighty stream, that there was almost 
no decennial population growth at the censuses of 1891 and 
1901 (Ch. 6). Though a relatively prosperous stratum of 
peasants had emerged, it was too small in number (we estimate 
it to have been about 246 persons) , in the extent of its 
holdings, in its export capability and its economic and 
political power, to have averted the economic collapse of 
1884.
The relatively late emergence of a peasantry in Tobago, 
by contrast with the analysis of Marshall [1968], who 
described, for most of the BWI, a period of emergence in the 
1840s to 1860, of consolidation in the 1860s to 1880s and of 
saturation in the early 20th century, highlights afresh the 
importance of the political and economic power of groups and 
classes in the historical process. Marshall [ibid.] observes 
that, from the 1860s, most Caribbean peasantries began to 
focus more on the production of export crops than on local 
food production. Thus, the late emergence of the Tobago 
peasantry may help to explain the late production of minor 
export crops.
The analysis according to districts demonstrated the
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varying specificity of internal relations and micro-processes, 
even on a small island, which are significant in the dynamics 
of development [M. Silverman 1979:467]. It allowed us to 
relate the relative landlessness in the Windward District to 
the consolidation of the McCalls in particular, and showed 
that there was greater, though limited, opportunity for 
landownership by the labouring class in the Middle and Leeward 
Districts, down to 1882.
Although minor crops were under-enumerated in the 
exports, the data suggest that it took the collapse of the 
sugar economy to break the fetters on diversified production. 
The dominance of the McCall/Gillespie conglomerate over 
investment, shipping and plantation production meant that no 
large segment of the planter class could break away from 
sugar. The only significant alternative crop, produced by 
planters, lessees and the small shopkeepers and landowners who 
rented estate lands, was coconuts, which did not exceed 5% of 
export value before 1888.
Thus, in answer to our hypothesis (Options 2A, 2B) ,
neither from within the plantocracy, from the stratum of 
persons who owned or occupied medium-sized holdings, nor from 
the smallholding sector, was there any group of people, 
numerous enough, and economically bouyant enough, to have 
successfullv provided an alternative base for production by 
1884. 'The peasant labour process' was continued on lands 
owned, or to which the people had access; but metayage tied 
the labourers to nominal cultivation of sugar. The peasant 
initiative away from sugar before 1888 was significant, but it
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took time before the Tobago peasantry fully came into its own, 
both as landowners and producers. Its trajectory was thus 
different from that of peasants elsewhere in the BWI.
The peasant initiatives underscore afresh the conflicting 
strategies and interests of the dominant and labouring 
classes. Circumscribed though the latter were, they laid the 
basis for increased autonomy from the estates. That the 
peasants, labourers and metayers moved so swiftly and 
aggressively to intensify production of alternative crops and 
trade with the neighbouring colonies, is testimony to the 
vision, enterprise and energy of the common people of Tobago.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE METAYAGE SYSTEM 
IN TOBAGO: 1842-1900
V.l INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3 showed that metayage became the major method of 
cultivating the Tobago estates in the 1850s. We argued that 
it was integral both to plantation production, and to the 
patterns of wage earning and land acquisition among the ex­
slaves; and it symbolized the stalemate in the struggle of the 
two major contending groups, planters and labourers.
Because of the centrality of metayage in the agrarian 
order and in the historical process, its rise and demise are 
now examined. First, we outline the major conceptions of 
metayage in the literature. Next, since its origins in Tobago 
were discussed in Chapter 3, we explore its development, and 
relate the Tobago experience to the conceptual literature. The 
social and political crises in which it was central in the 
1880s and 1890s are then examined. We argue that metayage 
contributed to low levels of accumulation on the account of 
most planters and metayers, and therefore contributed to the 
failure to emerge of planters and smallholders, who could 
either upgrade the sugar industry or diversify the economy 
(Options 1 and 2 of our hypothesis).
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V.2 CONCEPTIONS OF METAYAGE
'Sharecropping is as old as recorded history' [Byres 
1983:7]. The classical economists assumed a calculus of self- 
interest by each party to such contracts. For Adam Smith, it 
was superior to slavery, since the slave had an interest in 
producing as little as possible above his own maintenance, 
while metayers would have an interest in making the whole 
product as large as possible, to increase their own share of 
the crops; but they would not be interested in further 
improvement of the land, since investment out of their own 
resources would give to the landlord one-half of the increased 
produce, in which he had not invested [1789/1937:366-368].
John Stuart Mill agreed with Smith, but saw many more 
positive facets to the practice. While the metayer had less 
motive to exertion than the peasant, he had more than the day 
labourer, whose main interest was in not being dismissed, and 
than the tenant farmer without a lease. Assuming that the 
metayer's share of the produce was sufficient to support his 
family, he would see himself as the landlord's 'partner'. 
Given the disadvantages noted by Smith, Mill felt that if the 
landlord was willing to provide capital for improvements, the 
metayer had the strongest interest in promoting them, because 
of the benefits accruing to himself. Mill also noted that 
metayer contracts were usually subordinate to usage and 
custom. Contrary to Smith and other detractors of the system, 
he reasoned that there was no necessarv connection between 
metayage and poor husbandry of the soil or abject poverty of 
the cultivators [1926:303-315].
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Alfred Marshall, developing further Smith's objections, 
argued that the metayer 'will apply only so much capital and 
labour as will give him returns more than twice enough to 
repay himself: so that his landlord will get a smaller share 
even of those returns than he would have on the plan of a 
fixed payment' [1961:644]. Thus, for him, 'the advantages of 
the metayer system are considerable when the holdings are very 
small, the tenants poor, and the landlords not averse to 
taking much trouble about small things'; otherwise, renting 
would be preferable [ibid.:645],
Marx regarded metayage as 'a transitory form from the 
original form of rent to capitalist rent' [1967:803], and in 
this he was followed by most Marxists, who see it as a pre­
capitalist or intermediate form of surplus creation and 
appropriation, destined to be swept aside by productive forces 
which would revolutionize agricultural production and promote 
capitalist appropriation [e.g. Pearce 1983].
Another standpoint is that of Chayanov, although his 
concerns were not specifically with metayage. In considering 
peasant households in Russia, Chayanov rejected the classical 
and neo-classical models of economic man, and the economic 
theories derived therefrom. He argued that most peasant 
households balance the satisfaction of needs against the 
amount of drudgery required to fulfil those needs, a process 
affected by demographic factors as well as the mutual effects 
of size of holdings, type of soil, crops, availability of 
draught animals, land and market prices, interest rates and 
alternative work [Thorner 1966:xvi-xvii]. The usefulness of
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Chayanov's approach lies in his appreciation of the non- 
quantitative criteria with which the farmer assesses any 
course of action, and in his perception that often the 
benefits pursued are indivisible goods.
Within the neo-classical paradigm, several writers tried 
to test Marshall's thesis, but because of the social, 
political and customary contexts in which sharecropping is 
embedded, the results of such attempts remain inconclusive 
[e.g. Bell 1977]. Cheung [1969] shows that different types of 
tenancies and contractual arrangements do not automatically 
result in different efficiencies of resource use. While 
Herring's study on South Asia places more weight on the 
Chayanovian than the Marshallian thesis, he is careful to 
state that factors such as the social organization of 
production, the extent of competition for tenancies, and the 
quality of land, are also important in 'this frustrâtingly 
inconclusive exercise' [1984:144].
Martinez-Alier argues, contrary to Marshall, that some 
systems of land tenure and use of labour, such as the Hindu 
iaimani system, cannot be explained using conventional 
economic analysis; neo-classical assumptions on economic 
rationality may play a role, but are not necessarily decisive, 
in systems such as plantation slavery, sharecropping, Andean 
haciendas etc. He also states that sharecropping or cash 
tenancy may exist in a free labour market even when 
agriculture becomes more commercialized, provided that the 
share of labour in total costs is high [1974:158, 135].
Cooper [1983:245] demonstrates that to view sharecropping
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as a formal rental contract between two parties is 'a rather 
sterile approach', given the non-contractual factors (such as 
indebtedness or control of markets) which facilitate surplus 
appropriation and deny alternatives to the sharecroppers.
This is one of the central issues in the explanations of 
the rise of sharecropping after the Civil War in the South of 
the USA. Reid [1973; 1975], DeCanio [1974], Higgs [1977],
Ransom and Sutch [1977]^, are among those using the neo­
classical paradigm, which is criticized by writers such as 
Roark [1977], Woodman [1977], Wiener [1978], Litwack [1979], 
Davis [1981], Handle [1978; 1983] and Wayne [1983], on the 
grounds that it ignores the legacy of the past, the crop lien 
system, the role of merchant/planters, and their use of legal, 
political and other structures to hem in the ex-slaves. Mann 
[1990, Ch. 4] indicates regional differences in the post- 
bellum South; sharecropping was facilitated by the long crop 
cycle in cotton, which made easier the indebtedness of the 
labourer, and it was buttressed by crop liens and the use of 
family labour, both of which reflected attempts to deal with 
class conflicts and reduce the risks inherent in agricultural 
production.
The perils of the Marxian assumption are as real as those 
of the neo-classical position. In both the United States South 
and the Caribbean, wage labour preceded the introduction of 
sharecropping after Emancipation. That capitalist forms of
 ^Ransom and Sutch [1972; 1977] are among the most
sophisticated authors in this genre of writing, since they 
take the non-contractual factors into account, far more 
than Higgs and Reid in particular.
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surplus appropriation should be superseded, wholly or partly, 
by 'pre-capitalist' ones, should lead us to examine closely 
the structure of agrarian relationships, rather than to assume 
that non-capitalist forms bespeak the absence of capitalism. 
The Caribbean literature demonstrates that in the Bahamas 
[Johnson 1991], Nevis, Montserrat [Shephard 1945], and the 
Windward Islands [Marshall 1965], where the plantocracy was at 
its weakest, short of capital and credit, unable to procure 
indentured labour in large numbers, metayage became the long­
er short-term expedient to which both the capitalist planters 
and the workers reluctantly agreed.
As happened elsewhere, non-contractual arrangements, 
which cannot easily be separated from the metayer contracts, 
buttressed the system in the BWI. Johnson [1991] shows how 
the share system in the Bahamas was undergirded by a credit 
and truck system, which ensnared even the peasantry. Where 
Bolland [1981; 1984] places the emphasis on the control of
land as crucial to the control of labour, Johnson [1991:105] 
argues that the key to the control by the agro-commercial 
bourgeoisie lay in its 'monopoly of capital in an economy 
where forms of non-wage payment were widely used and where, as 
a result, the labouring classes depended on credit.' In both 
cases, though the mechanisms differed somewhat, the planters' 
strategy was to control the options available to the ex-slaves 
and to limit their bargaining power.
Most of the standpoints on metayage which we have 
considered have their strengths, though none has been shown to 
be adequate in actual situations. Many of their arguments are
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illustrated in the Tobago data, which we now examine.
V.3 THE METAYAGE SYSTEM IN OPERATION
V.3.1 The Manor Issues of the 1840s and 1850s
Although metayage began in Tobago in 1842, it was not 
widely employed until after the hurricane and the failure of 
the West India Bank in 1847, following the British Sugar 
Duties Act of 1846. At the time, the Stipendiary Magistrates 
recommended cash rental of estate land by the labourers, who 
would grow canes on their own account and sell them, when 
ripe, to the highest bidder. This solution, of separating 
cultivation from the manufacture of sugar, was seldom adopted.
While cash rental would have given more legal safeguards 
than metayage, it had its disadvantages. Firstly, there was no 
competitive market for the canes; thus, the grower would have 
been at the mercy of the manufacturer. Secondly, canes being 
heavy and bulky, bad roads and length of cartage would have 
made the grower vulnerable to planters and other owners of 
carts. Thirdly, cane has to be ground and manufactured within 
a few days after it is cut, a process requiring a large number 
of labourers. The acute shortage of cash was the crux of the 
matter. The planters could neither pay wages, nor purchase 
canes, nor procure continuous labour. The labourers lacked 
sufficient land and viable alternatives. Metayage, which 
involved the mutual interests of planter and labourer in the 
growth and processing of the crop, was the option to which 
both parties resorted.
There was no law governing metayage until 1888. The
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stipendiary Magistrates, until 1853 when their reports ceased, 
called for legislation to ensure uniformity and security of 
tenure, written contracts to protect the labourers from fraud, 
and jurisdiction to the magistrates in matters of dispute.
From 1849, the magistrates voiced their concerns more
vehemently. Dowland (Leeward District) described its workings
as follows;
The general terms of the Metairie System 
are, that the Renter cuts his Canes, and 
has them conveyed to the Mill, and that 
he finds the Boilerman and Mill Gang all 
at his own expense. That the cultivation 
be under the control of the Proprietor, 
who shall supply at his own Cost, Stock, 
and Carts & Machinery necessary to grind 
the Canes, and make the Sugar in the usual 
manner. The Sugar, when made to be divided 
in equal portions, and the Proprietor to 
have all Rum and Molasses. Renter to 
furnish his own barrels or V e s s e l s . ^
Commenting on the usual metayer contracts, Dowland wrote:
There is no specified termination mentioned, 
no period of notice to quit given, no 
equitable conditions named on giving up 
the Land with its Crop, nor is any Referee, 
or Arbitrator appointed in the event of 
dispute. On the contrary the Form is one 
sided, and the laborer seems to me to be 
very much open to the will and caprice of 
the Landlord.3
Le Plastrier (Windward District) suggested legislation,
permitting leases for 3 or 5 years, which would avoid
the misunderstandings which now take 
place, as to whether he or the Estate is 
to cut and cart the canes, he or the Estate 
to pay for boilerman, firemen, fuel and a 
variety of other expenses ... which are 
frequently the cause of dispute when the
2 C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1849. 
 ^C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1849.
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manufactured article comes to be divided/
Nothing was done.
In 1849, Sir William Colebrooke, the Governor-in-Chief, 
agreed that laws were needed, especially when a mortgage was 
foreclosed, or when the estate changed hands. He wanted a 
'prompt and summary process for the recovery out of the 
growing crops of all ... claims of the labouring classes', 
since their expenses were 'considerable', and their 'returns 
often p r e c a r i o u s ' . 5 in 1850 and 1853, he called again for 
legislation,* but nothing was done.
Another aspect of the relationship between planter and 
labourer was the use of taxation to curb the real income of 
the labourers. The houses, carts, mules, and asses of the 
estates were exempt from taxation; those of the labourers were 
n o t . 7  Recommendations for tax exemptions for the metayer's 
house, mule, ass and manure were ignored. In 1850, a direct 
excise was imposed on all sugar produced by metayers. Child 
asked that only the sugar exported should be taxed, at the
 ^C0285/62; Colebrooke to Grey, 7 Mar. 1850, enc. 'Remarks 
on Metairie Contracts' by Geo. Le Plastrier.
 ^Fair Minutes of House of Assembly, Tobago, 1849-1851: 
Colebrooke to Yeates, 6 Nov. 1849, enc. Colebrooke to 
Lt.-Gov., St Lucia, 2 Aug. 1849. Cf. C0285/61: Colebrooke 
to Grey, 1 Sept. 1849, enc. Colebrooke to Yeates, n. d.; 
Colebrooke to Grey, 25 Oct. 1849, enc. 'Metairie Lease'.
* C0285/62: Colebrooke to Grey, 7 Mar. 1850, enc. Colebrooke 
to Yeates, 4 March 1850. C0285/66: Colebrooke to 
Newcastle, 30 Sept. 1853, enc. Colebrooke to Yeates, 16 
Aug. 1853.
 ^Measures of this kind were common throughout the BWI; cf. 
Robotham [1981].
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exporter's expense.* This too was ignored.
The availability of capital and the size of the estates 
affected the conduct of the metayage system. Child, after 
'minute enquiries', observed that metayage was best suited to 
estates where the landlord had works and plant, but not 
capital to hire labour.* Similarly, Dowland reported that 
'small scale' planters with no capital benefitted most from 
metayage, whereas it was a 'drawback' to large plantations, 
because it narrowed the labour supply.^
But size of estate was related to the availability of
capital. The chief difficulty of the small estates was, in
Dowland's words, 'the want of Capital1':
It is the Class of Petty Planters who are 
causing discontent amongst the Metayers by 
depriving them of a due return for their 
industry. Canes which ought to have been 
converted into Sugar in last Month (May) 
are still on the ground, and, perhaps, 
may never be reaped. Such spoliation of 
property leads to heart burnings, and 
distrust, and renders the Laborer unsettled 
and erratic.“
The irony is that if the smaller estates were most likely 
to benefit from metayage, their lack of capital and increasing 
dilapidation made them least likely to provide harmonious 
relationships with the metayers. Many of the small planters 
were 'white and coloured persons, who have long acted as
* CO290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1849, Dowland; 30 June
1850, Child.
* C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1852, Child. Cf. Breen
[1844/1970:202] on St Lucia.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 Dec. 1850, Dowland.
" C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1850, Dowland; 
author's emphasis.
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Managers and Overseers', who acquired estates in the 1840s.
The conditions of metayer tenure varied from district to 
district, and over time. By 1853, Child reported that 
'occasionally' a proportion of the rum made from the skimmings 
of the sugar was given to the cultivator.^ Over the years, 
by a process of informal negotiation, many planters allowed 
the metayers either rum or a part of the molasses, in addition 
to their half of the sugar.
In 1850, Child observed that, from the metayer's
standpoint, the system could be 'highly profitable', provided
that he devoted to it only occasional labour, and that of his
family if they were not otherwise earning money. He continued:
... but if, for the sake of a large crop 
he entices Estates Labourers by high wages, 
and other inducements, to work with him, 
his net earnings will prove to be very
unsatisfactory.w
Not surprisingly, the planters and officials complained very 
frequently of the neglect of the metayers' cane pieces. 
Child's point, which is one about marginal utility and 
opportunity costs, shows that the calculus of interest, which 
the classical and neo-classical writers assumed, did operate; 
but the social, legal and political conditions coloured the 
perceptions of the actors as to what were rational choices. We 
should also note that familv labour, which the planters could 
not automatically expect in a situation of wage labour, was
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1850, Consol. Tables.
CO290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 31 Dec. 1853, Child.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1850, Child; cf. 30
June 1853, Consol. Table C.
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implicitly built into the metayage system.
Marshall [1965] gives the following reasons for the 
failure to legislate. First, the planters were unwilling to 
appear to make permanent what was regarded as a temporary 
expedient; second, neither were they willing to legislate on 
matters which affected the interests of the British 
capitalists who were absentee owners or creditors and 
consignees; third, it was difficult for official opinion, 
local and metropolitan, to hold sway where the Assembly was 
controlled by planters, who 'continued to resist even when it 
should have become clear in the late 'fifties and early 
'sixties that metayage had come to Tobago to stay' [ibid.: 
45]; fourth, it was the metayers who suffered most keenly from 
the refusal to make just laws to administer the system. In 
sum, the balance of power was against the metayers.
Appearing before the 1890 Metairie Commission, C. L. 
Abbott, whose father, S. F. H. Abbott, had practised at the 
Tobago Bar from 1850, produced one of his father's letter- 
books for 1854-1858. It indicated that many disputes between 
metayers and planters were settled out of court, by one of the 
disputants taking the matter to the solicitor, who would write 
to the other party, asking that (s)he come to see him to 
settle the matter.^ Thus, in the absence of formal rules, 
informal regulation became integral to the metayage system.
In the 1850s, metayage was, on balance, profitable to 
both planters and metayers. Moribund and formerly abandoned 
estates were kept as going concerns. No full estimate of a
Met. Com. Rent. . 1891, Abbott's evidence, p. 141.
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metayer's income and expenditure survives, but Child stated 
that the profit to those who sold their sugar locally was 
'highly remunerative.'^ He attributed the falling rate of 
commitments to prison to the extension of metayage, 'which is 
gradually elevating many of the peasantry to a higher social 
standing than they could have otherwise attained.
V.3.2 Differentiation and Change; 1860-1890
In 1859, the planters decided to impose an export tax on 
all estate produce, including metayers' sugar, to raise 
revenue for the importation of labourers. A property tax, 
restricted to estates on which the immigrants would be 
located, along with a fee or stamp duty on all contracts of 
service with immigrants, had previously been mooted as the 
means of raising revenue for immigration. But Lt.-Gov. 
Drysdale lost the support of the leading planters on the 
issue, and in December 1859, the necessary Bills were 
introduced in the legislature.
Several points on the metayage system emerge from the 
correspondence on these issues. First, metayage was island- 
wide by 1860. On some estates, the whole crop was so 
produced, but on all, it existed to a greater or lesser
C0290/4; Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1851, Consol. Table 
C.
C0285/77: Hincks to Lytton, 3 Mar. 1859, & Encs., esp. 
Child's rept. on the prisons, 31 Dec. 1858 & Drysdale to 
Hincks, 22 Jan. 1859. Breen [1844/1970:302] on St Lucia.
C0285/77: Walker to Lytton, 28 June 1859, enc. Drysdale's 
1858 Blue Bk. Rept.; C0285/78: Hincks to Newcastle, 4 
Jan. 1860, enc. Drysdale to Hincks, 10 Dec. 1859.
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degree. Moreover, it was directly related to the nominal 
wages paid. Drysdale observed that metayage would progress, 
'so long as the rate of daily wages remains so low as it now 
is.'*’ Low wages induced labourers to become metayers, which 
offered an incentive to the more productive growers; 
immigration, for which they were to be taxed, would keep wages 
low, and would remove the advantages of metayage by causing a 
reversion to wage labour.
Gov. Hincks, commenting on the proposed tax, called for 
a minimum wage of Is per day, the Barbados rate; wages in 
Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana and St Lucia (to East 
Indians) exceeded Is, while in Tobago, the rate paid by the 
planters was 8d per day, with metayers who employed labour 
paying Is 4d per day. Agreeing with Drysdale that it would be 
'not only impolitic, but unjust in the extreme' to impose the 
export tax, Hincks asked that the proposed legislation not be 
sanctioned, with which the Colonial Office agreed.^
One of the factors which contributed indirectly to the 
spread of metayage was the truck system, defined as 'a set of 
closely related arrangements whereby some form of consumption 
is tied to the employment contract' [Hilton 1960:1].^* As
*’ 00285/77: Walker to Lytton, 28 June 1859, enc. Drysdale's 
1858 Blue Bk. Rept.
20 00285/78: Hincks to Newcastle, 4 Jan. 1860, & Encs., esp. 
Drysdale to Hincks, 10 Dec. 1859, from which the quot. 
is taken.
Hilton sees the system as a continuum ranging from 
outright compulsion to a situation of no compulsion 
except the existence of a company shop [1960:10]. Both 
ends of the continuum were practised in Tobago between 
1838 and 1900.
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early as 1839, a newspaper observed that many managers and
planters kept retail stores on or near their p r e m i s e s . B y
1842, the system was fully established. By the 1860s, it was
entrenched. Drysdale wrote:
... Credit is easily obtained and debt 
insidiously contracted. ... It is ... the 
detestable truck system over again. ... 
proceedings such as these ... tend to 
estrange the laborers from engaging in the 
culture of the cane, otherwise than as 
independent Metayers.
Thus, to avoid indebtedness resulting from low wages, many
labourers resorted to metayage.
Metayage was preferred to wage labour by the metayers for
several reasons. The earnings were greater, and were enhanced
by the provisions invariably grown between the canes.
Secondly, the metayer's autonomy was far greater, since
supervision by the managers was minimal. Thirdly, the input
of the metayer into the upkeep of the soil was trifling, for
he could occupy as much land as he wanted, whether he
cultivated it all or not, and he could move from one plot to
another, after reaping the crops from his ratoons. H. I.
Woodcock, Chief Justice, gave a 'neo-classical' analysis of
the system in 1862:
Under such a system of cultivation there 
can be no farming; the labourer cultivates 
his field so long as it remains in heart;
Tobago Gazette and West Indian News. 24 Dec. 1839, p.2. 
Marshall notes that truck shops are a means of getting 
back part of the nominal wage, and that foremen and 
managers who keep shops are often more injurious than 
employers, for these supervisors are not held in check 
by a regard for self-interest [1961:553, fn. lb].
C0285/80: Walker to Newcastle, 30 June 1862, enc. 
Drysdale's 1861 Blue Bk. Rept.
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it is not in his interest to manure it; for 
as soon as it ceases to produce what will 
remunerate him for his labour he moves off 
to a fresh field: there is an entire ab­
sence of all implemental industry; and, 
owing in a great measure to the bad faith 
in which, on both sides, the contract is 
too often carried out, what is done is 
imperfectly done, and from many causes 
yields little return. I have known canes 
so planted to remain on the land two 
years without being cropped.
[Woodcock 1867/1971:190]
The contours of the metayage system changed in the 1860s.
Whereas, initially, metayers were labourers on or near the
estates on which they had contracted, this was no longer
always the case. There was also increasing differentiation
among the metayers, as many employed labour to do all the work
involved. Daniel Gordon, owner of Courland estate, writing to
the Colonial Office in support of the export tax for
immigration in 1860, described himself as 'the largest Metayer
Planter in this Island, my Estate being wholly cultivated by
Metayers'. Gordon argued that the 'Agricultural body' might
be divided into four 'classes'.
1st. The great majority who work in the 
fields have nothing whatsoever to do with 
Metairie Planting, labourers for hire, 
they make no Sugar on their own account 
and export none. 2nd. A smaller number 
though still large who do work in the 
fields and make their barrel each, but 
who being without any capital and indus­
try cultivate their land in miserable and 
slovenly manner, the quantity of Sugar 
they make being too small to be of any 
value ... . 3rd. A smaller body who make 
from three to four Hogsheads of sugar, 
these men do not till the soil exclusively 
with their own hands; they all hire labour, 
and all complain bitterly of the rascality 
of those whom they employ, and cry out for 
more labour. 4th. A few men who make from 
ten to twenty Hogsheads of sugar, these 
too employ labour and would treble their
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present crops if they could command a 
supply of it[;] of this last class is my 
own butler who has grown this year Sixteen 
Hogsheads of Sugar without being absent 
from my house, and all by hired labour.
Gordon thought that only the second group would be adversely
affected by immigration, and stated that every year, 'on
almost every Estate', metayers' canes were not reaped, for
lack of labour.^
Stratification of the metayers was also indicated by
Drysdale:
In many instances land has been allotted 
for Metairie cultivation to persons 
dwelling at a distance of several miles 
from the property of which it forms a part, 
not unfrequently to individuals who never 
work in these grounds themselves, but hire 
occasional labor for the purpose, and who 
are often tradesmen such as Carpenters or 
Masons, or even Grooms and Domestic 
Servants.^
The legal problems continued. By 1874, the courts had no
precedents to cover metayage cases. Lt.-Gov. Ussher stated
that metayage disputes were
necessarily ... settled at haphazard, and 
according to some existing law which may 
appear to bear most closely upon the 
special case, ... and in the absence of 
written agreements, I believe the "custom", 
or practice, between metayers and planters 
is generally ignored by judicial officers,
... litigation ... is becoming frequent, 
and in some parts of the Colony is mis­
chievous and highly injurious to 
planters ...
Ussher's successor, Harley, also wrote that the unwritten
^ C0285/78: D. G. Gordon to Newcastle, 10 Jan. 1860.
C0285/80: Walker to Newcastle, 30 June 1862, enc. 
Drysdale's 1861 Blue Bk. Rept.
P.P. 1875, Vol. LI, Pt. Ill, 1874 Blue Bk. Rept., p. 90.
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contracts were 'a fruitful source of litigation.'^
As in the 1850s, many cases were informally compromised.
Jackson O'Connor, a metayer from 1874, explained to the 1890
Metairie Commission how this worked:
The metayer used to go to a lawyer and he 
used to charge him 10s. to write a letter 
to the proprietor and compromise the 
matter. I know on several occasions he 
charge three guineas if he have not got 
the cane ground. But he would not go to 
law if he had not the money paid him. ...
How could they [metayers] go through the 
law with empty hands, because it is three 
guineas for a lawyer besides Court expenses? 
and you have no money? That's the whole 
upshot.
He also claimed that often metayers going to court would have
to forfeit the 'privilege' of pasturing their cows on the
estate. 'You have to submit to these impositions on purpose to
keep in friendship with them.
We are fortunate to have the reports of several
commissions and investigations of the system between 1884 and
1890, which allow us a clear picture for that period. All
observers regarded metayers as better off than wage labourers.
When Stephen Gatty, Chairman of the 1890 Metairie Commission,
citing John Stuart Mill, questioned John McKillop, lessee of
Bacolet estate, his reply was unequivocal:
A. I know it is the case here. If you go 
through the island ... where the metayer 
system is carried on you will see the 
difference. Every metayer's house is on 
a lot of land - and quite respectable 
houses too. You will not find the same 
in the parts where the labourer has been 
working on the monthly wage entirely. ...
27 P.P. 1877, Vol. LIX, 1875 Blue Bk. Rept., p. 69.
Met. Com. Rept., 1891, O'Connor's evidence, pp. 158, 156.
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The metayer has been able to buy a piece 
of land and to build a comfortable house 
and presents a more respectable appearance.
Q. Then you say the custom has a civiliz­
ing influence?
A. It has most decidedly. ... as regards 
the metayer himself, it has a good effect, 
because it improves his social status.^
In good years, when the prices were high, many metayers 
profited. Metayage was a means to land owning, and at least 
three of the 'large' metayers became planters.
Brutus Murray was born a slave on Orange Valley estate. 
According to Walter Sladden, who was an overseer on that 
estate from 1845, Murray was the first metayer when Mr 
Cruickshank, the lessee who introduced metayage in Tobago, 
first tried the system there. Murray moved to the Windward 
District, where he became the first metayer also. In 1853, he 
was manager of Belle Garden estate; in 1862, he was part-owner 
of Pembroke estate, which he wholly owned from the early 1870s 
until his death in 1887.^°
D. S. Gordon, while still a boy, worked with his father,
a metayer on Annesdale (probably Arnos Vale) estate. Their
net yield was 4 hogsheads of sugar per year. He continued as
a metayer on Mary's Hill estate and bought Adventure in 1887,
when prices were low. He was also a shopkeeper.
... I work from '65 up to now and I live 
by it up to now and what I make since '65 
I hold out of my metayer work so that I 
call myself a proprietor. I work up to it
29 Met. Com. Rept.. 1891, McKillop's evidence, p. 13.
Ibid., Sladden's evidence, pp. 34, 38; Vote Bk., 
1862-1870; C0289/1: Tobaao Gazette. 30 July 1875, revised 
voters' register; The News. 7 Jan. 1888, Leader.
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you see.
Paul Tobago, an illiterate shopkeeper, became the owner
of Prospect, 500 acres in extent, in the late 1880s. He
testified in 1890;
In all my time I work up from a metayer 
to what I is to-day. I make upwards of 20 
and 21 hogsheads when I was a metayer.
That was at Adventure and Garden estate.^
J. B. Swalls testified to the 1897 Royal Commission that 
he had been 'a labourer, an overseer, and metayer, now a 
merchant and proprietor,
Women were among the metayers, although none testified
individually before the various commissions of enquiry which
examined the system. Newton Browne, the police magistrate,
told the 1890 Metairie Commission that women were among the
best metayers. Maurice Restant, manager of Mt Irvine estate,
cited a Mrs Scotland as 'the best metayer we have':
She has 10 acres in cultivation. She made 
lots of sugar and I offered the price paid 
by Mr. McCall who was buying sugar up at 
16/8 a barrel ... but she would not give 
it at that price and she went to Mr. McCall 
and shipped all the sugar on her own 
account. They have money and they are all 
well off. That Mrs. Scotland cultivates 
10 acres of land and that is no joke I 
can tell you ...
Differentiation between large and small metayers produced 
a conflict of interest between them, which became most acute 
in the dealings of those who became planters with the metayers
3^ Met. Com. Rent.. Gordon's evidence, pp. 152-154.
3^ Ibid. . Tobago's evidence, p. 159.
33 WI Roval Com. Rent. . 1897, App. C, Pt. V, p. 356.
3^ Met. Com. Rent. . 1891, Rostant's evidence, p. 167.
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contracted to them. Both Gordon and Tobago, two former 
metayers who became planters, expressed very unfavourable 
attitudes about the work ethic, the independence, and the 
ambition of the Tobago worker to the 1890 Metairie Commission 
[ibid.: 153-162].
The chief problem faced by the metayers was to find the
labour to cut, cart, grind the canes and manufacture their
sugar in the reaping season. Many testified of this in reply
to the questionnaire sent out by the Agricultural Society in
1884. Often, they exchanged 'labour for labour', each metayer
giving to those who came to help him/her an equivalent number
of days labour. The scarcity of labour was compounded when a
metayer's turn to reap was at the end of the crop, in the wet
months of June and July, which coincided with the season for
planting provision grounds; often the metayers would be
competing with the estates for labour as well. Several
complained of not having the cash to pay wages, which were
usually double the current plantation wage.^ D. S. Gordon,
owner of Adventure, testified in 1890:
It is a well known secret in cane cultiva­
tion ... that it is in the reaping part 
you have most expenses. The expense you 
take to reap canes in the dry season you 
must calculate to go through double that 
expense when the rain comes. ... it is 
double labour and you must look for double 
expenses, both metayer and proprietor, and 
every one.^
John McKillop, the lessee of Bacolet estate and a keen 
observer of the merits and demerits of the system, stated:
Met. Com. Rent. . 1891, App. F, p. 228.
Met. Com. Rent.. 1891, D. S. Gordon's evidence, p. 155.
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But the disadvantages under which the 
laborer works are to my mind more serious 
than those which affect the proprietor.
In the agricultural part of the business 
the industrious labourer with his family 
can do all the operations required, from 
the clearing of the land to the ripening 
of the canes. But as soon as the manager 
gives him orders to cut his canes his 
troubles begin. He must now beat up his 
friends and those who owe him labour to 
come to his assistance. When he is 
cutting and carting his canes he requires 
the help of at least twenty able-bodied 
labourers, and then when the canes are 
carted home ... he requires ten to twelve 
more, and has to pay very highly for them, 
while any failure in providing sufficient 
labour to carry out the manufacture 
expeditiously entails serious loss both 
on the labourer and also on the employer.^
As convener of the Committee appointed by the Agricultural
Society in 1884 to examine the system, he wrote:
The industrious man with a good crop 
requires several days' labour ... and as 
the price they charge each other is con­
siderably higher than the normal rate of 
wages, the metayer finds himself involved 
in expenses which absorb all the profit 
he would otherwise receive for his 
labour ...
An official Commission, which reported in 1885,
concluded:
... and the necessary result of all this 
is, that there is no encouragement for a 
man, however able and willing to exert 
himself, in making a good crop under the
system. 39
Met. Com. Rept. , 1891, App. R, 'Notes on the Metairie 
System by Mr McKillop', p. 262.
Met. Com. Rent.. 1891, App. G, 'Rept. of the Committee 
of the Agricultural Society appointed to enquire into the 
working of the Metairie System', 1884, p. 233.
Met. Com. Rent. . 1891, App. H, 'Rept. of the 
Commissioners appointed by His Honor the Administrator 
...', 1885, p. 235.
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The size of metayer ground was thus a crucial factor in 
assessing the costs and benefits of the metayer. All of the 40 
'principal metayers' who responded to the questionnaire of the 
Committee of the Agricultural Society, when asked, 'How much 
land can an industrious man, with the assistance of his 
family, keep in cane cultivation?', gave between 1 to 4 acres 
as their answer, and only 5 persons mentioned 4 acres.^ 
Patrick Edwards, a 'large' metayer of over 30 years' 
experience, and Henry Yeates, who were members of the official 
Commission appointed in 1884, both testified that it was 
disadvantageous; Yeates abandoned cultivation in 1885, after 
12 years experience/"
Cultivation of large metayer holdings seems to have been 
exceptional. For those with little cash to pay for labour, 
the wisdom of having a small allotment to which little time 
was devoted, which Magistrate Child perceived in 1850, still 
held good in 1884.
In 1884, the metayers complained of the difficulty of 
getting cane plants. Some admitted to stealing them from the 
estates; others worked for other metayers in exchange for 
plants. Often, canes were grown on provision grounds and taken 
on the heads of the metayers and their families, for distances 
of from 2 to 4 miles, to the cane pieces. George Trestrail, 
lessee of Auchenskeoch estate, observed that one metayer 
sacrificed 10 hogsheads worth of canes in order to have plants
Met. Com. Rent.. 1891, App. XII, F, pp. 224-225. 
" Ibid.: App. H, pp. 239, 241.
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for the next crop/^
By 1884, certain customary practices prevailed. Only on 
4 estates, all wholly worked by metayers, were there written 
contracts. The 'universal custom' was for the people to plant 
provisions among their canes. Planters also allowed provision 
grounds either free or at a nominal rent, the right to pasture 
stock either free or cheaply, and the right to gather firewood 
and grass on the estates. Although there had been 'spasmodic' 
attempts by the managers to supervise the metayers, 'generally 
speaking the people do very much as they like.' By then, the 
estates supplied the labour of the head boiler man, the mill 
or engine driver and one fireman for the manufacture of the 
sugar, the metayer paying for the rest. The 'invariable 
practice' was to allow the metayer molasses in proportion to 
his quantity of sugar, the average being 5 gallons per 
hogshead.^
From the planters' standpoint, the 'chief disadvantage' 
of the system was 'the difficulty of controling [sic] the 
metayer or his labour supply.' Metayers who reaped their crops 
were stated to be indifferent to the needs of those whose turn 
came after, and this was a frequent cause of canes not being 
fully reaped. Thus, the inability to exercise strict 
supervision and the scarcity of labour during crop seemed most
See Met. Com. Reot.. 1891, App. XII, F, p. 225, for the 
metayers' answers on the subject; App. XII, H, p. 238, 
for Trestrail's evidence before the official Commission 
on metayage.
Met. Com. Reot. . 1891, App. XII, G, Rept. of the Committee 
of the Agricultural Society appointed to enquire into the 
working of the Metairie System, 1884, pp. 232-233.
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important to them.*
V.3.3 The Tobaao Experience in the Light of the Conceptions 
Reviewed
The Tobago experience well illustrates the points raised 
by the classical and neo-classical writers. The calculus of 
interest in surplus creation and accumulation by both parties, 
on their own account, was evident. So too was the importance 
of detailed supervision by the managers, which Marshall 
stressed. In the informal process of negotiation, one of the 
gains won by the metayers was the absence of supervision; the 
planters saw this as their greatest disadvantage. Thus, 
arbitrariness, which rendered metayer contracts precarious, 
was beneficial to both parties. Further, the importance of 
autonomy for the metayer highlights Chayanov's emphasis on 
non-quantifiable criteria and indivisible gains.
Secondly, the striking contrast between metayage and wage 
labour aptly reinforces Mill's points on the subject. Wage 
labour under the watchful eye of the overseer or manager was 
the negative backdrop, the unwanted alternative, to metayage.
Moreover, the planters' complete loss of control over the 
labour process held within it the seeds of their own 
destruction as a class. The failure to create a proletariat 
and the arbitrariness of the system could only lead to 
haphazard and wasteful cultivation. Given the low
technological capacity, labour-intensive methods and 
consistently low acreages under cultivation, the planters, by
* Met. Com. Rent.. 1891, App. VIII, Representation by Tobago 
Planters Club, p. 190.
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having to agree to such an unsatisfactory compromise, were 
doomed to an irretrievable state of indebtedness and 
dependence on their creditors. Metayage generated too small a 
surplus on the planters' account. Yet, the constraints on the 
metayers also resulted in too low and too slow a rate of 
surplus accumulation on the account of most metayers. If, in 
the good years of the 1860s, the system appeared to be 
bouyant, as the long Sugar Depression set in after 1875, the 
crisis of production became increasingly a crisis of metayage. 
Metayage therefore contributed to the inability of the 
planters to break out of their indebtedness to Gillespie, to 
upgrade their estates and/or to diversify away from sugar 
(Options 1, 2A of our hypothesis) . Although it enabled a small 
stratum of 'large' metayers and planters to emerge, most 
metayers who bought land were smallholders, who were unable to 
diversify the economy significantly before 1884 (Option 2B).
Thirdly, Mill's observation that metayage is usually 
subordinate to custom is significant. Without law, custom 
became the norm. Custom was double-edged; although it gave 
degrees of freedom to the metayers, the balance of power and 
advantage was overwhelmingly in favour of the planters. Thus, 
the planters were always committed to the custom.
These data also illustrate the limitations of the neo­
classical standpoint. The relationships between planter and 
metayer cannot be understood as mere contracts, apart from the 
social, political and juridical context in which they took 
place. The absence of law and the unwritten 'contracts' 
reflected the power, and at times the caprice, of the dominant
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class within each negotiation. Further, differentiation and 
conflict of interests between 'large' and 'small' metayers, 
and among the 'small' metayers, make it impossible to
understand the system without locating it in the context of 
the relationships between the actors involved.
Another hidden aspect was the great dependence on family 
and community labour. The carrying of cane plants from
provision grounds, the tasks of binding the canes, carrying 
them from field to cart or road, spreading out the megasse 
etc., which were done by women and children, and the exchange 
of 'labour for labour', were not accounted for in the fiction 
of a contract between 'planter' and 'metayer'. Most labourers 
depended on substantial kinship and community support.
Our data show that metayage led to poor husbandry, which 
supports Smith and Marshall; Mill, however, saw no necessary 
connection between the two. Since metayage also imposed severe 
restrictions on the rate of accumulation of both planters and 
metayers, Marx's view on the transitoriness of the system may 
be borne out in this case.
V.4 CRISIS. NEGOTIATION AND STALEMATE IN THE 1880s ^
In April 1884, when the news reached Tobago that
Gillespie and Co. had crashed, one of the first responses of 
the labouring class was to refuse to continue as metayers. In 
part, this was because their profits were more precarious in 
a situation of low prices; but it was also a context in which, 
with the removal of both Gillespie and Thomas Reid & Co., the 
merchants who made advances to the planters, the power of the
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metayers was greatly enhanced. There could be no possibility 
of continued sugar cultivation without their willing co­
operation. In 1889, when the system became the subject of 
increased litigation because of the intervention of Sir John 
Gorrie, the Chief Justice, the planters averred that the 
metayage system had worked amicably until Gorrie incited the 
metayers to rebel. The evidence shows an entirely different 
picture for 1884.
In November 1884, Administrator Carrington stated that 
the Agricultural Society had asked him to
use my influence with the Metayers ... to 
induce them to commence planting opera­
tions for the crop of 1886. It appears 
that the Metayers generally, disheartened 
by the extremely low price of sugar and 
dissatisfied with the working of the 
Metairie system, were about to discontinue 
planting fresh canes ... .
Carrington complied by addressing the metayers at the main
population centres, in nine well attended meetings. Their
complaints were 'so bitter, and so strong a feeling of
dissatisfaction ... evidently existed', that he decided to
establish an independent enquiry.^
The Agricultural Society, the planters' association,
confirmed this. Its 1884 Report stated that, at their request,
Carrington 'was good enough to use his influence to encourage
the Metayers to keep alive the sugar industry'/* In July
1884, it appointed a Committee to advise on the metayage
system. The Committee sent out questionnaires to 48 metayers
Admin.'s Despatches, 1882-1885: Carrington to Robinson, 
22 Nov. 1884.
^ The News. 7 Feb. 1885, p. 3.
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and 50 managers, and reported in December 1884; its findings
were made available to the official Commission, which
Carrington appointed in December 1884.^
The metayers' frustrations were graphically outlined by
Percy Castillo, at Carrington's Mt St George meeting:
... my Honor you si dis head? He tun 
crook^ fe carry cane plant from provision 
ground to cane piece. When managa please to 
gie you orda fe cut cane, you cane tan 
[stands] a ground fa tree week sometimes, 
fo [before] he go cat [cart] um. ... Heare 
me good. Suppose man mek 5 hogsheads 
sugar. He pay £1 for every hogshead[;] 
he pay all expenses for cat and grine 
[grind] and boil. Estate tek for dem half.
Time come fe cat um a bay you mus leave 
one barrel^" sugar in cur in [curing] house, 
no so you no go get cat, same time you 
want cat estate cat fo'e [their] own all 
day. Time fo you own come fo cat, ship 
load go way. If you owe one merchant in 
town he no believe say you ha sugar. He 
no go gie you credit sak a you no [unless 
you] gie um sugar, betime man pay out all 
expenses wha lef fo feed he fambaly 
[family]? Ef you mek law fo metayer sa 
[say] dem proprieta for deal just wid awe 
[us], we go work; but ef not a no go mek 
one chop in a cane field, all awe [of us] 
go dead together.^
Only one manager and eight metayers testified before the
Commission appointed by Carrington. Perceiving that metayage
For the full Rept. of the Committee, see Apps. A to G, 
pp. 208-233 of the Met. Com. Reot.. 1891; App. H, pp. 
233-241, for the Rept. of the Commissioners appointed by 
Carrington, 1885.
48
49
50
A crook was a wooden device which was placed on the back 
of an animal to enable it to carry much load.
The sizes of hogsheads (hhds) varied, but they were 
usually between 15 and 16 cwt. There were usually 8 
barrels to each hhd.
The News. 25 Oct. 1884, on the Mt St George meeting, 15 
Oct. 1884.
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was 'undesirable' but 'absolutely necessary', the Commission 
felt it 'imperative' that the Government regulate the system, 
to ensure equity and engender confidence. All of the eight 
metayers testifying, with experience of metayage ranging from 
5 to 30 years, stated that it was disadvantageous to them.
In October 1885, the new Administrator, R. B. Llewellyn, 
asked the Agricultural Society to respond to the Commission's 
Report. Their recommendations included several concessions to 
the metayers.^
After further discussion, a draft Ordinance was prepared 
in 1886. It stipulated that contracts be written, and it 
outlined clear procedures for the magistrates to adjudicate 
disputes. It also provided for the managers to make the sugar 
at a fixed charge to the metayer.
A Committee of the Legislative Council considered the 
draft Ordinance and made recommendations in February 1888, on 
the basis of detailed consultation with 20 metayers delegated 
by their colleagues. This was a far cry from the official 
ignoring of the metayers' views, which had been the norm of 
previous decades.
The Committee sought to codify the unwritten practice. 
They recommended that the metayer be allowed three crops on 
any particular cane piece, with compensation for his crops if 
he was turned off before; that manure be supplied by the 
estate, with the manager bearing half the cost of cartage;
Met. Com. Rent.. 1891, App. XII, H, Rept. of the 
Commissioners ..., 1885, pp. 233-241.
52 Met. Com. Reot.. 1891, App. XII, J, pp. 242-243.
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that metayers be responsible for the repair of the cane piece 
roads, which was the 'general practice'; that the cost of fuel 
for the manufacture of the sugar should be included in the 
metayer's costs; and they endorsed the provision giving one 
gallon of molasses per barrel (8 per hhd) to the metayer. No 
existing metayer was to be bound by the law, unless he 
expressed a willingness to come under it; new metayers were to 
be bound by it, unless they expressly wished to opt out.^
On balance, the gains to the metayer were as follows; an 
end to arbitrariness; the provision of cane plants either free 
or at low cost by the managers; assistance with manure; the 
option to let the estate find the labour for the manufacture 
of the sugar, by paying a fee instead; and entitlement to a 
greater share of the molasses. However, the metayer would 
still bear the major costs for both cultivation and 
manufacture, in exchange for half the sugar. Moreover, the law 
prevented him from asking for more land than he could easily 
cultivate, and imposed greater supervision by the manager, 
which would considerably limit his freedom.
The Metairie Ordinance, 1888, received assent in April 
1888, but was not implemented. By then, Tobago's revenue was 
so low that, to cut administrative costs, it was annexed to 
Trinidad on 1 January 1889. The Chief Justice of Trinidad, 
Sir John Gorrie, became Tobago's Chief Justice. His 
intervention in the judicial system had enormous repercussions 
and warrants consideration.
Met. Com. Reot. . 1891, App. XII, O, Rept. of the Committee 
of the Leg. Co. on the Draft Metairie Ordinance, 1888, 
pp. 250-252.
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V.5 THE INTERVENTION OF SIR JOHN GORRIE
V.5.1 The Immediate Background to the Litigation of 1889-90
By 1889, the crisis of the metayage system had been 
thoroughly discussed, but not resolved. Metayage, which was 
a compromise solution to the impasse in class relations, had 
itself been brought to an impasse! Llewellyn, under whose 
administration the 1888 Ordinance was enacted, stated that 
only a few alterations and concessions on both sides had been 
made 'in what has been the unwritten law for the past forty 
years.'* The planters and officials had confined the debate 
within the prevailing custom, and it was the custom, which was 
to the planters' advantage, that, with few alterations, had 
become law.
This stalemate in the simmering class conflict was the 
first of six major factors which helped to sharpen and ignite 
the situation.
Secondly, between 1884 and 1888, some estates passed into 
new hands, and many planters diversified cultivation. With 
these changes, customary practices were disrupted, and there 
were more complaints from the metayers.
Thirdly, the administration of justice in Tobago had 
reached its lowest ebb by 1888. Since 1880, there had been no 
resident Chief Justice to handle cases above the jurisdiction 
of the Stipendiary Magistrates. Tobago shared a Chief Justice 
with St Lucia, and was served by him for three months each 
year. The crisis of 1884, resulting in drastic cuts in
* C0321/109: Sendall to Knutsford, enc. Llewellyn to 
Sendall, 10 Apr. 1888.
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government expenditure, meant that, thereafter, there was 
little legal administration. Annexation to Trinidad was 
intended to procure the services of professionals of high 
calibre at little cost, among them the senior legal officers.
The keeping of the laws and the Court records was 
chaotic. Administrator Carrington (May 1883-May 1885), who 
had been Chief Justice in the early 1880s, offered, in 1882, 
to revise and compile the laws, since 'the Statute Book in its 
entirety [was] non-existent'.^
In 1888, there were only two magistrates in Tobago: S. J. 
Fraser, also the owner of Orange Hill estate, worked by 
metayers; and T. Newton Browne, who was Inspector of Police, 
Actg. Marshal of Gaol and Actg. Stipendiary Justice, an 
unfortunate combination of offices. Thus, the entire 
administration of justice was unsatisfactory.
The fourth combustible ingredient in the situation was 
the personality and politics of Sir John Gorrie (1829-1892), 
the Chief Justice from January 1889. Gorrie, a Scotsman, was 
called to the Scottish Bar in 1856. After the Morant Bay 
rebellion in Jamaica in 1865, he was selected by the Jamaica 
Committee in Britain to enquire into excesses of martial law 
and, assisted by two other lawyers, he exposed the cruelty and 
injustice committed in those events.
From August 1869, he was appointed Substitute Procureur 
and Advocate General, Mauritius, where he quickly reported and 
investigated 'great abuses' against labourers, which led to a
C0321/72: Carrington to Wingfield, 22 Aug. 1883, enc. 
Carrington to Laborde, 22 Nov. 1883. C0321/99: Carrington 
to Herbert, 6 Apr. 1886.
287
Royal Commission, through which the labour laws were altered.
As Chief Justice of Fiji from 1876, he reformed the land and
bankruptcy laws and secured to the natives possession of their
land, for which he was thanked by the Secretary of State. For
his services, he was knighted in 1881. In 1882, he became
Chief Justice of the Leeward Islands, where he revised the
laws on land tenure, for which he was again specially thanked
by the Colonial Office.^
Gorrie had had a long career as a radical, energetic
advocate for the poor. He was fearless, outspoken and
intolerant of humbug. Therefore, after his arrival in Trinidad
early in 1886, he quickly collided with the leading merchants
and planters, some of whom called for an enquiry into the
administration of justice in August 1887.^
Brereton [1980:44] writes:
As Chief Justice, he reformed judicial 
proceedings, he promoted suits in forma 
pauperis, and he instigated a long series 
of cases by cocoa contractors, cane 
farmers and metayers against the planters.
He promoted a People's Bank to give small farmers access to
credit. He was therefore immensely popular among the poor and
his frequent trips around Trinidad 'assumed the character of
triumphal processions' [ibid.:57].
Because of the constant traffic between Trinidad and
Tobago, Gorrie's reputation had been established in Tobago
before he arrived in January 1889. For example, James Smith,
C0295/350: E. Counel to Ripon, 11 July 1893; POSG. 5 Oct. 
1889.
The Times (Bridgetown), 17 Sept. 1887, on the proceedings 
of the Trinidad Leg. Co., 2 Sept. 1887.
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metayer on Goldsborough estate, wrote to William Sanger 
Tucker, the proprietor, in November 1888, concerning their 
disputes:
So sir as my layer [lawyer] tell me to 
write to you before the Judge come and 
hear if you will agree to pay me for my 
half of suggar so be if no must come back 
to him before the Judge so sir I write to 
know from you what you intend to do Sir I 
am poor but I am not a blackgrad [blackguard] 
but if you want to make me one I will not 
be one with you but Gurry [Gorrie] will cool 
each and every one of us
Smith sued in forma pauperis and won in January 1889.^*
The fifth combustible element in the situation was
Robert Benjamin Anderson (b. 1848, UK), a physician and
surgeon. He and his brother, James Goodridge Anderson, also
a doctor, arrived in Tobago in 1874. By 1876, the Andersons
were notorious for charging extortionate fees. During the
1876 riots, they had to flee from the Windward District.
After the riots, Robert Anderson was one of the planters
who urged the change of constitution to Crown Colony
government upon the Assembly.^ In 1881, however, his brother
started a newspaper. Daylight, whose 'main object' was 'the
abrogation of the Crown Colony s y s t e m . R o b e r t  was
catapulted, by his conflicts with Gorrie, into the role of
angry critic of Crown rule.
Smith to Tucker, 26 Nov. 1888, POSG. 30 Jan. 1889, p. 5, 
reporting on Smith v Tucker before Judge Gorrie on 17 
Jan. 1889.
59 Barbados Globe, 13 July 1876, quot. The People (Tobago), 
4 June 1876.
^ C0321/79: Robinson to Derby, Conf., 1 Nov. 1884, enc. 
Davliaht No. 1, 4 Oct. 1884; leading article.
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In 1877, Robert Anderson was appointed District Medical 
Officer (DM0) in District No. 1, which included Scarborough; 
and he and his brother became lessees of Castara estate, which 
they bought in 1880. They displayed a remarkable penchant for 
litigation, and took clients to court for trifling sums. In 
1878 alone, Robert brought 80 such cases before the courts.^ 
Between 1880 and 1882, three petitions, signed by people 
of all walks of life, asked for neither brother to be DM0.® 
Robert Anderson was therefore confined to being the Colonial 
Surgeon, with responsibility for the Scarborough hospital, 
which the 1883 Royal Commission described as the worst in the 
BWI.® Sir William Robinson, then Governor of the Windward 
Islands, called them 'a hard & grinding lot.'*
Anderson's removal from office was made imperative by his 
treatment of Jane Dryce, also known as 'Blacky Mamby', who 
died at Lambeau in childbirth, late in 1885. Anderson refused 
to visit her, although she was in labour and having fits. Her 
mother, Sarah Mamby, walked many miles to find the DMOs 
without success, since two of them were out of their 
districts. Even though she returned several times to plead, 
and undertook to pay little by little, as was common, Anderson 
demanded that people with cash guarantee his payment before he
61 C0321/40: Strahan to Hicks Beach & Encs., 11 Feb. 1880.
® C0321/41: Robinson to Kimberley & Encs, 13 Sept. 1880; 
C0321/42: Reid to Kimberley, 31 Dec. 1880. C0321/59: 
Robinson to Kimberley, 8 July 1882.
® Reot. from the Roval Com. ..., 1884, Pt. II, p. 36.
* C0321/59; Robinson to Kimberley, 8 July 1882; Robinson 
to Wingfield, 18 June 1882.
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visited Blacky. The News. commenting on Anderson's 
'surpassing heartlessness', called for his dismissal for such 
a 'heinous' offence.^ This is the unhappy record of 
Anderson's public service before 1888, when his brother died.
Sixthly, the unusual circumstances of Tobago must be 
understood. Throughout the decades after 1838, money wages 
were small, always supplemented by access to land and other 
payments in kind. From the 1850s, there was very little coin 
in circulation.^ By the 1870s, the planters began to 'give 
day', meaning that they decreased the few labourers whom they 
employed, and hired only on a rotating basis.^ After the 
Gillespie crash of 1884, the availability of cash was further 
diminished.
For this reason, the truck system took on new forms by 
the 1890s. C. Plagemann, a druggist, told the 1897 Royal 
Commission that wages were usually paid after a delay of 2 or 
3 months, 'in shops or stores owned by the estates[,] ... by 
an order on the store', or with deductions from the wage for 
debts already incurred. A meeting of labourers at Plymouth 
petitioned the Commission, inter alia, for wages to be paid 
'in the coin of the realm, and not in kind.' Labourers at
The Times. Bridgetown, 23 Dec. 1885, quot. The News. 
Scarborough, n.d.
^ The Blue Bk. for 1854, the year in which the garrison (a 
source of cash via the soldiers' salaries) was removed, 
noted that the coin in circulation had been decreasing 
'for some years past'; there was no paper currency in 
circulation; cf. C0290/38, /41, /42, /50, /69: Blue Bks. 
for 1854, 1857, 1858, 1866, 1885.
Barbados Times. 11 Dec. 1878, quot. Tobago correspondent 
(7 Dec. 1878) who commented on the 'scarcity of money'; 
ibid., 15 Nov. 1879, quot. Barbados Globe, 13 Nov. 1879.
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Moriah asked the Commission to enquire into the method of 
payment, with a view to enforcing the Truck Act.^ Because of 
the long crop cycle for sugar, it was easy for metayers to 
become ensnared in debt. Thus, if metayage was a means of 
avoiding the truck system in the 1860s, by the 1890s many 
metayers were indebted to the merchants and planters.
In the 1890s, the only sources of cash were wages earned 
in, or the profits of trade with, Trinidad. The lack of cash 
and the indebtedness of metayers to planters/shopkeepers, are 
important features of the context in which the litigation took 
place. The lawyer's fees of 3 guineas plus the other costs put 
the courts out of the reach of many metayers.
V.5.2 The Litigation of 1889 and Its Aftermath
The first sittings of the courts before Sir John Gorrie 
began on 15 January 1889. On the first day, 3 appeal cases 
were heard - Anderson v Philip, Gordon and George, claiming 
rent for provision grounds and pasturage. They were all 
dismissed. Gorrie stated that the matter had been carried by 
Dr R. B. Anderson, the plaintiff, 'beyond human endurance', 
and Anderson left the court, 'through a deriding crowd'.^ In 
the afternoon, Anderson appeared as defendant in a debt suit, 
and lost the case, with Gorrie observing that Anderson would 
argue at a stone wall, if given the chance. This public 
humiliation of Anderson was the start of a long train of 
litigation that continued even after Gorrie's death.
68 WI Roval Com. Reot.. 1897, App. C, Pt. V, pp. 355-358.
POSG. 23 Jan. 1889, p. 5.
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Several in forma pauperis cases were allowed. According 
to the Judicature Ordinance, No. 28 of 1879, to sue in forma 
pauperis, the litigant must not be possessed of property 
valued over £10, exclusive of his or her wearing apparel. 
He/she must also sign an affidavit. All these requirements 
were waived by Gorrie in Tobago in 1889 and 1890.
Gorrie later gave his reasons as follows. There were in 
Tobago only two solicitors, one of whom he considered 
'incompetent', and the other newly arrived. There was little 
money in circulation. Therefore, the common people had neither 
the financial nor the technical means to know the Trinidad 
Rules of Procedure, and the Judge had to direct them as to how 
to enter their actions. Further, the officials were friends of 
the planters, 'and share their dislike of the metayers'.
Moreover, in the metayer cases, many of the plaintiffs
had not had their canes ground for over two years. In that
context, the Trinidad fees of court were too high. There was
also no time to have affidavits filed and applications made to
the Commissioner of the Supreme Court, since this would have
unduly delayed the sittings. He admitted that
indeed there would have been a difficulty 
in many of the plaintiffs signing the 
affidavits, as having a right of metayer- 
ship, a house and a provision ground, 
they may have had something worth £10 over 
and above the cause of an action. The 
reason requiring the interference of the 
Judge was the absolute want of money, 
both because of the little in circulation 
and from the peculiar position of the 
metayer not getting wages.
Therefore, to exact the fee of 5s for a summons and fees of
service from metayers 'would have been to shut out the people
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from the Courts of Justice altogether'.
Gorrie argued, further, that many metayers were indebted
to the planters with whom they were in conflict; those who won
their cases received only a book entry in their favour. The
cases therefore helped to relieve the metayers of debts and to
redress the arbitrariness to which planters had become prone,
there being little legal administration.^
Justice Lewis, who conducted the Tobago sittings in
October 1889, supported Gorrie's position. Lewis stated that
he found 'a quite abnormal state of things'; the official
responsible had not given notice of the sittings and the
preliminary proceedings had not been taken. Moreover, 'I was
much struck with the poverty of the people and under the
circumstances I was forced to adopt one of two courses';
either to return to Trinidad, or to modify the preliminary
proceedings in keeping with his powers under the Judicature
Ordinance. He therefore suspended payment of court fees.?'
Gorrie also complained that he could find no record of
former metayer cases. (Some of the records were produced,
however, for the 1890 Metairie Commission.And he marvelled
at the absence of legislation for the past forty years:
Why ... it was not from time to time 
regulated by Ordinance so that Judges 
could have some guide to go by would 
have been incomprehensible were we not 
dealing with Tobago.
C0295/328: Robinson to Knutsford, 21 June 1890, & Encs., 
esp. Gorrie to Robinson, 19 June 1890.
00295/328: Robinson to Knutsford, 24 June 1890, Enc. 5, 
Lewis to Robinson, Conf., 2 July 1890.
Met. Com. Rept. . 1891, App. IX, pp. 193-204.
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He noted that the 1888 Metairie Ordinance gave 'the sanction
of law to the worst features of the system':
... the one great evil is that the 
proprietor in claiming half the sugar 
exacts too much, considering all the 
expenses which are cast on the metayer.^
Gorrie used his visit to Tobago to urge greater self-
reliance on the populace. He told the people at Roxborough to
buy land and work. He exhorted a large Wesleyan congregation
in Scarborough to take advantage of their access to the Port
of Spain market, to increase production and decrease the need
for imports from Venezuela. He told them to start Penny Banks,
beginning in the Sunday Schools. With popular credit
institutions, they could 'reconquer' Tobago:
... form your own bank and keep all the 
others out. (Laughter and applause.)
Haven't you got a proverb somewhere in 
these West India Islands ... "When 
cockroach give dance, he don't invite 
fowl to supper." (Loud laughter.)
... what is the use of a multitude of 
savings lying idle in the Government 
Savings Banks? They are very good to 
deposit your reserves in, but then you 
ought to have other institutions where 
you can deposit your savings, in order 
that they may pour forth like rivers to 
fertilise the land.^
Gorrie later started a Penny Bank, enabled by Ordinance 
No. 15 of 1891; it had three branches, one being the Tobago 
Crop Advance and Discount Co. (1892). Brereton states that 
none of the companies went into operation [1979:23].
Gorrie's visit was followed by that of the Governor, Sir
C0295/328: Robinson to Knutsford, 21 June 1890, & Encs., 
esp. Gorrie to Robinson, 19 June 1890.
POSG. 23 Jan. 1889, p. 6.
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William Robinson, in February 1889. 'Several hundred labourers
and others in a humble walk of life' travelled from the most
distant villages, to see him at the Court House. They
complained that Tobago wages should be equal to those of
Trinidad, and that the condition of metayers should be
improved. Robinson reported that the relations between
planters and metayers were coloured by 'a spirit of
discontent' among the people.^"
In mid February, L. G. Hay, the Commissioner, asked for
a man-of-war, which would 'have the effect of aweing the
people and reassuring the t i m i d . H a y ' s  request was in
response to a strike and unrest at Studley Park estate in
January and February 1889. The Inspector of Police, Newton
Browne, reported a speech by Joseph Prescott, one of the
spokesmen for labour there:
"Besides who is Robinson or Hay or Browne?
- all one lot who have put their heads 
together to oppress us. We have no 
other Governor than Gorrie and he tell 
us already that he coming back in May.
Dont [sic] do a damned thing till he 
comes and let the canes go to Hell!"
After loud shouts of "Gorrie!","Gorrie!", 
some of the crowd said - "damned Tobago 
Buccras, he cut their tails for them the 
other day, and he will cut their tails 
again when he comes.
Browne reported a 'distinct spirit of something worse than
discontent' among the 'lower orders' everywhere in Tobago.
C0295/321: Robinson to Knutsford, Conf., 28 Feb. 1889.
Ibid. : Enc. 1, Hay to Robinson, Priv., 16 Feb. 1889.
^ C0295/321: Robinson to Knutsford, Conf., 28 Feb. 1889, 
Enc. 3, Browne to Hay, 16 Feb. 1889. 'Buccra' referred 
to white people.
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The man-of-war was sent and Hay went on it to Studley
Park, to be greeted, according to Byles, the ship's captain,
by shouts of, 'We don't want Robinson or Hay, we want
Gorrie!'^ The few who met with Hay complained of what he
called 'the old notion of obtaining higher wages'.^
On receipt of this correspondence in the Colonial Office,
Sydney Olivier, recalling the metayer contracts which they had
received over the years, minuted;
Sir J. Gorrie seems to have been telling 
the blacks that the planters oppress them, 
which is a statement justifiable perhaps, 
in fact, though not in policy.
It was decided that Gorrie should not return in May.*°
Throughout Tobago, the antagonistic class relations that
had simmered for years became explosive. The Port of Spain
Gazette (20 March 1889) wrote of a 'state of ferment' in
Tobago. The Tobago News, owned by Ebenezer Henderson, a
leading merchant and planter, wrote on 16 February of the
'class antagonism' that imperilled the 'peaceful relationship'
between employers and employed.
In April, after petitions from the leading Tobago
proprietors and officials against the return of Gorrie in May,
C0295/321: Robinson to Knutsford, Conf., 2 Mar. 1889, enc. 
Hay to Robinson, 1 Mar. 1889. C0295/322: Robinson to 
Knutsford, 16 May 1889, enc. Byles' rept., 2 Mar. 1889.
C0295/321: Robinson to Knutsford, 15 Mar. 1889 & Encs., 
esp. Hay to Byles, 28 Feb. 1889, & Hay to Robinson, 2 
Mar. 1889. The quot. is from the latter.
C0295/321: Robinson to Knutsford, Conf., 28 Feb. 1889; 
Minutes, 10 Mar. (Olivier), 16 & 22 Mar. 1889.
Newspaper cuttings, Encs. 1 & 2 in C0295/321: Robinson to 
Knutsford, 30 Mar. 1889.
297
Knutsford, the Secretary of State, authorized, on grounds of 
economy, an Ordinance to provide for the sittings of the 
Tobago Supreme Court to be held 'invariably at all times' by 
a Puisne Judge.
The Gorrie Exclusion Bill, as the Ordinance was 
nicknamed, was an embarrassment to the Government. Gorrie 
wrote a printed letter of 17 pages to Knutsford, enclosing 
statutory declarations from the Solicitor-General and the 
Registrar General, in his defence. The Act was disallowed.” 
In a second letter, Gorrie complained that the Bill was aimed 
at personally discrediting him and weakening his moral 
competency to make rules of court for Tobago, since the saving 
from sending a Puisne Judge was £15 7s 6d per year.”
Knutsford, hoist by his own petard, could only reply 
hypocritically, especially since, to test the Government's 
sincerity, Gorrie had offered to go to Tobago free of charge. 
He regretted that the Ordinance was construed as excluding 
Gorrie from the Tobago courts, and he cleared Gorrie of any 
'indirect censure'. He minuted, however, that, 'The mischief 
which might have been occasioned by a second visit following 
so soon after the former one ... has been averted'.”
” C0295/322: Robinson to Knutsford, 12 Apr. 1889, & Encs.; 
Robinson to Knutsford, 13 Apr. 1889, & Encs.; Knutsford 
to Robinson, 1 May 1889. The quot. is from Cl. 2 of the 
Act.
” 00295/326: Gorrie to Knutsford, 24 June 1889; Knutsford 
to Gorrie, 10 July 1889.
” 00295/326: Gorrie to Knutsford, 24 June 1889, & Encs.
” 00295/326: Knutsford to Fowler, 10 July 1889; Knutsford's 
minute, 6 July.
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The number of cases heard in 1889 did not exceed that of
1884 (Table 48). However, 150 actions were set down for trial
in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction, only 8 or 10 of which
had been ready before Gorrie arrived; the rest were brought to
court in the fortnight after his arrival.^
Throughout Tobago in 1889, there was an uneasy peace. In
April, the Annual Races, held under the auspices of the
dominant class, were disrupted by members of the 'lower
classes', who invaded the course and resisted the police.^
In August, J. H. Hart, Superintendent of the Trinidad Botanic
Gardens, visited Tobago and surveyed its agri-horticultural
resources. He stated:
... I failed to find anv one good point 
in favour of the [metayage] system either 
from employer or employed, and I questioned 
both; and I believe the Island would in­
deed be rid of a great "bugbear" were it 
totally abolished.**
All the evidence shows that the problems of the metayage
system were deeply rooted and far from new. What was new was
the opening of the courts to the poor by a judge who did not
conceal his hostility to the planters.
*^ Met. Com. Rent.. 1891, evidence of H. H. Sealy, App. I, 
pp. 59-63. Many actions were settled out of court.
*^ In April 1890, the races were postponed indefinitely, 
since Gorrie stated that the beach belonged to the 
'Imperial public'. C0295/328: Robinson to Knutsford, 14 
Apr. 1890, & Enc.; POSG, 28 Mar. 1890, p. 7, ad. signed 
by Dr J. P. Tulloch, Sec. of Race Committee.
** Hart [1889:8, 9; author's emphasis].
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TABLE 48
Number of Cases Filed in the Summary and Ordinary 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: 1884-1890
Year Smnmarv Ordinary
1884 38 15
1885 12 19
1886 4 10
1887 7 8
1888 7 4
68 56
1889 35 2
1890 196* 2*
231
NOTE: * Up to 1 July 1890.
Source: Met. Com. Reot.. 1891, App. IX, F, p. 202.
V.5.3 Grinding Canes at the Court House: 1890
Gorrie returned to Tobago on 29 January 1890, and was 
greeted by a waiting crowd, who escorted him from the jetty 
with 'one or two salvos of small artillery'.^
The courts began on Monday 4 February 1890. In the first 
three days, in which he saw litigants in Chambers before the 
sittings began, Gorrie disposed of 214 applications. In the 
fortnight of sittings, 162 actions were brought before the 
court, 140 of them without prepayment of fees. The 
unprecedented wave of litigation, the many cases that had to
POSG. 4 Feb. 1890, p. 5.
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be compromised out of court for fear of heavy fines, and the 
celebrated Frank v Anderson decision, brought the explosive 
situation to a head.
In the matter of Frank v Anderson, the plaintiff, Joseph 
Frank, aged 73, who had been born enslaved on Castara estate 
and had been a metayer there from 1845, was evicted by 
Anderson for refusing to pay rent for the provision grounds 
which, it seems, he had been allowed without charge by the 
former owners. Judgement was given in favour of Frank, and the 
case raised several controversial points. Firstly, Anderson 
disputed Frank's right to sue in forma pauperis. Secondly, he 
argued that no automatic right to provision grounds was ever 
part of written or unwritten metayer contracts; Frank had had 
a written contract since 1877, which included no such right. 
Thirdly, Gorrie's judgement raised the issue of 'fixity of 
tenure' within metayage. It argued that a metayer must have 
security of tenure on the estate on which he served, and could 
not be easily evicted. Gorrie stated that metayer contracts 
could not be altered without going to court, with which 
Anderson disagreed.^
The Colonial Office received a spate of petitions on the 
litigation. They included one from Anderson; one from 
Alexander Davidson of Aberdeen, an owner of Old and New Grange 
estates, for which Anderson was attorney; and one from 
merchants, planters and others of Tobago, complaining, inter 
alia, of the admission of 140 cases without court fees, of too 
little time for the preparation of their cases, and of Gorrie
^ POSG. 20, 23, 30 May; 4, 20, 24 June 1890.
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being 'insulting and humiliating in the extreme' to
'respectable persons and their witnesses'. The petitioners
asked for protection in their appeals, since they were obliged
to appeal to the Chief Justice as President of the Appeal
Court. A further petition, signed by nearly all the planters,
complained of the in forma pauperis cases. They were dismayed
by the Frank v Anderson judgement, which was upheld in the
Trinidad Supreme Court on appeal before Gorrie and Justices
Lumb and Cook in June 1890. The insistence on fixity of
tenure was contrary to custom and to the 1888 Metairie
Ordinance. They therefore called for an independent enquiry.^
Gorrie replied to his critics giving his frank, but
uncomplimentary, opinion of the leading petitioners, and named
Hay as 'The Petitioner who does not sign'. He justified his
suspension of court fees on the grounds of the financial
situation of the metayers. There must, he felt, be some
continuity of tenure if the people were to be attached to the
properties in a reliable way; even the 1888 Ordinance, 'which
was not made by metayers for metayers', provided for this.^
By March 1890, the London officials, led by Sir Robert
Herbert, the Permanent Under-Secretary, decided to remove such
a 'political and partisan judge'. Knutsford decided to catch
Gorrie craftily:
The only way to meet his action [is]
... to appoint an impartial Commission 
to inquire into the metayer system ... :
This will be the professed object of the 
Commission but indirect good might be
C0295/328: Robinson to Knutsford, 21 June 1890, & Encs. 
” Ibid.: Gorrie to Robinson, 19 June 1890.
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gained by exposing some of Sir J. G's 
decisions.^
Sir William Robinson appointed a local Commission to 
enquire into the métairie system; but it was not impartial. 
The Chairman, Stephen Gatty, the Attorney General, had 
publicly clashed with Gorrie, and had opposed the judgement in 
Frank v Anderson.* The other members of the Commission, 
Aucher Warner, a barrister, Robinson's son-in-law, and L. G. 
Hay, Commissioner for Tobago, were both opposed to Gorrie.
When the Metairie Commission left for Tobago in June
1890, the appeals were being heard in several of the Tobago
cases in the Trinidad Supreme Court, over which the Chief
Justice presided. Gorrie agreed to send down 20 cases against
the Davidsons for rehearing in Tobago before another judge,
but on condition that the plaintiffs, who had all sued in
forma pauperis, be allowed to file their affidavits of poverty
and sue as paupers, 'to put them on the same footing that they
were in when these cases were tried first. ' It was a tacit
admission that his procedures had been faulty:
... if from the pressure of business 
they were not filed then it is proper 
that they should be filed now.*
The pressure to remove Gorrie continued from within and 
without the colony. By June 1890, Sir George Baden Powell and 
other British MPs raised questions in the House of Commons.
* C0295/331: Davidson to Knutsford, 8 March 1890; minutes
of Herbert (12 March) & Knutsford.
* C0295/328: Robinson to Knutsford, 24 June 1890, & Encs.,
esp. A.-G.'s Rept.
95 POSG. 1 July 1890, p. 5.
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The West India Committee expressed support for the planters 
and merchants, and the Colonial Bank stated that the 
administration of justice prevented financiers from investing 
and lending in Trinidad. In December, a committee of Tobago 
planters made several charges against Gorrie, asking that he 
be impugned and suspended from office.*
V.5.4 The 1890 Metairie Commission
The Commissioners reported, contrary to the abundant 
evidence but consonant with the testimony of the planters, 
that the relations between employers and employed had been 
harmonious until 1889, and that the system had worked very 
favourably for the metayers. They did not explicitly blame 
Gorrie for the class antagonisms, but stated that both 
planters and metayers believed that 'the metayer's best chance 
of getting all he claims is to go before the Chief Justice, 
whether his demand is just or not ... . They argued that 
Gorrie's judgement in Frank v Anderson was incorrect about 
fixity of tenure for the metayer.
Before the Commission sat, Gorrie and W. S. Kernahan, the 
Receiver for Mt Irvine estate, devised a metayer contract in 
which the people were only to grow the canes, which would be 
carted and paid for by the estate at the rate of 7s per ton. 
The Commissioners felt that such terms could not be afforded
* C0295/331: W1 Committee to Knutsford, 17 June 1890 & 24 
July 1890, enc. Col. Bank to W1 Committee, 11 July 1890. 
C0295/330: Robinson to Knutsford, 15 Dec. 1890, & Encs.
^ Met. Com. Rept.. 1891, p. vi.
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by most Tobago planters.’*
Among the minor modifications to the 1888 Act, they 
suggested that where ratoons continued after 3 crops, 
provision should be made for the metayer to continue on his 
holding from year to year. The right to terminate his tenancy 
by six months' notice was also recommended for the metayer, 
since this was allowed for the planter.
They recommended that all points for adjudication should 
be interpreted by the corresponding section of the 1888 
Metairie Ordinance, which was to govern all métairie 
contracts, existing and future. The law would thus become 'a 
statutory declaration of the custom of the country.
Gorrie's comments on the Metairie Commission Report were 
caustic. The Commissioners, he remarked, had no moral 
authority, since they had the confidence of one class only, 
and had all 'conspicuously' taken one side. Gatty, the 
chairman, had held a brief before the Appeal Court for the 
Davidsons 'on the employment of the notorious Anderson', and 
had attacked him 'like a partisan'. Hay suffered from 
'offended dignity and feminine spitefulness', because the 
people had regarded the Chief Justice as their Governor. 
Robinson did not escape Gorrie's anger: he had served for 
almost 12 years as Governor of the Windward Islands and, under 
his administration, there was not even an inland post in
’* Met. Com. Rept. . 1891, p. viii; App. V, pp. 184-186; 
Rostant's evidence, App. I, pp. 166-167. Kernahan 
testified in 1897 that when he paid 7s per ton, the 
estate lost £500. WI Roval Com. Rept., 1897, App. C, Pt 
IV, p. 299.
” Met. Com. Rept.. 1891, p. x.
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Tobago. Gorrie denied that it was the litigation which caused 
the disturbed relations and not vice versa; the problems lay 
in the failure in 1888 and 1889 by some estates, including 
those of Catty's clients, to perform their contracts.
Gorrie stated, too, that the metayer contracts, by 
allowing for the wife and children of the metayer to keep the 
allotment after his death, implied that a 3-year term was not 
the normal practice, but that there was security of tenure, 
though not fixity to a particular allotment.
The Commission, Gorrie concluded, had missed the point. 
Metayage had been responsible for the 'deplorable condition of 
eyerything connected with agriculture' in Tobago. He felt 
that the estates should buy the canes, as at Mt Iryine, or 
giye 6-year leases instead.
The London officials were more dispassionate in assessing
the eyidence than the Commissioners. Wingfield, on whose
analysis Knutsford's reply was based, minuted:
The selection of Commissioners was unfortu­
nate and I think many of Sir John Gorrie's 
strictures on their procedures are 
justified.
Knutsford concluded that in 1884 and 1890, there was 'great 
and general dissatisfaction on the part of the Metayers with 
the working of the system . .. '. He agreed that the law should 
coyer all contracts, and he concurred with the Mt Iryine 
agreement, where the planters bought the canes and 
manufactured the sugar. He also agreed to the extension of
Trinidad Royal Gazette. 23 Sept. 1891: Council Paper No. 
113, 1891, 'Papers relating to the Commission to Enquire 
into the Metairie System in Tobago'.
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contracts beyond 3 years for ratoons to be reaped.
He clarified that Gorrie's judgement in Frank v Anderson
was not accurately stated by the Commissioners. The judgement,
however, was found to be 'contrary to the general
understanding' of the metayer contract, and Knutsford
recommended that it be annulled.
Knutsford disagreed with the Commissioners and the
planters on the causes of the litigation. He noted that
numerous successful actions were brought only against a few
proprietors.
... it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the cause of the litigation was 
the failure of those few proprietors 
to perform their contracts.
If all contracts were brought under law, oral ones abolished,
and canes bought by the planters, the sources of conflict
would become fewer. Thus, he leaned heavily towards Gorrie's
perception of the issues. He also asked for Gorrie's remarks
to be given publicity equal to that of the Report, though his
tone was 'very unbecoming'.
V.5.5 The Judicial Enauirv
The pressure for Gorrie's removal produced another 
enquiry, this time into the administration of justice.
In January 1891, Anderson, having lost his appeal in 
Frank v Anderson, was imprisoned by Justice Cook, for failing 
to pay £500 bail and £500 security for the judgement debt of 
£42 2s owed to Frank. Leading Trinidad planters paid
C0295/333: Knutsford to Robinson, 18 Aug. 1891, & 
minutes.
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Anderson's bail and security, which were obviously too high,
convinced that his imprisonment was judicial persecution.
Public outrage was heightened by allegations that Cook was
alcoholic and sometimes inebriated in court. The beleaguered
Anderson had become a hero among the élite of the colony.
The new Governor, Sir Frederick Napier Broome, was faced
with a political crisis. On November 22nd, the unofficials in
the Legislative Council passed resolutions asking for an
independent enquiry into the conduct of Cook, and into the
administration of justice. Broome summed up the situation:
The Legislature ... as [sic] at open war
with the Bench ... The Bench is at open
war with the Legislature.
So scandalous had the situation become that one of the movers
of the resolutions, A. P. Marryat, referred to Cook publicly
as a 'drunken i m b e c i l e . S o m e  of the unofficials
complaining were planters who had had adverse judgements in
court, especially from in forma pauperis cases.i**
Knutsford agreed to a Judicial Commission of Enquiry,
selected from outside the colony and empowered to examine
witnesses under oath. It comprised two UK lawyers - Sir
William Markby, the Chairman, and Sir Frederick Pollock. They
sat in May 1892, but in Trinidad and not in Tobago, although
102 C0295/333: Robinson to Knutsford, 24 June 1891, & Encs.
0^^ C0295/335: Broome to Knutsford, 16 Nov. 1891, & Encs., 
esp. Minutes of Leg. Co., 2 Nov. 1891; POSG. 3 Nov. 
1891.
C0295/334: Broome to Knutsford, 26 Dec. 1891, enc. Gorrie 
to Broome, 20 Dec. 1891. Lange, Fenwick and Marryat,
3 of the unofficials, received adverse judgements. 
Ninety cocoa contractors had sued Fenwick in forma 
pauperis in 1888.
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it was agreed that the man-of-war. Tourmaline, would be 
despatched there. Gorrie, who presided over the Tobago Supreme 
Court in May 1892, awaited the Commissioners in Tobago. After 
that, he refused to co-operate with the enquiry.
Broome observed that the Commission did not thoroughly
examine all the available evidence;
In my opinion, the Commissioners made a 
great mistake in not proceeding to Tobago, 
and in assuming, as they did in effect, 
that they had already heard enough to 
condemn Sir John Gorrie, ... I think that 
a more discreet line of action on the 
part of the Commissioners would have en­
abled them to have had before them the 
full facts and defence, in both Mr.
Justice Cook's and Sir John Gorrie's cases, 
before reporting on them.
The Commission's report condemned Cook, who was 
dismissed. Cook's imprisonment of Anderson was deemed 
excessive; and Gorrie's treatment of Anderson was tantamount 
to 'judicial persecution'. Of the three senior judges, only 
Lumb emerged without serious blame.
One area of concern was the procedure for dealing with 
funds in trust of the Courts of Equity for persons entitled, 
many of them infants. Gorrie, the Commission found, did not 
respect the individuality of each fund, and did not always 
seek the wishes or interests of their beneficiaries. Thus, 
there were several cases in which infants' money was invested 
as loans to assist planters. Among the recipients was Edward 
Keens, Tobago planter and merchant, who borrowed £3000 on the
C0295/337: Broome to Knutsford, Conf., 17 May 1892, & 
Encs.; Broome to Knutsford, 19 May 1892, & Encs.
C0295/338: Broome to Knutsford, 2 June 1892.
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security of his estates; £283 0 of this came from funds on 
which consultation with the solicitors of the beneficiaries 
had not taken place. Gorrie was condemned for this, as well 
as for relaxing the rules in in forma pauperis cases.
The Commission condemned Gorrie for acting in several of 
Anderson's cases, including Frank v Anderson, 'contrary to 
law' and in a manner involving 'a substantial denial of 
justice'. In general, he was said to have displayed a perverse 
disregard of law and procedure in a manner tending to destroy 
confidence in the administration of justice, and to have used 
intemperate language in public.
Broome tried to persuade Gorrie to resign, but he 
refused, intending to vindicate his judicial reputation, and 
was interdicted from duty on 21 June 1892, to face trial 
before the Executive Council. On June 23, however, Gorrie was 
granted 3 months sick leave, owing to 'persistent mental 
overwork', 'deficient and irregular feeding' and anaemia.^*
The story of Sir John Gorrie came to a tragic denouement. 
On June 30, escorted by a large crowd of lower class people 
from his home in Diego Martin, some 2 0 miles from the city, to 
the Port of Spain Crop Advance and Discount Company, which he 
had founded, and then to the jetty, he left Trinidad never to 
return. The Port of Spain Gazette stated that 'Crowds of the 
hoi polloi' carried a banner saying, 'Au revoir our upright
107 Jud. Ina. Com. Rept.. 1892.
0^* C0295/338; Telegrams, Broome to Knutsford, 17, 21, 22, 23 
June 1892; Broome to Knutsford, 27 June 1892, & Encs., 
esp. Gorrie's application for sick leave with medical 
certificate, 22 June 1892.
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judge'. Mrs Catherine Rawlins, a fowl vendor, organized a
banquet of over 100 people in his honour at the People's Bank.
But Gorrie could hardly respond to the adulation of the crowd;
Haggard looking, with a death-like palor 
[sic] overspreading his face. Sir John 
Gorrie presented a woful [sic] ... 
appearance; yet his carriage was erect, 
his bearing defiant ..., and there was to 
be seen from the Chief Justice's flashing 
eyes that the old temper was still not 
extinguished.
Because of Gorrie's popularity, Broome wanted to make him 'an 
example', by denying him a pension, but this punitive notion 
was overruled by K n u t s f o r d . G o r r i e  died at Exeter on 4 
August 1892, shortly after his arrival in England.
V.5.6 Judge Gorrie: An Assessment
Gorrie intervened in three crucial areas of social life 
in Tobago: metayage, credit institutions and the
administration of justice. He perceived with stark clarity the 
issues that class bias and official neglect had allowed to 
fester for decades. He fought for greater self-reliance and 
prosperity for the labouring class, but his role as tribune of 
the plebs was incongruous. Ironically, he was applying the 
principle of 'trusteeship' by the Crown on behalf of the poor, 
to protect them from the powerful rich, with which the 
advocates of Crown Colony government had always justified 
their rule.
Credit institutions were important in determining the
C0295/339: Broome to Knutsford, 9 July 1892, & Encs., 
esp. POSG. 1 July 1892.
C0295/342: M. Graham Gorrie to Knutsford, 12 Aug. 1892.
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prospects of labour from Emancipation to the present in the 
Caribbean [Sharpe 1977]. Throughout the 19th century in 
Trinidad and in Tobago, there were no banks or institutions 
advancing money to smallholders [Brereton 1979; Brown 1989]. 
Their exclusion from access to credit continued for decades 
after Gorrie's death. Therefore, the People's Banks were 
timely and significant.
Gorrie's language was often injudicious, his methods 
arbitrary; but none can deny the worthiness of his motives, 
especially as he acted at such high personal cost.
Since the Crown Colony system was based on class bias and 
official paternalism, Gorrie's intervention was the mirror 
image of what he opposed: he sought, by what today is called 
'affirmative action', to redress the class bias in a way that 
smacked of paternalism. At the time, it may have been the only 
way; but his only success was to expose the sharpness of the 
class conflicts and the unviability of metayage as a system of 
production. Ultimately, the labourers themselves had to be 
organized to effect lasting change.
'Judge Gorrie', as he was called in Tobago, was one of
the few officials with the moral courage to fight publicly for
the advancement of the poor. The Tobago folk graphically
recorded their appreciation in song:
Sar [Sir] John Gorrie 
Never make a bit of fun;
See Collens [1912b:84, 87], Craig [1988:15-17] for debt 
peonage in early 20th century Trinidad. Credit for 
smallholders remained a major area of racial discrimina­
tion by the banks, according to the 1970 Commission of 
Enquiry into Racial Discrimination in the Private 
Sector.
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He knock de fine
Like de eight o'clock gunl“^
V.6 THE METAYAGE SYSTEM; 1892-1900
The 1888 Metairie Ordinance was amended by Ordinance No.
17 of 1892, in accordance with Knutsford's wishes. The Act
covered all metayer contracts, both oral and written, included
a penalty for unauthorized reaping of metayer canes, and
provided for the purchase of the canes or the cane juice by
the planters."3
At the end of 1892, the Acting Commissioner, T. C.
Rayner, observed that 'all over the island', there was only
nominal cultivation of canes and large tracts of abandoned
sugar lands. He said of the metayers:
I hear they dislike the new Ordinance, 
and are refusing to work under it. They 
say it is too stringent, though the older 
metayers say it is merely a return to the 
old system; but the bulk of the metayers, 
being accustomed to the loose state of 
things which prevailed here lately, refuse 
to be bound by it, and are giving up 
cultivation.
However, Commissioner Low reported increased cane 
cultivation in 1893; but there were 'very few, if any, written 
contracts made under the Ordinance'. Low reported two 
complaints by the metayers. One was that the metayer should 
be allowed to remove a small part of his sugar for home use.
Because very few people in Scarborough and its environs 
had clocks and watches, a gun was fired from Fort King 
George above the town at 8.00 a.m. and 8.00 p.m. daily.
CO295/340: Fowler to Ripon, 20 Oct. 1892, & Encs.
C0295/341: Broome to Ripon, 5 Dec. 1892, enc. Rayner's 
Rept.
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before it was 'cured', with which the planters disagreed. The 
second was that they had to provide all the labour for 
cutting, carting and manufacturing of the sugar (except for 
the head boiler man, engine or mill driver and one fireman). 
Low saw no inequity in this, but found 'a strong impression on 
their mind that all law was for the white man and planter.'"^ 
But the attempt to prop up the moribund sugar industry 
with metayage had failed. At its best, metayage encouraged 
poor husbandry; in the Depression, only minimal cultivation 
was viable. In 1898, Sir Hubert Jerningham, the Governor, 
wrote of 'disused sugar mills, deserted cane fields and ruined 
tenements', and of 'capital irretrievably lost', wherever he 
went in Tobago."*
In 1897, although most of the sugar produced was by 
metayage, 95% was from ratoons, little new cultivation being 
undertaken. The Royal Commission published a list of 
production on the 39 working sugar estates in 1897, which 
shows that only 7% of the acreage and 17% of the capacity of 
the mills were in use (Table 49).
The submissions of metayers to the Commission reflected 
the old disaffections. A meeting of 200 labourers at Moriah 
advocated 'the entire abolition of the metayer system.' 
Another meeting at Plymouth unanimously resolved likewise, and 
requested payment for the canes by the estates. Watty Cudjoe, 
who had been a metayer since 1864, testified that if he made
C0295/351: Broome to Ripon, 30 Jan. 1894, enc. Low to 
Col. Sec., 19 Jan. 1894.
"* C0295/388: Jerningham to Chamberlain, 24 Nov. 1898.
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62 barrels of sugar, his net product was only 4 barrels after 
paying for labour to manufacture."^
TABLE 49
Sugar Production in Tobago; 1897
Number of estates
Acreage of estates
Acres Cultivated 
by Owners
% Acreage Cultivated 
bv Owners
Acres Cultivated 
bv Metavers
% Acreage Cultivated 
bv Metavers
Capacity of Machinery 
(hhds sugar)
1896 Crop 
(hhds sugar)
1896 Crop 
(% Capacity)
39
27435
149
.5%
1793
6.5%
8140
1364
16.7%
Source; Compiled from WI Roval Com. Rept.. App. C, Pt. V, 
'List of Working Sugar Estates, March 1897, Tobago' by Duncan 
McGillivray, pp. 361-362.
WI Roval Com. Rept.. App. C, Pt. V, pp. 358-360.
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V.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter amply demonstrates that the metayage system 
permeated the entire social fabric of Tobago. The crisis of 
metayage was a crisis of production, of commerce and credit; 
of class and colour relationships; a crisis of the law, and of 
fundamental conceptions of equity and justice; ultimately, 
too, it was a crisis of the moral authority of Crown Colony 
rule by officials. Its rise and demise reflected the 
centrality of class relationships in the social order, and the 
failure of the planters' efforts to achieve capitalist 
accumulation based on non-wage labour.
Ironically, metayage, whose hallmark for over 40 years 
was lack of legal regulation, became so intertwined with the 
judicial system that protagonists on either issue were 
protagonists on both. The courts in 1889-92 were the terrain 
on which the battles between the planters and the metayers, 
formerly fought to a stalemate on the terrain of the estates, 
were carried forward. The metayers themselves succintly summed 
up their strategy:
Me no grind, me grind canes at Court House."* 
Gorrie's intervention highlighted the class conflicts 
that had simmered for decades. It further undermined popular 
confidence in the metayage system and exposed its unviability.
The reliance on custom and the failure to enact laws on 
metayage for 40 years resulted from official neglect and 
compromise with the planters. It led to an impasse within an 
impasse, to which the planters and officials responded by
"* Met. Com. Rept.. 1891, p. v.
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seeking to codify the custom in the 1880s. In response to 
pressure from the metayers and Gorrie, the 1892 Act was 
designed to change the custom to some degree. But it was too 
late. The Act was a dead letter, not only in the decreasing 
number of persons to whom it applied, but in the increasing 
recourse to custom which was implied in the inability of the 
estates to purchase the canes or the juice. It was a return 
to the old ways, within the new constraints imposed by the 
law. The old burdens were thrown on the shoulders of the 
metayers; and the intentions of Gorrie, Knutsford, and the 
officials of the 1840s and 1850s foundered on the want of 
capital and the privileged power of the planters.
Within metayage, both planters and metayers sought to 
accumulate surplus. Neither succeeded to any great extent. 
From the planters' side, it proved impossible to be successful 
agrarian capitalists without control over the labour process. 
Poor husbandry, low technological capacity and low prices led 
to low levels of surplus creation, which enhanced the chronic 
indebtedness of the planters and their dependence on a few 
British merchants. For the majority of labourers, metayage 
offered a limited mechanism for surplus creation. The greater 
the investment of time and labour, the greater the costs; and 
most metayers reckoned that the optimal size of holding was 
less than 4 acres. Therefore, in spite of the exceptional 
'large' metayers who became planters, there were structural 
obstacles to the metayers' viability as sugar producers.
Neither of the two contending classes could therefore 
fully accomplish their aims. The planters failed to create an
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agro-proletariat and a viable agrarian capitalism, whether in 
sugar or other crops. The metayers succeeded in avoiding 
becoming proletarians, and in increasing their autonomy and 
access to land. But before the collapse of the sugar economy, 
to which the crisis of metayage contributed, except for a 
small stratum of smallholders and large metayers, most 
metayers could not fully succeed in becoming independent of 
the estates. The conflicts within the metayage system thus 
help to explain why neither Option 1 nor Options 2A, 2B of our 
hypothesis were fulfilled. Low profitability on the planters' 
account also indicates why they could not extricate themselves 
from acute dependence on small British merchants.
We inferred from Bolland [1981; 1984] and Johnson [1991] 
how crucial the control of alternatives was to the planters' 
strategies of controlling the labour force in the BWI after 
1838. Metayage was the compromise reached by 1855 in a 
context where the planters had annexed unused land and 
effectively narrowed the options available to the ex-slaves 
(Ch. 3). The supreme irony, therefore, is that metayage, by 
providing access to, and ultimately ownership of, land for the 
ex-slaves and their descendants, while denying the planters 
control over the labour process, provided the leverage for the 
creation of alternatives to estate monoculture, and for the 
diversification of the economy so dramatically accelerated 
after 1884, as seen in the export data (Ch. 4). Directly and 
indirectly, therefore, metayage contributed to the demise of 
the agrarian order which it was established to maintain.
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CHAPTER SIX 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND OCCUPATIONAL 
STRUCTURE IN TOBAGO: 1838-1900
VI.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the demographic trends and occupational 
structure are analysed, using the censuses. In spite of 
limitations such as inconsistent definitions and time-bound 
perspectives (both ours and theirs), we assess those aspects 
of the patterns of occupational and gender stratification 
which are amenable to quantitative study. This is a necessary 
part of using all the available sources to provide a 
composite, though at times refracted and blurred, picture of 
Tobago society between 1838 and 1900.
VI.2 MAJOR DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF THE POPULATION 
VT.2.1 The Origins and Composition of the Population
There was no compulsory registration of births, deaths or 
marriages until an enabling Act was passed at the request of 
the Colonial Office in 1868; but the records were unreliable 
until a more stringent Ordinance of 1882* was revised in 1884. 
There were no comprehensive records on migration. Thus, the 
major sources of statistics on the population in the 19th
* C0321/59: Robinson to Kimberley, 27 Oct. 1882, enc. The 
Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Ord., 1882.
319
century are the censuses taken in 1844, 1851, and thereafter 
decennially. The 1844 census was a simple enumeration, and for 
most purposes does not allow comparison with the later ones. 
The 'base' data are therefore usually those from the 1851 
census, but the officials regarded its population total of 
14,378 as an under-estimate, 15,000 being seen as more 
accurate.^
At census 1851, 89% of the population had been locally 
born. The largest migrant groups were, firstly, the natives of 
Africa (753 or 5.2% of the population), whose numbers had been 
boosted shortly before the June census by the arrival in May 
of 292 Liberated Africans; secondly, there were the British 
West Indians (732 or 5.1%), of whom the Barbadians were the 
largest group (Table 50). (A second and final group of 225 
Liberated Africans arrived from St Helena in April 1862; 134 
of them were under 15 years old.^) In 1851, the European- 
born, of whom the Scots (66 persons) formed the largest sub­
group, constituted only .8% of the population (115 persons). 
By 1871, the last year for which we have information, 38 Scots 
were enumerated, but the resident Europeans may have been 
fewer than 104, the census figure, because the sailors on 
ships in the harbour, most of them European, were also 
included.4
2 CO290/38: Blue Bk., 1854; C0285/73: Hincks to Labouchere, 
7 July 1856, enc. Dowland to Shortland, 5 June 1856.
 ^C0285/80: Walker to Newcastle, 22 May 1862, enc. Drysdale 
to Walker, 5 May 1862.
 ^C0286/26: Fraser to Kortright, 22 July 1871, Rept. on the 
1871 Census. Fraser believed that many of the Africa-born 
had been enumerated as natives of Tobago.
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TABLE 50
Origins of the Tobago Population: 1851-1901
1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901
PLACE No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Tobago 12744 88.6 14029 91.0 15484 90.8 16665 92.3 16942 92.3 17241 91.9
Africa 753 5.2 426 2.8 378 2.2 199 1.1 204 1.1 132 .7
BWI
Barbados
Grenada
Trinidad
other
732
489
115
17
111
5.1 837
610
97
18
112
5.4 1060
834
83
40
103
6.2 1112* 6.2 1118
735
66
193
124
6.09 1299
340
959
6.9
Other WI 22 .15 18 1 12 .07 10 .05 13 .07
UK
England
Scotland
Ireland
109
37
66
6
.76 84
41
36
7
5 88
42
38
8
.5 52 .3 47 .25 48 .25
Other Eur 6 .04 12 .07 16 .09 3 .01 2 .01 5 .03
Rest of World 12 .08 4 .02 16 .09 20 .1 25 .14 11 .06
Not Given - - - - - - - - 5 .03 2 .01
Total 14378 99.9 15410 99.9 17054 99.9 18051 100 18353 99.9 18751 100
NOTE: * The 1881 Census gives 1093 from 'Other WI Colonies' and 19 from British and Dutch Guiana.
Sources : Tobago Population Censuses for given years.
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The century was marked by the steady decrease of natives 
of Africa and Europe, and an increase of British West Indians. 
Tobago's planters could not afford to recruit Indian 
indentured labourers. There were 24 persons of Indian birth 
or descent in 1891, and only 8 in 1901. By 1901, only 1.04% of 
the population had been born outside of the Caribbean, and 
nearly all the people were of African or mixed 
African/European descent.
The attrition of the white population is important for 
the class/colour/gender configuration of Tobago society. In 
1842, the Blue Book gave the distribution of whites by parish 
and town, which are compared with a similar distribution for 
1844, based on the census (Table 51). The totals are 225 and 
208, respectively. As in the 1830s, white females were few, 
and most whites who reproduced begat progeny of mixed race. 
The Europeans were concentrated in the major centres of 
economic activity - Scarborough, its suburbs, and the leeward 
parishes of St David and St Patrick. When we exclude the five 
children, 49% of the white males were 'proprietors' or in 
supervisory positions on estates in 1842; they also dominated 
banking, the professions and the clergy.
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TABLE 51
Distribution of Whites by Gender. 1842. 1844
and
Occupational Classification of White Males. 1842
Place M
1842
F Total M
1844
F Total
Scarboro' 54 12 66 45 10 55
Plymouth 4 3 7 3 4 7
St John 8 0 8 11 2 13
St Paul 16 2 18 17 1 18
St Mary 11 3 14 5 2 7
St George 18 2 20 17 4 21
St Andrew 17 4 21 24 5 29
St Patrick 17 2 19 22 3 25
St David 39 13 52 27 6 33
Total 183 42 225 172 36 208
Occupations of White Males, 1842
Resident Proprietors
Managers of Estates
Overseers
Merchants
Merchants' Clerks
Public Officers
Barristers
Clergymen
Doctors
Bankers
Mechanics
Sailors
Domestics
Vendue Master
School Master
Children
Overseers & Clerks 
Unemployed
Total
11
49
27
10
9
16
3 
6 
8
4
1
5
11
183
Sources; C0290/26, /28: Blue Bks. for 1842, 1844, respectively
323
The only census with a 'racial' classification is that of 
1881, which shows 109 'Europeans' (.6% of the population of 
18,051), a half their number in the 1840s. Of these, only 55 
were born in Europe, which suggests that 50% of them were 
Creoles. Those classified 'mixed' were 2862 (15.8%),
'Asiatics' 8 (.04%), and 'Africans' 15,072 (83.5%).
VI.2.2 Population Density. Growth and Settlement Patterns
Throughout the 19th century, the population density was 
low. Table 52 gives the data and compares Tobago with the 
Windward Islands, of which it formed part until 1889.
TABLE 52
Tobago Population Density. 1844-1901. 
and Comparison with the Windward Islands. 1882
At TOBAGO
Year
1844
1851
1861
1871
1881
1891
1901
Population
13208
14378
15410
17054
18051
18353
18751
Persons/Sg. Mile
116
126
135
150
158
161
164
Island
Barbados 
St Lucia 
St Vincent 
Grenada 
Tobago
B: WINDWARD ISLANDS. 1882 
Population Area
172000
39300
41000
43000
18500
rsa. milest
166
243
132
133 
114
Density
1036
162
311
323
162
Sources; A: Tobago Population Censuses for given years;
B: Report from the Roval Commission ..., 1883, Pt. II, p. 4
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Population growth, which was 1% between 1851 and 1861, 
declined to insignificant levels between 1871 and 1901, and it 
is only by 1911 that the annual rate of growth again reached 
1% (Table 53) . Although infant mortality rates were high, the 
major determinant of population growth was emigration to 
Trinidad and other nearby colonies, which grew to remarkable 
proportions between 1871 and 1901.
VI.2.2.1 Population Changes at District Level
Emigration took place from the entire island, but the 
Leeward District experienced the heaviest loss. In 1844, 
almost 20% of the population resided in the Windward District, 
41% in the Middle, and 39.5% in the Leeward. By 1891, the 
last year for which these data are available in the 19th 
century, the proportion for the Windward District had risen to 
24%, after a decline owing to internal migration in the 1840s 
and 1850s (Ch. 3) . The Middle District, in which Scarborough 
and its suburbs were situated, suffered a decline in its share 
of the population to 34% and the Leeward, which in 1871 
accounted for 47% of the population, declined to 42% by 1891. 
Strict comparisons are not possible for the entire period, 
because the extent of the districts is not known for 1851 and 
1861; but the 1871, 1881, and 1891 censuses appear to have 
used the same district boundaries. The intercensal population 
changes at district level, for the decades 1871-81, 1881-91, 
subdivided by gender, are given in Tables 54 and 55.
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TABLE 53
Tobago: Population Growth. 1844-1931. and Comparison with the Windward Islands
Census Population 
Years
Increase Increase % Increase Windward Islands
per annum in the intercensal % Intercensal
period preceding Increase per annum
1844 13208 — — — — —
1851 14378 1170 167 1.3
1861 15410 1032 103 .7 1844-61 .82
1871 17054 1644 164 1.0 1861-71 1.37
1881 18051 997 98 .58 1871-81 1.25
1891 18353 302 30 .17 1881-91 .88
1901 18751 398 40 .2
1911 20749 1998 199 1.06 1891-1911 .79
1921 23390 2641 264 1.3 1911-21 .42
1931 25358 1968 197 .84 1921-46 .94
Sources: Tobago Population Censuses, 1844-1931; Roberts [1957: 50], Table 8, 'Annual Intercensal 
Rates of Growth (%) for West Indian Populations', for Cols. 6 & 7.
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TABLE 54
Population by District and Gender: 1844-1891
1844 1851
Male Female Total % Male Female Total %
Windward 1227 1364 2591 19.6 1205 1144 2349 16.3
Middle 2439 2955 5394 41 2866 3287 6153 42.8
Leeward 2486 2737 5223 39.5 2878 2998 5876 40.8
Total 6152 7056 13208 100.1 6949 7429 14378 99.9
1861 1871
Windward 1358 1321 2679 17.4 1559 1572 3131 18.3
Middle 2995 3398 6393 41.5 2835 3079 5914 34.7
Leeward 3080 3258 6338 41.1 3868 4141 8009 47.0
Total 7433 7977 15410 100 8262 8792 17054 100
1881 1891
Windward 2041 1987 4028 22.3 2145 2264 4409 24.0
Middle 2853 3219 6072 33.6 2842 3319 6161 33.6
Leeward 3800 4151 7951 44.0 3653 4130 7783 42.4
Total 8694 9357 18051 99.9 8640 9713 18353 99.9
Sources: Tobago Population Censuses of given years.
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TABLE 55
Gender Specific Population Increase/Decrease by District: 1871-1891
1 8  7 1-1 8 8 1 1 8  8 1-1 8 9 1
Increase/
Decrease
%
Change
Increase/
Decrease
%
Change
MALES
Windward
Middle
Leeward
482 
18 
-  68
+31 
+ .6 
-  1.8
104 
-  11 
-147
+ 5
- .4
- 3.8
Total 432 + 5.2 - 54 —  .6
FEMALES
Windward
Middle
Leeward
415
140
10
+26.4 
+ 4.5 
+ .2
277 
100 
-  21
+13.9 
+ 3.1 
+ .5
Total 565 + 6.4 356 + 3.8
MALES AND FEMALES
Windward
Middle
Leeward
897 
158 
- 58
+28.6 
+ 2.7 
- .7
381
89
-168
+ 9.6 
+ 1.5 
-  2.1
Total 997 + 5.8 302 + 1.7
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses for given years.
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The Windward District was said by the compiler of the 
census to have contributed most to population growth between 
1871 and 1891, because of less communication with other 
colonies.3 However, in the Windward and Leeward Districts, 
male rates of growth declined markedly in the decade 1881- 
1891, and the decline in the rate of increase of males in the 
Windward District was steeper than it was elsewhere. The 
Middle District showed the lowest rates of decline for both 
males and females (Table 55).
VI.2.2 .2 Population Changes in Parishes and Towns
For most of the censuses, the districts were deemed to be 
composed of parishes and towns as follows: St John, St Paul 
and St Mary were the Windward District; St George, St Andrew 
and Scarborough, the Middle District; St David, St Patrick and 
Plymouth, the Leeward District. The data were therefore 
examined at the parish level also. (See Figures 3, 4, for
parish boundaries.)
The parish boundaries were the most stable spatial 
boundaries over time, although for the censuses in which the 
settlements in each parish are given (1881 and 1891), there 
are slight discrepancies. The most dramatic changes were in 
the Leeward District where St Patrick rose from having 14% to 
21% of the population between 1844-61, to fall to 17.2% by 
1891 (Table 56).
 ^Tobago 1881 Census, H. H. Sealy (Compiler) to Laborde, 1 
Aug. 1881; cf. Sealy to Hay, 31 Aug. 1891, on 1891 census.
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TABLE 56
Population of Parishes and Towns by (render: 1844-1891
1844 1861
Parish/ % %
Town M F Total Pop'n M F Total Pop'n
St John 485 474 959 7.3 455 424 879 5.7
St Paul 443 476 921 7.0 729 744 1473 9.6
St Mary 299 412 711 5.4 313 299 612 4.0
St George 785 818 1603 12.1 903 966 1869 12.1
St Andrew 1049 1268 2317 17.5 1291 1294 2585 16.8
St David 1409 1580 2989 22.6 1448 1575 3023 19.6
St Patrick 899 935 1834 13.9 1563 1695 3258 21.1
Scarboro' 605 869 1474 11.2 467 723 1190 7.7
Plymouth 178 222 400 3.0 250 249 499 3.2
Total 6152 7056 13208 100.0 7419 7969 15388* 99.8
1881 1891
Parish/ % %
Town M F Total Pop'n M F Total Pop'n
St John 588 543 1131 6.3 568 623 1191 6.5
St Paul 860 891 1751 9.7 973 1074 2047 11.1
St Mary 593 553 1146 6.3 604 567 1171 6.4
St George 1032 1039 2071 11.5 1062 1158 2220 12.1
St Andrew 1470 1678 3148 17.4 1376 1646 3022 16.5
St David 1928 2011 3939 21.8 1889 2096 3985 21.7
St Patrick 1517 1728 3245 18.0 1467 1695 3162 17.2
Scarboro' 351 502 853 4.7 404 515 919 5.0
Plymouth 355 412 767 4.3 297 339 636 3.5
Total 8694 9357 18051 100.0 8640 9713 18353 100.0
NOTES :
1. *The 1861 Census does not account for 22 persons in
its table on population by place of abode.
2. Persons in the harbours are included in the relevant 
parishes.
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses for given years.
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The sex ratios (males per 100 females) in the parishes 
also showed marked fluctuations. The remotest Windward parish, 
St John, had high sex ratios until 1881, after which there was 
a decline to 92.2. St Mary (Windward) experienced a sharp 
increase from 72.6 in 1844 to 104.7 in 1861; and this high 
level was sustained until 1891, probably as a result of 
Barbadian immigration. The parishes with the lowest sex 
ratios were St Andrew near Scarborough, and St Patrick. In the 
former, this was probably related to the traditionally high 
female component in Caribbean urban populations (see below); 
St Patrick, as a result of emigration, experienced a steady 
decline in its sex ratio, although its population grew by 
77.4% between 1844 and 1861 and declined by 2.5% between 1881 
and 1891 (Tables 56, 57).
TABLE 57
Male/Female Ratios by Parish: 1844-1891
Parish 1844 1861 1881 1891
St John 102.3 107.3 108.3 92.2
St Paul 93.1 98.0 98.0 90.6
St Mary 72.6 104.7 107.2 106.5
St George 96.0 93.5 99.3 91.7
St Andrew 82.7 99.8 87.6 83.6
St David 89.2 91.9 95.9 90.1
St Patrick 96.1 92.2 87.8 86.5
TOBAGO 87.2 93.1 92.9 88.9
NOTE; Males per 100 females are given.
Sources ; Tobago Population Censuses for given years.
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The net decreases in the population of Scarborough for 
1861-91 (-31.4%) and for Plymouth between 1881-91 (-17%) are 
important for different reasons. In neither case do we know 
the boundaries used at each census. Assuming that they were 
the same over time. Table 58 presents their composition by 
gender for 1844-1891.
In 1844, Scarborough was a primate capital town, typical 
of the BWI colonies during slavery [Higman 1984b]. Such towns 
had low sex ratios, because of the high demand for female 
domestic slaves, and because of the high degree of female 
ownership of urban slaves, women also tending to own more 
female than male slaves. There were usually also high
proportions of the African-born, and of Creoles from other 
colonies in the towns [Higman 1984a:118-9, 145]. In 1844,
11.7% of the population lived in Scarborough; and females far 
exceeded males, the sex ratio being 69.6 males per 100 
females.
The absolute and proportionate decline of the Scarborough 
population down to 1881 does not indicate the decline of the 
town per se, but rather the growth of its suburbs, to which 
some freedpeople had resorted before 1838, and which became 
more populous thereafter. In 1861, the census gave the
'suburbs of Scarborough' as having 276 persons, 130 males and 
146 females. In 1891, considering the suburbs of Scarborough 
to be those settlements within a radius of one mile from the 
town, their population was 1331 persons (Table 59). (The 1881 
data are also given, but the enumeration of settlements is 
inconsistent, and comparison of settlements would be unwise.)
332
The female preponderance was maintained over the years.
The slow increase of Plymouth's population over that of 
1844 does not indicate a growth in urban characteristics. 
Situated on Courland Bay with a deep harbour, it was the sole 
port of entry for the ships of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. 
(RMSPCO), which brought the mail and passengers from Europe. 
However, from 1841 to 1881, there was often protest against 
this by the planters and merchants, since Plymouth was not a 
place of trade. Late in 1881, Plymouth ceased to be a port of 
entry. It was a fishing and agricultural village, and a 
centre for sea communication, some of it clandestine, with 
nearby islands, for smallholders. None of the merchants did 
business there, and few of the propertied able to vote resided 
there.
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N o .
% M /F  
S e x
R a t i o s *  
% P o p 'n
M
605
41.0
N o .
% M /F  
S e x
R a t i o s *
% P o p 'n
NOTES ; 1
Sources;
44.5
2.9
TABLE 58
Population of Scarborough and Plymouth by Gender; 1844-1891
SCARBOROUGH
1844
F
869
58.9
M F
178 222
55.5
T o t a l
1474
69.6
9.8 12.3 11.2
T o t a l
400
80.2 
3.1 3.0
M
467
39.2
6.3
1861
F
723
60.7
M F
250 249
50.1 49.9
T o t a l
1190
M
351
41.1
64.6 
9.1 7.7 3.9
PLYMOUTH 
T o t a l  M
499 355
46.3
100.4 
3.4 3.1 3.2 4.1
1881
F
502
58.8
F
412
53.7
T o t a l
853
69.9 
5.3 4.7
T o t a l
767
86.2 
4.4 4.2
1891 
M F
404 515
44.0 56.0
M F
297 339
46.7 53.3
No data are given for 1851 and 1871. 2.* Males per 100 females.
Tobago Population Censuses of given years.
T o t a l
919
78.4 
4.7 5.3 5.0
T o t a l
636
87.6 
3.4 3.5 3.5
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TABLE 59
Settlement
Suburbs of
Population of Scarborough and Its Suburbs; 1881. 1891
Population
1881
Scarborough M F Total
Lower Scarborough 149 170 319
Wilson's Road Not Given
Breeze Hall 1 6 7
Morne Quiton Not Given
Bagatelle 160 221 381
Fort Road Not Given
Fort King George 51 22 73
Rockly Vale 247 315 562
Bacolet Road Not Given
Smithfield Estate 3 2 5
Total 611 736 1347
% Male/Female 45.4 54.6
Sex Ratio* 83.0
% Population 7.0 7.9 7.5
Scarborough 351 502 853
Scarborough & Suburbs 962 1238 2200
% Male/Female 43. 7 56.3
Sex Ratio* 77.7
% Population 11. 1 13.2 12.2
1891
M F Total
93 119 212
56 99 155
4 5 9
100 120 220
16 25 41
29 27 56
43 48 91
202 248 450
41 56 97
Not Given 
584 747 1331
43.9 56.1 
78.2
6.8 7.7 7.25
404 515 919
988 1262 2250
43.9 56.1 
78.4
11.4 13.0 12.2
NOTE; * Males per 100 females.
Sources: Tobago Population Censuses, 1881, 1891.
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VI.2.2.3 Population Changes at Settlement Level
There were 95 settlements apart from Scarborough and 
Plymouth in 1861, and 112 in 1891, the earliest and latest 
years for which there are data. In 1861, outside of the 
towns, only Rockly Vale, a suburb of Scarborough, had over 500 
persons (503 or 3.3% of the population). By 1891, 8 villages, 
with 4746 persons or 25.9% of the population, had more than 
500 persons. These large villages were Riseland (563), Canaan 
(532), and Buccoo (511) in the Leeward District; Mt St George 
(800), Mason Hall (663), Adventure (616) and Indian Walk* 
(Moriah) (551) in the Middle District; and Roxborough (510) in 
the Windward District.?
The most significant change in the settlement patterns 
between 1861 and 1891 is that, although an increased 
proportion of settlements had fewer than 100 persons, whereas 
46.3% of the population had lived in villages with between 100 
and 299 persons in 1861, 33.9% lived in such settlements at 
the later date; settlements with over 400 persons in which 
resided 11.6% of the population in 1861, had 30.7% in 1891, 
the greatest shift being to the villages with over 500 
persons. There was thus, by 1891, a proliferation of very 
small settlements, flanked by a growing number of larger ones
* Indian Walk was the estate from which the ex-slaves bought 
land and built Moriah village after 1838. The 1891 census 
gives 'Moriah' as having 10 persons, but this prob. refers 
to the residents of the Moravian mission.
 ^Mason Hall, Mt St George, Moriah and Riseland (near 
Bethel) had been noted as centres of smallholding activity 
in the 1840s (Ch. 3). Roxborough was the main port of 
entry for the Windward District before 1881 and its 
administrative centre.
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which accounted for an increasing share of the population 
(Table 60).
Figures 3 and 4, in giving the spatial dimension to these 
statistics, show the development, by 1891, of what may be 
termed 'conglomerate settlements', where two or more larger 
villages were close together, usually with smaller settlements 
nearby. For example, in St Patrick, Canaan and Tyson Hall 
comprised one such grouping; Buccoo, Riseland, and 
Bethel/Bethlehem were another. Mason Hall (St George) had 
smaller satellite settlements nearby in Adelphi and Concordia, 
and it was closely linked by road with Mt St George and Indian 
Walk. The largest such cluster was Scarborough and its 
suburbs, of which Rockly Vale was the largest.
None of these 'conglomerate settlements' was in the 
Windward District. This pattern of development, which was 
already discernible in 1861 (Figure 3), is probably related to 
the availability of land for village settlements, which in 
turn was affected by the pressure on the planters, which the 
labourers congregating in the Middle and Leeward Districts 
exerted after 1838.
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TABLE 60
N um ber  
% P o p 'n
N um ber  
% P o p 'n
N um ber  
% S e t t l e ­
m e n ts
N um ber  
% S e t t l e ­
m e n ts
0-
Population in Settlements of Varying Population Sizes 
and Proportion of Settlements with Varying Population Sizes: 1861. 1891
P r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  P o p u l a t i o n  i n  S e t t l e m e n t s  o f  V a r y in g  P o p u l a t i o n  S i z e s
100-
2322 3529
15.1 22.9
200- 300-
3602 2357
23.4 15.3
400- 500+
1275 503
8.3 3.3
S u b -
T o t a l
1861
13588
88.3
1891
T ow n s
1689
10.9
E s t a t e s
N .G .*
Shipping
E t c
111
.7
2290 2428 3798 2406 872 4746 16540 1497 257 59
12.4 13.2 20.7 13.1 4.8 25.9 90.1 8.2 1.4 .3
P r o p o r t i o n  o f  S e t t l e m e n t s  w i t h  V a r y in g  P o p u l a t i o n  S i z e s  ( E x c l u d i n g  T o w n sI
1861
46 24 14 7 3 1 95
48.4 25.3 14.7 7.4 3.1 1.0 99.9
1891
62 18 
55.3 16.1
15
13.4
7
6.2
2
1.8
8
7.1
112
99.9
TOTAL
15410**
100
18353
100
NOTES ; * N.G. = Not Given.
** Includes 22 persons not accounted for in the census tables on place of abode. 
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses, 1861, 1891.
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FIGURE 3
Tobago: Settlem ent with more
than 300 Persons. 1861
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■  Major Towns 
O Settlements with 
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•  Settlements with 
400-499 Persons 
n  Settlements with 
> 500 Persons
Sources : John Byre's Map, 1776, and
Tobago Population Census, 1861,
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FIGURE 4
Tobago: Settlements with more 
than 300 Persons. 1891
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Sources; John Byre's Map, 1776, and
Tobago Population Census, 1891.
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Unfortunately, the censuses do not consistently 
distinguish settlements on estates. In 1891, they were given 
only for the parishes of the Middle and Leeward Districts. 
Altogether, the estate residents identified were 1.4% of 
Tobago's population. For the parishes for which there is 
information, the figures are given in Table 61.
TABLE 61
Residents on Estates. Available Parishes: 1891
Estate %
Parish Population Residents Poo'n
St George 2220 52 2.3
St Andrew 3022 42 1.4
St David 3985 85 2.1
St Patrick 3162 78 2.5
Source; Tobago Population Census, 1891.
The picture that emerges is that of a population living 
at low density, in small settlements, which were increasingly 
becoming clusters of villages by 1891; there, face-to-face 
relationships and popular sanctions would have been the norm. 
Most people lived off the estates, at least in the Middle and 
Leeward Districts, but there were no inaccessible settlements; 
the population was concentrated near the estates and towns, 
within reach of the roads and services.* In 1884, when the 
Administrator, Dr Carrington, did a tour of the island, the
Holt [1992:150] argues for Jamaica that if the ex-slaves 
were oriented to marginal subsistence, as was believed by 
Colonial Office officials, they would have gone to the 
remote backlands. Mintz [1974a: 155] shows that the creation 
of Caribbean peasantries was an act both of westernization 
and of resistance.
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northern coast beyond Parlatuvier was still uninhabited.*
VI.2.2.4 Types of Dwellings
The 1891 census was the first to describe the types of 
dwellings. Although the Registrar General saw the 1901 
figures as only approximate, the pattern for Tobago was 
particularly interesting. In 1891, 95% of the occupied
dwellings were undivided dwelling houses, and 3% divided 
dwellings; in 1901, the respective proportions were 97.7% and 
1.4%. In 1891, there were 31 'barracks' with 106 rooms; in 
1901, there were only 6 'barracks' with 6 rooms. Thus, by 
1901, the overwhelming majority of the population lived in 
undivided dwellings. Although the ratio of persons to rooms 
(2.6 in 1891 and 1901) was less favourable than that of 
Trinidad (2.2 persons per room in 1901), Tobago had almost no 
estate barracks and urban 'barrack yards', which were integral 
to the development of society and culture in Trinidad in the 
19th and early 20th centuries (Table 62).^
* 00321/79: Robinson to Derby, 7 June 1884, enc.
Carrington's 'Notes of a Journey ... made in April, 1884'. 
Bloody Bay (Bennettsville), was partly owned by a Mr 
Bennett who, with other cultivators, commuted there to 
plant cocoa and ground provisions.
Brereton [1979] and Wood [1968] show for Trinidad that the 
barrack yards were the crucible in which stick fighting, 
calypso, steelband and other folk traditions were forged.
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TABLE 62
Types of Dwellings. Tobago; 1891. 1901: 
Trinidad: 1901
T 0 B A G O T R I N I D A ]
1891 1901 1901
Dwellings No. % No. % No. %
Dwelling
Houses 4011 95.1 4045 97.7 36889 66.1
Divided
Dwellings 128 3.0 57 1.4 5089 9.1
Barracks 31 .7 6 .1 4948 8.9
Rooms in
Yards 49 1.2 29 .7 8898 15.9
Total
Dwellings
Occupied 4219 100.0 4137 99.9 55824 100.0
Rooms
Occupied 7026 7083 121033
Population 18353 18751 255148
Unoccupied
Houses 128 170 1805
Houses
under
Construe'n 91 112 607
Rooms
Unoccupied 304 372 4555
Sources: Tobago Population Census, 1891; Trinidad and Tot
Census, 1901, p. 25.
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VI.2.3 Age Structure. Sex Ratios. Migration and Fertility
Migration affected the age/sex structure of the 
population. Before 1891, only the 1871 census gave details on 
the age categories above 60 years; therefore, in the tables 
immediately following, persons over 60 are treated as one 
group. Table 63 gives the distributions of age cohorts, which 
are further subdivided by gender in Table 64. Since the 
migration was largely of the able-bodied, the proportion of 
the population aged 20-50 declined steadily from 41.7% in 1851 
to 33.5% in 1901, rising again slowly to 36.4% in 1931 (Table 
65) . The disparity in the sex ratios in those age cohorts, 
and particularly for the 20-29 age group, is marked between 
1871 and 1911, as Table 66 indicates. Table 66 also shows a 
decline in the ratio of males per thousand females in the 
population between 1871 and 1901 and, thereafter, only a 
gradual increase to the ratio of 1871, which was attained in 
1931. Between 1881 and 1891, the male population declined by 
54, while females increased by 356; in the subsequent decade, 
only 31 males were added to the population, while there was an 
increase of 367 women (Table 64).
TABLE 65
Proportion of Population Aged between 20-50: 1851-1931
Year
1851
1861
1871
1881
% Population 
41.7% 
39.6% 
38.5% 
37.5%
Year
1891
1901
1911
1921
1931
% Population 
36.2% 
33.5% 
35.3% 
36.2% 
36.4%
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses for given years
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TABLE 63
Population by Age: 1851-1901
AGE
1851 
No. %
1861
No. %
1871 
No. %
1881
No. %
1891
No. %
1901
No. %
0- 4 1910 13.2 2035 13.2 2604 15.3 2593 14.4 2616 14.2 2767 14.7
5- 9 1641 11.4 1836 11.9 1882 11.0 2274 12.6 2201 12.0 2580 13.6
10-14 1539 10.7 1732 11.2 2002 11.8 } 2423 13.2 2430 13.3
15-19 1306 9.0 1497 9.7 1759 10.2
} 3964 
}
22.0
1864 10.1 1943 10.3
20-29 2541 17.6 2688 17.4 3176 18.6 2970 16.5 2831 15.3 2729 14.4
30-39 1971 13.7 1811 11.75 2064 12.1 2235 12.4 2089 11.4 1924 10.2
40-49 1505 10.4 1611 10.5 1339 7.8 1577 8.7 1762 9.5 1696 9.0
50-59 905 6.2 1124 7.3 1159 6.75 1181 6.5 1178 6.3 1331 7.0
60+ 1060 7.3 1076 7.0 1069 6.2 1257 7.0 1389 7.6 1351 7.2
TOTAL 14378 99.5 15410 99.9 17054 99.75 18051 100 18353 99.7 18751 99.7
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses for given years.
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TABLE 64
Population by Age and Sex: 1851-1931
1851 1861 1871
AGE Numbers % Pop 'n Numbers % Pop 'n Numbers % Pop 'n
COHORT M F M F M F M F M F M F
0- 4 924 986 6.4 6.9 986 1049 6.4 6.8 1257 1347 7.4 7.9
5- 9 805 836 5.6 5.8 936 900 6.1 5.8 939 943 5.5 5.5
10-14 839 700 5.8 4.9 903 829 5.9 5.4 1052 950 6.2 5.6
15-19 636 670 4.4 4.7 701 796 4.6 5.2 865 894 5.1 5.2
20-29 1273 1268 8.9 8.8 1299 1389 8.4 9.0 1405 1771 8.2 10.4
30-39 959 1012 6.7 7.0 892 919 5.8 6.0 1070 994 6.3 5.8
40-49 739 766 5.1 5.3 768 843 5.0 5.5 635 704 3.7 4.1
50-59 378 527 2.6 3.7 563 561 3.7 3.6 589 570 3.5 3.3
60+ 396 664 2.8 4.6 385 691 2.5 4.5 450 619 2.6 3.6
TOTAL 6949 7429 48.3 51.7 7433 7977 48.2 51.7 8262 8792 48.4 51.6
Population 14 ,378 15,410 17,054
Sources: Tobago Population Censuses for given years
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TABLE 64 continued
Population by Age and Sex; 1851-1931
1881 1891 1901
AGE Numbers % Pop 'n Numbers % Pop n Numbers % Pop
COHORT M F M F M F M F M F M F
0- 4 1347 1246 7.5 6.9 1320 1296 7.2 7.1 1354 1413 7.2 7.5
5- 9 1107 1167 6.1 6.5 1112 1089 6.1 5.9 1291 1289 6.9 6.9
10-14 > 1232 1191 6.7 6.5 1253 1177 6.7 6.3
} 2014 1950 1.1 1.08
15-19 } 894 970 4.9 4.7 925 1018 4.9 5.4
20-29 1333 1637 7.4 9.1 1188 1643 6.5 9.0 1062 1667 5.7 8.9
30-39 991 1244 5.5 6.9 928 1161 5.1 6.3 804 1120 4.3 6.0
40-49 733 844 4.1 4.7 799 963 4.4 5.2 798 898 4.3 4.8
50-59 648 533 3.6 3.0 563 615 3.1 3.4 606 725 3.2 3.9
60+ 521 736 2.9 4.1 604 785 3.3 4.3 578 773 3.1 4.1
TOTAL 8694 9357 48.2 51.8 8640 9713 47.1 52.9 8671 10080 46.2 53.8
Population 18,051 18, 353 18,751
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses for given years
347
AGE
TABLE 64 concluded
Population by Age and Sex; 1851-1931
1911 
Numbers
1921
% Pop'n Numbers
1931 
Numbers
COHORT M F M F M F M F M F M F
0- 4 1526 1474 7.4 7.1 1678 1675 7.2 7.2 1804 1747 7.1 6.9
5- 9 1372 1302 6.6 6.3 1577 1593 6.7 6.8 1741 1721 6.9 6.8
10-14 1352 1329 6.5 7.1 1552 1480 6.6 6.3 1644 1499 6.5 5.9
15-19 1035 1051 5.0 5.1 1102 1136 4.7 4.9 1255 1419 5.0 5.9
20-29 1466 1869 7.1 9.0 1519 2031 6.5 8.7 1804 2016 7.1 8.0
30-39 991 1213 4.8 5.8 1272 1417 5.4 6.1 1187 1436 4.7 5.7
40-49 836 981 4.0 4.7 1033 1126 4.4 4.8 1105 1229 4.4 4.8
50-59 632 738 3.0 3.6 692 776 3.0 3.3 846 896 3.3 3.5
60+ 712 870 3.4 2.4 770 961 3.3 4.1 889 1114 3.5 4.4
TOTAL 9922 10827 47.8 51.1 11195 12195 47.8 52.2 12275 13077 48.5 51.9
Population 20, 749 23, 390 25, 352
Sources: Tobago Population Censuses for given years.
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TABLE 66
Age-Specific Sex Ratios (Males per 1.000 Females): 1851-1931
AGE
COHORT 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931
0- 4 937 940 933 1081 1018 958 1035 1001 1033
5- 9 963 1040 996 949 1021 1001 1054 990 1012
10-14 1198 1089 1107 } 1034 1065 1017 1049 1097
15-19 949 881 968 1033} 922 909 985 970 854
20-29 1004 935 793 814 723 637 784 748 895
30-39 948 971 1076 797 799 718 817 898 827
40-49 1047 911 902 868 830 889 852 917 899
50-59 717 1001 1033 1216 915 836 856 892 944
60+ 596 557 727 708 769 748 818 801 798
All Ages 935 932 940 929 889 860 916 918 939
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses for given years.
349
We are given no subdivisions of the cohort aged 60 and 
over for the years 1851, 1861 and 1881. The population over 60 
saw almost no numerical increase between 1851 and 1871. 
Between 1881 and 1891, it accounted for two-thirds of the 
population increase; 202 out of a total of 302. Between 1891- 
1901, this group declined by 128, although the population grew 
by 398. This was partly the result of the attrition in 
younger age cohorts owing to emigration. In 1911, however, 
there was an increase of 232, or 11.6% of Tobago's increase.
Where gender is concerned, men aged over 60 who, in 1851, 
constituted only 2.75% of the population while the comparable 
figure for women was 4.6%, increased their proportion to 3.1% 
in 1901 and 3.5% in 1931 (Table 67). The proportion of women 
over 60 fell to 3.6% in 1871, but remained at just over 4% in 
the five decades following. Thus, as the century after 
Emancipation progressed, more men enjoyed a longer lifespan, 
which was an improvement on the demographic patterns of the 
slavery era.
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TABLE 67
Persons Aged over 60 by Gender as Proportion of Population: 1851-1931
60 — 65
No.
% Pop'n 
Sex Ratios
M
N.G.
F
70±
M F
1851
N.G.
Total >60 
M F
396 664
2.75 4.6
59.6
60 - 65 
M F
354 449
1.9 2.4
70+
M
1901
224
1.2
F
324
1.7
Total >60 
M F
578 773
3.1 4.1
74.8
No.
% Pop’n 
Sex Ratios
N.G
1861
N.G. 385 691
2.5 4.5
55.7
451 541
2.2 2.6
1911
261 330
1.25 1.6
712 871
3.4 4.2
81.7
1871 1921
No.
% Pop'n  
Sex Ratios
284 340 166 279
1.6 2.0 1.0 1.6
450 619
2.6 3.6
72.7
465 544
2.0 2.3
305
1.3
417
1.8
770 961
3.3 4.1
80.1
No.
% Pop'n 
Sex Ratios
N.G.
1881
N.G. 521 756
2.9 4.1
68.9
532 604
2.1 2.4
1931
357
1.4
510
2.0
889 1114
3.5 4.4
79.8
1891
No.
% Pop'n 
Sex Ratios
375 402 229 383
2.0 2.2 1.2 2.1
604 875
3.2 4.1
69.0
NOTE; N. G. means not given. Sources: Tobago Population Censuses of given years
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In the absence of a reliable continuous series on births 
and deaths, a rough estimate of the fertility rate for each 
decade was derived, by calculating the number of children 
under 10 alive at each census as a ratio of the number of 
females in the population aged between 15 to 50, since some 
censuses give only 10-year intervals for the age cohorts above 
20 years old. It is recognized that this measure is subject to 
changes in the age structure, and that it falls short of the 
actual number of births, because of high infant mortality 
rates;" but it remains the best available estimate.
Table 68 indicates that the females aged 15-50 declined 
in number between 1871 and 1901. The apparent increase in 
fertility rates for those decades may therefore be illusory on 
two counts: firstly, some of the children could have been
mothered by emigrants; secondly, the smaller number of females 
in the denominators would increase the ratios. The number of 
surviving children fell in the decade 1881-1891, suggesting 
that it was the decade of heaviest female migration (cf. Table 
55); it was also a time of economic hardship, which may have 
adversely affected the health of children, particularly in the 
parishes which suffered drought in 1885-86. From 1901, after 
the period of heavy migration, fertility rates seem to have 
risen.
" For example, as late as 1886, there were 675 births, of 
which 28 were still births. Of the 398 deaths, 37% (147) 
were of children under 5 years. The News. 14 May 1887, 
giving Rept. of the Registrar for Births, Marriages and 
Deaths, 1886.
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TABLE 68
Surviving Children under 10 Years Old per Thousand Females
Year Children Females Rate/ Year Children Females Rate/
< 10 vrs 15-50 1000 < 10 yrs 15-50 1000
Females Females
1851 3551 3716 955 1901 5347 4703 1137
1861 3871 3947 980 1911 5674 5114 1109
1871 4486 5313 844 1921 6523 5710 1142
1881 4867 4664* 1043 1931 7013 6100 1150
1891 4817 4737 1017
NOTE; *The number of women aged 15-19 was estimated from the figure for the cohort aged 10-19 on 
the assumption of no change in the proportion of males and females in the population between 1871 
& 1881, since the proportion of both males and females for the cohort 10-19 was unchanged, and 
since another estimate assuming these proportions to be the mid-point of those for 1871 and 1891 
was too high.
Sources: Tobago Population Censuses for given years.
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Another indicator of these trends in both migration and 
fertility is a comparison of the annual growth of the 
population and that of the working force^^ (Table 69) . Between 
1851-61, the annual growth of the working force was .3%; in 
the succeeding decade it was .5%, rising to 1.1% for 1871-81. 
For 1881-91, however, the rate declined to -.02% and further 
declined to -.25% for 1891-1901. Again, attesting to the 
slower emigration rates and possibly higher fertility rates 
after 1901, the population grew by 1% per annum in the 1901-11 
decade, with the working force outstripping it with an annual 
growth of 2%, while in the following decade both rates were 
the same (1.3%). After 1921, however, both population and 
working force grew more slowly - less than 1% per annum.
Trinidad was the main destination for Tobago emigrants. 
There are no records on Tobagonians in Trinidad for 1851-1881. 
In 1891, there were 3307 (1774 males, 1533 females)
Tobagonians in Trinidad, and 16,942 in Tobago. In 1901, the 
comparable figures were 5334 (2948 males, 2386 females) and 
17,241.w
In 1844, the compiler of the census examined the persons 
over 18 years and considered those at work and those 
'having no employment.' In the subsequent censuses, the 
procedure was basically to describe the 'working force', 
that is, the number of people enumerated in their usual 
main activity, paid or unpaid. The working force is the 
concept used throughout this chapter.
Trinidad and Tobago Census, 1901, p. 19.
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TABLE 69
The Growth of the Population and of the Working Force: 1844-1931
Annual Annual
Census
Year Population Increase
%
Rates of 
Growth 
%
Workina
Force
%
Pop'n
Increase/
Decrease
Increase/
Decrease
%
Rates oi 
Chance 
%
1844 13208 n. a. - - - - - -
1851 14378 8.8 1.3 8469 58.9 - - -
1861 15410 7.0 .7 8761 56.8 + 292 + 3.4 + .3
1871 17054 10.6 1.0 9190 53.9 + 429 + 4.9 + .5
1881 18051 5.8 .6 10210 56.6 +1020 +11.1 +1.1
1891 18353 1.7 .2 10194 55.5 — 16 - .2 - .02
1901 18751 2.2 .2 9934 53.0 - 260 - 2.5 - .25
1911 20749 10.6 1.06 11919 57.4 +1985 +20.0 +2.0
1921 23390 12.7 1.3 13421 57.4 +1502 +12.6 +1.3
1931 25352 8.4 .8 14107 55.6 + 686 + 5.1 + .5
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses of given years.
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Thus, between 1891 and 1901, the Tobago-born living in 
Trinidad increased by 60%, and the proportion of Tobagonians 
living in Trinidad increased from 16.3% to 23.6%. Expressed 
another way, the increase of Tobagonians in Trinidad between 
1891-1901 was five times the increase of the Tobago population 
(398 persons). Emigration occurred at a slower rate after 
1901, but the number of Tobagonians residing in Trinidad 
remained significantly large. In 1901, the first year for 
which we have information, Tobagonians in Trinidad were 
clustered in the north-eastern ward of Toco (County of St 
David), the nearest point between the islands, with which 
there was constant traffic by steamer and small craft, and in 
Port of Spain, the capital. There were smaller concentrations 
at Manzanilla on the east coast and in County St George, the 
urban area relatively near the capital. Over time, however, 
the migrants to Toco declined numerically and proportionately, 
while the concentrations in Port of Spain/St George and in St 
Patrick, the oilfield area of South Trinidad, became more 
significant (Table 70).
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TABLE 70
Tobago-Born Population in Trinidad and in Tobago: 1891-1931
1891 1901 1911 1921 1931
Divisions No. % No. % No. % No. %
City of Port
of Spain 1252 23.5 1161 19.5 1259 20.6 1793 26.0
Borough of San
Fernando 84 1.6 72 1.2 139 2.3 71 1.0
Borough of Arima 162 3.0 108 1.8 78 1.3 258 3.7
County of
St George 577 10.8 609 10.2 615 10.1 1029 14.8
St David 1453 27.3 1878 31.6 1617 26.5 1164 16.8
St Andrew 630 11.8 653 11.0 682 11.2 585 8.4
Nariva - - - - 117 1.9 136 2.0
Mayaro 107 2.0 233 3.9 230 3.8 258 3.7
Caroni 439 8.2 356 6.0 417 6.8 276 4.0
Victoria 300 5.6 432 7.3 386 6.3 332 4.8
St Patrick 320 6.0 441 7.4 554 9.1 1020 14.7
Total in Trinidad 3307 5324* 99.0 5943 99.9 6094 99.9 6922 99.9
Ward of Tobago 16942 17241 18865 20941 23035
Stragglers - - - - 12
Waters of Colony — 10 13 16 7
TOTAL 20249 22575 24821 27051 29976
Total in Tobago as
% of Tobago-born 83.7 76.4 76.0 77.4 76.8
NOTE: * The 1901 total of 5334 probably includes those in the waters of the colony.
Source: Trinidad and Tobago Census, 1931 , p. 24.
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VI.2.4 Literacy. Religious Affiliations and Coniuaal Condition
TABLE 71
Literates as Proportion of Population over Five Years Old 
by District: 1871
Can Read and Write' PoD'n Literates as
District Can Cannot > 5 % Poo'n > 5
Windward 930 2201 2653 35
Middle 2404 3510 4959 48.5
Leeward 2904 5105 6838 42.5
Total 6238 10816 14450 43.2
Source; Tobago Population Census, 1871.
The census data are sparse on important aspects of 
the social condition of the population. Only in 1861 and 1871 
were figures on literacy given in the 19th century. For 1861, 
the numbers of those who could read and those who could write 
were given, without any indication of whether there was 
overlap between the two groups. In 1871, the Middle District 
had the highest literacy rates, followed by the Leeward and 
Windward Districts, respectively (Table 71). By comparison 
with Jamaica, where the gross literacy rate computed on the 
same basis was 16.3% in 1871, the rudiments of education seem 
to have reached a wide proportion of the population.^
However, given the low enrolment of girls, and the 
attendance rate that was below enrolment, particularly on 
Mondays (washing day) and Fridays, when produce had to be
Roberts [1957:78] shows that the gross literacy rate in 
Jamaica was 32% in 1891 and 47.2% in 1911.
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prepared for market, Table 72 leaves us less sanguine.
The religious affiliations of the population were given 
for the years 1871 to 1901, as shown in Tables 73 and 74. 
Tobago was nominally Protestant, although African-derived 
religious beliefs and practices were maintained by some who 
attended the Churches. The decline of the Church of Scotland 
reflects the decline of the Scots, and the absence of a 
Presbyterian ministry after 1841.^ The increase of Roman 
Catholics, mainly from Trinidad, indicates the thrust which 
that denomination began in the 1880s, which was intensified 
after the annexation of 1889. The Church of England, to which 
half of the population claimed affiliation, had congregations 
in all the Districts, whereas the Moravians were concentrated 
in the Leeward and Middle Districts, and the Methodists in the 
Middle and Windward Districts.
WMS: Box 140, File 1841, Ranyell to General Secs., 9 June 
1841.
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TABLE 72
Children Enrolled in Schools: 1850-1900
Church Male
1850
Female Total Male
1860
Female Total Male
1870
Female Total
Anglican 379 324 703 384 153 537 317 197 514
Moravian 261 266 527 407 292 699 513 372* 885
Methodist 264 160 424 217 214 431 298 220 518
Total 904 750 1654 1008 659 1667 1128 789 1917
School Age
Pop'n (5-15) 1644 1536 3180 1839 1729 3568 1991 1893 3884
% School Age
Pop'n 55.0 48.8 52.0 54.8 38.1 46.7 56.6 41.7 49.3
Male
1880
Female Total Male
1890
Female Total Male
1901
Female Total
School Age
Pop'n (5-15) 2218 2178
% School Age
Pop'n 53.4 48.0
4396
50.7
2344
56.2
2280
52.7
4624
54.5
2544
68.0
2466
66.2
5010
67.1
Average
Attendance
Anglican 553 438 991 444 386 830 683 635 1318
No.
723
%
54.8
Moravian 333 328 661 451 373 824 466 459 925 520 56.2
Methodist 299 279 578 407 419 826 429 413 842 420 49.9
Roman Catholic - - - 16 23 39 152 126 278 163 58.6
Total 1185 1045 2230 1318 1201 2519 1730 1633 3363 1826 54.3
36.4
NOTE: * Includes 42 girls in sewing school.
Sources: C0290 series: Blue Bks. for 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880; C0300/101, /111 for 1890, 1901, 
respectively; Population Censuses for 1851-1901.
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TABLE 73
Religious Affiliations of the Tobago Population by District: 1871-1901 (Numbers)
District
Church of 
England
Church of 
Scotland Moravians Wesleyans
1871
Roman
Catholics
Other
Christ.
Non- 
Christ .
Not
Given Total
Windward
Middle
Leeward
Total
1895
3453
3768
9116
10
15
12
37
16
281
3369
3666
942
1965
360
3267
6
27
3
36
261
163
496
920
3131
5914
8009
17054
1881
Windward
Middle
Leeward
Total
2527
2520
3818
8865
2
8
1
11
27
975
3610
4612
1416
2297
303
4016
1
10
2
13
_ *
7
20
27
55
255
197
507
4028
6072
7951
18051
1891
Windward
Middle
Leeward
Total
2696
2553
3423
8672
1
13
5
19
43
1189
3884
5116
1610
2268
298
4176
38
113
25
176
31
22
129
182
4409
6161
7783
18353
1901
Tobago 9238 4688 3744 794 65** 207 18751
NOTES ; * For 1881, 'Other Forms of Worship' were put under the heading 'Other Christians'; the 
persons so enumerated could have included non-Christians, for whom no figures are given. 
** 55 were 'Baptists'.
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses for given years.
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TABLE 74
Religious Affiliations of the Tobago Population by District: 1871-1901 (Percentages)
Districts
Church of 
England
Church of 
Scotland Moravians Wesleyans
1871
Roman
Catholics
Other
Christ.
Non- 
Christ .
Not
Given
Windward
Middle
Leeward
Total
20.5
37.8
41.3
53.4
27.0
40.5
32.4
.2
.4
7.6
91.8
21.5
28.8
60.1
11.0
19.2
16.6
75.0
8.3
.2
66.6 
33.3 
.2
11.1
88.8
.05
28.4
17.7
53.9
5.4
1881
Windward
Middle
Leeward
Total
28.5
28.4
43.1
49.1
18.1
72.7
9.1
.06
.6
21.1
78.3
25.5
35.3
57.2 
9.0
22.2
7.7
76.9
15.4
.07
25.9
74.1
.15
10.8
50.3
38.8
2.8
1891
Windward
Middle
Leeward
Total
31.1
29.4
39.5
47.2
5.3
68.4
26.3
.1
.8
23.2
75.9
27.9
38.5
54.3
7.1
22.7
21.6
64.2
14.2 
.96
33.3
50.0
16.6
.03
33.3
66.6
.03
17.0
12.1 
70.8
.99
Tobago 49.2 .03 25.2
1901
20.0 4.2 .3 .04 1.1
NOTES ; 1. See notes to Table 73.
2. Percentages for the districts give the proportion of the persons in the 
denomination who belong to the district. Percentages in the total rows 
give the proportion of persons in the island who belong to the denomination
Sources; Tobago Population Censuses of given years.
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We look now at the conjugal condition of the population 
(Table 75) . While the married persons more than doubled 
numerically and almost doubled proportionately between 1861 
and 1871, there was a numerical decline thereafter; the adult 
population also decreased in the latter decade, again 
reflecting the effects of emigration.
Tobago, with 37.9% of its adult population married in 
1901, was second only to Grenada (39.82%), among the
neighbouring islands.^ The proportion of married persons for 
1911, 1921 and 1931, was 39.7%, 40.4%, and 37.2%,
respectively. Clarke [1957] shows the high incidence of 
marriage in peasant communities in Jamaica. Further research 
should examine whether the apparent increase in marriages was
related to the growth of a peasantry in Tobago.
16 Trinidad and Tobago Census, 1901, pp. 8-9.
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TABLE 75
Conjugal Condition of Tobago Population. 1861-1901. 
and Comparison with United Colony. 1891. 1901
TOBAGO
1861 1871
Harried Adult % Adult Married Adult % Adult
Pop'n Pop'n Pop'n Pop'n
Windward 558 1705 32.7 547 2009 27.2
Middle 755 4115 18.3 1489 3587 41.5
Leeward 668 3987 16.7 2130 4970 42.8
Total 1981 9807 20.2 4166 10566 39.4
TOBAGO UNITED COLONY*
1891 1901 1891 1901
Numbers % Adult Numbers % Adult Numbers % Adult Numbers % Adult
Pop'n Pop'n Pop'n Pop'n
Married 3981 35.8 4156 37.9 28850 29.75 37129 30.6
Unmarried 6213 55.9 5937 54.1 60751 62.7 75192 61.9
Widowed 919 8.3 881 8.0 7464 7.6 9174 7.5
Total Adult Pop'n 11113 10974 96965 121495
NOTE; * Excludes East Indians.
Sources: Calculated from Tobago Population Censuses, 1861, 1871; Trinidad and Tobago Census, 
1901, p. 9.
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VI.3 OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF TOBAGO: 1844-1901 
VI.3.1 The 1844 Census
In 1844, the census treated persons 18 years old and 
above as significant for the analysis of occupations, and 
divided them into three categories. The first combined 
'planters, agricultural labourers and cultivators of land for 
a livelihood'; the second was those 'deriving a living from 
trade or other business, profession or employment', and the 
third was those 'having no employment' (Table 76) . Agriculture 
occupied 4852 persons, 59% of those 18 years old or over and 
69.5% of the employed; trade, business and professions 
occupied 26% and 30.4%, respectively. The unemployed were 
enumerated as 1201 persons, or 14.7% of those over 18, but 
these included the aged and infirm; women were 86% (1033) of 
this group, since domestic duties were not distinguished.
In spite of the withdrawal of women from estate labour, 
women were the majority among those in agriculture (52%). 
Since there were no female professionals in 1844, 923 women 
(43% of the total) were in trade, business, services and 
craft, with women outnumbering men in these activities in 
Scarborough (by 23%) and Plymouth (by 7%). Opportunities for 
trade, business and craft for both sexes were most limited in 
the windward parishes (St John, St Paul, St Mary), but in all 
of them men greatly outnumbered women, as was also the case in 
the leeward parish of St Patrick.
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TABLE 76
Occupational Categories by Gender. Parish and Town, 
for Population 18 Years Old and Over: 1844
Parish/ Planters, Agricultural
Town Labourers & Cultivators
of Land for a Livelihood
Living by Trade, 
Other Business, 
Profession or 
Employment
'No Employment'
M F Total % M F Total % M F Total %
St John 205 229 434 71.6 68 24 92 15.2 11 69 80 13.2
St Paul 212 213 425 70.5 64 43 107 17.7 14 57 71 11.8
St Mary 168 208 376 78.8 40 21 61 12.8 6 34 40 8.4
St George 342 392 734 70.8 123 67 190 18.3 16 96 112 10.8
St Andrew 343 433 776 54.2 254 205 459 32.1 44 153 197 13.8
Scarboro' 49 78 127 15.3 264 325 589 71.0 9 104 113 13.6
St David 629 511 1140 61.6 194 109 303 16.4 45 362 407 22.0
St Patrick 363 417 780 69.8 125 54 179 16.0 19 140 159 14.2
Plymouth 24 36 60 26.4 70 75 145 63.8 4 18 22 9.7
Total 2335 2517 4852 59.3 1202 923 2125 26.0 168 1033 1201 14.7
NOTE; The three categories comprise the total no. of persons 18 years old or over in each locality 
and the percentages are based thereon.
Source: Tobago Census, 1844.
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VI.3.2 Limitations of the Data; Method of Classification
From 1851, occupational titles were given. These are
imprecise and say nothing about the relations of production in
which the persons are involved. Some occupations were also
under-enumerated. For example, metayers were mentioned only
in 1891, and the compiler observed that probably in every
instance, metayage was a secondary occupation.*^ Perhaps the
absence of metayers from earlier censuses reflected this
occupational multiplicity, but there may have been persons
whose primary occupation was metayage. Again, probably
because of occupational multiplicity, 'peasant proprietors'
are first mentioned in 1891. Thus, important areas of income
earning and opportunity are hidden by the occupational data.
Enumerations by gender were also rare before 1891.
Roberts states:
... in analysing occupational data we 
enter a domain in which census material 
proves often treacherous and unrewarding.
Changing concepts of the working population, 
changing definitions of its major classes 
and the persistent attempts to fit the 
essentially simple occupational pattern 
of the island into elaborate classifica­
tions, more suitable to countries on the 
road to full industrialization, impose 
severe limitations on the available data.
[Roberts 1957:85]
As for Jamaica, so for Tobago. In keeping with the simple 
occupational pattern of Tobago, the occupations were 
classified into three categories, based on the author's 
understanding of the social relations at the time. The job 
titles were understood in their social context; where the
H. H. Sealy, Dep. Registrar Gen. to Hay, 31 Aug. 1891, 
submitting the abstracts from the census returns.
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titles were vague or difficult to interpret, they were placed 
in the 'Other' category.
In Class I, two main strata were identified: planters, 
managers and merchants, on the one hand; senior officials, 
professionals, pharmacists, surveyors and clergymen, on the 
other. The few hotel keepers who were listed in a few censuses 
were also placed in Class I.
Class II was deemed to be composed of four main strata. 
Teachers, petty officials, such as constables^* and clerks, 
and merchants' clerks, bookkeepers and shopmen were considered 
one stratum. Printers were also included here, because it was 
a trade to which greater prestige was given than to the other 
manual trades, since it required some formal education. 
Teachers and petty officials were poorly paid, frequently in 
arrears; some were smallholders; a few were obliged to depend 
on a trade of some kind. These occupations, which required 
some education, therefore allowed a kind of genteel poverty. 
Overseers and those in lower supervisory positions were 
considered to be the second stratum within Class II. 
Shopkeepers and hucksters were considered the third stratum; 
many of these were regarded as 'respectable', some of the most 
successful shopkeepers becoming renters of coconut walks and 
owners of substantial tracts of land (Ch. 4) . The fourth 
stratum is peasant proprietors. No definition of the term is 
given in the two censuses which use it (1891 and 1901), but it
*^ Constables, usually black, were not usually accorded the 
prestige given to clerks, bookkeepers etc, many of whom 
were coloured; but their numbers were too small to make 
a big difference to the analysis, and their occupation 
suggests that they belong in Class II.
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is presumed that this was the main occupation of the 
respondents, and that they enjoyed a more comfortable standard 
of living than that of wage labourers. Photographers, who 
were few, and mentioned only in 1871, were also placed in 
Class II, since their work required equipment and skill, and 
since most of their clientele were from the upper strata.^
In Class III were placed, first, the skilled 
tradespersons, including butchers. Dressmaking is separately 
listed in our tables because, besides baking and making of 
confectionery, it was the main skilled trade in which women 
participated. Since only two censuses gave classifications by 
gender, seamstresses were specially identified throughout, so 
that female occupational mobility could be more clearly 
understood. There was a wide range of skills among 
tradespeople, especially in trades where there were hundreds; 
and the demand for their services fluctuated with the economic 
cycles. However, they earned more than field labourers and 
were among the first freeholders after 1838. Some of the 
'bespoke' tailors, seamstresses, blacksmiths, carpenters etc 
were coloured men and women, whose social status was far 
higher than that of labourers.
A few of the skilled tradesmen accumulated enough to 
become planters. Two of the most successful were James 
Hackett and Luke Toby. An illiterate black carpenter, Hackett 
became a cart owner and porter, and then owned a bakery and 
spirit shop. As early as 1854, he qualified to vote in both
One of the 2 photographers was Jason Boxill Thomas 
(1851-1905), a coloured. Conversation with Mrs Dolores 
Thompson, a relative, 1 & 9 Apr. 1993.
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St Andrew and St George. He first leased Calder Hall estate, 
then Whim in the 1850s, and Belmont. By 1862, he owned both 
Les Coteaux, one of the largest estates, and Belmont, as well 
as a house and land at Morne Quiton, a suburb of Scarborough. 
He educated his children in the UK and in Barbados at the best 
schools, and his youngest son, Henry Hackett, was an 
engineer.^® Toby, a black butcher, owned Hampden, a small 
leeward estate, by 1897.^
Mariners, boatmen and fishermen were placed together in 
Class III. Many of the mariners on census day worked on ships 
which happened to be in the harbours, and some may have been 
commanding officers. 'Fishermen and boatmen' included many who 
assisted the captains of boats, sloops, droghers etc. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of more information, mariners, 
fishermen and boatmen are treated as a stratum near the top of 
Class III. These are assumed to have been jobs that could have 
brought upward mobility, since the opportunity for earning 
from fishing would have placed them above the standard of 
living of agricultural labourers. Unless specified, when we 
mention fishermen, mariners are excluded, since many mariners 
were foreigners.
Many in fishing and skilled trades earned more than those 
in teaching and clerical work. We therefore have to assume 
that the line between Classes II and III is not rigid, in
20 C0285/68: Colebrooke to Newcastle, 14 June 1854, Enc. 4, 
voters' list (Jan. 1854); Vote Book, 1862-1870. Hackett 
died in Oct. 1885, aged 81% years. The News, 17 Oct. 1885.
WI Roval Com. Rept. . 1897, p. 361.
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keeping with the fluidity and ambiguity of the reality 
itself.^
Agricultural labourers, general labourers, domestic 
servants, laundresses, porters and government messengers were 
placed in the lowest stratum of paid workers. Male domestic 
workers such as grooms and butlers earned more than field 
labourers, but in general these were the lowest-paid 
occupations. Midwives, who were often illiterate and trained 
by apprenticeship to older midwives,were placed in Class 
III, as were the nurses enumerated in 1871, since there was 
then no public hospital, and no training facilities. Unpaid 
domestic work was placed in Class III; since wives and 
daughters so employed were paid in kind, it is treated as 
another form of work for little pay. This category may have 
included women at all levels of the society, but most of the 
censuses with this category also enumerated those 'living on 
private means', which would have included wealthier women.
Among teachers, skilled tradesmen and printers, the first 
labour organizations in the English-speaking Caribbean 
were formed in the late 19th century [Hart 1982]. 
Quintero Rivera [1988] also shows that the earliest 
assertion of proletarian solidarity in Puerto Rico in the 
19th century was among artisans.
23 In 1884, under the 1882 Medical Ordinance, the DMOs 
examined the midwives and, if found qualified, each 
midwife was given a license to practise. There were 51 
midwives practising in 3 districts, and the no. in the 
fourth was not given. Some had been practising for 40 
years. Administrator's Despatches, 1882-85: Carrington 
to Browne, 20 Oct. 1884. In 1885, the 2 midwives who 
attended to Blacky Mamby who died in childbirth, Elizabeth 
Archer and Daphne Cudjoe, were illiterate (Ch. 5). 
Midwifery, usually accompanied by a knowledge of herbal 
medicine, was a skill which, from the days of slavery, had 
been transmitted as part of the oral, African-based 
tradition.
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This perception of the occupational titles is supported 
by the jurors' lists. In 1879, the qualifications for jurors 
were lowered. They were required to have a minimum income of 
£60, or freehold estate valued over £30; or to be managers of 
estates minimally valued at £100; or to be paying either a 
minimum yearly rent of £30 or annual customs duties of £50. 
The 1880 jurors' list had managers, merchants, professionals, 
teachers, merchants' clerks, overseers, shopkeepers, 
blacksmiths, mechanics and carpenters, although the skilled 
tradesmen were far outnumbered by those in what we call 
Classes I and 11.^ The jurors' lists show, therefore, that 
persons in Classes I and II, and some in the upper reaches of 
Class III, had incomes above the basic agricultural wage of 8d 
per day, equivalent to less than £10 per year. The discussion 
below (Section VI.3.5) on statutory road labour also gives 
credence to our classification. Merchants, planters, 
professionals, clergymen, teachers and clerks consistently 
refused to work on the roads, because it was demeaning to 
their station in life. Therefore, in terms of both income and 
occupational prestige, our classification will serve.
VI.3.3 Main Occupational Trends; 1851-1881
After 1838, there was a redistribution of the population, 
spatially and occupationally. By 1851, the basic contours of
C0289/3: Tobago Gazette, Feb. 1880; cf. the 1875 jurors' 
list in C0289/1: Tobago Gazette. 27 Mar. 1875; and for 
1891, which included tailors, butcher, carpenters, 
blacksmiths etc. C0289/6; Tobago Gazette. 30 Jan. 1891. 
From May 1886, all male residents who could read and write 
were eligible.
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the occupational structure were established, and persisted for 
decades. Between 1851-1881, Classes I and II together 
accounted for less than 4% of the working force, the remaining 
96% being in Class III (Table 77) . The data suggest that 
mobility into Class II occupations via education, shopkeeping, 
huckstering and landowning was relatively limited before 1891.
Because of internal migration, the concentration of 
population and economic activity in the Middle and Leeward 
Districts which had occurred during slavery was enhanced; 
thus, there were important differences in the occupational 
distributions according to districts^ (Table 78). In 1851, 
75% of the merchants, 92% of the clerks and 71% of the 
hucksters were in the Middle District, where Scarborough was 
located. Since many hucksters were itinerant, they may have 
served the Windward District, where there was only 1, though 
residing outside of it.
Of the occupations which could have been avenues of 
upward social mobility for the labouring class, only the 
skilled trades, in which men predominated, were 
proportionately represented in the Windward District. The 
schoolteachers were too few to be significant. Of the 
seamstresses, only 8% were in the Windward District. Thus, 
for the labouring population at Windward, where land owning by 
them was insignificant in 1851, skilled trades for men were 
the major avenue to social mobility. Even fishing was 
concentrated in the Leeward District.
Since it is uncertain that the district boundaries were 
the same before 1871 as after it, attempts at comparison 
before 1871 are cautious.
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TABLE 77
Persons in Occupations as Percentage of the Working Force; 1851-1901
1 8 5 1 1 8 6 1 1 8 7 1 1 8 8 1 1 8 9 1 1901
OCCUPATIONS No. % No. % No
CLASS I
Planters,
Merchants 123 1.45 97 1.1 79
Offic. etc. 38 .4 29 .3 32
Hoteliers 1 .01 - - -
Sub-Total 16 2 1 . 9 1 2 6 1 . 4 Ill
CLASS II
Teachers,
Clerical 102 1.2 128 1.5 126
Overseers - - - - 38
Shopkeepers,
Hucksters 62 .7 55 .6 51
Peasants 10 .1 - - -
Sub-Total 174 2 . 0 183 2 . 1 2 1 5
CLASS III 
Artisans 908 10.7 920 10.5 1178
Dressmakers 475 5.6 508 5.8 605
Fishermen etc 185 2.2 209 2.4 239
Agric. Lab. 5644 66.6 6130 70.0 5721
Gen. Lab. - - - - -
Dom. Servts. 799 9.4 487 5.5 868
Laundresses - - 182 2 . 1 175
Dom. Duties 1 12 1.3 - - -
Others 6 .07 13 . 2 72
Sub-Total 8 1 2 9 9 5 . 9 8 4 4 9 9 6 . 5 8 8 5 8
Others 4 .04 3 .03 6
TOTAL 8 4 6 9 9 9 . 8 8 7 6 1 1 0 0 . 0 3 9 1 9 0
.8
. 3
1.1
1 . 4
. 4
. 5
2 . 3
12.8
6.6
2.6
6 2 . 2
9 . 4
1 . 9
.8
9 6 . 4
. 0 6
9 9 . 9
N o .
1 0 5
47
15 2
1 3 9
43
18 2
1 1 9 5
5 5 5
2 1 9
6 5 9 8
1 0 9 9
1 9 4
16
9 8 7 6
10210
% N o . % N o . %
1 . 0 1 3 5 1 . 3 59 . 6
. 5 39 . 4 4 1 . 4
- 3 . 0 3 2 .02
1 . 5 177 1 . 7 1 0 2 1.02
1 . 4 1 5 3 1 . 5 2 1 4 2 . 1
- - - 3 1 . 3
. 4 1 6 9 1 . 7 2 2 4 2 . 2
- 29 . 3 1 8 7 1 . 9
1 . 8 3 5 1 3 . 4 6 5 6 6 . 5
1 1 . 7 1 0 7 0 1 0 . 5 1 0 3 3 1 0 . 4
5 . 4 6 4 0 6 . 3 6 8 6 6 . 9
2 . 1 3 1 4 3 . 1 2 5 2 2 . 5
6 4 . 6 4 4 3 6 4 3 . 5 4 0 8 2 4 1 . 1
- 7 5 6 7 . 4 1 1 3 0 1 1 . 4
1 0 . 8 7 5 4 7 . 4 7 2 9 7 . 3
1 . 9 1 9 5 1 . 9 2 6 6 2 . 7
- 9 1 8 9 . 0 7 7 8 7 . 8
. 2 5 0 4 4 . 9 11 . 1
9 6 . 7 9 5 8 7 9 4 . 0 8 9 6 7 9 0 . 2
79 . 8 2 0 9 2 . 1
1 0 0 . 0 1 0 1 9 4 1 0 0 . 0 9 9 3 4 9 9 . 8
Sources ; Tobago Censuses, 1851-91; Trinidad and Tobago Census, 1901.
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DISTRICTS
TABLE 78
Selected Occupations by District; 1851
Planters Merchants
O C C U P A T I O N S  
Schoolteachers Clerks Hucksters
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Windward 25 24 — — 4 16 1 2 10 30 1 4
Middle 34 33 15 75 11 44 48 92 14 42 20 71
Leeward 44 43 5 25 10 40 3 6 9 27 7 25
Total 103 100 20 100 25 100 52 100 33 99 28 100
Mise Seam­ Domestic
Trades stresses Fishermen Mariners Labourers Serv ' ts. T o t a 1
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %*
Windward 150 16 37 8 13 11 2 3 1328 23.5 70 9 1641 19.4
Middle 397 44 278 58.5 22 19 50 72 1992 35 468 58.5 3349 39.5
Leeward 360 40 160 33 81 70 17 25 2324 41 261 33 3281 38.7
Total 907 100 475 99.5 116 100 69 100 5644 99.5 799 100.5 8271 97.6
NOTE; * Percentage of the working force. 
Source: Tobago Population Census, 1851.
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DISTRICTS
TABLE 79
Selected Occupations by District: 1881
Planters* Merchants
School-
teachers
O C C U P A T I O N S
Shop-
Clerks Hucksters
Misc.
Trades
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Windward 22 23 _ _ 11 30.5 7 12 3 8 — _ 234 20
Middle 28 30 11 100 14 39 45 79 22 58 5 100 458 38
Leeward 44 47 11 30.5 5 9 13 34 503 42
Total 94 100 11 100 36 100 57 100 38 100 5 100 1195 100
Seams Aaric Domestic Laund
tresses Fishermen Mariners Labourers Servants resses T O T A L
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %**
Windward 85 15 27 27 5 4 1736 26 168 15 21 11 2319 22.7
Middle 254 46 10 10 64 71 1806 27 542 49 126 65 3405 33.3
Leeward 216 39 64 63 29 25 3056 46 389 35 42 24 4377 42.9
Total 555 100 101 100 118 100 6598 100 1099 99 194 100 10101 98.9
NOTES ; 1. * Managers and overseers are not distinguished in the census 
2. ** Percentage of the working force.
Sources; Tobago Population Census, 1881.
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Between 1851 and 1881, there was little change in this 
pattern. Merchants, clerks, shopkeepers and hucksters 
remained concentrated in the Middle District. The Leeward 
District continued to have the majority of fishermen, although 
they increased in the Windward District after 1871 (Table 79) .
Since skilled trades, including dressmaking, and fishing 
constituted the highest-paid jobs in Class III, Table 80 
examines the percentages of these occupations in each district 
from 1851 to 1891. It shows a relatively stable pattern, with 
improvement in the positions of the Middle and Leeward 
Districts by 1871, and decline thereafter.
TABLE 80
Persons in Skilled Trades and Fishing as Percentage of 
Working Force in Each District: 1851-1891
1851 1861 1871 1881 1891
Windward 12.1 15 15 15 17
Middle 20 20 24 21 22
Leeward 18 15 20 18 18
Sources; Population Censuses, 1851-1891.
VI.3.4 The 1891 Census
In 1891, the categories for classifying the data were 
given by the Registrar General of Trinidad, and modified to 
suit Tobago conditions. It is thus not always easy to make 
comparisons with certain categories at previous censuses. Two 
groups, hucksters and shopkeepers, fishermen and boatmen, who 
were formerly disaggregated, were combined in 1891. However, 
for the first time, we are given the gender of the persons in
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each occupation.
Metayers were enumerated for the only time between 1844- 
1901. The total was 798; but the occupational tables gave only 
the number for the Leeward District and part of the Middle 
District (503).
The working force numbered 10194^, 16 less than in 1881 
(Table 77). Class II increased dramatically from 182 persons 
in 1881 to 351, or by 93%. In part, this probably resulted 
from re-classification of some of the people in skilled 
trades. Skilled men were placed in a general category called 
'mechanics and handicraftsmen'^, which probably did not 
exhaust all the trades, since some of the bakers, for example, 
must have been females. The classification of bakers, who may 
have had itinerant or small sales outlets, as hucksters and 
shopkeepers, is therefore a strong possibility, especially 
since this group leaped from 43 in 1881 to 169, an increase of 
193%, and since 85% of them were females. (Huckstering was 
female-dominated since slavery.) It is also possible that 
hucksters were under-enumerated in 1881, when there were only 
5; and that in the crisis, waged employment being scarce, many 
resorted to itinerant vending. In Class II, the teachers also 
increased, from 36 to 55 persons, or by 53%; and 20 (36%) were 
women.
In Class III, there was, in keeping with the collapse of
The census occupational table gives 10197, which is 
inaccurate.
^ The previous censuses listed the numbers in each
trade or craft, without aggregating them. In 1891, this 
was not done.
378
the sugar economy, a dramatic decline in both agricultural 
workers and domestic servants. In 1881, they numbered 6598 and 
1099, respectively, or 75.4% of the working force; in 1891, 
they were 4436 and 754, or 51% of the working force. The 1891 
census gives a new category, 'general labourers, porters 
etc',^* numbering 756. For the first time since 1851, 'wives 
and daughters in domestic duties' were enumerated, and these 
were 918 or 9% of the working force. The lowest-paid workers 
combined - agricultural labourers, domestic servants and 
laundresses - constituted 77.3% of the working force in 1881; 
for 1891, when general labourers are added, they constituted 
60.2%; women in unpaid domestic employment increase these 
lowest categories of workers to 69.2% of the working force.
The number of persons in skilled trades declined from 
1195 to 1070; but this may be partially due to changes in the 
categories used. Similarly, the trend among fishermen is 
uncertain; but there was a marked increase in fishermen, 
mariners and boatmen combined, from 219 in 1881 to 314 in 
1891. The Windward District had 27% of them; it accounted for 
79 of 218 boatmen and fishermen (36%) , which suggests that 
fishing and seafaring became more important as estate 
agriculture declined.
When the occupations were classified by gender (Table 
81), only 6 women were in Class I. They slightly outranked 
men in Class II (52%) and constituted 58% of Class III. (Women 
constituted 56% of the working force.)
Porters in the 19th century censuses never exceeded 10; 
therefore most would have been 'general labourers'.
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TABLE 81
Occupations by Gender: 1891
Occupations
CLASS I
Proprietors, 
Managers, 
Merchants etc. 
'Public Officers
Males Females % Total
132 98 135
Middle District. 
Source: Tobago Census, 1891.
Vtorkinq
Force
1.3
& Professionals 
Hotelkeepers
39 100
3 100
39
3
.4
.03
Sub-Total 171 97 6 3 177 1.7
CLASS II
Schoolteachers, 
Clerks, & Petty 
Officials 118 77 35 23 153 1.5
Shopkeepers,
Hucksters 25 15 144 85 169 1.7
Peasant
Proprietors 27 93 2 7 29 .3
Sub-Total 170 48 181 52 351 3.4
CLASS III 
Skilled Trades 1070 100 1070 10.5
Seamstresses - - 640 100 640 6.3
Mariners 96 100 - - 96 .9
Fishermen/
Boatmen 218 100 218 2.1
Agric. Labourers 1843 41.5 2593 58.4 4436 43.5
Metayers* 346 69 157 31 503 4.9
Gen. Labourers 343 45.4 413 54.5 756 7.4
Domestic Servts . 165 22 589 78 754 7.4
Laundresses - - 195 100 195 1.9
Wives/Daughters 
(Dom. Duties) - - 918 100 918 9.0
Sub-Total 4081 42 5505 58 9586 93.9
Others 17 21 63 79 80 .8
TOTAL 4439 43.3 5755 56.1 10194 99.8
NOTE: * Only for the Leeward District and part of the
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In the 'Gender by Occupation' classification (Table 82) , 
agricultural and general labour, and paid domestic work 
occupied 62.4% of females, with laundresses bringing the 
figure to 66%; unpaid domestic duties added a further 11%. 
Therefore, the lowest categories of paid labour and unpaid 
domestic work accounted for 77% of all female workers, while 
53% of the men were in the first three of these categories. 
In the skilled trades, 24% of the men were employed, but only 
11% of the women were seamstresses, the most popular skill for 
women. Ninety-two per cent of the men and ninety-six per cent 
of the women were in Class III occupations, but roughly a half 
of the men were in the lowest-paid jobs, while two-thirds of 
the women were so located, with another 11% unpaid.
The number of agricultural labourers fell sharply, the 
decline being most dramatic (44%) in the Leeward District, the 
heartland of the sugar economy (Table 83).
TABLE 83
Agricultural Labourers by District: 1881. 1891
1881 1891 Decline
District No. % No. % No. %
Windward 1936 26.3 1430 32 306 17.6
Middle 1806 27.4 1294 29 512 28.3
Leeward 3056 46.3 1712 39 1344 44.0
Total 6598 100 4436 100 2162 32.7
Sources ; Tobago Population Censuses, 1881, 1891.
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TABLE 82
Gender bv Occupations: 1891
% %
Occupations Males Males Females Females Total
CLASS I
Proprietors,
Managers,
Merchants etc 132 3.0 3 .05 135
'Public Officers '
& Professionals 39 .8 - - 39
Hotelkeepers 3 .05 3
Sub-Total 171 3.8 6 .1 177
CLASS II
Schoolteachers,
Clerks & Petty
Officials 118 2.6 35 .6 153
Shopkeepers &
Hucksters 25 .6 144 2.5 169
Peasant
Proprietors 27 .6 2 .03 29
Sub-Total 170 3.8 181 3.1 351
CLASS III
Skilled Trades 1070 24.0 — — 1070
Seamstresses - - 640 11.1 640
Mariners 96 2.2 - - 96
Fishermen/
Boatmen 218 5.0 - - 218
Agric. Labourers 1843 41.5 2593 45.0 4436
Metayers* 346 7.8 157 2.7 503
Gen. Labourers 343 7.7 413 7.2 756
Dom. Servts. 165 3.7 589 10.2 754
Laundresses - - 195 3.4 195
Wives/Daughters
(Dom. Duties) 918 16.0 918
Sub-Total 4081 92.0 5505 95.6 9586
Others 17 .4 63 1.1 80
TOTAL 4439 100 5755 99.9 10194
NOTE: * Only for the Leeward District and part of the 
Middle District.
Source: Tobago Census, 1891.
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Women predominated in the agricultural workforce, 
particularly in the Leeward District (Table 84).
TABLE 84
Agricultural Labourers by District and Sex: 1891
District Male Female Total Male Female
(No.) (No.) (No.) (%) (%)
Windward 648 782 1430 45.3 54.7
Middle 539 755 1294 41.6 58.3
Leeward 656 1056 1712 38.3 61.6
Total 1843 2493 4436 41.5 56.2
Source; Tobago Census, 1891.
Of the new category, 'general labourers', 60% were in the 
Leeward District. If we add agricultural to general labourers 
for 1891, the level of employment in these two categories was 
still below the number of agricultural labourers in 1881, the 
decline again being most apparent in the Leeward District 
(Table 85).
TABLE 85
Agricultural and General Labourers. 1891. compared 
with Agricultural Labourers. 1881. by District
1881 1891 1881-1891
District
Aaric. 
Labourers
Aaric. & General 
Labourers Decline
No. No. % No. %
Windward 1736 1525 29.4 211 12.1
Middle 1806 1502 29.0 304 16.8
Leeward 3056 2165 41.6 891 29.1
Total 6598 5192 100 1406 21.3
Sources : Tobago Censuses , 1881, 1891.
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Among the 'general labourers', females exceeded males by 
over 2:1 in the Windward District, and were 56% of the 
category in the Leeward; but in the Middle District, males 
accounted for 56% (Table 86).
TABLE 86
General Labourers by District and Sex: 1891
Male Female
District No. % No. % Total
Windward 29 30.5 66 69.5 95
Middle 116 55.7 92 44.2 208
Leeward 198 43.7 255 56.3 453
Total 343 45.4 413 54.6 756
Source: Tobago Census, 1891.
Thus, the collapse of the sugar industry began to alter 
the occupational structure. Class II increased, mainly 
through what was classified as shopkeeping and huckstering, 
which today would be called the 'informal sector'. In Class 
III, there was a re-distribution from agricultural and 
domestic labour into new lowly-paid or unpaid categories, 
especially 'general labourers' and domestic duties; and there 
was increased seafaring in the Windward District.
VI.3.5 The 1901 Census
The enumerators used the following occupational 
classification: 'Official', 'Professional', 'Commercial',
'Agricultural' and 'General and Indefinite'. Since this 
obscures the gradations of rank and income which were integral 
to the occupational structure, our simple classification was
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kept. As in 1891, the gender classification is also given, 
but there was no distribution by district.
The working force was 9934,^ a decline of 2.5% from that 
of 1891. Class II grew dramatically, from 351 to 656, an 
increase of 305 or 87%; it accounted for 6.6% of the working 
force, by contrast with 3.5% in 1891. The steep increase is 
owed, firstly, to peasant proprietors, now 187 as opposed to 
29 in 1891, a growth of 545%. Secondly, shopkeepers 
(hucksters were not mentioned in 1901) increased from 169 to 
224, the majority (164 or 73%) again being women; and 
teachers, merchants' clerks and minor officials moved from 153 
to 214 (by 40%), with the teachers showing the largest 
increase - from 55 to 101, or 84% growth. One-third of the 
teachers (33) were women, as well as 25 (27%) of the clerks.
In Class III were 90% of the working force, a decrease of 
4%. This was due partly to the increase in Class II, and also 
to 209 in the 'Other' category, 31 being 'proprietors not 
defined' and 157 'living on private means'.
In 1901, the skilled trades were fully enumerated; and 
for the first time we can see the importance of female 
participation among bakers and confectioners, 60 of the 66 
(91%) being women. Agricultural labourers continued to 
decline, from 4436 (43%) in 1891 to 4082 (41%) in 1901.
General labourers grew from 756 to 113 0, an increase of 49.5%, 
and the proportion of women in this category grew also, from
The census occupational tables give a total of 9946 as the 
working force, when the accurate total is 9934. When the 
children in and out of school are added, the census 
accounts for 18,409 persons; the total population was 
18,751.
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55% to 60%, while the women in domestic duties fell from 918 
to 778. The lowest-paid stratum of workers - agricultural 
labourers, general labourers, domestic servants, laundresses 
and women in domestic duties - were 7059 or 69% of the 
workforce in 1891; in 1901, they were 6985 or 70%. There was 
no change in the better-paid ranks of Class III. Skilled 
trades, dressmaking and fishing had 1923 or 19% of the working 
force, roughly the same as in 1891 (Table 77).
When the occupations were classified by gender (Table 
87), there was an increase, by 40%, of women in Class II, from 
181 to 254; but male penetration of Class II advanced more 
rapidly than that of females - 170 men in 1891, 402 in 1901, 
an increase of 136%. Men were 61% of the persons in Class II, 
but in Class III, the proportions were reversed, with women 
constituting 61%. For Class III, this was because of the 
disproportionate sex ratios owing to emigration: men were only 
40.5% of the working force. But the over-representation of 
men in Class II indicates that opportunities for social 
mobility via landowning, teaching and lower supervisory 
positions were greater for males than for females, whose major 
expansion in Class II was in shopkeeping.
Among the lowest-paid categories of workers 
agricultural labourers, general labourers, domestic servants 
and laundresses - males numbered 2257 (36%) and females 3950 
(64%); 55.5% of all men were in these jobs, but 67.3% of the 
women (Table 88). When unpaid domestic duties were added to 
the figure for females, the proportion of women in the least 
lucrative occupations was 79% (77% in 1891) .
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TABLE 87
Occupations by Gender: 1901
Occupations
CLASS I
Proprietors, 
Managers, 
Merchants 
'Public Officers'
Males Females Total
56 95.0 5.0 59
Source: Trinidad and Tobago Census, 1901.
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Working
Force
.6
& Professionals 
Hotelkeepers
40 97.5 1
2
2.4
100.0
41
2
.4
.02
Sub-Total 96 94.1 6 5.9 102 1.03
CLASS II
Schoolteachers, 
Clerks & Petty 
Officials 156 72.9 58 27.1 214 2.2
Shopkeepers 60 26.8 164 73.2 224 2.2
Peasant
Proprietors 155 82.8 32 17.1 187 1.9
Sub-managers, 
Overseers etc 31 100.0 - - 31 .3
Sub-Total 402 61.3 254 38.7 656 6.6
CLASS III 
Skilled Trades 973 94.2 60 5.8 1033 10.4
Seamstresses - - 686 100.0 686 6.9
Mariners 48 100.0 - - 48 .5
Fishermen & 
Boatmen 204 100.0 204 2.05
Agric. Labourers 1662 40.7 2420 59.3 4082 41.1
Gen. Labourers 453 40.0 677 60.0 1130 11.4
Domestic Servts. 142 19.5 587 80.5 729 7.3
Laundresses - - 266 100.0 266 2.7
Women in 
Domestic Duties - - 778 100.0 778 7.8
Sub-Total 3482 38.9 5474 61.1 8956 90.1
Others
Others
(specified) 84 40.6 123 59.4 207 2.1
Others
(unspecified) 5 38.5 8 61.5 13 .1
Sub-Total 89 40.5 131 59.5 220 2.2
TOTAL 4069 41.0 5865 59.0 9934 99.9
TABLE 88
Gender bv Occupations: 1901
% %
Occupations Males Males Females Females Total
CLASS I
Proprietors,
Managers,
Merchants 56 1.4 3 .05 59
'Public Officers'
& Professionals 40 1.0 1 .02 41
Hotelkeepers 2 .03 2
Sub-Total 96 2.4 6 .10 102
CLASS II
Schoolteachers,
Clerks, & Petty
Officials 156 3.8 58 1.0 214
Shopkeepers 60 1.5 164 2.8 224
Peasant
Proprietors 155 3.8 32 .5 187
Sub-managers,
Overseers etc 31 .8 31
Sub-Total 402 9.9 254 4.3 656
CLASS III
Skilled Trades 973 23.9 60 1.0 1033
Seamstresses - - 686 11.7 686
Mariners 48 1.2 - - 48
Fishermen,
Boatmen 204 5.0 - - 204
Agric. Labourers 1662 40.8 2420 41.3 4082
Gen. Labourers 453 11.1 677 11.5 1130
Domestic Servts. 142 3.5 587 10.0 729
Laundresses - - 266 4.5 266
Women in
Domestic Duties 778 13.3 778
Sub-Total 3482 85.6 5474 93.3 8956
Others
Others
(specified) 84 2.1 123 2.1 207
Others
(unspecified) 5 .1 8 .1 13
Sub-Total 89 2.2 131 2.2 220
TOTAL 4069 100.0 5865 99.9 9934
Source; Trinidad and Tobago Census, 1901
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In the skilled trades and fishing, 29% of the men were 
employed, but only 13% of the women were dressmakers and 
bakers, the two trades in which women are recorded.
Thus, women remained the backbone of the working force, 
constituting 60% of those in general labour, 59% of those in 
agricultural labour and over 80% of the domestic servants. 
Almost 80% of all women were either lowly paid or unpaid.
Female participation rates also exceeded those for men in 
1891 and 1901. In 1891, 71.5% of males, and 78.5% of females, 
over 10 years old, were in the working force; the comparable 
figures in 1901, were 67.5% and 79.5%, respectively.
One final area in which women participated, was in road 
repairs. The Road Act (Amendment) of 1849 obliged all males 
aged 16-50 to labour on the roads or to provide a substitute, 
and to be paid 6d per day; the penalty was 4s for each day 
defaulted. Planters, merchants, professionals, senior 
officials, clergymen, teachers and clerks consistently refused 
to perform such labour; they often paid women to do so. Many 
labouring men sent their wives to the roads. There were 
changes to the Act over time, but statutory labour and 
penalties continued. By 1885, the workforce on the roads was 
mostly women, who were accused of 'bickerings and brawlings 
and q u a r r e l l i n g s ' . ^  The system was abolished in 1887.^^
Chapter 4 showed that women were usually among the 
smallest freeholders. The 1901 census indicates that land
30 The News. 31 Jan. 1885, Leader, p. 3.
C0321/103; Sendall to Holland, 25 Mar. 1887, enc. 
Llewellyn's minute, 17 Feb. 1887.
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owning was the least favourable Class II occupation for women, 
who constituted only 17% of this group (Table 87).
The beach-head which women sustained among hucksters and 
shopkeepers is therefore noteworthy. The statistics, which 
probably reflect those who vended full-time, are likely to 
have under-estimated the hundreds of women who vended and 
bartered at the weekly markets, and who were reported in the 
1880s as bartering from village to village in the Windward 
District. Even in settlements where there were shops, 
itinerant female vendors found a niche.^
VI.4 CONCLUSION
Tobago was a society with a relatively homogenous 
population, mainly of African descent. Creole by birth, with 
small numbers of Europeans and native Africans by 1901. In 
1881, those of mixed race were 16% of the population.
The agrarian crisis led to a remarkable exodus of both 
males and females, but moreso males of working age, 
particularly after 1871, and particularly from the Leeward 
District, the epicentre of sugar cultivation. Migration 
affected the composition and growth of the population and the 
working force, fertility rates, family life, incomes, and the 
ethos of the society. It also contributed to population growth 
in Trinidad, and to the cementing of family, trade, religious 
and other ties between the people of the united colony, as the 
Registrar General observed on the 1901 census.
The majority of the people lived in small settlements
The News. 26 May 1888.
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off, but close to, the estates; clusters of villages of more 
than 300 persons, flanked by smaller hinterlands, developed in 
the Middle and Leeward Districts, where smallholding was most 
concentrated, by 1891. By 1881, settlement patterns which 
continued into the 1950s were firmly established [Niddrie 
1961]; only very small settlements existed on the north coast, 
connected by an overgrown bridle path [Hooper 1887:5]. 
Scarborough and its suburbs eclipsed Plymouth to become the 
sole urban, commercial centre.
Nearly all the houses were detached and undivided, which 
gives further significance to the observations in Chapters 3 
and 4 on home ownership as the first step in the guest for 
autonomy of the ex-slaves, and on the salience of houses and 
homesteads in the pattern of property ownership. Tobago had 
little 'barrack' housing, which loomed large in the formation 
and culture of the Trinidad proletariat.
By 1851, an occupational structure was established, 
whereby 96% of the working force remained, for the next three 
decades, in occupations which we have designated as Class III 
(Table 77). The major avenues of mobility for the labouring 
class, as revealed in the occupational statistics, were 
skilled trades, dressmaking, fishing, and 'shopkeeping'; and 
these opportunities varied from district to district, with the 
Windward District being least favoured.
By 1901, there was a steep decline in agricultural 
labourers and a redistribution of the lowly-paid into 'general 
labour' and unpaid domestic duties. The disproportionate sex 
ratios resulting from emigration meant that women constituted
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59.5% of the working force in 1901. Women were the backbone 
of the agricultural, general and domestic workforce at the end 
of the century. They had also been the majority in agriculture 
in the 1830s (Ch. 2) and in 1844 [cf. Higman 1979], and the 
majority of road workers from the 1840s to 1887. Throughout 
the period surveyed, the opportunities for both males and 
females were limited, but moreso for females, 79% of whom in 
1901 were in the most menial occupations, whereas 56% of men 
were so placed. All of the skilled trades, except baking and 
dressmaking, were exclusively male.
By 1901, a significant breach into Class II occupations 
was made, largely by males who became 'peasant proprietors', 
teachers and clerks. Women, whose participation in teaching 
and clerical work also increased, predominated in 
'shopkeeping' which was in unbroken continuity with their 
roles as hucksters and market vendors during slavery.
Chapter 4 showed differential access to the ownership of 
land by gender. The census data confirm that gender was a 
significant factor differentiating the population and 
affecting its life chances, and is vital in analysing the 
social structure.
There was a clear division of labour according to gender. 
At the top of the occupational ladder, women were rare. In 
part, this reflects the vision of the enumerators since 
missionaries' wives, for example, laboured alongside their 
husbands, but were not mentioned. In the middle ranks, women 
were not usually employed as petty officials, and most 
teachers were men. In 1845, there were 3 female teachers out
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of 19; in 1880, there were still only 3, out of 21.” By 
1901, women had stormed the citadels of education and 
'respectability' to become a third of the teachers* and 27% 
of the store clerks; and they dominated petty trading. At the 
base of the occupational ladder, women predominated in all the 
least-paid occupations, while most of the skills that were 
valued were male preserves.
Max Weber warned that interpretive understanding of the 
actors' meanings - '^verstehen' - is a necessary though not 
sufficient condition of all sociological explanation, strong 
though the statistical data may be [1964:99-102]. To avoid 
'reading back' into the past the concerns of the present, 
firmer conclusions must await a clearer understanding of the 
meaning of gender roles in 19th century Tobago, in the context 
of class, status and family relationships, and of other 
sources of income which are not reflected in these data.
This chapter is consistent with the argument of this 
thesis. It buttresses the analyses of Chapters 3 and 4 on the
” C0290/29: Blue Bk., 1845. All the female teachers were 
paid lower wages than the males in 1880. 00290/64: Blue 
Bk., 1880. They were usually responsible for teaching 
infants and sewing classes in the day schools.
* A few of the female teachers at the turn of the century 
were the relatives of former sugar planters who had become 
bankrupt or who had died; they started small schools, 
teaching music and other subjects to the children of the 
upper and middle strata. One such private school was run 
by a Mrs McCall, of the foremost planting family before 
1884; another by Miss Prince, daughter of Mitchell J. 
Prince, a black Methodist schoolmaster (Ch. 8) . Interviews 
with Miss Isabelle Dalrymple, retired seamstress, 15 July 
1992, and with Mrs Irma Crosby, retired store clerk and 
bookkeeper, 20 July 1992. Thus, some degree of the 
expansion in Class II was owed to the downward mobility 
of women of the dominant class, and to the descendants of 
teachers, clerks etc.
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smallholders, their location, the importance of home 
ownership, and the relatively late emergence of a peasantry. 
The expansion in Class II after 1891 supports our view that 
the crisis of the 1880s led to a restructuring of production 
and social relations, and to relative gains for the labouring 
class after 1889 (Ch. 8) .
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SOCIAL CLASS, COLOUR AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 
m TOBAGO: 1838-1886
VII.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses the class/colour configuration of 
Tobago society between 1838 and 1884, and relates it to the 
definitive collapse of the sugar economy and of the government 
as a separate entity in the mid 1880s. It argues that the fate 
of the colonial state was closely associated with that of the 
resident plantocracy which emerged in that period. It examines 
the development of a near monopoly over credit, production and 
trade by the McCall/Gillespie combine, and the intra-class 
conflicts which this engendered. It discusses the ideological 
and political orientations and strategies of the classes and 
fractions, located in the metropolis and in Tobago, which were 
the major historical actors. Drawing on the insights of 
previous chapters, it confirms our hypothesis, that Tobago's 
crisis in the 1880s is accounted for by the source and 
deployment of capital, and by its social structure; all of 
which were affected by the outcomes of inter- and intra-class 
struggles.
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VII.2 THE CLASS/COLOUR CONFIGURATION OF TOBAGO; 1838-1884
VII.2.1 The Dominant Class
In 1842, the majority of white merchants and some of the
'upper class of planters' collapsed.* They had borrowed too
heavily to stock their shops to cater for the increased
consumption of the freedpeople.
The large quantity of goods stocked by the merchants was
bought by estate managers, who established shops on or near
the estates, so initiating the truck system which remained
significant until the end of the century (Ch. 5) . As an
increasing number of estates fell into local hands after 1848,
the Tobago plantocracy became a planter/merchant oligarchy.
On the one hand, the control by a few British merchants grew
tighter over the decades; on the other, shopkeeping by the
resident planters was very common.
This planter/merchant oligarchy was no longer almost
exclusively white. Chapter 2 showed that a few of the leading
whites had begun from the 1830s to marry, usually, the
wealthiest and most educated coloured women. In 1847, Lt.-
Gov. Graeme commented on the changing complexion of the élite;
In no Island have I seen the distinction 
[between white and coloured] more com­
pletely overcome, than in Tobago; Upon my 
arrival I was waited upon by several 
families of coloured extraction, the 
females of which, were visited by, and 
received into the best society this Island 
affords; nor is it confined to a mere 
interchange of civilities, for in many 
cases marriages have taken place between 
the European and coloured races ... I 
found that in every case these happy re-
* C0285/51: Grey to Stanley, 5 Sept. 1842, enc. Darling to
C t*p>v  - Anrf-Grey, 26 ug. 1842.
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suits were brought about, solely by super­
ior education: Most of the Ladies and 
Gentlemen of African descent who have inter­
married with Europeans or are freely re­
ceived into their Society, have been ... 
resident and educated in Europe ... [They] 
do not indiscriminately associate with 
others of the same origin, and are as 
exclusive in the choice of their companions 
as the most fastidious could desire.
The coloured presence was equally marked among the senior 
officials in the 1850s. The Treasurer was Dougald Yeates, a 
planter and civil engineer trained in Scotland, the son of the 
late President Yeates, an Englishman. The Collector of 
Customs, Joseph T. Comissiong, of Grenada, was transferred to 
Sierra Leone in 1850. The Deputy Treasurer and Superintendent 
of Police was J. H. Roche, who was succeeded in 1854 as 
Inspector of Police by Robert Crooks, a planter. These were 
all coloured.
In the 1840s, many coloureds and blacks became lessees
and managers of estates. Davy observed:
When I was in Tobago [in 1848], a prop­
erty was pointed out to me, that had 
nearly ruined its proprietor ... which 
was then let to a colored man, at £100 a 
year, - a rent regularly paid; and another 
property, that was returning to its pro­
prietor (an absentee,) on an average three 
or four per cent, of invested capital, 
under the direction of an intelligent 
coloured manager.
[Davy 1854/1971:251 fn]
Lt.-Gov. Shortland stated that by 1855, there were joint
efforts by blacks to rent estates or estate works:
I am aware of offers having been made to 
proprietors by the negroes to rent estates, 
and to repair the works at their own cost;
2 C0285/56: Reid to Grey, 18 May 1847, enc. Graeme, Separate 
and Conf., 1 Mar. 1847.
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indeed, in one instance, three negroes 
have taken the lease of an abandoned sugar 
works, and have repaired both the mill and 
the boiling house. Several other instances 
might be adduced of equal enterprise.^
Among these lessees and managers was James Hackett, an 
illiterate black carpenter who began as lessee of 3 estates, 
and who owned Belmont, and Les Coteaux, one of the largest 
estates, before 1862. Brutus Murray, also illiterate, was one 
of the first metayers; in 1862, he was manager of Belle Garden 
and part-proprietor of Pembroke; by 1870, he was Pembroke's 
sole owner. Craig Castella, a black clerk, became manager of 
Pembroke in April 1852, on behalf of James Ewing and Co., 
Glasgow merchants; from December 1852, he managed, then 
leased. Providence, also owned by the Ewings, and by 1862 
owned it.* In 1884, blacks and coloureds owned 21 estates and 
leased at least another 11 (Tables 92, 93).
The dominant class of planters, merchants, senior 
officials and professionals was composed of both whites and 
coloureds by 1855, but the alliance between them was still an 
uneasy one. In 1855, Dougald Yeates was suspended from the 
post of Treasurer, because the local Privy Council found him 
guilty of irregular bookkeeping and appropriating funds owed 
to him by the government, without due authorization. A 
coloured barrister from Dominica, S. H. Frederick Abbott, a 
leader in the Assembly, led a militant protest of coloureds, 
accusing Shortland of being influenced 'by complexional
 ^C0285/73: Hincks to Labouchere, 7 July 1856, enc. 1855 
Blue Bk. Rept.
* Vote Book, 1862-1870; Met. Com. Rept.. 1891, W. Sladden's 
evidence, p. 34; Castella's evidence, pp. 30-4.
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distinctions' and of not wanting coloureds and blacks in 
public office. Abbott and the 'Coloured party' called a 
meeting in Scarborough which gained them popular favour. 
Shortland's description of what followed, though not 
disinterested, is useful: 'Another public meeting was convened 
with the expressed intention of compelling me to leave the 
island.' Scarborough was 'literally filled with persons of all 
classes and colours, but to the dismay of my opponents the 
objects the negroes had in view were not at all in unison with 
those of Mr Abbott and the friends of the Treasurer. ' The 
black labourers, instead of backing the demands of the 
coloured professionals for access to public office, used the 
occasion,
to pronounce against a contemplated 
reduction of wages. Mr Abbott observing 
this, made an effort to adjourn the meet­
ing till the following Tuesday, but could
not prevent a strong expression of opin­
ion both respecting the question of wages, 
and the intended attack on myself.^
The protests occurred in July and August 1855. Late in 
August, Shortland appointed Abbott to the Privy Council. His 
co-optation silenced the coloureds, although they and the 
blacks of the middle strata continued to be concerned about
the appointment of natives to the Civil Service.* In 1857,
Abbott was appointed Attorney General, after acting briefly as 
Solicitor General. The Lords Commissioners of the UK Treasury 
exonerated Yeates in 1856, and Henry Taylor minuted that he
 ^C0285/71: Colebrooke to Molesworth, 2 Oct. 1855, & Encs., 
esp. Privy Council minutes & App., 4 Aug. 1855; Shortland 
to Colebrooke, 22 Aug. 1855.
* C0285/79: Hincks to Newcastle, 28 July 1860, & Encs.
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had met with 'less than justice in the Colony', although his 
books had not been properly kept.?
By 1871, the coloured presence was firmly established 
among the senior officials. Only the Lt.-Governor, the Chief 
Justice, Joseph Wattley, and the Postmaster, James Hamilton, 
were white. Besides Crooks (Inspector of Police and Provost 
Marshal) and Yeates (Stipendiary Magistrate who had acted as 
Colonial Secretary on several occasions), there were Samuel 
Hill, Colonial Secretary; Charles Berkeley, Treasurer since 
1856; also Stipendiary Magistrates Samuel Titzck, from the 
Danish Virgin Islands, and Simon Fraser, from Dominica.*
The planters, merchants and senior officials (some of the 
latter were also planters or large landowners) moved in the 
same social circles. They (including the black planters) 
attended the Lt.-Governors' balls; their wives and daughters 
were pillars of the churches, particularly the Church of 
England and the Methodist Church, where, at concerts, bazaars 
etc., there was scope for their musical and other talents. The 
whites and coloureds in the dominant class had, by the 1880s, 
ties of intermarriage, friendship, interests and predicaments.
Although the leading blacks were jurors and Justices of 
the Peace, none of them sat in the Assembly or in the 
Legislative Council during Tobago's existence as a separate 
colony. There was also little intermarriage between whites or 
coloureds, and blacks. The black planters and lessees must
? C0285/73: Trevelyan to Merivale, 29 Feb. 1856; Taylor's 
minute, 3 Mar. 1856.
* C0285/89: Rawson to Kimberley, Conf., 5 May 1871, enc. 
Kortright to Rawson, Conf., 8 Apr. 1871.
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therefore be seen as a segment of the dominant class; with the 
smaller coloured planters and merchants, they also constituted 
a subordinate stratum within that class.
Two other groups, located in the metropolis, were 
connected to the dominant class. Firstly, the Colonial Office 
Ministers and officials were key actors in the local power 
struggles. Although they were determined to curb the power of 
the planters, after the 1840s, there were few attempts to 
overrule the planters in the labourers' interests. The senior 
officials, most of whom were British aristocrats, with common 
backgrounds in public schools and Oxbridge [Young 1961; 
Blakeley 1972], were, in spite of their conflicts with the 
planters, objectively their allies on most matters of policy.*
Secondly, the British merchants who owned or financed 
most of the estates were an overseas segment of the dominant 
class, using their influence and that of their organization, 
the West India Committee, to press for their demands at the 
Colonial Office, in Parliament and in the colony. However, 
there were fundamental conflicts of interest between them and 
some of the planters, especially the smaller ones.
* The senior civil servants effectively shaped the decisions 
taken by the Secretaries of State. Henry Taylor, Senior 
Clerk in the WI department for 47 years (1824-72), 'ruled 
not only his department of the Office but the British 
West India colonies' [Morrell 1969:28]. The influence of 
H. M. Merivale, Sir Frederic Rogers, Robert Herbert, 
successive Perm. Under-Secs., and of Edward Wingfield, 
head of the WI dept, from 1878 to 1897, is striking.
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VII.2.2 The Middle Strata
The majority of the coloureds, in spite of their cultural 
identification with the whites and aspiration to social 
intercourse with them, were not part of the top Tobago 
families. They constituted a large part of what we call the 
middle strata [cf. Post 1981, 1:24-6].
The coloureds were careful of their social status. They 
normally aspired to marry whites or other coloureds. The 
result was considerable intermarriage and inbreeding among 
coloured families, often between first cousins. Some of the 
coloureds were closely related to the wealthier whites. For 
example, James Henry Keens (English planter) married Frances 
Collier. All John McCall's children were coloured; his 
daughter, Agnes Rubenia McCall, married Albert Collier; 
William McCall, John's brother, married Martha Keens, daughter 
of James and Frances Keens.^
The coloureds filled a range of occupations. Many were 
merchants' clerks and clerks in the Civil Service; a few were 
teachers; several were artisans and boat captains, overseers 
and estate managers and, as Chapter 4 shows, a significant 
number were shopkeepers, owners of sizeable tracts of land and 
lessees of estates. Some coloured women worked as itinerant 
seamstresses, often for an exclusive clientele; some made 
preserves and confectionery; a few were store and shop owners.
From the 1840s, there were stringent reductions in the
Conversations with Mrs Dolores Thompson, who is studying 
three Tobago coloured families from which she is 
descended, 1 & 9 Apr. 1993; interviews with Isabelle 
Dalrymple (1896- ) and her daughter, Aldith Cameron 
(1912- ), Scarborough, 15 July 1992.
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salaries of overseers, and such positions were increasingly
filled by blacks. By 1853, the Stipendiary Magistrates
observed that the Scots overseers were being replaced by
'uneducated negroes & other persons equally ignorant'.
These gentry on £20 or £25 a year, ride
their horses or mules, dress handsomely,
buy land at £15 an Acre - some of them
erect thereon handsome houses; - but, of 
course, nothing of this appears in the 
Annual Estates accounts.
Thus, there was upward mobility for some coloureds and 
blacks, for whom the first step in the process of accumulation 
was usually the skilled trades, shopkeeping, metayage or
supervisory roles.
We have demonstrated that there was significant 
differentiation among the blacks. Tradesmen and mechanics, who 
had been the most valued of the slaves, emerged as the first 
black freeholders (Ch.3). In Chapter 6, we placed those in 
skilled trades at the top of Class III, given the possibility 
of greater accumulation for the exceptional. Chapter 5 showed 
that there was differentiation among the metayers, noting a 
stratum of 'large metayers', who employed others to cultivate 
their metayer holdings. Chapter 4 showed that, by the 1880s, 
there was a small but important stratum of black shopkeepers 
becoming petty landlords and renters of coconut walks. There 
was also (Ch. 6), a rising group of black petty officials and 
school teachers, many of them lay readers and catechists, 
whose salaries were low, but whose 'respectability' was high. 
The black segment of the middle strata was drawn from these
" CO290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1853, Child; cf 
Consol. Tables.
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groups. Some of the tradesmen identified with the labouring 
class and signed their petitions; many did not.
The 'middle strata' are therefore seen as comprising two 
major blocs, each having persons from the intermediate strata 
we have described. One bloc comprised the coloured petty 
bourgeoisie (small landowners, shopkeepers, smaller merchants) 
as well as coloured clerical and supervisory workers and 
successful artisans; the other was of upwardly mobile blacks 
in similar positions.
VII.2.3 Class-Oriented Organizations
There was organizational expression to the groupings we 
described.
Agricultural and Chemical Societies were formed by the 
planters in 1844, but failed by 1850 owing to 'want of zeal' 
[Davy 1854/1971:256]. In November 1881, a Merchants and 
Planters Association was formed, but it was not very active. 
An Agricultural Society was formed by the leading planters and 
officials in December 1882, and a Chamber of Commerce in 
1883^ ;^ the latter was defunct in 1888. These organizations 
overlapped considerably in membership.
Lodges, however, were popular.^ There were three main
Colin Gillespie, a partner of A. M. Gillespie & Co., urged 
the formation of the Agric. Soc. and Admin. Carrington in­
vited the merchants to form the Chamber.
Hobsbawm [1968:69] states that they sprang up all over the 
north of Britain after 1815; Hyam, that the importance of 
freemasonry in building up the empire has been underrated. 
In the English and Scottish form, the freemasons were a 
society with secrets, not a secret society. Lodges were 
formed in the WI from 1739 [1976:152-5].
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lodges in Scarborough. The Freemasons were composed of 
leading officials, including in 1872 Lt.-Gov. Kortright, the 
top merchants, planters and a few of the clerks. Good Templars 
(Excelsior Lodge), started in August 1877, was largely 
coloured, with a sprinkling of middle strata blacks. Its 
members were small planters, merchants, shopkeepers, clerks, 
butchers etc., and it had female members as well as a juvenile 
section. In 1884, when the Tobago Defence Association (TDA) 
was formed, it drew many members from Excelsior. One 
Excelsior member, J. A. P. Bowhill, a coloured merchant's 
clerk, was reported in 1883 as being 'sorry to find that 
persons in the upper walks of life were loath to cast in their 
lot among them and join their ranks.' By 1884, Bowhill was 
secretary to the Freemasons, while continuing as an officer of 
Excelsior.w The third lodge was Odd Fellows (Alpha Lodge), 
which was started in August 1882. It too had coloureds and 
blacks of the middle strata, and was closely connected to 
Excelsior and the TDA. There were also Rechabites, of whom 
only the name survives in the records.
Late in 1884, the TDA was formed. Its pillars were the 
smaller planters, lessees, and the coloured and black clerks, 
shopkeepers, teachers and artisans. The TDA was the voice of 
the middle strata and the smaller coloured and black planters, 
for a few years thereafter.
The black segment of the middle strata had a penchant, at
The News. 18 Aug. 1883; Hay [1884, App.].
The News. 11 Aug. 1883. The Freemasons were defunct in 
1888 [ibid., 21 Apr. 1888].
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times exaggerated, for the social ideals of the whites and the 
coloureds, and for benefit societies as both social gatherings 
and a hedge against misfortune.
The first known organization of upwardly mobile blacks 
was the Charitable Union Society, formed in 1850, with 40 
members, all male tradesmen residing in and near Scarborough, 
the majority of whom were 'of pure unalloyed African descent'. 
A friendly society, it was also concerned with upright conduct 
among its members. Members were fined for attending meetings 
and funerals 'in déshabillé', the costume of the society being 
'a Suit of Black Cloth with blue Silk Aprons and scarves with 
rosettes, the Office bearers to be distinguished by carrying 
a wand.' The subscription was 10s to join and 2s monthly, 
which was prohibitive for most labourers. Lt.-Gov. Graeme 
looked to such people for 'the formation of a respectable 
middle class.
Another association, mainly of blacks but with a few 
coloureds, was the Tobago Mutual Benefit Society (TMBS), 
established in August 1883. They were self-styled 'loyal and 
law abiding men', concerned to assist members with sickness, 
death and 'pecuniary distress'. The membership fee was 4s on 
entrance and 2s per month, again prohibitive for labourers.^
The people of the middle strata, along with the coloured 
merchants and planters, and supported by many from the 
labouring class, started a Penny Savings Bank in 1881, given
16 C0285/63: Colebrooke to Grey, 17 Sept. 1850, Encs. 1 & 4.
C0321/88: Robinson to Derby, 29 Jan. 1885, Enc. 3. Tobago 
Archives: Rules of the TMBS, 1883.
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the absence of any bank since the commercial crisis of 1847. 
The bank opened on 22 March 1881 in the store of Thomas 
Blakely jun., a coloured merchant and planter. At the request 
of the depositors, the Government took over its funds as the 
nucleus of a state-run Government Savings Bank, under an Act 
passed in September 1882.^
VII.2.4 The Labouring Class
The labouring class - the majority of metayers, 
agricultural and general labourers and others in the lower 
occupational ranks - was black. It cannot be called a 
proletariat, because of the remarkable occupational 
multiplicity and the importance of metayage. Apart from 
benefit societies, formed under the auspices of the churches, 
it appears to have had no known organizations, although its 
rebellions (1852, 1867, 1876)^" reveal a high degree of
underground organization.
From the mid 1850s, Benjamin Blake, the self-styled 
'Labour Agent General', a black tailor, wrote sundry letters 
and petitions on behalf of the labourers, for which he charged 
a fee, or accepted payment in kind. Blake was not very 
literate; but he was a juror, and he often illegally wrote 
legal documents for fees. His commitment to the labourers' 
cause is doubtful, for in 1890 he applied for a government
The News. 9 July 1881, 29 Apr. 1882, 30 Sept. 1882.
In 1883, it closed and a Govt. Savings Bank was started
in 1893.
The Land Tax riot, 1852 (Ch. 3) ; the Mason Hall riot 
against the dog tax, 1867 (below); the Belmanna riot,
1876 (Ch. 4 and below).
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job, declaring publicly that, since many of his clients did 
not pay, 'I have had enough of them,
However, the undercurrent of protest to which Blake 
responded should not be minimized. He was suspected by Lt.- 
Gov. Kortright of instigating the Mason Hall riot of 1867, but 
Kortright admitted that Blake was 'occasionally the means of 
exposing abuses'.^ His office was a little hut in 
Scarborough, 'The Shanty' (he was denied the use of the Court 
House, where the functions of the dominant class and the 
lodges were held), where labourers would discuss their 
grievances, particularly on market days; and his sphere of 
influence was within a radius of 10 miles from Scarborough. He 
participated in the protest at Studley Park estate in 1889, 
after the court sessions held by Sir John Gorrie (Ch. 5).
The first of Blake's addresses on record, signed by him 
and 43 others, was written in 1856, on behalf of 'us the 
Blacks', expressing their gratitude for several improvements, 
including the change in the magisterial system (magistrates 
were no longer to hold courts in the planters' or managers' 
homes) , the introduction of an Appeal Court and a Chief 
Justice, the review of the Treasury, better jail discipline, 
and the 'promised extension and improvement of the present 
Franchise Bill'.^
In 1864, Blake sent another memorial, signed by 63
Met. Com. Rent.. 1891, Blake's evidence, pp. 143-9, & 
petition, p. 174.
2^ C0285/83: Walker to Cardwell, 15 Feb. 1865, enc. Kortright 
to Walker, 7 Feb. 1865.
C0285/73: Hincks to Labouchere, 12 July 1856, Enc. 1.
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persons, of whom 29 were illiterate, complaining that taxes 
were enforced, but there was no public institution for 
destitutes, no hospital and no sailors' home. They drew 
attention to two instances of people dying destitute, to the 
high Coroner's fees for the inquests into such cases, and 
pleaded:
May Your Majesty improve this sort of 
things in this benighted Colony, and we 
find those two Individuals to be the 
Blacks too, and the Coroners White &
Mullotoe [sic].
They complained of the high fees for taking cases to the 
Stipendiary Magistrates who had fixed salaries ('it matters 
not whether Civil or Criminal no Money no justice'), of the 
arbitrariness of the metayage system, of wages not paid 
promptly on estates, and of high taxes. Drysdale, whose recall 
they demanded, described them as 'ignorant labourers 
intermingled with ... Tailors, tradesmen, and fishermen', the 
annual value of the property owned by all of them being less 
than ElOO.^
Only two of Blake's subsequent letters survive, the 
first on a personal grievance, the other supported by more 
than 70 signatures of people who were too poor to qualify for 
the vote, protesting on the increase in the license on entire 
horses from 2 0s to 3 0s, which they deemed a 'Self pleasing 
Tax', because it was instituted at the wish of one white man, 
who had been injured by an entire. One Colonial Office
23 C0285/82: Walker to Newcastle, 29 Mar. 1864, & Encs.
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official minuted that the tax was 'unfair & hard'.^
Blake's letters displayed a keen awareness among 
labourers of all the major public issues. There was also a 
common theme: that the black labouring class was oppressed and 
received no justice at the hands of whites and mulattoes.
Although the ideology and organization of the labouring 
class are seldom found in the written record, they were 
expressed in folk songs, folk theatre, and in village yards. 
The surviving fragments again show plainly that some labourers 
were keen observers of local affairs.
Walter Sladden, a white planter, testified in 1890 of
mock trials which took place over two decades in the Leeward
District. John Horsford, a metayer, called himself 'Sir John',
and wrote letters, addressed from 'Chambers Office'.
Down in that district they have mock 
trials where they try their cases. One 
person represents Mr. Cadiz, who was the 
former Attorney-General, and Horsford is 
"Sir John". Someone else represents Mr.
Fraser, and another person Mr. Abbott.
Horsford was formerly "Chief Justice 
Whately," but now he is "Sir John." The 
house they hold their trials in is called 
"Parliament House.
Surviving folk songs also suggest a continuing commentary 
on the dominant class. For example, when James Kirk jun., 
white planter, member of the Executive Council, and Inspector 
of Inland Revenue officers and of the police, who had arrested
^ C0285/85: Walker to Carnarvon, 25 Mar. 1867, Encs. & 
minutes. Entires or stallions are male horses not 
castrated.
Met. Com. Rent. . 1891, Sladden's evidence, p. 163; 
allusions are to Sir John Gorrie, then Chief Justice, S. 
J. Fraser, Stip. Mag., and C. L. Abbott, barrister.
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the former First Revenue Officer for embezzlement in 1879, was
himself jailed in 1885 for embezzlement, a folk song remarked
on his descent to equality with the blacks;
Granderry wall, high wall 
Granderry wall, Granderry wall 
Granderry nuh bull' for me one [alone]
White darg [dog] ah go - Jim Kirk 
Black darg ah go 
White darg ah go - backra Jimmy 
All a' we ah one, Ohl^
The crash of 1884 and the calamities of the planters' families
were also proclaimed in song:
Yard Oh, yard Oh!
Bell ah ring a' yard Oh! (Repeat)
Massa dead, he nuh lef no money
Missis got fuh wuk she ______
Oh, Oh, Oh, Bell ah ring a' yard, Oh!^
Since the culture of the labouring class cannot be 
separated from its political consciousness and self-assertion, 
a few remarks are made thereon. As had occurred during 
slavery, the processes of cultural retention, of 
interculturation and of creation continued simultaneously in 
the post Emancipation years within the labouring class.
Obeah and other African-derived religious beliefs and 
practices persisted, though driven underground, both by the 
missionaries, and by the law, which provided for the 
prosecution of obeah practitioners. There was continued 
evidence of syncretism, not only of elements from different 
African cultures, but also of African and European magical
As told by Mrs Eileen Guillaume (1917- ), who learned it 
from a woman aged 95 in the 1950s; conversation, 22 Apr. 
1983. The first lines refer to the high walls around the 
jail.
27 As sung by Dr J. D. Elder (1914- ); interview, 24 May 
1983.
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beliefs and rites.
Churching and schooling were a powerful influence, 
promoting acculturation to European norms, particularly in the 
young. In 1854, Dr William Allen Purser, doctor, lay preacher 
and gifted musician, arrived in Tobago. Purser, from about 
1856, and Bro. Voullaire, a Moravian missionary, in the 1860s 
were among the musicians who trained the children and young 
people in the churches and schools to sight read music. Church 
and village choirs, to which the highest prestige was given, 
remained established in the music making of Tobago well into 
the twentieth century [Elder 1972a:22-25].
But the subtle process of interculturation is well 
illustrated in the fact that, while Purser brought European 
song and speech traditions to the folk, his life and work were 
interwoven into the African-derived folk traditions, and are 
'fixed forever in the folklore' [Elder 1972b:18]. A legend, 
known throughout Tobago, describes his encounter with a 'fairy 
maid'; and at least two folksongs in the vernacular record his 
battle for good hygiene and against cholera.^
The schools hired sewing mistresses who taught the girls. 
Many of the missionaries' wives contributed to this and some 
of the finest Scandinavian embroidery ('hardanger' etc.) was 
learnt from them, these skills becoming important female
28 T. L. Badham, Periodical Accts. 17 (1844):193.
'The Legend of Pica'ny Moma Water' [Elder 1972b: 17-20]. 
'Fairy maids' were half human, half fish. Elder's acct. 
includes a song on Purser; another is No. 116 of the songs 
by Tobago migrants in Toco, Trinidad, collected by M. J. 
Herskovits in 1939. I am grateful to Lise Winer for the 
latter.
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accomplishments.
Language and speech patterns were transformed. Rev
Badham, a Moravian missionary from 1844-49, returned in May
1863 and observed, from his cultural standpoint:
Another striking and pleasing feature was 
the remarkable improvement in the lan­
guage of the people. No doubt they still 
understand, and among themselves make use 
of their uncouth patois; but formerly they 
spoke nothing else, and it was most dif­
ficult to teach them to read English 
properly. Now, however, we were astonished 
to hear addresses and prayers, the language 
of which was ... really chaste and elegant 
English. Those whose attendance thus grati­
fied us were chiefly such as I recollected 
as little children in the schools.^
African languages by 1844 were no longer publicly used, and
they were not significantly revived by the Liberated Africans
arriving in 1851 and 1862. Badham researched this subject, but
his results were 'very meagre'
As Mintz and Price [1992] have rightly argued, loss of
retentions did not mean loss of the ancestral heritage, but
rather the complex and creative selection, transformation and
interweaving of African elements with European-derived norms
and forms, and with new cultural elements, as the African
culture became what Mintz called an underlying 'grammar', that
informed the idioms of everyday life [cf. Klass 1961/1988:
X X X ]. There were differing degrees of orientation to, and
practice of, African traditions, depending on religion, family
history, personal ambitions, social status and residence.
'Retrospect of the History of the Brethren's Church in 
Tobago ...', Periodical Accts. 30 (1876-78): 89-90.
Periodical Accts. 18 (1846-48) : 257.
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VII.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MONOPOLY IN PRODUCTION AND TRADE
VII.3.1 Factors Affecting the Tobaao Sugar Economy
The BWI sugar industry entered the era of free labour
with several factors militating against the smaller planters.
The West India lobby had lost ground in the UK Parliament,
owing to the reforms of 1832 and their loss of power relative
to East India merchants and planters and to British industrial
interests [Hall 1971] . The mercantilist system which protected
West Indian sugar in the British market was gradually
dismantled from 1844-45, with the first reduction of the
discriminating duty against foreign sugar, followed by The
Equalization of Duties Act (1846); by 1874, all sugars entered
the UK market on equal terms. The British financial crisis of
1847-48, which led to the failure of several important banks,
made credit difficult to obtain, especially for West Indian
properties with heavy encumbrances. Green argues:
The combination of free trade and inter­
national economic crisis sealed the fate 
of the old West Indian plantocracy ...
The eclipse of the British West Indian 
sugar industry which had begun in the 
late eighteenth century was finally con­
summated by 1850.
[Green 1973:463]
Tobago, additionally, was hit by a disastrous hurricane in 
October 1847.
Capital investment, precisely the factor needed to 
improve the cultivation and manufacturing processes, was the 
perennial want. In most BWI colonies, there was no loan 
market. In Tobago, although merchants could advance small 
sums, they were unable to make advances on the scale needed to 
sustain and modernize the sugar industry. This, combined with
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the established dependence on merchant houses in Britain, left
the planters entirely dependent on British capital and
vulnerable to extortionate charges [Root 1899]. In the 1850s, 
absentee owners either sold their Tobago holdings and
concentrated their investments in more profitable sugar 
colonies, or made minimal advances while cutting costs.
The 1860s were a relatively prosperous decade for the 
ailing sugar industry (except in Jamaica), but competition 
from European beet sugar, subsidized by export bounties, 
caused the London price of sugar to fall sharply, especially 
in the decades after 1872 (Table 89). Between 1881 and 1896, 
prices fell by 50%; and between 1882-1891, imports of sugar 
from the BWI and British Guiana to the UK fell from 200,000 
tons to 50,000 tons per annum, while beet sugar imports rose 
from 400,000 tons to over 1 million tons per annum [Shephard 
1940:61-63]. Amalgamation of holdings, central factories and 
technological upgrading were the usual means whereby the
industry was made more competitive. For Tobago, these 
improvements were possible on a very limited scale; so the 
primary, systematic causes of its unviability as a sugar 
producer were aggravated by the depression of the 1880s, when 
only the most competitive could survive.
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TABLE 89
Price of Raw Sugar in London: 1872-1904
Year Per Cwt Year Per Cwt Year Per Cwt
s d s d 8 d
1872 25 6 1883 19 0 1894 11 3
1873 22 6 1884 13 3 1895 10 0
1874 21 6 1885 11 9 1896 10 9
1875 20 0 1886 11 9 1897 9 3
1876 21 6 1887 11 9 1898 9 6
1877 24 6 1888 13 0 1899 10 6
1878 20 0 1889 16 0 1900 11 3
1879 19 0 1890 13 0 1901 9 3
1880 20 6 1891 13 0 1902 7 3
1881 21 3 1892 13 6 1903 8 6
1882 20 0 1893 14 0 1904 10 3
NOTE: Cwt hundredweight (112 lbs) ; s d = shilli
pence.
Source; Deerr [1950, 2:505],
In Tobago, there were few technological advances in 
cultivation. The plough had been introduced since the turn of 
the 19th century, and its more extensive use in the 1840s was 
the only significant agricultural improvement.^ But it was 
difficult to use, especially in the Middle and Windward 
Districts, because of the topography and because of deep 
drains intersecting the cane pieces; few estates could afford 
the necessary covered sub-soil drains. To replace human
2^ C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 Sept. 1845, 30 June 1847.
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labour, wheelbarrows were frequently used in the 1840s,” and 
machines for weeding the canes were used on a few estates. 
After 1838, guano was frequently imported. In 1843, Betsy's 
Hope, one of the finest estates, installed a railway to convey 
wet megass from the mill to the megass house. But most estates 
had few of these improvements; the basic implements of 
cultivation remained the hoe, the cutlass and the bill.
On the manufacturing side, Tobago fared better. Tobago 
had been in 1808, one of the first West India colonies to 
import a steam mill, which was the most efficient and reliable 
source of motive power for crushing the canes.” Most of the 
20 steam mills used in 1840 had been erected after 1834; 
however, the less efficient cattle, wind and water mills 
continued to be much used (Table 90) . From about 1869 to 1873, 
there was investment in new water wheels.”
By 1850, advanced sugar factories used vacuum pans ('the 
chief factor in the production of refined sugar') for the 
evaporation of the water in the cane juice, instead of open 
tayches (coppers) in which there was loss of sugar by burning 
on the copper walls; and multiple-effeet evaporation to
” C0285/56; Reid to Grey, 18 May 1847, enc. Graeme's 1846 
Blue Bk. Rept.
” Trinidad and British Guiana were the first to import in 
1803 and 1805, respectively [Deerr 1950, 2:553]. The 
Tobago importer was Geo. Morrison, Les Coteaux estate. 
Nat. Lib. of Scotland: Rennie Papers, Inglis, Ellice & 
Co. to John Rennie, 21 July 1809, & Encs. Jamaica also 
imported its first steam mill in 1808.
” The value of machinery imported rose from £2009 in 1869 
to £5801 in 1870, £8958 in 1871 and tapered thereafter 
to £1196 in 1872, £1697 in 1873, £804 in 1874, £2334 in 
1875. The extraordinary imports occurred before 1873. 
C0290 series: Blue Bks., 1869-75.
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produce crystallized sugar [Manington 1925:285-6]. The scale 
of the Tobago estates inhibited investment in vacuum pans and 
centrifugals (for separating the molasses from the crystals). 
The cost of this equipment was so great that it was not 
considered for estates making less than 500 hogsheads per year 
[Green 1973:460-1], whereas most Tobago estates produced one- 
tenth of that. Only one estate, Betsy's Hope, had centrifugals 
by 1870, but it produced centrifugal muscovado, not crystal 
sugar. The most that the planters could manage was to upgrade 
the clarifying process (separating impurities from the cane 
juice before it is converted to sugar) . They used new 
combinations of lime and alumena, and by 1870, steam 
clarifiers were installed on all the estates using steam 
power.
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TABLE 90
Sugar Mills in Tobago; 1840-1897
YEAR STEAM STEAM/WIND STEAM/WATER WIND WATER CATTLE TOTAL
1840 20 - - 28 26 3 77
1845 25 - - 24 16 5 70
1850 26 - - 16 23 5 70
1855 24 - - 15 20 7 66
1861 19 4 1 10 21 7 62
1865 20 4 1 12 20 5 62
1869 20 4 7 13 15 6 65
1875 20 4 7 13 16 6 66
1882 23 - 6 10 11 5 55
1888 18 - 2 6 3 3 32
1897 19 _ 2 6 2 2 31
Sources; C0290 series: Blue Books for 1840-88; C0300/109 for 1897
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TABLE 91
Average Annual Sugar Production in Tobago: 1824-1886
Years Production Years Production
(Tons) (Tons)
1824-33 5202 1857-66 2820
1834-38 4363 1867-76 3764
1839-46 2731 1877-86 3463
1847-56 2540 1887-96 Unified with
Trinidad.
Source: Deerr [1950, 2:377].
Confined to muscovado production, Tobago growers lost 16% of 
their sugar through drainage during shipping.^ Table 91 
gives the figures on sugar production.
In spite of greater managerial economy from the 1840s, 
the system was wasteful in its use of capital and labour. In 
1849, there were 70 sugar factories producing a crop of only 
4000 hogsheads; given that a good wind or water mill could 
produce 250 hogsheads per crop, only 16 sets of works were 
necessary.^ But there was little division of labour between 
cultivation and manufacture, and few estates were amalgamated.
From the 1850s, sugar planters world-wide increased 
economies of scale by establishing central factories to serve 
several estates, linked by railways. Trinidad was the first in 
the British Empire to do so at Usine Ste Madeleine in 1874; in 
Tobago the subject was considered, since the Gillespies wanted
00321/13: Rept. of Mr A. Chapman upon the Scheme of a 
Central Sugar Factory, Tobago, 1876.
00285/60: Colebrooke to Grey, 31 March 1849, enc. Graeme's 
1848 Blue Bk. Rept.
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it for their leeward estates. But they were unwilling to fund 
and guarantee the investment, and the Colonial Office refused 
to risk the falling revenues on that venture.
As regards rum stills, by 1843, Tobago producers had 
introduced some of the latest, and made an improved quality of 
rum [Porter 1843:169]. The records say nothing on the 
distillery technology thereafter, and because of heavy 
taxation under Crown rule after 1877, most distilleries were 
closed.
To sum up, by 1880, although such enhanced technology as 
the planters could afford had been installed,^ cultivation 
and manufacture were both labour-intensive and wasteful. Green 
states that the 'availability of labour and the degree of its 
discipline remained the crucial factors determining the 
capacity of the estates to hold down costs' [1973:462].^ 
Want of capital after 1846 made the Tobago planters depend on 
metayage, which allowed them little control over production. 
Since the metayers bore almost all the costs of production, 
the majority found it expedient not to cultivate more than 4 
acres, because of the scarcity and expense of labour. Thus, 
estates were under-utilized and cultivated in small sub-units. 
Metayage was resorted to because of the lack of credit and 
surplus on the planters' account, but it contributed to the 
inability of the planters to extricate themselves from both of
The Tobago sugar works were 'very superior' to those of 
Grenada and St Vincent. Evidence of Admin. Laborde, Reot. 
from the Roval Com.....  1884, p. 409.
Cf. PP. 1878-79, Vol. XIII, Rept. from the Select 
Committee on Sugar Industries, evidence of G. H. Chambers, 
merchant concerned with over 3 00 WI estates, p. 248.
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these conditions (Ch. 5).
By 1870, Tobago was a backwater within the Caribbean. Its 
production crisis led to its marginality, by comparison with 
nearby colonies. From 1874, the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. 
made only one monthly trip to Tobago, though two trips were 
made to all other BWI colonies. Down to 1888, in spite of 
several petitions 'influentially signed/, the Company 
consistently refused to alter its schedule, because the 
freight and passenger traffic was too small to render a second 
service profitable, while the imperial Treasury refused to pay 
the costs, which Tobago could not afford.^ Tobago was also 
marginalized by its inability to pay for telegraph lines, laid 
down in the BWI in 1871/72, and upgraded in 1 8 7 5 / 7 6 . Much 
of the sea traffic bypassed the island.
VII.3.2 The Rise of a Resident Proprietarv
In 1855, there were 71 cultivated estates; 28 absentee 
owners had 52 properties, while 16 residents owned 19 
properties.
The largest absentee landholders were merchants: the
heirs of the wealthy planter, shipowner and merchant at the 
turn of the 19th century, Joseph Robley (6 estates) ; James 
Ewing and Co., Glasgow merchants (4 estates); Ellice, Kinnear
C0321/88: Robinson to Derby, 10 May 1885; C0321/92: GPO 
to Under-Sec. of State, 9 July 1885, & Encs.; C0321/109: 
Sendall to Knutsford, 27 Oct. 1888, & Encs.
Hobsbawm [1975:60] argues that the telegraph widened the 
gap between the places with and without it. By 1897, only 
Fiji, Brit. Honduras, St Helena, the Falklands, Turks Is, 
Papua and Tobago were without it in the Empire [Hyam 1976: 
108] .
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and Co. (London merchants) and Hon. Edward Ellice (British MP) 
(3 estates, and the former joint owner of a fourth) ; the 
Ellice company was consignee for 3 other estates. Robert 
Gordon was the largest resident planter with 3 estates, 
followed by John and James Leith, owning 2.^ ^
After 1855, there was a rapid transfer of estates to 
local owners, as properties were abandoned and sold cheaply. 
In 1863, of 71 cultivated estates, 58 (82%) were owned by
residents, white, coloured and black, 'no less than 21 Estates 
having passed from Absentees to Resident owners during the 
last 7 years.
By 1884, of 80 estates worked singly or jointly, 28 were 
owned by absentees and at least 50 by residents. The number of 
leased estates had also risen from 7 in 1855 to 22 (with 22 
lessees) in 1884, with at least half the lessees being 
coloured or black (Tables 92, 93). In 1884, there was a
remarkable degree of concentration into a few hands, which 
surpassed that of any earlier period in Tobago's history, the 
leading figures being the partnership between A. M. Gillespie 
and Co. (London merchants) and John (d. 1879) and James McCall 
(residents), with 25 estates.
As late as 1862, the McCalls and Gillespies had not yet 
established their economic dominance. In 1862, James and John 
Leith owned, singly or jointly, 11 estates. John McCall owned 
only Irvine Hall (not an estate), while A. M. Gillespie (then
2^ C0285/73: Hincks to Labouchere, 7 July 1856, App. to 1855 
Blue Bk. Rept.
C0285/82: Walker to Cardwell, 23 May 1864, enc. Drysdale's 
1863 Blue Bk. Rept.
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and in 1869) was part-proprietor of Green Hill and Friendship 
estates. By 1869, McCall was part-proprietor of Betsy's Hope, 
Richmond, Glamorgan and Goldsborough. Many of the leeward 
estates later owned by the Gillespies and McCalls were still 
in the hands of the Ellices, Edward Ellice being the owner 
listed for 6 estates.* What, then, accounts for the 
spectacular control of the McCalls and Gillespies by 1880?
Firstly, A. M. Gillespie had been consignee and creditor
to Tobago estates since 1850 and in 1863 enjoyed a consignee's
lien over 20 estates.
I am and have been for nearly 3 0 years 
past acquainted with the business of a 
West India Merchant and for the last fif­
teen years have been particularly con­
nected with the Island of Tobago as Con­
signee and Correspondent of Several of the 
Principal Owners of the Plantations and 
Estates ... I know by repute almost all 
the Estates in the Island of Tobago ... .*
* The Ellice estates, with Prospect, were formerly owned by 
John Balfour, who had in the 1790s been financed by Alex. 
Ellice and his merchant house, Inglis, Ellice & Co.
After 1853, Wm. Ellice ran the estates at a loss; they 
were sold in the Encumbered Estates Ct. Nat. Lib. of 
Scotland: Ellice Papers, Ellice to Thruff & Dixon, 19 May 
1868. Vote Bk., 1862-70.
* C0441, 5/9: Affidavit of A. M. Gillespie, 8 July 1865, for 
quotation. C0441, 18/1, Pt. 2: Affidavit of A. M. 
Gillespie, 21 July 1885. Cunningham and Co., UK merchants, 
had for 50 years previously been consignees for most of 
these estates.
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TABLE 92
Tobago Estates: Ownership by Residence and Colour, 
1855 and 1884
1855 1884
Race/Colour 
and Residence 
of Owners
No. of
Owners
Absentee Whites 28
Resident Whites 15
Resident Coloureds 1 
Resident Blacks -
Race/Colour Unknown - 
TOTAL 44
No. of 
Estates
52 (49)
18
1
71 (68)
No. of 
Owners
9
13
8
4
3
37
No. of 
Estates
28 (24)
28 (25)
16
5
3
80 (73)
NOTES ; 1. Estates owned by 'heirs of' someone or by companies 
were counted as having one owner. Some of the owners 
whose race/colour are unknown were residents.
2. Numbers in brackets indicate that some estates were 
worked together.
Sources; C0285/73: Hincks to Labouchere, 7 July 1856, App. to 
1855 Blue Bk. Rept.; Hay [1884, App.].
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TABLE 93
Lessees of Tobago Estates by Colour: 1884 and 1881/82
1884
PARISH 
St George 
St Andrew 
St David 
St Patrick 
TOTAL
N U M B E R O F L E S S E E S
Whites
1
Coloureds
1
2
2
1
6
Blacks
1
3*
1* *
5
Unknown
1
2
3
1
7
No. Estates 
Leased
4
5 
7
6 
22
1881/82
Lessees
Estates
5 5* 9
7 5 9
No. of lessees = 25
28
NOTES;
1. * Includes 2 joint-lessees.
2. ** Leasing 2 estates.
Sources; Hay [1884, App.]; Assessment Roll, 1881/82
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Secondly, in 1858, Tobago entered into the jurisdiction 
of the Encumbered Estates Court, established to give 
indefeasible parliamentary titles to West India properties, 
many of which could attract no investment because of heavy 
encumbrances. Critics of the Court argued that it facilitated 
the concentration of West Indian estates in the hands of the 
British merchant consignees, through its recognition of the 
consignee's lien. In fact, British merchants owned and 
controlled many West India properties long before the Court 
was established (Ch. 2), and the consignee's lien, which was 
peculiar to sugar colonies, had also been recognized in courts 
of law long before 1858/* However, the Court, by realizing 
insolvent estates and putting them on a footing for receiving 
credit, strengthened the position of the merchants, who 
acquired properties cheaply. James Fleming, Chief Commissioner 
of the Court, saw the Court as a means of continuing the 
association between the West Indies and the London 
merchants.^
Owing to the 'passing' of moribund estates through the 
Court, and the operation of the consignee's lien, the McCalls 
and Gillespies swiftly became the leading planters in Tobago. 
The Ellice estates and 2 of the Leith estates became the 
property of the McCalls and Gillespies by 1880, the Gillespies
* PP. 1831-32, Vol. XX, Rept. from the Select Committee on 
the Commercial State of the West India Colonies, pp.18-19; 
cf. Rept. ... on the West Indian Incumbered Estates Ct. 
. . . . 1884; Further Corr. resp. the West Indian Incumbered 
Estates Ct.. 1884; Cust [1865; 1874].
C0285/90: Rawson to Kimberley, 2 May 1871, enc. Fleming 
to Herbert, 14 July, 30 Aug., 1871.
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buying on the McCalls' behalf estates for which the Gillespies 
were consignees or creditors; the McCalls, on the other hand, 
bought properties which John McCall had worked as attorney or 
manager for several years.
The transition to a near monopoly took place between 1863 
and 1875. Eleven British merchants 'interested' in Tobago 
had petitioned the Colonial Office for a loan after the 1847 
hurricane.'^* By 1884, there were only the Gillespies'^’ (13 
estates worked as 9), Thomas Reid (5 estates), the Davidsons 
(4 estates), and Daniels and Co. (1 estate) [Hay 1884, App.]; 
most of their acquisitions had been made through the 
Encumbered Estates Court.
Tobago estates did not undergo the diversification made 
possible by the granting of clear titles, as happened in 
Grenada and Jamaica. Its experience was akin to that of St 
Vincent and Antigua where, with a concentration of holdings in 
the hands of a few merchants, the controlling businesses 
reduced expenditure and refused to invest in major 
improvements [Beachey 1957:37-8]. With few exceptions, the 
estates which grew minor crops in 1884 were owned by residents 
(Table 94). However, these crops were insignificant in the 
exports down to 1888 (Table 46).
48 C0285/57: Colquhoun to Grey, 13 Dec. 1847, & Enc.
Table 44 showed that the McCall estates cannot be 
separated from the Gillespies'.
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TABLE 94
Tobago Estates: Ownership and Crops by Parish. 1884
O W N E D  BY A B S E N T E E S O W N E D  BY R E S I D E N T S
N o . o f
R E S »  UNKNOWN
PARISH Estates I II III IV V VI I II III IV V VI I
St John 4 ( 3) - - — — — - 1 2 - - - - -
St Paul 8 2 - — — — 2 3 - - - - 1 -
St Mary 6 ( 4) - - — — — - 3 1 - - - - -
St George 13 3 - — — 1 - 6 - - - 2 - 1
St Andrew 11 (10) 4 - — — — - 4 - 1 - - - 1
St David 20 (18) 5 1 — — — - 9 - 1 1 1 - -
St Patrick 18 (17) 4 - — — 1 - 7 - 2 - 1 2 -
TOTAL 80 (73) 18 1 — — 2 2 33 3 4 1 4 3 2
Total Absentee Owned: 23 Total Owned bv Residents: 48 Owners
U n k n ow n : 2
NOTES ; 1. Key to symbols:
I Sugar; II Sugar and Cocoa; III Coconuts; IV Cocoa and/or Other Minor Crops; 
V Proyisions/Pasture; VI Abandoned.
2. Numbers in brackets indicate that some estates were worked together.
Source; Compiled from Hay [1884, App.].
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VII.3.3 The Struggle for Control of Shipping
A critical aspect of the dominance of McCall and 
Gillespie was their control of the carrying trade, facilitated 
by the new British Navigation Act (1845), which maintained 
British supremacy in colonial shipping [Schuyler 1966]. In 
1880, the main Scarborough merchants were the companies of 
John McCall, S. B. Isaacs, Edward Keens, Ebenezer Henderson, 
Thomas Blakely jun., Angus Collier, James Robertson, Henry 
Panting, George Agard, with all except Robertson importing 
directly from the UK. All except Collier, Isaacs and Panting 
were planters, and all except McCall and Isaacs (whose 
descendants were coloured) were coloured. Between 1879 and 
1882, the struggle for control over shipping revealed a marked 
cleavage within the dominant class between the 
McCall/Gillespie combine and the smaller merchants and 
planters.
By 1880, Gillespie owned four vessels (in partnership
with McCall) and chartered four or five annually. For several
years, they shipped four-fifths of the island's produce to the
UK, charging 3s 6d per cwt for freight, while in nearby
islands freight ranged from 2s 6d to Is 9d per cwt. Lt.-Gov.
Ussher commented in 1873:
The advantage to the merchant-planter, 
combining his speculation in Sugar es­
tates with a private fleet of his own, 
and the disadvantage to small producers 
unable to ship except at high prices 
will be tolerably apparent.^
In the late 1870s, C. E. Dunn and Co., London West India
50 C0285/91: Rawson to Kimberley, 13 Aug. 1873, enc. Ussher's 
1872 Blue Bk. Rept.
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merchants, who gave advances on a small scale to Tobago
planters, began sending ships to Tobago and charging lower
rates for freight than Gillespie. In response, in January 
1880, McCall lowered the freight on sugar and its by-products 
to 3s, but they doubled the charges on freight from the UK, as 
well as on coconuts shipped to the UK.^ Dunn was the only 
competitor in the steamship trade between the UK and Tobago.
While the transatlantic trade was almost exclusively
controlled by McCall/Gillespie, the inter-colonial trade,
particularly with Barbados, the entrepôt for US and British
goods, had been, from the 1830s, controlled by the smaller
local merchants. S. B. Isaacs and Co. and James Keens and Co.
were two of the firms owning the three sailing vessels which
plied between Tobago and Barbados.
The food supply, American breadstuffs, 
fish, lumber, oil ... are all brought 
from Barbados in three small schooners 
each about 40 tons burthen and 40 years 
old. A steamer from New York affording 
regular communication is greatly needed, 
but as the principal importers own these 
small vessels they will not encourage 
such a change, as they will lose the profit
of the freight ... The result is that all
the refuse flour and lumber of Barbados 
finds it [sic] way to Tobago, is retailed 
at high prices, ...
The local merchants wanted to retain their inter-colonial 
monopoly, while competing with McCall/Gillespie in the 
transatlantic trade. The latter tried to eliminate the trade
with Barbados, by bringing more shipping directly to Tobago
from Europe and North America. In 1882, Gillespie introduced
C0321/41: Gamble to Kimberley, 24 July 1880, & Encs. 
Rept. on the Blue Bk. for 1887. p. 6.
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Hoult's Line from Liverpool and Scrutton Sons and Co. from 
London, and in 1884 McCall brought an American line of 
steamers.^ From 1880, recognizing the growth in trade and 
migration between Tobago and Trinidad, McCall also ran a 
cutter as a passenger vessel between them.
The smaller Tobago merchants and planters, among them 
Edward Keens (James Keens' son, whose firm became Edward Keens 
and Co. after the father's death in 1878)*, Gordon 
Macdougall, attorney for Dunn and Co. and planter, and James 
Hackett, planter, formed in 1880, with Dunn and Co., The 
Tobago Steamship Co. Ltd., to build a 100-ton steamer. The 
Dawn, to ply between Tobago, Grenada, Barbados and Trinidad. 
The intention was to consolidate their hold on the inter­
colonial trade. The Dawn began to trade in October 1881. In 
February 1882, she was shipwrecked.*
Another contender in the carrying trade was the Royal 
Mail Steam Packet Co. (RMSPCO). Starting in 1840, its vessels 
carried passengers, mail and freight from the UK, and were a 
major link between the British colonies. In 1880-81, James 
McCall, backed by Gillespie and the West India Committee, 
militantly fought for the ending of the privileges granted to
* PP. 1881, Vol. LXIV. II, 1880 Blue Bk. Rept.; The News. 
22 March 1884.
* The Keens stores had been the best, but declined after 
1878. Judicial Ina. Com. Rent.. 1892, evidence of D. B. 
Horsford, Edward Keens' brother-in-law, p. 192.
* C0321/50: Dawson, Man. Dir., Tobago Steamship Co., to 
Kimberley, 10 Jan. 1881; Dawson was also a principal of 
Dunn & Co. The Times (Bridgetown), 1 March 1882, quot. The 
News (Scarborough), 18 Feb. 1882. The wreck was bought by 
Goodridge and Good (the Anderson brothers; Ch. 5).
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the RMSPCO vessels (which were exempt from harbour, pilotage, 
light and other dues), for the abolition of tonnage dues, and 
for Tobago to be a free port. The ostensible reason was that 
more transatlantic ships would call, and freight would be 
reduced. Dunn and Co., McCall's competitors, also wanted 
exemption for The Dawn from tonnage and other port dues.*
However, McCall's demands were intended, not only to 
decrease the competitiveness of the RMSPCO, but to eliminate 
the sailing vessels trafficking with Barbados. The smaller 
merchants vacillated. On the one hand, their shops would have 
benefitted from lower shipping dues; on the other, those in 
the shipping trade, according to James McCall, 'very frankly 
expressed their dread of too free competition.' But McCall was 
adamant. Even after the wreck of The Dawn, he pressed for the 
abolition of tonnage dues, to strengthen their hold on the 
shipping business, given the near bankruptcy by 1880 of most 
of the estates under their control.^
But the revenues of Tobago, of which customs dues formed 
a large part, would have suffered greatly by foregoing £500 
per year to the merchants, who were not likely to reduce 
retail prices. It was also unlikely that Tobago, with a small 
market, and without the telegraph, would have attracted many 
transatlantic vessels. Administrator Laborde railed at the 
'selfishness' of James McCall, Duncan McGillivray (a partner
* C0321/50: McCall to Kimberley, 14 Dec. 1881. Dawson to 
Kimberley, 10 Jan. 1881, 2 May 1881, 14 Oct. 1881, 14 Nov. 
1881.
C0321/59: Robinson to Kimberley, 6 Jan. 1882, Encs., esp. 
McCall & Co. to Kimberley, 22 Dec. 1881.
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of the McCalls and attorney for the Gillespies) , Colin 
Gillespie, and the West India Committee, all of whom pressed 
for the abolition of tonnage dues. He argued that such a 
policy would be 'a handsome present' to 'the wealthy 
Merchants'. But finally, the Government exempted steam vessels 
(the local merchants had sailing ships) from harbour, 
pilotage, wharfage and light dues, and halved the duty on 
cargo inwards and outwards; dues on registered tonnage were 
abolished. The London officials agreed that within a year all 
tonnage dues should be abolished.^*
VII.3.4 The Galling Yoke
The wreck of The Dawn, following hard on the collapse of
Dunn and Co. early in 1882, symbolized the failure of the
smaller planters and merchants to extricate themselves from
the yoke of the McCall/Gillespie combine. L. G. Hay, the
Treasurer, told the 1883 Royal Commission:
Dunn and Co. failed at beginning [sic] of 
1882 and affected all the planters. Thev 
tried to cut out Gillespies and failed.
In the absence of local or regional sources of capital,
another small metropolitan merchant house was the leverage
used against the Gillespies. The root problem was capital.
Hay continued:
The monopoly of the Gillespies is bad; 
what the islands want is capitalists; all
C0321/70: Robinson to Kimberley, 3 Jan. 1883, 8 Jan. 1883, 
25 Jan. 1883, & Encs. Quot. is from the last despatch, 
Enc. 2, Laborde to Robinson, 30 Oct. 1882. C0321/59: 
Robinson to Kimberley, 27 May 1882, enc. Amendment to 
Tonnage Dues Ord. The Rept. from the Roval Com. .... 
1884, p. 331, saw the dues as 'excessively high'.
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planters have to ship by the Gillespies' 
bottoms, and the advances they do give are 
paltry, compared with what is needed.^
Whether because they invested more heavily elsewhere in 
the Caribbean or, as The News^ argued, in the coffee trade of 
the East, or because they could not afford the central factory 
and expensive equipment needed to modernize the Tobago 
estates, or because their commissions on advances, freight, 
supplies, sales and consigneeship were sufficiently lucrative, 
Gillespie deliberately kept the Tobago estates at a minimal 
level of investment, while tying them to sugar. The planters 
and merchants were unable to stop it.
Thus, by 1884, there were open conflicts of interest 
within the dominant class. The control of the monopolists over 
credit, production, and shipping engendered opposition from 
the smaller planters and merchants. A resident proprietary 
able to generate profits sufficient to allow them more freedom 
from the sugar merchants did not emerge before 1884.
The failure to diversify away from sugar was due to the 
lack of capital and the close dependence on small sugar 
merchants for meagre advances. Because Tobago was a minor 
producer, it did not interest larger investors, attracted to 
the newer, larger colonies. And since the smaller merchants, 
'principally those financing muscovado estates in the smaller 
islands' were the most vulnerable [Beachey 1957:59], it is no
Rent, from the Roval Com.....  1884, pp. 407-8; emphasis
added.
60 3 May 1884, Leader, p. 2.
435
accident that the three main Tobago investors, Gillespie^, 
Reid and Dunn, all failed in the Depression of the 1880s. 
Further, the extent of diversification and the level of
technological advance determined the degree to which the 
colonies succumbed to the crisis [Beachey 1957:60]; the near
monopoly of Gillespie inhibited both. Thus, the sugar
planters, as if caught in pincer moves from the merchant
houses without, and the metayers within, were doomed.
VII.4 SOCIAL CLASS. COLOUR AND STATE POWER: 1838-1876 
VII.4.1 Introduction
The political process mediates, and is mediated by, the 
alliances and conflicts of groups in society. In Tobago, 
control over the state was crucial to the interests of all 
classes. Firstly, the constitution and the franchise 
determined access to the levers of power, and reflected the 
relative weight of classes, blocs and alliances in the social 
and political process. Secondly, the policies of the state on 
land, taxation and immigration were vital to the power of 
planters and labourers. All of these issues are interrelated, 
and indispensable to understanding both the process of
The Gillespies were not personally bankrupt. Colin and 
William Gillespie reopened in the 1880s as Gillespie Bros 
& Co. at the same Crutched Friars address, London; Alex. 
M. Gillespie, their father, left real and personal estate, 
with instructions that his funds be invested. Somerset 
House: Bk. of Wills No. 1/1905, Will of A. M. Gillespie, 
dd. 18 July 1898. Salmon [1888:167] states that 'the mono­
polists' in Tobago 'transferred their capital to other 
places where this cultivation pays better.' In 1896, the 
Gillespies still had 'business relations' with most of 
the BWI: Colin Gillespie, WI Roval Com. Rent.. 1897, App. 
C, Pt. 1, p. 185.
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accumulation and the dynamics of intra- and inter-class 
relationships. Therefore, they are now examined. The role of 
the Colonial Office, which pursued 'imperial interests', 
distinct from, and often opposed to, the interests of both 
metropolitan and resident planters and merchants, is shown to 
have been critical to, but also dependent upon, the struggles 
between the dominant and labouring classes.
VII.4.2 The Struggle for Executive Control; 1838-1863
By 1838, the West Indian Assemblies were entrenched in 
their fight for autonomy from executive control. The erosion 
of their power in the conflicts over slavery had increased 
their intransigence. The Jamaican Assembly, angry at what it 
saw as the highhandedness of the UK Parliament in imposing 
emancipation, revolted when, in July 1838, Parliament passed 
The West India Prisons Act, since prison conditions and the 
treatment of blacks were closely related. The Jamaican 
Assembly refused to transact business; it was prorogued by 
Gov. Smith and dissolved 'for contumacy', but after new 
elections, most of its old members were returned and Smith had 
to prorogue again until February 1839 [Ward 1976:117-121].
Henry Taylor, Senior Clerk in the West Indian department 
of the Colonial Office, wrote a Cabinet Minute, in which he 
argued that no West Indian Government could be trusted to rule 
responsibly in respect of the ex-slaves. The ascendancy of 
the planters might be replaced by a worse ascendancy of 
coloureds or blacks, which 'would change the complexion of the
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evil to be dealt with, but not reduce its magnitude'.^ 
Therefore, he wanted all Assemblies abolished, to be replaced 
either by a legislative commission to visit the West Indies 
and make the necessary laws, or by Crown Colonies with wholly
nominated legislatures (as obtained in St Lucia and Trinidad);
he preferred the latter, which would place initiative and 
control in London. Taylor was adamant that popular 
constituencies were out of the question: the Crown was 'the 
only possible representative of the people.'^ Glenelg, his 
Minister, vacillated. The Cabinet was divided. The Government 
attempted to persuade the House of Commons to suspend 
Jamaica's constitution for five years, but won by a narrow 
majority of 5, and the Whig Government had to resign. 
Eventually, a policy of conciliation with the Jamaican 
Assembly was followed, the UK agreeing to co-operate in 
allowing state-assisted immigration. The Jamaican case 
provided a framework for dealing with the other Assemblies.
After 1840, therefore, with the decline of the anti­
slavery lobby in Britain, there was little interest in the 
welfare of the freedpeople.
Their advocates in Exeter Hall made rep­
resentations from time to time on immigra­
tion policy and other matters to the 
Colonial Office, the clerks in the Colonial 
Office read the reports of the stipend­
iary magistrates; and policy there was 
none. ... the conventional view was still 
that there was every reason to be satis­
fied with their condition.
[Morrell 1966:162]
Taylor to Stephen, 24 Oct. 1838, in Taylor [1885, 1:257].62
Taylor to Fairfield, 26 March 1871, in Higham [1926:94].
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Thus, while the franchise needed to be broadened, the
executive was seldom willing to press for it, except where 
they hoped to constitute a new legislature, more amenable to 
their own wishes.
In Tobago, the leading attorneys continued to control the 
Assembly. Alexander Macdougall took up this mantle from 
Alexander Gairdner (Ch. 2) in the 1840s, James Leith and Chief 
Justice Sanderson in the late 1850s and 1860s; after 1870, 
John McCall (until his death in 1879), succeeded by his
brother, James, were the influential brokers of power between 
the executive and the planters.
Between 1846-48, when supplies were withheld for two
years, the Gov.-in-Chief, Grey, realizing that a dissolution
would probably result in a more intransigent Assembly,
considered extending the franchise. But the London officials
refused to do so. To widen the franchise would grant more
power to the coloureds, a few of whom were already
Assemblymen; therefore the whites had to be upheld in power.
James Stephen minuted:
Our choice ... lies between the main­
tenance of Oligarchies, like those we 
have at present, and the creation of 
democracies, in which the coloured will 
ere long, triumph over, exclude, and 
persecute the White or European settlers.
The latter may be a right choice, but it 
is not a choice to which any one would 
willingly be reduced.*
New elections were held in September 1847, with 110 voters;
and a Bill to widen the franchise was abandoned in 1849,
* C0285/55: Grey to Gladstone, 2 July 1846, & Encs.; 
minutes, esp. Stephen's, 10 Aug. 1846.
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because the Assembly found it 'unpalatable'.^
The deadlock between the executive and the planters
continued. In 1852, after the Land Tax Act (Ch. 3) provoked a
riot, Administrator Henry Yeates' intervention led to yet
another constitutional crisis. By January 1853, the Privy
Council, tired of recommendations to the Assembly being
ignored, put pressure on Yeates to seize the initiative,
rather than allow the Assembly to frustrate good government.
Sanderson, the Chief Justice, said;
I attribute the disastrous state of the 
Colony, its bankrupt exchequer, and its 
legislation, in which it is behind all 
other Colonies ... to the course which 
has been invariably adopted by the 
Executive ... of remaining perfectly 
inactive, awaiting measures to be origin­
ated by the Council and Assembly ... .
The answer to the 'degraded condition' of Tobago was executive
initiative and well-prepared laws.
The Colonial Office supported the Privy Council. But
Yeates, with the support of Gov. Colebrooke, backed away from
what he saw as a collision course with the Assembly.“ Yeates
later complained to the legislature of the emasculation of the
executive by the Assembly:
The state of our Roads, the state of our 
Public Buildings, the condition of our 
Jails, the Bankrupt state of our Exchequer, 
all indicate a want of power in the 
Executive ... principally attributable to 
the deficiency of its pecuniary means ... 
centralization of power ... has been ...
C0285/57: Reid to Grey, 8 Sept. 1847; CO285/60: Colebrooke 
to Grey, 28 March 1849, enc. Graeme (quoted) to 
Colebrooke, 14 Mar. 1849.
“ C0285/66: Colebrooke to Newcastle, 2 May 1853, & Encs.; 
Enc. 7, Privy Council minutes, 18 Jan. 1853.
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lost, the Executive power weakened ..., 
and the character of the Government ... 
superseded by an Oligarchy. ... [E]very 
thing within this Colony betokens 
retrogression.
In response, the Assembly declared that it was not willing to 
give up any of its prerogatives, but intimated that it would 
co-operate with an Executive Committee.
The Executive Committee, the brainchild of the Jamaican 
Assembly, was the middle ground between the two real options 
in the constitutional deadlock: either responsible government 
with the legislature controlling the executive, or executive 
control [Wrong 1963/1969:63-4]. First introduced in Jamaica 
in 1854, it was intended to improve the machinery of 
government by having at least one spokesman for the executive 
in each House, and vesting all initiative on money votes in 
the executive.^* It was the most feasible option to officials 
committed to the view that only white minorities should rule.
The Bill authorizing the Executive Committee passed both 
Tobago Houses, but the initiative for money Bills was not 
vested in the executive; instead, the Assembly decided to 
restrain money votes by annual standing orders. The 
Legislative Councillors, previously appointed 'during 
pleasure', were to hold office for life; the franchise, 
however, remained the same.^
C0285/67: Colebrooke to Newcastle, 14 June 1854, Yeates' 
Address, 13 Sept. 1853.
As a quid pro quo, the UK guaranteed £500,000 of Jamaica's 
debt, and advanced a further £50,000 [Wrong 1963/1969:63].
CO285/70: Colebrooke to Grey, 7 March 1855, & Encs.; cf. 
Morrell [1969:389-390].
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The view from below was different from that of the
planters and the Colonial Office, each wanting their own rule.
Following a memorial from the Assembly asking for the removal
of Shortland, 93 persons, 'principally mechanics and
labourers', sent a counter-memorial, calling for the removal
of the Assembly, for the widening of the franchise, and 'the
elevating of men who may be more usefully acquainted' with the
people's affairs.
"Assembly" can, as stands now, produce 
nothing good, for the use of the Colony,
in its present state, without a Change in
the present enfranchisement. and let a new
one be made so, as to reduce the ...
qualification for Membership, ...
These labourers felt that both the candidates and the voters
should include the less wealthy. The London officials
concurred, but did nothing about it.^ °
The Executive Committee began in 1856, under Drysdale's
administration, and both Houses again agreed to widen the
franchise. (The Franchise Act was passed in 1858.) But by
December 1859, the weaknesses of the Executive Committee had
become apparent, particularly on the issue of taxation for
immigration, which the planters wanted, as a means of ending
the metayage system.
The Executive Committee and Drysdale proposed to raise
funds for immigration by a property tax which would fall
mainly on the estates. The Assembly promptly voted no
confidence in the Committee, and Drysdale was obliged to
appoint a new Committee led by James Leith, the leader of the
C0285/70: Colebrooke to Sec. of State, 5 Apr. 1855 (2 
despatches), & Encs.; authors' emphases.
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Assembly. The new Committee, with the agreement of both
Houses, proposed to raise funds for immigration by a tax on
exports, including the produce of metayers. Gov. Hincks asked
that the loan also requested (£30,000) be not sanctioned.^
The loan was refused, but the executive was put in the
anomalous position of not agreeing with the policy of its
Executive Committee. The problem, ultimately, was the
unrepresentative basis of government. Drysdale concluded:
The true basis of all forms of Respon­
sible Government must be Representation,
but Representation in so far as it con­
cerns the people of Tobago, is a mere 
fallacy, twelve at least of the whole 
sixteen Members of the Assembly being the 
nominees of one single individual.^
In 1860, the executive capitulated to the same interests
in the legislature that the Executive Committee had been
designed to overrule. Hincks' counsel to Administrator Baynes,
to avoid the stoppage of supplies, was that 'the policy of the
Government must take its line in a great degree from the
Executive Committee', except where 'imperial interests' were
involved. The Colonial Office agreed, and this became the
official position.^
C0285/78: Hincks to Newcastle, 4 Jan. 1860, & Encs. The 
Bill was lost because it was tied to an imperial loan.
In 1862, a revised Export Duty Bill failed because, though 
it was passed by the Assembly, it was opposed by James 
Leith, on the grounds that he had not been consulted. 
C0285/80: Hincks to Newcastle, 14 Feb. 1862. After that, 
because of the cost, another Bill was not passed until 
1870.
C0285/78: Hincks to Newcastle, 5 May 1860, Enc. 5, 
Drysdale to Hincks, 4 Apr. 1860.
C0285/78: Hincks to Newcastle, 12 Oct. 1860, Hincks to 
Baynes, 11 Oct. 1860; Newcastle to Hincks, 11 Dec. 1860.
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In 1862, new elections were held under the 1858 Franchise 
Act. The Act lowered the qualifications for the vote to 
persons owning or renting land or buildings worth £10, but 
raised those for candidates to £200 annual income (from £100 
annuity or £150 salary). The elections made no difference to 
the composition of the House. Representative Government, said 
Drysdale, was 'a mere fiction'; and he deemed it 'no surprise 
... should class legislation be found to dominate over the 
interests of all.' Except for one constituency, the elections 
were uncontested, the new members having been returned through 
the influence of a few prominent planters. To crown it all, 
2 members were elected in 1 parish by an illiterate.^
The Assembly, having regained control of the Government, 
asked that the Executive Committee be abolished.^ On 27 
March 1863, the Assembly carried without division a motion 
that the rule giving initiative for money grants to the 
executive be expunged [Woodcock 1867/1971:133].
To sum up, the Executive Committee was 'a strange 
contrivance' [Wrong 1963/1969:66]. It was difficult to find 
people who would not oppose the executive, that would also be 
acceptable to the legislature. The Committee became a game of 
musical chairs, as it were, with frequent resignations, 
removals, dissolutions and reconstitutions; 11 changes were 
made in 8 years and, on one occasion, 4 months elapsed before
C0285/80: Walker to Newcastle, 30 June 1862, enc. 
Drysdale's 1861 Blue Bk. Rept.; 30 July 1862, & Encs.; 
C0285/81: Walker to Newcastle, 17 June 1863, enc. 
Drysdale's 1862 Blue Bk. Rept.
C0285/80: Walker to Newcastle, 14 & 29 Nov. 1862, & Encs.
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3 persons could be found to serve. In 1863, Drysdale confessed 
that only 'the interchange of addresses' had been achieved. 
Nothing major was accomplished before his departure in 1865.^^
Financial policy returned to the old patterns, marked by 
lateness of supplies, deficiency in appropriations, private 
money votes and reckless expenditure. The executive did not 
oppose, for fear of the capricious refusal of supplies. In 
such circumstances, 'There need be no surprise ... that 
colonial exchequers ... were chronically close to bankruptcy' 
[Rogers 1970:47]. Tobago was an apt example of this.
VII.4.3 The Making of a Crown Colonv: 1863-1876
After the fiasco of 1839 and the failure to bring to heel 
the Jamaican Assembly, the Colonial Office played a waiting 
game with the West Indian Assemblies, expecting that their 
errors would lead to chaos, which would force them to become 
Crown Colonies. In 1865, the Jamaican Assembly, following on 
the Morant Bay rebellion, was pressured into surrendering its 
constitution and accepting a wholly nominated Crown Colony 
legislature.^
The British strategy after 1865 was to urge on its 
administrators the introduction of simplified legislatures - 
single chambers with a nominated majority, the balance of 
power favouring the Crown. In the Leeward Islands, through 
the energy and skill of Gov. Benjamin Pine, this was
76 C0285/81: Walker to Newcastle, 24 Mar. 1863, Sub.-Enc. 1.
^ For Henry Taylor's account of his role in this, see Taylor 
to Fairfield, 26 Mar. 1871, in Higham [1926:93-4].
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accomplished in St Kitts, Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat and 
Dominica, and in the Virgin Islands with Pine's backing, 
between 1866 and 1867 [Morrell 1969:436-8]. None of these 
Assemblies dissolved themselves voluntarily [Rogers 1970:4].
In the Windward Islands, the abolition of the Assemblies 
was slower, the opposition greater. The first breach in the 
Old Representative System was in St Vincent, where riots in 
1862, exposing the class and colour divisions, made the 
Assembly willing to follow the Jamaican example; in 1867, 
under pressure from Lord Carnarvon, on Taylor's advice, a 
casting vote in the single-chamber legislature was given to 
the Crown [Morrell 1969:438; Marshall 1983].
In 1868, the famous Circular Memorandum of the Earl of 
Buckingham and Chandos, then Secretary of State, summed up the 
Colonial Office position on this movement to Crown Colony 
status, while protesting that it was done 'voluntarily and 
without any suggestion from Her Majesty's Government.' The 
object was to establish a system of government whereby 'the 
financial condition of the Colonies should be improved and 
their commercial interests be promoted, crime repressed, and 
the welfare of all classes be better provided for.' The UK 
was also willing to provide imperial grants, once adequate 
powers were given to the Crown. It was deemed evident that the 
Crown had to be given control, since the uneducated blacks 
'were incapable of contributing to the formation of any 
intelligent public opinion'. Where the chambers were partly 
nominated, only the elected members could oppose the Crown, 
but their protest had to be sent through the Governor to the
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Secretary of State; all other members, including elected 
officials, were expected to co-operate with the Crown.^
In the mid 1860s, it was agreed at the Colonial Office 
that there should be a federation of the Leeward and Windward 
Islands. In 1869, Gov. Pine was instructed to combine the 
Leeward Islands into one colony with one legislature. By 
1871, his mission was accomplished [Morrell 1969:442-446].
In 1869, Governor Rawson Rawson was also instructed to 
federate Barbados and the Windward Islands. But the opposition 
to Confederation in those islands, where single-chamber 
legislatures had not yet been introduced (except in St 
Vincent), was formidable, since nominated majorities would 
deprive the planters of their control over finance.^
The difference in population and resources between 
Barbados and the Windwards would have given Barbados a 
disproportionate share of councillors in a federal Council. 
Rawson therefore felt that the matter should be approached in 
stages, with each colony having a single-chamber legislature 
and Crown Colony status first. He also thought that the 
economic advantages were likely to be 'illusory', since the 
Leeward Islands federation had increased costs. Kimberley, 
the Secretary of State, unwillingly conceded in November 1871
Barbados Archives: CSO: Buckingham and Chandos to Gov.-in- 
Chief, 17 Aug. 1868.
Rawson's successor, J. Pope-Hennessy (1875-76), sought by 
gradual means to bring about co-operation between the 
Windward Islands, with federation as the ultimate goal. 
Bidding for public support, he spoke on the social 
conditions in Barbados on 3 March 1876. When the Barbados 
labourers rioted at Easter 1876, all prospects of 
Barbados' participation in a Windward Islands federation 
were dead [Hamilton 1956; Levy 1980].
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that the matter could be approached in stages, but when there
was no further action by August 1872, he stepped up the
pressure, insisting on single-chamber legislatures for
Barbados, Grenada and Tobago.^
Rawson's strategy was to seek the support of the most
influential planters in the Assemblies. John McCall, the
rising man after the death of James Leith in 1867, was pivotal
to the conversion of Tobago to a Crown Colony.
In 1871, Tobago's Lt.-Gov. Kortright proposed widening
the franchise to include those possessing property with an
annual assessed or rental value between £5 and £10. He did it
because the Assembly had been in existence more than 8 years,
and a new election would have produced the same House by the
'same ridiculously small constituencies.'^
Both Rawson and Kortright immediately ran foul of the
Colonial Office. The sole concern of the UK Government was to
convert the BWI to Crown Colonies. Widening the franchise to
embrace more of the black segment of the middle strata, though
likely to increase support for the Lt.-Governor against the
planters, was counter to 'imperial interests'.
The views of the British officials on this are
particularly revealing. Henry Taylor argued:
Whichever franchise tends most to the con­
version of Tobago into a Crown Colony shd
Barbados Archives: Rawson to Kimberley, 8 Sept. 1871; 
Kimberley to Rawson, 2 Nov. 1871, 30 Aug. 1872; Rawson to 
Kimberley, 26 Sept. 1872, The West Indian. 22 Sept. 1876. 
Kimberley to Rawson, 1 May 1873; Carnarvon to Hennessy, 
25 Jan. 1876, The Gazette. 6 Mar. 1876.
C0285/89: Rawson to Kimberley, 29 Apr. 1871, & Encs.; 15 
Aug. 1871, Enc. 4, Kortright to Rawson, 1 Aug. 1871.
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be regarded as the best.
Kimberley told Rawson in strong terms that Tobago 'should be
well advised in following the example of Jamaica and becoming
a Crown Colony or in default, like the Leeward Islands,
have a single chamber with a Crown majority.*^
The London officials were clear, both about their
objectives and about the divisions in West Indian society
which made it opportune to press for Crown Colony régimes.
It was Taylor who outlined their strategy:
Till about 8 or 10 years ago the W.Indian 
Assemblies were so jealous of any inter­
ference with their rights, that if anything 
was wanted of them, the Secy of State was 
studiously kept out of sight. I believe 
this jealousy exists still except in such 
instances, & in so far forth, as it has 
been supplanted by another jealousy, - 
the jealousy, not unmixed with fears, of 
the Blacks, which has lately taken 
possession of the White & Coloured Classes.
In some Colonies the White & Coloured Gentry 
were in danger of being ousted from 
political power by the increasing influence 
of the Blacks in the elections. In others 
there was the danger of Black insurrections, 
as exemplified in Jamaica in 1865. It is 
to these fears & jealousies, skilfully, but 
not perhaps very overtly, worked on by Sir 
B. Pine, ... that we owe the conversion of 
the Leewd Islds into quasi Crown Colonies.
The part taken by the Secy of State has 
been to stand aside, & when applied to, 
to say that the crown would have no objec­
tion to undertake the responsibility of 
governing the Colony if invested with 
adequate power ... ; & adequate power meant 
a casting vote in the Legislature.^
Rawson, under pressure to accomplish the mission of his
*2 C0285/89: Rawson to Kimberley, 29 Apr. 1871, & minutes; 
Kimberley to Rawson, 15 June 1871.
C0285/89: Rawson to Kimberley, 15 Aug. 1871; Taylor's 
minute.
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masters, went to Tobago in August 1871 for talks with 
Kortright. Both felt optimistic about changing the 
constitution to at least a single chamber, to be effected by 
publicizing Kimberley's views, dissolving the present House 
without anv change in franchise, and inducing a sufficient 
number of 'respectable gentlemen' to contest and sit for a few 
sessions, 'for the express purpose of ... establishing a 
single chamber.' Rawson recognized that it would be 
impossible to convert Tobago to a Crown Colony immediately. 
There was public suspicion that a single chamber would lead to 
Confederation and increased taxes. Therefore, he suggested 
that Confederation be kept 'out of sight', the Franchise Act 
disallowed, and an effort made to get the lesser change 
(single chamber) as the first step towards the greater. Rawson 
also suggested ways of inducing, bribing and flattering those 
whose support would be needed.^
By then a backwater of little imperial significance, 
Tobago was often called in the Colonial Office minutes, 'a 
miserable little Colony'. When Kortright was replaced by Lt.- 
Gov. Ussher in 1872, the Colonial Office reduced the Lt.- 
Governor's salary from £1300 to £1100.
Initially, Ussher recognized that only the biggest 
planters supported the move towards Crown Colony status, and 
was chary of broaching any constitutional issues:
I think the Single Chamber must be kept
out of sight at present ... There is a
84 C0285/89: Rawson to Kimberley, Conf., 26 Aug. 1871.
C0285/90: Law to Herbert, 19 July 1872; minutes by 
Wingfield and Herbert.
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strong feeling amongst the better Classes 
for it. - But a portion of the Lower House 
will feel that they will be extinguished 
at once.*®
However, by March 1873, Ussher strongly urged 'a thorough 
and speedy change in the Constitution of Tobago.' He wanted 
some of the principal officials removed because they were 
indebted to locals, owing to their small salaries, often paid
in arrears; and they were caught in the pervasive atmosphere
of 'corruption and lethargy'. He described the lack of 
executive control and the absence of checks on public 
expenditure, resulting in a bankrupt Treasury. Ussher 
suggested a single chamber, to be accomplished by dissolving 
the House, substituting 'one or two better men', and getting 
the House to vote for his measure.
The Colonial Office welcomed Ussher's analysis. However,
Kimberley refused to transfer inefficient officials, in the
hope that the situation would so worsen as to require the
imposition of a Crown Colony régime. He minuted:
This nest of corruption and lethargy must 
... grow more & more foul, and where 
the colony cannot pay its way, which seems 
to be a proximate event we shall have 
sufficient ground to propose to Parliament 
a bill to sweep the whole of the present 
system away. Meantime in order to lay the 
ground for this action, we should first
give the Tobago Legislature ample oppor­
tunity to reform itself.^
Keenly contested elections were held in October 1873,
86 C0285/91: Rawson to Kimberley, Conf., 10 Jan. 1873, enc. 
Ussher to Rawson (Extract), 7 Jan. 1873.
C0285/91: Rawson to Kimberley, Conf., 23 Apr. 1873, enc. 
Ussher to Rawson, Conf., 14 Mar. 1873; Kimberley's min., 
25 May 1873, & Kimberley to Rawson, Conf., 30 May 1873.
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under a new Franchise Act, with £5 worth of real property as
the minimum qualification, producing an Assembly more amenable
to Ussher. In May 1874, through John McCall's influence, the
House voted to convert the legislature to a single chamber of
6 nominated and 8 elected members; its life was to be 3 years,
under the same franchise. The Act was welcomed in the
Colonial Office as a step in the right direction.**
The constitutional issue revealed, as Ussher had
perceived, that the political interests of the larger planters
were not identical with those of the smaller planters and
lessees, and of the middle strata. Many of the latter, having
recently acquired the vote with the lower franchise, saw the
immediate contraction of their power under the new
constitution, which reduced the elected members from 16 to 8,
so giving disproportionate weight to the more sparsely
populated (the Windward) of the 7 parishes.
On the Assembly floor, Robert McEachnie, a coloured land
surveyor and auctioneer, gave a spirited defence of the
interests of the middle strata against those of McCall. The
Bill's supporters had justified it on the principle of giving
greater weight to property than to numbers. McEachnie argued:
Numbers in this sense means property also.
Each one of the many Electors possesses 
real property, varying in amount, but no 
case less than, will rent for, £5 per 
annum. Property, in their case certainly 
widely distributed and not in the condi­
tion of monopoly. That is the difference.
... we have among us a law-abiding people, 
in the middle class which has sprung up, 
and is springing up ... For over 100 years 
we had a constitution which was, to them.
88 C0321/3: Rawson to Carnarvon, 15 June 1874, & Encs.
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a dead-letter. It is but fourteen years 
now, since we brought down the franchise 
to £10, just within their reach. We have 
since seen the need of further reducing 
it to £5 ... Has [sic] any evil results 
followed these concessions?
McEachnie also argued that, since most of the indirect taxes
were paid by 'the people', while the plantations enjoyed
'numerous exemptions', 'representation should keep pace with
taxation.'
Robert Crooks, the Speaker, resigned his office, stating
that under the new constitution, he was 'deprived of all my
political rights'. But excepting McEachnie, S. B. Isaacs, a
Jewish merchant with populist leanings, and John Kitson, a
small planter, all of whom wanted an adjournment of 6 months,
the other members, because of their allegiance to McCall or to
Ussher, supported the measure.*’
In a memorial, 190 persons from among the smaller
planters and merchants and the middle strata objected to the
smaller House, fearing that 'the dominant party will be more
free to unite, and in almost every case secure the Single
Seat.' The thrust of their protest was that the new
legislature would erode their political gains. Referring to
the 1794 constitution under which only wealthy whites could
vote, and rehearsing the comments of Graeme, Keens, and
Drysdale on the narrow franchise (Table 95), they argued;
... the change brought about by the 
accumulation of property in the hands of 
the people since, [is] made of no account - 
1874, is in the eyes of its [the Bill's] 
promoters as 1794 ...
*’ C0288/26: Assembly minutes, 23 May 1874.
453
Ussher protested that McCall, 'the mover and promoter' of 
the Bill, had 'really divested himself of the greater part of 
his power; and distributed it between the Government and the 
Electors.'^ In fact, McCall had calculated that his power 
would have been undiminished by the movement towards Crown 
rule; he therefore sacrificed the interests of the smaller 
planters and merchants, and of the middle strata and labouring 
class, wanting greater access to power, for his closer 
personal and corporate alliance with the Colonial Office.
TABLE 95
The Tobago Electorate: 1837-1876
Qualified
Year Voters Voters
1837 129 101
1847 153 110
1855 122 93
1857 102 66
1862 216 89
1873 215 166
1876* 301 144
NOTE; * Voting for a single-chamber legislature.
Sources: C0285/80: Walker to Newcastle, 30 June 1862, enc. 
Drysdale's 1861 Blue Bk. Kept., for 1837-1857; C0290 series: 
Blue Bks. for subsequent years.
^ C0321/3: Rawson to Carnarvon, 24 July 1874, enc. Memorial, 
and Ussher to Rawson, 4 July 1874. One of the movers of 
the Bill, J. G. Anderson, was from 1884 to oppose the 
Crown Colony régime he had helped to promote (Ch. 5).
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The Belmanna riots at Windward in May 1876 finally 
provided the opportunity awaited by the Colonial Office. The 
riots (Ch. 4) displayed both the strength of class antagonisms 
and the vulnerability of the dominant class, who discovered, 
in the words of the Privy Council, that they had been living 
on 'a half extinct volcano' which 'only slumbered to awake to 
meditated destruction.'^ Having no telegraph, the Lt.- 
Governor had to send by boat to Grenada to ask for a telegram 
to Barbados requesting troops. The riots also revealed serious 
limits to the personal influence of McCall, who 'thought he 
could depend upon the people upon his own Estate, as well as 
by his influence assist in keeping quiet those inclined to be 
riotous. Your Excellency will perceive how mistaken he must 
have been'
Thus, on 23 May 1876, the Assembly met, and James Kirk 
jun., white Creole planter from the Windward District, 
resolved that they ask Her Majesty to devise such a form of 
government as in her wisdom might seem most conducive to 
Tobago's welfare. The large landowners 'strenuously 
supported'” the Bill. R. B. Anderson who, with his brother, 
had been chased from the Windward District during the riots, 
wanted the powers of government 'so increased, that the law 
might once more be held in ... awe.'
” C0321/13: Hennessy to Carnarvon, 5 Sept. 1876, enc.
Privy Council minutes, 17 May 1876.
” C0321/13: Hennessy to Carnarvon, 11 May 1876, & Encs., 
esp. Harley to Hennessy, 9 May 1876.
” C0321/13: Hennessy to Carnarvon, 10 June 1876, Attorney- 
General 's rept.
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McEachnie predicted bitter regret, arguing that the House 
could vote funds for its better protection, rather than 
surrender the right of decision on heavy taxation. T. M. 
Sealy, a white Barbadian planter, implored the House not to 
act rashly, since the real meaning of Crown Colony was heavy 
taxation without representation.* In spite of the dissenting 
voices, now including Gordon Macdougall, the motion was moved 
by C. L. Abbott*, seconded by William McCall, and passed on 
26 May.
Thus, the Colonial Office gained its objectives at no 
cost to the Crown. The constitution given to Tobago, Grenada 
and St Vincent in 1876 provided for a wholly nominated 
Legislative Council, with 3 nominated unofficials besides the 
Lt.-Governor and 3 officials sitting ex officio. Three members 
and the Lt.-Governor constituted a quorum; only the Lt.- 
Governor could initiate money votes and only he could allow a 
member, who had to apply in writing, to propose any law, 
resolution or vote affecting the revenue.*
The biggest planters surrendered their powers in the hope 
that there would be better military protection against the 
labouring class, and investment in the central factory which 
neither Gillespie nor they could finance. But these were not
* Barbados Globe. 13 July 1876, quo. People (Scarborough), 
24 June 1876; cf. C0288/26: Assembly minutes, 23, 26 & 27 
May 1876.
* A young barrister, son of S. H. F. Abbott, who in 1870 was 
the first local man to be called to the Bar. The 
professionals (Drs Buhôt, Anderson; Abbott) , the officials 
(H. Byng), the 3 McCall brothers, J. Kirk and R. Pile 
(Windward planters) supported the measure.
* C0321/24; Strahan to Carnarvon, 29 Jan. 1878, & Encs.
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the objectives of the Colonial Office in the impending crisis 
of the economy and the state.
VII.4.4 Public Policy: 1838-1876
The public business was conducted capriciously. The 
Supply Act, whenever passed, was usually for the year (or 
years) preceding. The revenue was usually partly of fixed 
revenues for the current year and funds raised to meet the 
expenses of the previous one; expenditure was of fixed 
liabilities of the current year and contingent expenses of the 
previous one. Shortland complained: 'In reality the Revenue is 
first spent and afterwards appropriated'; and appropriations 
often exceeded the revenue.^
There was little concern for public institutions and 
works. The Assembly refused to establish an almshouse until 
one was started by Lt.-Gov. and Mrs Graeme in 1848 after the 
1847 hurricane; it was supported by private donations, but 
remained starved of public funds.^ There was no hospital or 
public dispensary until 1876, and the sexes were not separated 
at the new hospital. The 1883 Royal Commission described it 
as the worst in the West Indies. The insane were sent to the 
Grenada asylum or to the local jail. The administration of 
justice, for the most part in the hands of planters who served 
as Justices of the Peace and local magistrates, was wanting, 
as the history of metayage amply illustrates. The schools.
^ C0285/70: Colebrooke to Russell, 7 Aug. 1855, Shortland's 
1855 Blue Bk. Rept.
C0290/4: Stip. Mag. Repts., 30 June 1853, enc. Rept. of 
Sub-Committee of Assembly on Alms House, 23 May 1853.
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including the Free School in Scarborough, were run by the 
Churches, with the Moravian schools usually the best. The 
entire record of reports on the schools is one of insufficient 
government grants, resulting in minimal facilities, and 
teachers' salaries too low (at times equal to a labourer's 
wage) and too often paid in arrears, to attract well qualified 
persons. There was no school for those who could afford to go 
beyond the rudimentary teaching at primary level. The roads 
were repaired by a particularly wasteful system, whereby 
unpaid waywardens (usually planters, attorneys or managers) 
supervised compulsory male labour, or the labour of ageing or 
female substitutes (Ch. 6), and spent large sums without 
accountability. Jetties, public buildings and every public 
service were likewise starved of funds. The pattern of 
expenditure is shown in Table 96.
Recommendations on all these issues were urged upon the 
Assembly by the executive at the start of each legislative 
session; but little was done. Legislation and administration 
remained in permanent derangement.
Apart from the franchise (discussed above) , and land 
(Chs. 3, 4), taxation and immigration were the most important 
areas of public policy. These are now briefly discussed.
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TABLE 96
Tobago Government Expenditure: 1845-1886 (Pounds Sterling)
1845 1850 1855 1860 1865 1870
Civil Service 1545.12. 3 2052. 7. 2 2014.14. 1 2038. 0.10 2170. 0. 0 2185. 7.11
Ecclesiastical 1133. 5. 5 1060. 0. 0 921.17. 0 1022.18. 1 960. 0. 0 1060. 0. 0
Judicial 700. 0. 0 987.18. 11 650. 0. 0 800. 0. 0 1430. 8. 4 1475. 5. 2*5
Police & Jail 794. 5. 5 1256.13. 9 2271. 8. 4 h 1809. 9. 8 1594.14. 4 1902. 7. 7
Militia 67.19. 6 82. 5. 0 25. 0. 0 - - -
Education - - 84. 7. 6 359.10. 8 300. 0. 0 300. 0. 0
Hospitals/
Health - - - - - -
Paupers 45. 9. 0 76. 8. 4 19.12. 0 227. 3. 1 264. 1. 5 464.17. 0
Public Works 303. 4. 8*5 553. 4. 8 86. 1.11 337. 4. 4 200. 0. 0 323. 2. 6
Coroners 68. 3. 6 139.19. 6 168.12. 9 102.10. 0 186. 5. 6 236. 3. 3
Road Labour 614. 1. 8 828. 1. 6 348.11. 2 856. 3. 3 663. 2. 1 999.16. 3
Printing - - - 150. 0. 0 278.18. 0 268.13. 0
Immigration 410. 0. 0 - - - - 893. 9. 4
Hurricane
Loan - - 621.14. 6 117. 0. 0 - 691. 9. 0
Land Tax - - 243.12. 4 - - -
Tariff Officers - 441.14. 0 - - - -
Mise. 898.19.10 1341. 2. 3 264.15. 6 1190. 7. 0*5 517.18. 8 855. 0. 8
Arrears of
Expenditure 834. 1. 0% 17.10. 0 1494.18. 4 1088. 0. 5
TOTAL £6581. 1. 3*5 £8819.15. 1 £ 8 5 8 1 .  8 .  2*5 £ 9 0 2 7 . 1 6 . 1 1 * 5 £ 1 0 0 6 0 .  6 . 8 £ 1 2 4 7 3 . 1 2 . 1 * 5
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TABLE 96 concluded
Tobago Government Expenditure: 1845-1886 (Pounds Sterling)
1875 1880 1884 1886
civil Service* 1770.12. 2 2485.14. 3621.10. 1 2416. 9. 5
Ecclesiastical 1060. 0. 0 971.13. 4 1060. 0. 0 794.19.10
Judicial 1330. 0. 0 1777.15. 4 1650.10. 6 1243. 2. 4
Police & Jail 2058.11. 2 1918.14. 5 2339. 0. 1 1500. 4. 3
Militia - 113.11. 9 148.13. 8 -
Education 300. 0. 0 444.11. 2 770. 0. 0 500. 0. 0
Hospitals/Health 321.18.10 573. 9. 0 892.15. 2 592. 6.10
Paupers 367.14. 3 — 153.17. 4 157.18. 2
Public Works 341. 9. 1 1165.15. 6 1339.15. 9 371.10.11%
Coroners 213.16. 6 - - -
Road Labour 765.12. 9 - - -
Printing (inc.
stationery) 206.13. 4 219. 3.10 360. 2. 8 143.12. 5
Tariff
Officers 117. 6. 5 - - —
Mise. 771. 5. 9 599.12. 1 1144.12. 9 1808.17. 7%
Arrears of
Expenditure 1859.10. 0 3244. 7. 8 — —
TOTAL 11484.10. 3 13514. 8. Q h 13480.18. 0** 9529. 1.10
NOTES;
* Includes medical officers after 1876.
** Blue Book gives £13481 18s Od as total.
Sources; CO290 series: Blue Books for given years.
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\During slavery, most of the revenue was raised directly;
but after 1838, most of the colonies reduced the share of the
revenue from direct taxes, and raised the contribution of
duties on imports, exports and tonnage. Within the Windward
Islands, until 1850, Tobago was exceptional in reducing the
customs and increasing the direct taxes, which, as Colebrooke
observed, 'have for the most part been levied on the
productive industry of the labouring classes'.^
Yeates noted:
Many of the assessed taxes are unequal, 
and press more heavily on the labouring 
class than is perhaps advisable. A 
labourer's dog is taxed only Is less than 
his employer's hogshead of sugar, and more 
than the tax on a puncheon of rum; his 
cottage is assessed 5% on its presumed 
rental value, while plantation buildings 
and dwelling houses are untaxed altogether; 
if he presume to own, or even to use, a gun, 
he is charged IE ; his employer, who keeps 
a gun for sport only is charged no greater 
sum. Even fishing boats pay a heavy tax ... .***
However, the Colonial Office, particularly in the tenure 
of Earl Grey (1846-1852), regarded high direct taxes as a 
stimulant to 'industry' (meaning wage labour for the estates); 
Grey saw it as 'just & expedient' that a high 'proportion of 
the public burthens should be thrown upon the Labouring 
Classes'.
In the recurrent political deadlock between the Assembly
* PP. 1851, Vol. XXXIV, Colebrooke to Grey, 27 Aug. 1851, 
p. 55.
PP. 1851, Vol. XXXIV, 1850 Blue Bk. Rept., p. 71.
C0285/62: Grey to Colebrooke, draft, 6 June 1850; cf. 
Grey [1853, 1:54-84].
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and the executive, even taxes of which the Colonial Office 
disapproved were sanctioned, so as not to delay or jeopardize 
the Supply Act. Over the years, however, although the policy 
of high direct taxes continued, a larger share of the revenue 
was contributed by customs dues, especially after 1865, when 
a 40% ad valorem duty was imposed on imports. Declining 
imports, exports and trade in the 1880s therefore posed a 
grave danger to the viability of the Government, since its 
major revenue base was eroded. (Tables 97, 98).
TABLE 97
Tobago. Sources of Government Revenue: 1830-1850 
(Pounds Sterling^
Customs Duties Assessed/
Year Imports Exports Tonnage Other Taxes TOTAL
1830 1073 — — — —
1835 910 - 754 174 1838
1840 - 2413 795 2805 6013
1845 2920 1285 562 1733 6500
1850 1001 - 453 7362 8816
Source; PP. 1851, Vol. XXXIV, Colebrooke to Grey, 27 Aug. 
1851, p. 57.
The undercurrent of discontent about the high direct 
taxes exploded in 1867 in a riot at Mason Hall, a populous 
village in the Middle District, when an attempt was made to 
enforce what Walker, the Governor, called 'some obnoxious 
penalties under the Dog Tax Act.' The Act required that 6s be 
paid by May each year for each dog, and 20s plus costs imposed 
on those convicted of having a dog, regardless of size or age, 
without license, within 60 days after the time fixed by the
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Act. To make matters worse, costs plus half of the penalty 
were paid to informers, who were usually police constables.
Several villagers, who had refused to pay the tax,
resisted the police when they tried to execute the
magistrates' warrants. Finally, on 17 September, such a
concerted opposition was offered to the police by villagers
armed with bludgeons, cutlasses, sticks and stones, that the
officers, beaten and shaken, were forced to retreat to town.
Inspector Crooks reported:
I was ... told to inform the Governor 
that they would not pay Dog License, 
fine or costs [,] that they would not 
go to Gaol - that they would not pay 
any Taxes at all - that he might bring 
Soldiers and kill them all and if he came 
there they would give him some [blows] 
too.^G
Kortright was conciliatory, but sent for troops.
The Mason Hall riot, which embarrassed the Government, 
exemplified the weakness of the executive vis-à-vis the 
Assembly. The executive had regarded the dog license as 
excessive, but it was nonetheless sanctioned. In 1868, dogs 
under 6 months were exempted, and the tax reduced to 4s, with 
penalty subject to the Court's discretion.
C0285/85: Walker to Buckingham and Chandos, 3 Oct. 1867, 
& Encs., esp. Sub-Enc. 5, Crooks to Hill, 17 Sept. 1867.
In 1878, the tax was reduced to 2s 6d because it was ig­
nored by both taxpayers and collectors.
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TABLE 98
Tobago Government Revenue: 1855-1886 (Pounds Sterling)
1855 1860 1865 1870
Customs
Import Duties 3609. 4. sh 4484.16. 7 5194. 8. 3 6675.17. 8
Tonnage Dues 312. 8. 7 333. 9. 0 267.12. 0 575.10. 0
Lighthouse Dues 58. 8. 3 79.14. 0 61.14. 3 160. 9. 0
Wharfage Dues &c — — — 165. 7.10
Sub-Total 3 9 8 0 .  1 . 3H (45.8%) 4 8 9 7 . 1 9 . 7 ( 6 3 . 1 % ) 5 5 2 3 . 1 4 . 6 ( 6 3 . 0 % ) 7 5 7 7 .  4 .  6 (62.3%)
Excise
Export Duty — - - 1061. 9. 0
Rum Duties 262.13. 0 - - 20. 8. 0
Stamp Rev, — - - —
Sub-Total 2 6 2 . 1 3 . 0 ( 3 . 0 % ) — — 1 0 8 1 . 1 7 .  0 ( 8.9%)
Licenses
Liquor 90. 0. 0 226.19. 0 164. 0. 0 271.10. 0
Stills - - - 405. 6. 8
Animals 696. 4. 0 615.16. 0 641. 2. 6 505. 1. 6
Guns 99. 0. 0 57. 0. 0 65. 5. 0 45. 5. 0
Boats 106.15. 9 51. 7. 6 44. 3. 1 52. 9. 3
Hucksters 30. 8. 0 9.12. 0 1.12. 0 2. 8. 0
Other 25. 0. 0 - 4. 0 —
Sub-Total 9 5 7 .  7 . 9 ( 1 1 . 0 % ) 9 6 0 .  5 . 6 ( 1 2 . 4 % ) 9 1 6 .  6 . 7 ( 1 0 . 5 % ) 1 2 8 2 .  0 .  5 (10.5%)
Taxes
Land & Bldgs. 2545. 3. 3 1367. 7. 6 2026. 1. 9 1849.12. 1
Road Tax - - 89.16. 0 71. 2. 0
Incomes 722.15. 8 - - —
Sub-Total 3 2 6 7 . 1 8 . 11 ( 3 7 . 6 % ) 1367. 7. 6 ( 1 7 . 6 % ) 2 1 1 5 . 1 7 . 9 ( 2 4 . 1 % ) 1 9 2 0 . 1 4 .  1 (15.8%)
Other
Incidental &c 213. 7. 3 532.13. 8 202.16. 6 297. 5. 2
In Aid of Revenue - - — —
Sub-Total 2 1 3 .  7 . 3 ( 2 .4 % ) 5 3 2 . 1 3 . 8 ( 6 . 9% ) 2 0 2 . 1 6 . 6 ( 2 . 3 % ) 2 9 7 .  5 .  2 ( 2.4%)
TOTAL 8 6 8 1 .  8 . 2H ( 9 9 . 8 % ) 7 7 5 8 .  6 . 3 (100%) 8 7 5 8 . 1 5 . 4 (99.9%) 1 2 1 5 9 .  1 .  2 (99.9%)
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TABLE 98 concluded
Tobago Government Revenue: 1855-1886 (Pounds Sterling)
1875 1880 1884 1886
Customs
Import Duties 6927. 8. 2 6108. 6. 1 4700. 8. 8 3562.17. 3%
Tonnage Dues 755.17. 6 510.17. 6 480.15. 4 175.10. 0
Lighthouse Dues 193. 2. 0 155.16. 6 137. 9. 0 106. 8. 0
Wharfage Dues &c 174. 5. 9 281. 2 .  4h 197.15.10% 145.14. 3%
Sub-Total 8 0 5 0 . 1 3 . 5 ( 7 0 . 2 % ) 7 0 5 6 .  2. 5H ( 5 0 . 4 % ) 5 5 1 6 .  8 . 1 0 % ( 4 8 . 2 % ) 3 9 9 0 .  9 .  7 (44.7%)
Excise
Export Duty - — — —
Rum Duties - 1387.14. 9h 1181.14. 0 1014. 6.10
Stamp Rev. - 353.14. 3 224. 5. 0 266. 5. 6
Sub-Total - - 1 7 4 1 .  9. OH ( 1 2 . 4 % ) 1 4 0 5 . 1 9 .  0 ( 1 2 . 3 % ) 1 2 8 0 . 1 2 .  4 (14.4%)
Licenses
Liquor 186. 0. 0 216.10. 0 231. 5 .  6 160. 0. 0
Stills 432.13. 4 107.10. 0 76.13. 4 18. 6. 8
Animals 562.11. 6 1163.13. 9 893. 4. 0 688.15. 0
Guns 24. 0. 0 51. 5 .  0 31.10. 0 26.10. 0
Boats 49. 2. 3 41.12. 6 42.15. 0 45.17. 6
Other - - - —
Sub-Total 1 2 5 4 .  7 . 1 ( 1 0 . 9 % ) 1 5 8 0 . 1 1 .  3 ( 1 1 . 2 % ) 1 2 7 5 .  7 . 1 0 ( 1 1 . 1 % ) 9 3 9 .  9 .  2 (10.5%)
Taxes
Land Sc Bldgs 1717. 5. 2 2731. 1.10 1861.15. 7 1899.17.11
Road Tax 79. 0. 0 169.13. 0 234.14. 0 62. 0. 0
Sub-Total 1 7 9 6 .  5 . 2 ( 1 5 . 7 % ) 2 9 0 0 . 1 4 . 1 0 ( 2 0 . 7 % ) 2 0 9 6 .  9 .  7 ( 1 8 . 3 % ) 1 9 6 1 . 1 7 . 1 1 (22.0%)
Other
Incidental &c 368. 3. 3 40.14. 3 492.17. 1% 307. 7. 4
In Aid of Revenue* - 683.10. 4H 665. 8. 8% 436. 7. 6
Sub-Total 368. 3. 3 ( 3 .2 % ) 7 2 4 .  4 .  7H ( 5 .2 % ) 1 1 5 8 .  5 . 1 0 ( 1 0 . 1 % ) 7 4 3 . 1 4 . 1 0 ( 8.3%)
TOTAL 1 1 4 6 9 .  8 . 11 (100%) 1 4 0 0 3 .  2. 2H ( 9 9 . 9 % ) 1 1 4 5 2 . 1 1 .  1 (100%) 8 9 1 6 .  3 . 1 0 (99.9%)
NOTE: * Usually loans. Sources: CO290 series, Blue Bks. for given years.
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Immigration policy, important to both planters and 
labourers, likewise favoured the planters, whose consistent 
strategy was to tax the labourers in aid of immigration. The 
1852 Land Tax and the export duty on sugar and its by-products 
in the Drysdale administration had this intent. In 1870, the 
Assembly passed an Act to raise a duty on the major exports 
and to apply all the revenue so raised to immigration. The 
House wanted two-thirds of the expenses on immigration to be 
paid by funds raised under the Act, and one-third to be paid 
from the general revenue. Thus, immigration to undercut the 
metayers was to be wholly financed by the public. Kortright, 
more amenable to the planters' wishes than Drysdale, who had 
opposed such legislation, willingly took what he acknowledged 
to be a financial risk in sanctioning it, in spite of the 
public debt.
But after the Liberated Africans arriving in 1862, Tobago 
received no further foreign immigration. For officially 
sanctioned immigration, the planters had to compete with more 
influential colonies, and would have had to pay for medical 
and other facilities, which they were unwilling to do. When, 
in 1872, the Assembly requested captured Africans from East 
Africa, Rawson said that Tobago was incapable of using their 
s e r v i c e s . The request was not entertained.
An important matter for all classes in the 1870s was the 
establishment of a central factory. Gillespie and Co. were the
C0285/88: Rawson to Granville, 31 May, 29 June 1870, & 
Encs.; Rawson to Kimberley, 31 Oct. 1870.
C0285/90: Rawson to Kimberley, 14 June 1872, & Encs.
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authors of the plan, but Ussher wanted government intervention 
to promote more than one factory, or to guarantee 5% or 6% to 
the company. Alfred Chapman, a senior engineer from Fawcett, 
Preston and Co., Liverpool engineers, did a feasibility study 
for the Government in 1876; but the matter was overtaken by 
the Belmanna riots, and the officials ignored it, since their 
sole priority was the conversion of Tobago to a Crown 
Colony.^
Thus, although the planters had their way on most matters 
of state policy before Crown rule in 1877, they failed to 
achieve state support and guarantees to private capital for 
the crucial central factory, since this was not an 'imperial 
interest'.
VII.5 THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE: 1877-1886 
VII.5.1 Tobago under Crown Rule: 1877-1884
The relative power of the dominant class vis-à-vis the 
executive continued to be tested under the Crown Colony 
régime. The first taxes passed by the Gore administration in 
1877 increased the burden on larger properties from 10% to 15% 
of the rateable value, and removed the traditional exemptions 
on estate animals. However, Gore sought the help of Gillespie 
and Co. to get Chinese labourers, asking if Gillespie would, 
on the security of the general revenue, advance to the 
Government £5000 or £6000 for immigration. Gillespie declined
C0321/3: Hennessy to Carnarvon, 12 Apr. 1876, enc. 
Chapman Rept.; minutes, 12 July.
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to lend/°^ The importation of Chinese never occurred.
The combination of drought, short crops, falling sugar 
prices and declining imports meant declining revenue, while 
the expense of suppressing the Belmanna riots left the 
treasury with a deficit in 1878 of £3386. At the beginning of 
1879, the Government had to borrow £1000 from the Keens firm. 
In spite of rigid cuts, by July a second loan of £1000 was 
needed to meet the growing deficit.
So intractable was the situation that Gore proposed 
annexation to Trinidad, and abolition of most major public 
posts, to a saving of £2655 per annum.
In the meantime, the administration was beset by scandal 
after scandal, exposing the purloining of public funds and 
property by the senior officials of the Treasury and the 
police service; in addition, the senior police sergeant had 
kept a mistress in the barracks for several months. Gore 
himself was reprimanded for allowing the state to pay for his 
piano. Pregnancies in the prison were disclosed soon after, 
and the jailors were fired. In all, the administration was 
embarrassing to the Crown.
At the beginning of 1880, Meade at the Colonial Office, 
reporting to the UK Treasury on the financial condition of the 
Windward and Leeward Islands, indicated similar problems
C0289/2: Gore to Gillespie & Co., 7 Aug. 1878, & reply, 
31 Aug. 1878, Tobaao Gazette. 31 Jan. 1879.
*0* C0321/31: Dundas to Hicks Beach, 6 Feb. 1879, & Encs., 
esp. Gore to Dundas, 1 Jan. 1879.
C0321/31: Strahan to Hicks Beach, 30 Apr. 1879, & Encs. 
(2 despatches), 8 July, 29 July, 25 Nov., 5 Dec. 1879, 
Encs., & minutes.
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throughout, but stated that Tobago was
in a worse financial position than any 
other of the Windward Islands. There is at 
present a deficit of more than £1,250, 
without taking into consideration a loan 
of £1,000 which will have to be paid off 
before 1882. Apart from this, the exist­
ing revenue of the Colony barely suffices 
for its expenditure, and to withdraw the 
Lt. Governor's Salary would plunge Tobago 
in hopeless bankruptcy.
But in March, the Treasury ceased to pay for the Lt.-Governor.
The situation required increased taxation and further 
retrenchment. Gore proposed higher import duties, higher land 
taxes on all properties; and he reimposed the export duty, for 
general purposes and not for immigration. The unofficials in 
the Legislative Council, themselves planters and merchants, 
refused to support the export tax, for so long imposed when 
immigration was hoped for, but now unacceptable if it was to 
be applied to the general revenue. They embarrassed Gore by 
proposing to cut his salary from £1100 to £500, and only 
agreed to £600 as a compromise.
James McCall and Robert Gordon entered a 'most decided
protest' against the export tax:
For the last two years not one Estate of 
those under our Control realised any 
profit. These Estates ... form two thirds 
of the Sugar Plantations ... and the 
Majority of them have sustained enormous 
losses.
... even without additional burdens 
and with the most careful management it 
is very doubtful whether Sugar Cultiva­
tion can be much longer carried on in
no C0321/33: Meade to Sec. to Treasury, 10 Jan. 1880.
Gore was the last Lt.-Gov. In June 1880, the Leg. Co. 
voted to abolish the post and to have an Administrator/ 
Col. Sec. at £800 per annum.
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this Colony."2
On the taxation issue, all classes were united. The 
planters, lessees, merchants and shopkeepers protested. Gore 
backed down, giving up the export tax, while the Legislative 
Council agreed to increased property taxes and new taxes on 
imports.
The pressure from the planters and merchants for tax 
reliefs continued. As we saw above, in 1882, McCall and 
Gillespie waged a militant struggle for the abolition of 
tonnage dues. Colin Gillespie also went to the Colonial 
Office to complain of the evils of Tobago's administration. 
Gillespie opposed a water scheme proposed for Scarborough, 
seeing such expense as unwarranted, because 'it is chiefly a 
question of inconvenience. No epidemic has ever arisen from 
bad water, and we have never heard of serious scarcity'.
Like McCall, he provided an accurate view of the sugar 
economy: '... the position of nearly all the Estates is most 
critical. Every Estate in the Island (excepting two) has lost 
heavilv this crop and it is a serious question with many 
whether to go on or not.
Administrator Laborde analysed the statistics to show 
that the tax burden on estates was far less than that on the 
rest of the population, and that planters could not with 
reason 'cry to be "relieved from taxation"'.
Mr Gillespie as a non resident proprietor
“2 CO321/40: Strahan to Hicks Beach, 23 Apr. 1880, Sub-Enc. 
1 to Enc. 2.
CO321/60: C. M. Gillespie, 'Memo, as to Tobago's 
Finances', 6 Nov. 1882; author's emphasis.
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knows nothing of "serious scarcity" of 
water in Scarborough, recognizes no nec­
essity for raising a revenue for keeping 
up the public buildings, owns no obliga­
tion to raise and improve the condition 
... of the classes by whose labor he ex­
pects to derive his profits, but he simply 
looks to see in what manner, and by what 
influences, he can make his expected 
profits come to him in larger measure.
But Laborde was forced to abandon the water scheme and other
needed public works.
Thus, Crown Colony government did not diminish the
influence of the large planters and merchants over public
policy. The administrators were obliged to bow to their
wishes, while the smaller (mainly coloured and black)
planters, lessees and merchants, the middle strata and the
labouring class had far less influence. In 1883, a 'deputation
of coloured gentlemen from Scarborough' complained to the
Royal Commission;
Practically we have no voice in the legis­
lative affairs of the Colony ... and we 
note particularly, that any Government 
measure, however opposed to our interest, 
may pass the Legislative Council by 
the casting vote of the Governor ... .
Many of them, organized in the TDA, later called for a return
to the 1874 constitution, which they had opposed, with the
elected members chosen by the whole electorate and not by
parish, which would have strengthened their position as urban
voters against that of the McCalls. But the Colonial Office
was determined not to return to elections in 'this miserable
CO321/70: Robinson to Kimberley, 3 Jan. 1883, enc. 
Laborde to Robinson, 5 Dec. 1882.
Rent, from the Roval Com.....  1884, p. 422.
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little island.'"*
The labouring class, in all their many complaints to the 
1883 Royal Commission, spoke of burdensome taxation, official 
disregard and general distress. For them, there was little 
relief, except via emigration.
VII.5.2 The Fall of the Sugar Planters; 1884-1886
By 1883, James McCall, Colin Gillespie and Duncan 
McGillivray, Gillespie's attorney, had warned that the estates 
were on the verge of bankruptcy. Gillespie, efforts at 
procuring immigrants having failed, decided in 1882 to move 
from what McGillivray called 'the ruinous metayer system' to 
paid rental of the land, with the labourers selling the canes, 
after carting them to the mills. But the scheme was not 
popular; and McGillivray's contract was described by Sydney 
Olivier at the Colonial Office as 'iniquitous'."?
The drought of 1884-1886, the sugar depression and the 
collapse of Gillespie combined to make the raising of adequate 
revenue impossible. The failure of the Gillespie and Reid 
companies in April 1884 caused advances to the estates to 
cease, in a situation where production by metayage had reached 
an impasse (Ch. 5) . The middle strata and the labouring class 
exported their horses and other animals to avoid paying the 
licenses, and also to convert their assets to cash since, in
"* C0321/88; Robinson to Derby, 11 Mar. 1885, enc. Resolu­
tions of TDA; Wingfield's minute.
"? C0321/70: Robinson to Kimberley, 8 Jan. 1883, Enc. 1, 
McGillivray to Robinson, 9 Oct. 1882; Olivier, 20 Feb.
1883. Rept. from the Royal Com.....  1884, Laborde's
testimony, p. 409.
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the absence of a bank before 1881, investment had been in 
property. Wage labour was virtually non-existent and little 
cash circulated. Imports, exports and revenue fell. There were 
further retrenchment in the Civil Service, and cuts in 
expenditure.
The only hope perceived by the planters who wished to 
continue in sugar was, through the Colonial Office, to get 
loans for their estates. Their requests were usually tied to 
requests for loans in aid of the revenue. The first proposal 
was for £10,000 for roads and public buildings and £10,000 for 
planters. In the Colonial Office, Wingfield's position 
prevailed: since the planters were 'bankrupt' and their
business 'fading', it was better to wait.”* Within months, 
the Legislative Council passed the Tobago Public Loan 
Ordinance, 1885, for £30,000, of which £15,000 would be an 
advance to sugar growers and £15,000 for public works. 
Sendall, the Governor, disapproved, and Wingfield again 
prevailed: any loan to the planters should be 'peremptorily 
negatived'; for public works, there must first be additional 
taxation, cuts in expenditure, or both.”’
The TDA, the voice of the smallest planters and the 
middle strata, requested a loan of £50,000 for farmers wishing 
to diversify, which was ignored. The executive then dropped 
the request for a planter's loan and asked for a loan of £1000 
from Grenada and a further £15,000 for public works. Only the
”* C0321/88: Robinson to Derby, 17 Jan. 1885, & Encs.; 
minutes by Harris, Wedgwood, Wingfield, Derby.
”’ C0321/88: Sendall to Stanley, 13 July 1885, & Encs.; 
minutes & reply, 12 Nov. 1885.
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former was granted.
Two requests for loans in 1886 were refused. The London 
officials were unwilling, both to grant a loan and to seek a 
grant-in-aid. They advised further retrenchment, although 
they knew, as Wingfield put it, that the effect would be 'to
leave Govt more or less in abeyance ... in a year's time we
shall have to come to the Treasury for help'.^°
By May 1886, when further cuts were impossible, Llewellyn 
reported:
The collapse of Tobago has been so rapid 
that it has been impossible to keep pace
with it ... I need not say any more; the
picture is too sad. Civilized Government 
is at an end ... I cannot undertake to 
carry on the present form of government 
with any further reductions. Taxes 
cannot be raised when no wages are being 
paid and there is no money in circulation.
The only step now left ... is a complete 
and thorough change of the Constitution.
He recommended annexation of Tobago to a neighbouring colony,
preferably Trinidad.
Thus, the sugar planters, who had rushed to the Colonial
Office in their desire for investment and for protection
against the labourers, were deliberately denied both credit
and imperial aid, were removed from their bastion in the
state, and allowed, with the state, to wither away.
2^0 C0321/98: Sendall to Stanley, 4 Feb. 1886, & minutes; 
Sendall to Granville, 29 Mar. 1886, & Encs.; minutes by 
Wingfield and Harris.
C0321/98: Sendall to Granville, 19 May 1886, enc. 
Llewellyn to Sendall, 6 May 1886.
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VII.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter described the colour/class configuration of 
Tobago after 1838. There was, firstly, a dominant class of 
planters, merchants, professionals and officials (some of the 
latter being also planters), mainly white and coloured, but 
with a growing number of blacks owning and leasing estates. 
Secondly, there were the middle strata, comprising two blocs 
of upwardly mobile blacks and coloureds, who were managers, 
overseers, shopkeepers, small landlords, large metayers, 
teachers, clerical workers, and successful artisans. Thirdly, 
there was the labouring class of agricultural and general 
workers, domestics, metayers, fishermen and artisans, who were 
mainly black.
Within these contours of class and colour, gender was 
constitutive of the structuring of access to land, income and 
occupations. It is significant that the decisive
accomplishments of the upwardly mobile appeared in the 
censuses after 1881, suggesting that the collapse of the sugar 
economy allowed greater mobility for the labouring class and, 
in the process, for women who became shopkeepers etc. (Ch. 6) .
A resident proprietary arose, but swiftly succumbed to 
the monopolistic tendencies of the McCalls and Gillespies 
after 1863. The conflicts within the dominant class, between 
the larger planters in alliance with Gillespie, and the 
smaller planters and merchants, have been discussed in both 
their economic and political dimensions.
The economic crisis of production and trade helped to 
produce the fiscal crisis of the state; combined, they brought
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the plantocracy to its knees in the 1880s. The sugar planters, 
ensnared by the development of monopoly over credit, 
production and shipping, and having to rely on metayage, were 
unable to escape from the McCall/Gillespie yoke. The 
planters' success at diversification was remarkably small, 
therefore, because of their dependence on Gillespie, who did 
not invest enough to make them efficient sugar producers, 
while tying them to sugar. The wreck of The Dawn, following 
the collapse of Dunn and Co. in 1882, was a fitting metaphor 
for the shipwreck of the attempts by the smaller merchants and 
planters to consolidate their monopoly over the inter-colonial 
trade, and to 'cut out' Gillespie in the transatlantic trade. 
By 1882, the planters were trapped on two fronts: externally 
by Gillespie, internally by the metayers.
In spite of the divisions within the dominant class, they 
were agreed on land, taxation, immigration, and on their need 
to keep the labourers in subjection. Thus, for the smaller 
planters and merchants, their alliance with McCall and 
Gillespie was two-edged: their existence as planters and their 
social power were tied to that of the monopolists; but they 
were also being swallowed up by the combine, as minnows by 
whales, both economically and politically. Moreover, their 
future existence as planters depended on their cutting loose 
from Gillespie, which they were unable to do.
Control over the state was integral to the class strategy 
of the planters, particularly with regard to the franchise, 
land, taxation and immigration. In spite of the relative 
autonomy of the state, all these issues clearly mirrored the
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interests of different classes and strata.
The planters' continuous emphasis on immigration
demonstrates the centrality of control over labour to their 
survival. But the Tobago revenues, partly because of the 
abuses of planter rule, were never sufficient to support 
immigration policies on the scale and with the continuity that 
were needed to break the power of the metayers and force a 
return to wage labour alone.
The twin struggle, of the planters to usurp executive 
functions, and of the Colonial Office to remove the planters 
from power, was analysed. Conflicts between the executive and 
the Assembly were resolved, after the Executive Committee 
proved futile, by a policy of laissez-faire: the Assembly was 
allowed its way as long as 'imperial interests' were not at 
stake, while the Colonial Office, discerning the times and the 
latent power of the labouring blacks, played a waiting game, 
intending to sweep away the Assemblies and to convert the BWI 
to federated Crown Colonies. Thus, while responsible
government was being granted to the colonies with white 
majorities, in the Caribbean, to prevent black rule,
representative institutions were being withdrawn [Knaplund 
1942]. Therefore, widening the franchise, important though it 
was to the middle strata and the labourers, was never a 
priority for the Colonial Office, though some administrators 
used it to strengthen their hands against the planters.
The first stage in the conversion to Crown Colony (a 
single-chamber legislature) was accomplished through the 
influence of John McCall, the leading planter, who entered a
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rapprochement with the executive, once his influence over 
policy was assured. The Belmanna riots of 1876, exposing the 
precariousness of life and property amid such gross class 
antagonisms, propelled the larger planters to surrender their 
formal power over the state to the Crown. They miscalculated 
how greatly 'imperial interests' would prevail against their 
own. There was no reason for the UK to prop up indigent 
planters with moribund estates in a marginal colony, at the 
high financial costs which would have been necessary, once 
they no longer had any bargaining power. And to secure without 
effective opposition the constitutional arrangements which 
they desired, the Colonial Office officials watched the 
administration collapse and government 'set in abeyance', 
before they sanctioned imperial aid for public works.
This chapter reinforces the findings of Chapter 4, and 
confirms our hypothesis in two important ways.
Firstly, our hypothesis emphasized the source and 
deployment of capital as a critical factor distinguishing 
Tobago, a moribund sugar economy, from other equally dependent 
colonies (Trinidad, British Guiana) in which greater 
investment and technological advance were made. Although all 
West India merchants demanded extortionate commissions and 
charges, another pattern of investment or increased 
diversification would have led to different consequences for 
the Tobago sugar economy. To put it more generally, within the 
matrix of dependency or the capitalist mode of production, the 
proximate causes of socio-political change must always be 
sought.
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Having analysed the international factors affecting the 
BWI sugar industry, and the endemic problems faced by planters 
seeking to modernize in an era of scarce capital, this chapter 
shows that want of capital was important for five reasons. It 
made the planters highly vulnerable to the merchant houses 
investing in small muscovado estates, which tied them, by 
meagre advances, to operating at low technological levels; 
this fettered their accumulation, and put them increasingly in 
need of credit; it made them resort to metayage, which lowered 
efficiency and profitability; this vicious cycle made them 
particularly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the market; 
finally, lack of capital subjected the planters to the 
stratagem of the Colonial Office officials, who allowed them 
to succumb politically and economically.
Secondly, we show that the social structure is a vital 
key to understanding the crisis of the 1880s, since there was 
no class, stratum or fraction able to diversify the economy 
and prevent the collapse of the state.
The coloured and black planters, merchants and lessees 
tried unsuccessfully to 'cut out' Gillespie. Politically, 
their power was tied to that of the leading planters, and they 
were unable to avoid the surrender to the Colonial Office.
The petty shopkeepers, landowners etc of the middle 
strata had little organizational strength. The coloureds 
protested in 1855 (the Yeates affair) about employment in the 
public service; but it was not until 1874 that they and the 
upwardly mobile blacks again took a clear public position, 
this time over the single-chamber legislature which eroded the
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electoral gains they had made. From the surviving newspapers, 
there does not seem to have been a press militantly espousing 
their specific interests in a consistent way over the 
y e a r s . Their organizations - benefit societies, lodges and 
the Defence Association - were defensive; but they succeeded 
in defending neither their political gains nor any clear 
economic strategy by 1884. For economic success, they would 
have needed a sounder financial base, such as had the rising 
class of coloured merchants and professionals of Grenada, who 
bought up abandoned estates after 1858 and diversified them 
[Brizan 1984:201-2, 215]. For greater political gains, without 
greater economic strength, they would have had to treat the 
labouring blacks as part of the political constituency which, 
to most of the middle strata throughout the BWI, was 
unthinkable until the 193 0s when, through the labour 
rebellions, the working class thrust its way into the formal 
political arena [Lewis 1938/1977].
The labouring class, although without formal political 
recognition, was not without power. They organized in 
subterranean but effective ways. Their greatest strength lay 
in staving off a general system of wage labour, and in their 
control of the terrain of production, so converting metayage 
from a narrowing of their options in the 1850s to a broadening 
of their possibilities by the 1880s (Chs. 3, 5). They
succeeded in preventing the planters from achieving their
In continuity with the pre-1838 period, the Tobago 
coloureds were less aggressive and articulate than their 
counterparts in Jamaica [Will 1970], Barbados [Hamilton 
1956] or Grenada [Brizan 1984].
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economic goals; but they themselves did not for the most part 
become independent of the estates, although most of the 
diversification of the economy came from their initiatives. 
A viable peasantry did not emerge before 1884, because of the 
land and taxation policies of the planters; but, as the export 
data reveal (Ch. 4), they benefited quickly from the collapse 
of sugar, and were responsible for most of the exports between 
1884 and 1900. We have thus shown how and why neither Option 
1, the upgrading of the sugar industry, nor Option 2. the 
successful diversification of the economy, was accomplished.
Our hypothesis placed no specific weight on intra- and 
inter-class struggles. Our data show, beyond a doubt, that 
these are crucial in explaining the collapse of both the sugar 
economy and the state. By counting on the divisions in the
dominant class and on the weakness of the middle strata in
1874, the executive effected the partial surrender of
representative institutions, which made a complete surrender 
easier in 1 8 7 6 . Inter-class conflict was central to the 
two-pronged collapse of the planters. The failure of
production was partly the failure of metayage to allow 
capitalist accumulation for most planters; the loss of the 
planters' political power was fostered by their fear of the 
black labouring class, which made them rush into the waiting, 
but crushing, embrace of the Colonial Office.
2^3 By contrast, the Barbados planters, merchants and middle 
strata were able to resist the Crown and to compromise 
on their own terms, because they were stronger 
financially and their exchequer not bankrupt [Hamilton 
1956; Karch 1981]. Conrad Reeves, a coloured barrister, 
who later became Chief Justice, was also instrumental in 
devising their strategy.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIETY 
m TOBAGO: 1884-1900
VIII.1 INTRODUCTION
Between 1889, when Tobago was annexed to Trinidad (but 
with distinct Treasuries), and 1900, the year after the 
complete union of the two colonies, three major issues came to 
the fore. First was the intervention of Judge Gorrie, the 
Chief Justice of the united colony, which took the struggle 
between the planters and the metayers from the terrain of the 
estates to that of the courts (Ch. 5) . Second was an 
appropriate development strategy for Tobago; whether to focus 
on advances to planters and investment in estates, or to 
promote smallholders. Related to this was, thirdly, whether 
Tobago should return to having a separate administration, 
continue in partial union with Trinidad, or become more 
closely united with Trinidad. This chapter focusses on the 
second and third of these issues. It argues that they had 
profound implications for the class structure of Tobago, and 
that by 1900, the Union of the two colonies completed the 
erosion of the sugar plantocracy, while enhancing the 
potential of the emerging peasantry.
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VIII.2 THE CROWN LANDS QUESTION
The economic crisis, compounded by the heavy exodus of 
labourers, led the planters, through their Agricultural 
Society, to demand an urgent policy of selling the Crown 
lands. After much discussion in 1884 and 1885, it was decided 
to have two Ordinances, one vesting in the Crown 13,000 
unoccupied acres; the other providing for the sale of the 
land.
The planters pushed for their interests. They insisted 
that Crown land be sold as an incentive to labour to remain, 
but not to establish an independent peasantry. They tried to 
prevent persons from buying more than 10 acres, by making it 
an offence punishable by a fine and imprisonment for up to 3 
months to purchase under another person's name. They wanted 
payments in 5 yearly instalments, so that buyers unwilling to 
cultivate in the required manner could be evicted. They even 
wished to dispossess buyers who did not maintain the roads 
leading to the plots. But the penal enactment proposed and the 
requirement about the roads were disallowed.^ The 1887 Crown 
Lands Ordinance provided for conditional grants and payment in 
five instalments, with title being recorded after satisfactory 
occupation for five years.
Demands other than those of the labouring class were made
 ^C0321/89: Sendall to Stanley, 24 Aug. 1885, Encs. & 
minutes; C0321/98: Sendall to Stanhope, 31 Aug. 1886, & 
Encs; Holland to Sendall, 26 Jan. 1887; Sendall to 
Stanhope, 9 Dec. 1886, enc. Agric. Soc. resolution 
recording regret at delay in selling Crown lands. 
C0321/103; Sendall to Holland, 29 Mar. 1887, & Encs.; 
Wingfield's minute & Holland to Sendall, 4 May 1887; 
Sendall to Holland, 23 June 1887, enc. Crown Lands Ord.
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for the Crown lands. W. Sanger Tucker, a Trinidad planter, 
protested against sales to labourers for cocoa cultivation. 
Instead, to attract 'persons of Capital', he wanted the land 
sold in blocks of 'not less than 500 acres at a very low 
valuation' - 2s 6d to 4s per acre, depending on size and 
location. The Tobago executive offered him two contiguous 
blocks of 500 acres each, at 4s per acre.
Fortunately for the aspiring peasantry, Wingfield, 
Olivier and Sir Henry Holland (later Lord Knutsford), the 
Secretary of State, disapproved of further sales in large 
blocks, which would defeat the purpose of the Ordinance.%
Thus, the planters, were forced, after 50 years, urgently 
to reverse their policy of keeping the labourers off the 
unoccupied lands, much of which they had 'annexed' to their 
estates (Ch. 3). However, their desire for a landowning 
proletariat was to prove self-contradictory.
VIII.3 THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNION WITH TRINIDAD
The annexation of Tobago to Trinidad was viewed with 
anxiety by the major interest groups in both colonies, 
especially as it followed hard upon the British attempt to 
unite the Windward Islands into a Confederation. After the 
Barbados fiasco in 1876 (Ch. 7) , the 1883 Royal Commission 
recommended a federal government for Grenada, St Vincent, St 
Lucia and Tobago. However, all these islands decisively
 ^C0321/103: Sendall to Holland, 12 Dec. 1887, & Encs., esp. 
Tucker to Llewellyn, 17 May 1887, W. Tucker & W. S Tucker 
to Llewellyn, 27 Oct. 1887; Holland to Sendall, 16 Dec. 
1887; minutes by Wingfield, Olivier; Sendall to Holland,
8 Dec. 1887, & Enc.
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rejected the 1884 proposals of the Earl of Derby, then
Secretary of State.^
Wingfield wanted an arrangement whereby Tobago would be
'separately governed & have its own Treasury [,] taxation and
legislature - but ... have the use - for a consideration - of
the Judges and Auditor General of Trinidad and in case of need
of the Police Force.' Although Sir Robert Herbert, the
Permanent Under-Secretary, was doubtful that Trinidad would
'undertake this charitable & unprofitable obligation', they
agreed on that objective.*
Sir William Robinson, by then promoted to Governor of
Trinidad, treated the matter with astonishing flippancy:
Tobago should ... be incorporated with 
Trinidad and thus become part and parcel 
of this Colony. ... A Magistrate and 
Collector of Customs with a couple of 
Clerks in Scarboro and a Sub-Inspector of 
Police and twenty constables would I think 
be sufficient for the Executive Adminis­
tration of the Island. ... I would further 
suggest that [the Tobago people] be in­
vited to transfer themselves and their 
effects to Trinidad, ... at the cost of 
the Tobago Treasury, and that I should be 
authorised ... to offer them one acre of 
Crown Land for every man, woman and child 
who responded ... in the neighbourhood of 
Moruga ... By means such as I propose the 
Tobago difficulty would easily be settled.^
Sendall, the Windward Islands Governor, also agreed with
'complete incorporation', though not on Robinson's terms. But
 ^Papers Relating to the Proposed Union .... 1885.
* C0321/98: Sendall to Granville, 19 May 1886; minutes by 
Wingfield, 30 June, and Herbert, 1 July 1886.
 ^C0321/98: Sendall to Stanhope, 28 Sept. 1886, Enc. 1, 
Robinson to Sendall, 20 Aug. 1886. Moruga was in the 
remote south of Trinidad.
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it was Llewellyn, the Tobago Administrator, who had worked on 
the arrangement between the Turks and Caicos Islands and 
Jamaica, who, sensitive to local preferences, made the most 
realistic proposals. Llewellyn suggested that revenue, 
expenditure and debt should be kept separate from those of 
Trinidad, though the customs, tariff and shipping laws of 
Trinidad would apply to Tobago. The Trinidad Legislative 
Council would legislate for Tobago on all matters except 
direct taxation. Vessels between Trinidad and Tobago should 
be considered coasting vessels. Articles of native growth and 
manufacture except rum could be traded duty free, while 
foreign products would pay import duties in the colony where 
they were consumed. The proposal would require the abolition 
of the Tobago Executive Council and the formation of a 
Legislative Board in place of the Tobago Legislative Council, 
with full powers over local affairs, except for customs, 
shipping, excise or matters clashing with the jurisdiction of 
the chief legislature. Llewellyn foresaw that Port of Spain, 
Trinidad's capital, would become the entrepôt for Tobago, 
replacing Barbados.
At the Colonial Office, there was preference for 
'complete incorporation' over Llewellyn's proposal, although 
no clear formula was proposed for the former, and although 
Wingfield wanted separate Treasuries. All opposed Robinson's 
plan to depopulate Tobago. Both options were publicized for 
the wishes of the inhabitants of both Colonies to be
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ascertained.*
Llewellyn was clear that any plan to 'incorporate' Tobago 
with Trinidad would meet with the same opposition as had 
Confederation: 'The great objection is to the Common
Treasury.'; and only distinct revenues would be acceptable.?
Llewellyn was right. Sendall reported on his meeting in
January 1887 with the Tobago unofficials:
I found that the question was practically 
one of money. The people of Tobago were 
apprehensive that if they were wholly 
incorporated with Trinidad the revenue 
collected here would be absorbed in the 
general revenue of the united Colony, and 
would be employed in maintaining a scale 
of public expenditure altogether too cost­
ly for either the needs or the resources 
of the smaller Island.*
Sendall had to use much persuasion, both privately and in a
large public meeting, to neutralize the opposition to what he
called 'complete union' which, by then, was a compromise,
along the lines proposed by Llewellyn.
On 19 January 1887, the Tobago Legislative Council agreed 
to the annexation, to common external tariffs, to free trade 
between Tobago and Trinidad, but with internal taxes imposed 
'with strict reference to local circumstances'. The Council 
proposed a Financial Board of 3 unofficials (1 nominated, 2 
elected) and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), which would 
'advise the Governor in all matters relating to the internal
* C0321/98: Sendall to Stanhope, 28 Sept. 1886, & Encs., 
esp. Llewellyn to Sendall, 1 Sept. 1886. C0289/4: Tobago 
Gazette. 17 Dec. 1886.
? C0321/98; Sendall to Stanhope, 3 Oct. 1886, enc. Llewellyn 
to Sendall, 28 Sept. 1886.
* C0321/103: Sendall to Stanhope, 20 Jan. 1887.
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taxation and expenditure'. The Council also agreed that
all revenues collected in and on account 
of Tobago should be wholly expended in the 
administration of the Island, and should 
not be absorbed in the General revenue of 
the United Colony; that no part of the 
public expenditure of Trinidad should be 
chargeable upon the Revenues of Tobago 
and no part of the public expenditure of 
Tobago upon the revenues of Trinidad, 
except so far as the two Islands may by 
mutual consent and upon terms to be mu­
tually agreed upon enter jointly upon any 
public enterprise for the benefit of both.
The Tobago unofficials agreed with the motion, with the
exception of Ebenezer Henderson, by then a leading merchant.
Henderson laid before the Council a petition, by 'certain
Mercantile Firms and others', rejecting annexation. He and
Edward Keens (merchant) also moved a resolution, the revised
version of which was adopted:
That inasmuch as the wish of the people 
of Tobago for union with Trinidad has 
principally been based on the represen­
tations of the Government and the assur­
ances given to the people that material 
benefit will result to Tobago from such 
union, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies be respectfully asked ... to 
afford the people of Tobago a pledge that 
should it prove disadvantageous to this 
Colony, or otherwise undesirable to the 
majority of the inhabitants; this Colony 
shall on petition have granted back to it 
the form of self Government which now 
exists here.*
By May 1887, in spite of the objections of Keens and 
Henderson, this resolution was withdrawn by the Council.^ 
Moreover, since the Colonial Office refused to sanction the
* C0289/5: Leg. Co. minutes, 19 Jan. 1887, Tobago Gazette. 
28 Jan. 1887.
C0289/5: Leg. Co. minutes, 11 May 1887, Tobago Gazette. 
13 May 1887.
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control of taxation and expenditure by a majority of 
unofficials, the Financial Board had equal numbers of 
officials and unofficials, with a casting vote by the CEO, who 
was to be called the Commissioner for Tobago.
The resolution proposing the annexation passed the 
Trinidad Legislative Council with little dissent. The 
unofficials were sceptical about the benefits to Trinidad; but 
12 members voted for, and only G. Townsend Fenwick against.
The strongest opposition to annexation came from the 
Tobago merchants. They, the London and local officials, all 
perceived that the knottiest problems would surround the loss 
of customs duties, both from the conversion of Port of Spain 
to an entrepôt for Tobago, and from the freedom of trade 
between the islands, which rendered the exports to Trinidad, 
rapidly becoming the majority of Tobago's exports, free of 
duty. However, Wingfield insisted that 'the difficulties 
must be risked'. The merchants clearly saw that they would 
lose trade; the officials, that Tobago's declining revenue 
would be further diminished.*^
VIII.4 THE CHANGING SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF TOBAGO
The collapse of sugar and the annexation to Trinidad led 
to a restructuring of class relations in Tobago. The major 
changes are now outlined.
** C0298/43: Trinidad Leg. Co. minutes, 8 Mar. 1887. 
Fenwick's Protest, Council Paper No. 32, 1887.
C0295/318: Robinson to Knutsford, 6 July 1888, & Encs.; 
minutes, esp. Wingfield's, 22 Sept. & 6 Oct. 1888. The 
quot. is from the latter. Knutsford agreed, 30 Sept.
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VIII.4.1 The Dominant Class
The composition of the planters changed considerably. The 
old planters, through attrition by death and bankruptcy, 
declined in number and importance. By 1899, they were exceeded 
by new planters, some coming from nearby colonies; others 
emerged from within Tobago, mainly from the black middle 
strata. Among the migrants were Capt. Mayo Short from St 
Vincent; Canon Turpin and his brother, coloureds from St 
Vincent; Dr Latour, a coloured physician from Grenada; William 
Date, a coloured stock farmer from Trinidad; and Esme Howard, 
a British aristocrat, who was part of a syndicate investing in 
rubber plantations [Howard 1935]. The biggest investors were 
William and Trochilus Tucker, white Trinidadians, who bought 
Crown land as well as eight estates. Among the new black 
Tobago planters were the Bennetts, owning substantial tracts 
of land at L'Anse Fourmi; Paul Tobago and D. S. Gordon, 
shopkeepers and former metayers, who owned Prospect and Orange 
Valley, and Adventure and Roselle, respectively; Thomas 
Gordon, also a shopkeeper (Grafton); Luke Toby, a butcher 
(Hampden); heirs of Christmas Murphy, shopkeeper 
(Parlatuvier)^ and E. Edwards (Parrot Hall) [Collens 
1900:303-4; Hay 1899, App. 4].
Secondly, by 1897, there were only five absentee owners 
of sugar estates.^ Virtually all other owners were resident 
in Trinidad or Tobago.
Murphy owned Parlatuvier estate by 1881, but was not 
mentioned in contemporary lists as an estate owner. 
Assessment Roll, 1881.
WI Roval Com. Rent. . App. C, Pt. V, p. 362.
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Thirdly, there was an end to the old monopoly. The 
McCalls in 1899 owned only 5 estates, perilously close to 
bankruptcy. James Hamilton owned 4, the Blakelys 3; among the 
new planters, the Tuckers were exceptional with 8 estates, and 
the Turpins with 3 (later joined into 1, Charlotteville) . Most 
other owners had one or two estates.
Fourthly, on the advice of three visiting experts. Hart 
[1889], Eggers [1893] and Meaden [1898],^ emphasis was placed 
on alternative crops and stock rearing (Table 99).
The annexation meant that the merchants operating sailing 
ships with Barbados were completely bypassed.^ Free trade 
with Trinidad, the monthly Royal Mail packet, and the 
introduction in 1889 of steamers connecting the joint colony 
with New York, all combined to give Tobago greater access to 
other markets. Fifth, the merchants lost their export and 
import business as a result.
Sixth, the planters and merchants became distinct groups. 
Many of the new planters were not merchants, though some of 
the upwardly mobile blacks were small shopkeepers. By 1899, 
the only merchants who were planters were the McCalls, Thomas 
Blakely, Ebenezer Henderson & C o . a n d  C. Plagemann.
Hart, Supt. of the Trinidad Botanic Station, and Baron 
Eggers, an eminent Dutch scientist, visited in 1889; 
Meaden, Supt. of the Trinidad Govt. Farm, in 1898.
We do not know whether they imported from Trinidad 
instead; Esme Howard in 1898 stated, after investigation, 
that the main communication with Trinidad was by 'small 
sloops'. C0295/390: Howard to Selborne, Priv., 28 Nov. 
1898.
Henderson died in 1890, but his business continued.
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Colour
Whites 
Coloureds 
Blacks 
Indians 
D. K.
Sub-Total
Whites 
Coloureds 
Blacks 
Indians 
D. K.
Sub-Total
TABLE 99
Colour of Owners and Cultivation of Tobago Estates: 1899
No. of
Planters
9
11
2
1
23
9
6
8
1
10
34
Sugar
6
5
1
1
13
4
4
4
4
16
At OLD PLANTERS
Sugar &
Other
Crops
12
9
3
1
1
2
16
Other
Crops
B: NEW PLANTERS
4
3
3
1
11
Uncult, Stock Fibre
No. of 
Estates
17
24
2
1
44
19
11
10
1
12
53
Coloureds
TOTAL
2
57* 29
C: OLD AND NEW PLANTERS (JOINT OWNERS^ 
—  1 —
28 20 15
NOTES : 1. * The joint owners were both already counted. 2. DK
Source; Calculated from Collens [1900:303-304].
5 1
Don't Know.
1
98
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Seventh, the senior officials, because of retrenchment, 
were fewer, with, in most cases, lower salaries and fewer 
supporting staff.
VIII.4.2 The Middle Strata
The middle strata, allied to the smaller planters and 
lessees, quickly advanced proposals for the support of 
alternative crops. A Tobago Crop Advance and Discount Co., 
probably the one formed by Sir John Gorrie, existed from 1892 
to 1898, but no record of its accomplishments survives. Most 
of its officers were coloured and black, smaller planters and 
members of the middle strata. There was also a Tobago Co­
operative Society Ltd., the creature of the same social 
groups. Founded in 1892 to deal in real estate, its shares 
were 4s each. Its committee overlapped considerably with the 
officers of the Crop Advance and Discount Co., which served as 
its banker.!*
J. B. Price, the black lessee of Woodlands estate in the 
1880s, initiated other enterprises. He bought the press of The 
News, intending to publish under the title The Tobaao 
Indicator, but could not pay the bond of £200 required by the 
Trinidad Newspaper Ordinances.!* He also established The 
Agricultural Loan and Trading Co. Ltd., with a proposed share 
capital of £1000 at £2 per share. Its Board of Directors were 
mainly blacks from the middle strata, the Chairman being 
Edward Keens, who had lost his estates. The Company intended
!* The News, 26 Nov. 1892; 28 Jan. 1893; 29 Apr. 1893.
C0295/3 64: Knollys to Chamberlain, 12 July 1895, & Encs.
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to do business as agriculturists, merchants, and commission 
agents, and to develop portions of Crown land.^ Its 
accomplishments are unknown.
The schoolteachers, who had increased between 1881 and 
1901 (Ch. 6) , became more socially prominent. They signed more 
petitions, including those of the Defence Association. 
However, one incident indicates that though they were 
politically engaged, they did not have the power exercised by 
their Trinidad counterparts, who included such critics of the 
régime as John Jacob Thomas, the famous black schoolteacher 
[Brereton 1981].
J. A. P. Bowhill, a coloured merchant's clerk and land 
surveyor, appointed Acting Inspector of Schools, wrote in his 
1884 report that most of the schools, except those of the 
Moravians, were very poor, due to 'very defective' teaching. 
He argued that in reading, writing and arithmetic, 'the 
children betrayed the greatest ignorance; and I can impute 
this only to a bad system of teaching'; he called for stricter 
supervision by the ministers in charge.
M. J. Prince and R. Mayers, the black headteachers of 
Scarborough and Mt St George Wesleyan schools, respectively, 
responded in The News. Prince exploded: 'The lad is
impertinent'. Questioning Bowhill's competence, he asked, 'Is 
Saul also among the prophets?' He criticized Bowhill's 
punctuation, and condemned the attack on the teachers.
20 C0295/367: Prospectus of the Agricultural Loan and Trading 
Co. Ltd., 1895.
Tobaao Gazette. 6 Feb. 1885.
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Mayers, less vitriolic, discussed the overlooking of John B. 
Murray, a black schoolteacher, for the Inspectorship of 
Schools, preference being given to Bowhill and subsequently to 
John McKillop, a white engineer. He too challenged Bowhill's 
competence, and questioned his criteria on merit.^
The Board of Education withdrew the Government grant 
payable to Prince from the date of his letter to the end of 
the year (%ths of his income from that source) , and threatened 
him with 'instant dismissal' for any similar offence; it 
conveyed to Mayers its 'strong disapprobation'. It made a new 
rule: if a teacher wrote to the press on the school system, in 
what the Board considered 'intemperate or improper language', 
the teacher was liable to withdrawal of his salary grant, or 
other punishment.^ In spite of a petition from 38 
Scarborough residents on Prince's behalf and an apology from 
Prince, in June 1885, he was transferred to Grenada.^
The incident demonstrates the fledgling power of the 
teachers against the officials, ministers of religion and 
planters who controlled the Board of Education and the 
schools. Such was the political climate, that in 1888, an
article in 14 parts, criticizing James Anthony Froude's The 
English in the West Indies: The Bow of Ulvsses [1888] was 
published under the pen name, 'Apollo Africani'. By contrast.
22 The News. 21 Feb. 1885.
^ C0289/4: Board of Education minutes, 3 Mar. 1885,
Tobaao Gazette. 6 Mar. 1885; minutes of 14 Apr., ibid., 
17 Apr.; minutes of 12 May, ibid., 5 June.
^ Prince was described by Admin. Carrington as 'a black man, 
of considerable intelligence, and good address'. Admin.'s 
Despatches, 1882-85: Carrington to Robinson, 24 Aug. 1883.
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J. J. Thomas published openly his Froudacitv, in response to 
Froude [Thomas 1889/1969].^^
VIII.4.3 The Labouring Class
The labouring class quietly consolidated its interests.
In the Windward District, some bought Crown land, but the
preference was for estate land, already cleared, and nearer to
means of communication. They swiftly took advantage of the
Trinidad market to export produce from their freeholds and
metayer grounds (Ch. 4). Temporary migration to Trinidad for
waged work was also frequent. Rev Clemens, the Moravian
minister in Moriah, told the 1897 Royal Commission:
There are only labourers there ... Their 
condition is not poor, as they can provide 
themselves with food and clothing, and 
support him and two colleagues of his 
denomination. They also support their 
schools with assistance from Government.
They earn money by traffic with Trinidad 
in ground provisions, stock, goats, pigs
and cocoa ... no labour is employed at 
wages in his district ... His people 
depend largely on wages and trade with 
Trinidad.^
By 1900, although there was urgent need for a bi-weekly steam 
service around the Tobago coast, linking Tobago with Trinidad,
the foundation for the flowering of a peasantry had been laid.
Chapter 6 also suggests that between 1881 and 1901, many 
labourers achieved upward mobility by becoming shopkeepers.
Apollo Africani. 'The Modern "Bow of Ulysses" not only 
"Unstrung" but broken'. The News. 11 Aug.-29 Dec. 1888. 
Thomas also wrote the first Trinidad Creole grammar [1869/ 
1969] .
WI Roval Com. Rent.. 1897, App. C, Pt. V, pp. 357-8; cf. 
statements of Drs Blanc & Kenny, & David Hatt, pp. 358-9.
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VIII.4.4 Summary
The period 1884-1900 was a time of transition for all the 
social groupings in Tobago. The reduction in state employment 
left the officials few in number and weakened in influence. 
The old monopoly was broken and small capitalists invested in 
estates; but in the changing situation, merchants and planters 
were becoming distinct groups. The entire dominant class was 
subordinated to that of Trinidad. Some, particularly from the 
black segment of the middle strata, achieved upward mobility 
into the ranks of the planters; but most of the enterprises 
conceived by the middle strata to finance their upward advance 
appear to have borne little fruit. For the labouring class, 
land was easily available, both from the Crown and indigent 
planters. This, with the Trinidad connection, via trade and 
temporary migration for wages, allowed many to become
smallholders.
VIII.5 THE HAY ADMINISTRATION; 1889-1892
Since the late 1870s, the Tobago Government had pursued
a policy of stringency, and little had been spent on public 
works. Although the London officials had refused to sanction 
any loans for public works before the agreement on annexation, 
early in 1889, on the recommendation of the Governor, Sir 
William Robinson, a loan of £2000 from Trinidad, at 4%
interest, was approved, to repair the Tobago jetty. By 
October 1890, the loan having been repaid, £3000 more were
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sanctioned for public works.
The first dilemma for the dominant class was the drastic 
decline in the already low revenue after 1885 (Table 100) . 
They insisted that it was caused by the lower Trinidad tariff, 
and the abolition of shipping dues and ad valorem duties under 
the 1888 Order-in-Council^* uniting the colonies. But, as 
investigations gradually showed, the revenue problem was more 
complex; also, the attribution of decline to the annexation 
alone was poor logic: post hoc ergo propter hoc.
There were several reasons for the low revenue. Its 
principal sources were import and other customs duties; excise 
duties; land and house taxes; and licenses. All four sources 
had been falling steadily since 1880 (Table 98) . Firstly, 
imports and exports had been considerably reduced because of 
the low prices for sugar, the low profits of most estates, the 
metayer disputes and the severe lack of specie. In addition, 
some of the dues on shipping had been reduced in 1882 (Ch. 7) . 
Secondly, all but three of the thirty-two distilleries had 
already been closed by 1889, so reducing the excise duty 
collected. After 1889, under the Trinidad excise laws, the 
duty per gallon of rum rose from 4s to 6s 6d, and only two 
stills remained working. Thirdly, the crisis left many of the 
larger landowners unable to pay their taxes, and there was 
considerable forfeiture of land to the Crown in default.
^ C0295/321: Robinson to Knutsford, 19 Jan. 1889; reply, 
16 Feb. 1889; C0295/330: Robinson to Knutsford, 18 Oct 
1890.
2* C0289/5: Tobaao Gazette. 15 Dec. 1888, & C0298/44: 
Trinidad Council Paper No. 94, 1888.
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Finally, there was a marked export of animals by the middle 
strata and the labouring class after 1885, so reducing the 
license fees collected. The low revenue, which led to the 
decision to annex Tobago to Trinidad, was thus further 
compounded by the loss of direct imports and exports.
By 1892, there was a growing perception among the
Trinidad officials that Tobago was 'bankrupt'. Its government
was almost in abeyance, since the Commissioner, L. G. Hay,
under the strain of office and the conflicts with Gorrie, had
taken to drink, and ceased to function effectively. When the
Governor, Sir Frederick Napier Broome, visited Tobago in
September 1892, official salaries had not been paid for some
time; and the Treasury was almost £7000 in debt;
Tobago is at the present moment bankrupt, 
and cannot pay its way, much less its 
debts. ... The Tobago Government has been 
partly living ... on the proceeds of 
postal money orders ... instead of remit­
ting the money to meet the orders.
The London officials assumed that Tobago's condition was 
no worse than it had been in 1879 and 1886, and that careful 
administration would remove the difficulties. Hay resigned 
under pressure, and D. B. Horsford (Actg. Auditor-General, 
Trinidad) acted as Commissioner and investigated the 
accounts.^
CO295/340: Broome to Ripon, 11 Sept. 1892, & Encs.; 
minutes.
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TABLE 100
Tobago: Revenue and Expenditure. 1885-1898 (Pounds Sterling)
REVENUE
EXPENDITURE
1885
11826
12031
1886
8814
9529
1887
9387
6995
1888
10489
8155
1889
8809
10423
1890
8657
9253
1891
8730
8783
REVENUE
EXPENDITURE
1892
7459
9009
1893
9211
8537
1894
8843
8135
1895
8591
8218
1896
9321
9268
1897
8107
8387
1898
8213
7479
NOTES: 1. Figures rounded to the nearest £.
2. For 1895, the Blue Bk. Rept. gives the revenue as £8803.
Sources : C0290: Tobago Blue Books, 1885-1888; C0300: Trinidad and Tobago Blue Books, 1889-1898
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The Horsford Report of September 1892 confirmed a
liability of £8638 19s 4d. He ascribed the decline in revenue
partially to the customs union, which allowed travellers to
Trinidad to buy goods there, which were not taxed in Tobago.
The Tobago merchants are feeling the 
effect of this transfer of trade and are 
disposed to cry out for separation from 
Trinidad and for their right to levy taxes 
as in former years.^
By 1892, therefore, the worsening fiscal crisis was 
apparent, but as yet, the Colonial Office view was that a 
joint colony, with separate Treasuries, was a viable option. 
The local view was that the decline of revenue was due to the 
loss of customs duties after 1889.
In December 1892, a petition was sent by the leading
planters (including those recently investing), merchants and
some shopkeepers, teachers and other persons from the middle
strata. It argued that the annexation had resulted in
'disaster'. The Trinidad judges were blamed for sowing 'bitter
dissension' between the classes, resulting in 'an almost
complete stoppage of work.'
In consequence the Sugar crop of this 
year is only about 700 tons for the whole 
Island. The result being that the Public 
Treasury is empty, planters have no money 
to carry on their Estates, and labourers 
are leaving ... to seek work elsewhere.
Therefore, they asked for aid. Persuaded that a 
syndicate with capital to import Indian labourers and grow 
sugar would succeed, they confessed that they had 'neither 
means nor influence' to form it; and they asked the Secretary
C0295/340; Fowler to Ripon, 27 Sept. 1892, Hereford's 
Rept.
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of state to use his influence for that purpose, or to sanction 
a loan of £25,000 to develop Tobago's resources.
Thomas Rayner, the Acting Commissioner after Horsford's
departure, reporting on the memorial, stated that, with the
exception of one or two estates, cultivation was nominal.
'The remedy seems to be the abandonment of Sugar, and the
taking to other products instead.' He felt that, except for
the leeward plain which was suited to sugar, alternative crops
should be grown; and if sugar was retained at Leeward, it
would need a 'very considerable alteration' in the methods of
manufacture, since common process muscovado would not pay. It
would also require imported labour because 'the people prefer
to be peasant proprietors'. Therefore, the syndicate should be
considered only if coffee was not feasible. Rayner concluded:
In my judgement, the hope for Tobago lies 
not in large enterprises, but in the crea­
tion of a class of respectable and self 
respecting peasant proprietors, who will 
cultivate coffee and cocoa etc, which 
they will sell, and ground provisions for
their own use. This must be done by allow­
ing them to get Crown grants on easy terms
and by a rigorous prevention of squatting ...
At the Colonial Office, the officials agreed with Rayner,
and refused to sanction the syndicate and the loan.^*
By the end of 1892, the positions taken by those with a
voice in the debate on Tobago were emerging with clarity. The
Tobago dominant class, the British and Trinidad officials were 
all agreed on the need to settle labourers on the Crown lands, 
but for differing reasons. To the officials, smallholders were
C0295/341: Broome to Ripon, 5 Dec. 1892, Encs., & minutes 
esp. Wingfield's, 7 Jan. 1893; reply, 17 Jan. 1893.
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a source of revenue, and the main hope for future development; 
to the planters, faute de mieux, they were a source of labour, 
necessary to their own hopes of future accumulation.
For the dominant class, the annexation had had damaging 
effects. Firstly, it subordinated them to their Trinidad 
counterparts. Secondly, the merchants were superseded by the 
Trinidad merchants. Thirdly, the customs union seemed to have 
decimated the revenue.
The Tobago sugar planters were caught in yet another 
impasse. They needed both capital and labour, but no one with 
influence was persuaded that they should be helped, and they 
were unable to provide either. Therefore, for them, the last 
shred of hope lay in a separate administration, where the 
recovery of the revenue would, in principle, be possible, and 
where, at least, their influence over public policy would be 
greater. Their prospects of survival as planters therefore 
depended on the issue of customs/revenue and that of the 
development strategy, both of which were slowly tilting to the 
advantage of the emerging peasantry.
VIII.6 THE LOW ADMINISTRATION; 1892-1898 
VIII.6.1 Economic Strateav and Revenue: 1893
Commissioner William Low, a native of Dominica, arrived 
in December 1892. After two months, he analysed the situation 
on the estates in terms close to those of Rayner: there was 
minimal benefit to both planter and metayer, and some of the 
older planters were 'fossilised'.
Agreeing with Rayner on the need to 'create' a class of
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peasants, he vigorously set about to imprison squatters on
Crown lands, to remake the roads and to construct traces to
and through the Crown lands. He offered the lands at £1 per
acre in lots of 5 to 100 acres, and blocks of 200 to 300 acres
at 4s or 5s per acre to capitalists intending to cultivate the
whole purchase at once. But Low hinged his recovery plan on
the peasants he hoped to create.
A peasant proprietary - every man having 
an interest in the land, with his small 
house, and his cow, and, in many cases, 
his horse - means a well behaved body of 
citizens, bound to devote their whole time 
to the cultivation of their plots, and 
having no time to listen to demagogues and 
silly West India newspaper publishers.^
Later he wrote:
... my best energy is bent to obtain a 
large number of small peasant proprietors, 
who would spend all their earnings within 
the Island, rather than a few large land 
owners who might possibly graze cattle or 
leave the land idle.^^
However, Low felt that estates were also necessary, and 
needed advances to pay wages. There being no local capitalist 
willing and able to invest, he proposed a loan to Tobago of 
£3000 per annum at 4% interest, to make advances at 6% 
interest to farmers, with a mortgage on the growing crops. (In 
1895, he raised this request to £5000.)
Low's intent was, using the resources of the state, to 
create a peasantry and a proletariat, to restore the old 
planters, to increase the spending power of the residents.
C0295/345: Fowler to Ripon, 25 May 1893, enc. Low to Col. 
Sec., 27 Feb. 1893.
C0295/363: Broome to Ripon, 11 May 1895, Enc. 2.
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revive the merchants, and, indirectly over time, to increase 
the revenue, so ensuring Tobago's viability as a separate 
administration.
Neither the Trinidad Executive Council nor the London
officials agreed to advances for planters. As usual,
Wingfield went to the nub of the matter, highlighting the
importance to the planters of the recoverv of the revenue;
Whatever may be said in favour of 
Government making advances to cultivators 
the first condition is that Government 
must have the money to advance - the Govt 
of Tobago has no money and would not be 
justified in raising a loan for such a 
purpose even if it could do so which is 
doubtful.*
Only a loan of £2000 for roads and public buildings, in 
addition to the £5000 already borrowed from Trinidad, was 
sanctioned.*
How was Tobago to become viable as a distinct entity? If 
customs revenue was the source of the problem, as both Hay and 
Low insisted, there were three alternatives: (1) make an
annual allowance from the Trinidad Treasury to cover the loss; 
(2) incorporate Tobago into the Government of Trinidad; (3) 
alter the Order-in-Council to let Tobago make its own customs 
arrangements. The third course was pursued by the Tobago 
administration, as a step towards the unstated fourth option: 
to return to a separate administration. But only the first 
was conceded. When this proved unsatisfactory by 1894, they 
demanded the fourth, but were obliged to accept the second.
* C0295/345: Fowler to Ripon, 25 May 1893, enc. Low to Col.
Sec., 27 Feb. 1893; minutes.
* C0295/345: Fowler to Ripon, 14 June 1893, & Encs.
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Low insisted on amending the Order-in-Council to enable 
the Tobago administration to charge duty on articles imported 
from Trinidad in passengers' luggage. He claimed that Tobago 
was losing over £1000 per annum because of the Union, and 
asked for a refund of £4926, the supposed loss for 1889-1893.
It was Broome, in London when Low's proposal on altering
the Order-in-Council arrived, who perceived the class issues
at the heart of the revenue controversy: the loss to the
Government, the merchants (and implicitly to the planters) was
a gain to the labouring class. He minuted:
... this is a matter in which the prosper­
ity of the Government is one thing, and 
the prosperity of the people is another 
- to a considerable extent. The Tobago 
Government has no doubt lost revenue ...
The Scarborough merchants have also lost; 
but I imagine that the Tobago agriculturist 
has gained a better market.
Reversion to an independent customs tariff would not benefit
the small Tobago producer:
It would certainly restrict and interfere 
with his present way of carrying his goods 
to Port of Spain, having his holiday there, 
buying in the shops of the capital, and 
returning to Scarborough with his purchases.
Broome also saw that loss of customs duties was only one
source of the low revenue.
Ripon asked that the papers be laid before the 
Legislative Council, with a proposal that a yearly allowance 
be granted to Tobago for loss of revenue, the amount to be 
considered by a Select Committee, with Low attending the
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discussions.^
At the same time, greater efforts were made to collect 
the land and house taxes. The 1885 Land and House Tax 
Regulation was amended by an 1893 one, empowering the Deputy 
Marshal to levy on all goods and chattels of defaulters, 
instead of only those on which the taxes were due; it also 
made it more difficult for planters to forfeit a small part of 
their estates to the Crown in lieu of taxes. (In 1892 alone 
1400 acres had been so ceded to the Crown, but £30 were 
thereby lost to the revenue). Still, the Tobago finances did 
not improve.
VIII.6.2 The Petition for Closer Union; 1893
At the end of 1893, part of the middle strata and the 
labouring class made a significant intervention with a 
historic petition, which was decisive in shaping the views of 
the British officials on the future of Tobago. The petition 
had an exceptionally large number (1016) of signatures. 
Labourers, artisans, tailors, seamstresses, peasants, 
teachers, fishermen, mariners, cartermen, and even one 
schoolboy, George N. Paul of Mt St George, signed it. Only 
two planters, both from Trinidad and investing after 1886 - 
Trochilus Tucker and William Date - supported it. Henry 
Hackett, Glasgow-educated engineer, son of James Hackett, the 
deceased ex-slave who had bought Les Coteaux and Belmont 
estates, also signed. In general, the signatories belonged
C0295/346: Fowler to Ripon, 23 July 1893, & Encs. esp. 
Low's minutes, 28 Dec. 1892, 23 July 1893; Broome's 
minute, n.d.; Ripon to Broome, 6 Oct. 1893.
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firmly to the ranks of the black segment of the middle strata 
and the labouring class.
The petition, expressing dissatisfaction with the limited 
Union, asked 'that Tobago be incorporated more closely with 
Trinidad by a complete change from our present form of 
Government to the status of a Ward in the Colony of Trinidad. ' 
It also proposed a steam service going around Tobago, calling 
at Scarborough and sixteen bays, and going to Barbados, to 
connect with the Royal Mail steamers, and thence to Trinidad. 
In other words, the signatories saw the need to integrate 
Tobago village producers with international traffic and with 
the major nearby markets.
Both Broome and Low disagreed, the former without
comment. Low wrote:
... it is certainly supported by few names 
of any weight or importance; and I am 
satisfied that it is in no sense represent­
ative of public feeling. On the contrary 
it may be summed up as the work of an inter­
ested few - principally school teachers.
But at the Colonial Office, the memorial marked the 
turning point in their thinking. Whereas they had allowed 
Tobago an independent Treasury on the premise that only this 
was feasible, they swiftly adopted this proposal as the 
desired objective. Wingfield, after reviewing the relevant 
papers, wrote a long minute, recalling that this had been the 
original intention.^ He agreed with the petitioners, while 
recognizing that the dominant classes in both Trinidad and 
Tobago would oppose the change; the petition was simply taking
It was never clearly formulated in writing.
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the annexation to its logical conclusion.
Ripon's reply signalled the Colonial Office intent:
I am inclined to agree with the view taken 
by Her Majesty's Government in 1886, that 
the complete incorporation of Tobago with 
Trinidad, by abolishing the separate 
Treasuries and establishments [,] would be 
desirable, but I am not prepared to advise 
Her Majesty to adopt that measure, unless 
it is acceptable to the Legislative Council 
of the Colony, and to the Financial Board 
of Tobago; and as I gather ... that this 
is not the case, no action in the dir­
ection desired by the Petitioners can be 
taken at present.^
By early 1894, the Colonial Office supported a 
development strategy based on the creation of a peasantry, 
whose potential was enhanced by the customs union and free 
trade with Trinidad. Closer union with Trinidad would 
strengthen the interests of the middle strata and the 
labouring class. However, it was a direct threat to the 
interests of the old sugar planters and the merchants. The 
crystallization at the Colonial Office of the view that Tobago 
should be a Ward of the united colony gave the political 
initiative to the labouring class and those from the middle 
strata who promoted the petition.
VIII.6.3 The Select Committee on Tobago Customs Revenue
The Tobago dominant class was not helped by the Report of 
the Select Committee of the Legislative Council on 
compensation to Tobago for loss of customs duties. The
C0295/348: Broome to Ripon, 11 Dec. 1893, enc. Memorial 
of Certain Tobago Inhabitants, & Low to Col. Sec., 20 
Nov. 1893; minutes by Harris & Wingfield; Ripon to 
Broome, 30 Jan. 1894.
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Committee found, after examining passengers' luggage from 
Trinidad from 15 December 1893 to 14 January 1894, normally 
the busiest time of year, that the duty leviable was £3 12s 
3d, based on local prices, which were at least 3 0% higher than 
the invoice value on which duty had been collected in
Trinidad.
The Committee therefore estimated that the loss to Tobago 
in round figures would be, say, £45 per annum, and that the 
sum of £3928 11s 8%d, which had been paid to the Tobago
Treasury as compensation for customs and excise duties 
foregone from January 1889 to September 1893, was adequate.
They saw the falling value of Tobago exports as partly 
accounting for the reduced purchasing power of its people, as 
shown in the reduced imports. They recommended that 'the free 
interchange of goods between the two Islands [be] terminated 
and each permitted to collect and retain its own duties and to 
fix its own Customs Tariff.'
A minority report by William Gordon Gordon, a leading
merchant, added:
That if Tobago could be converted into a
Ward of Trinidad and its affairs managed
economically its position and prospects 
would be materially altered in a few years 
and it would become a valuable adjunct to 
Trinidad.^
Accompanying the Select Committee Report, Broome sent a 
Memorial from all the members of the Tobago Financial Board. 
They showed that, while Section 29 of the Order-in-Council 
allowed for the laws of Trinidad relating to customs and
C0295/351: Broome to Ripon, 3 Mar. 1894, enc. Council 
Paper No. 21, 1894.
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excise duties to apply to Tobago, Section 3 0 ordered that the 
revenue of Tobago be kept distinct from that of Trinidad. 
They argued that the aim of Section 30 was defeated by the 
customs union, which caused 'a considerable diversion of 
Revenue from the Treasury of Tobago to that of Trinidad, it 
being impossible as has been demonstrated [by the Select 
Committee], to arrive at any system by which the said loss can 
be checked.' They therefore asked the Secretary of State to 
ensure to Tobago control of her customs and other duties.
Broome had no objection to these requests to end the 
customs union. But the London officials considered it
'retrograde'; and the view already formed was reinforced. The 
Select Committee Report had demolished the claim of both 
Commissioners Hay and Low that the loss of revenue was 
principally due to the Union. Instead, the officials argued 
that there were alternative explanations:
(1) the lower consumption of spirits and tobacco because 
of the higher Trinidad excise duty;
(2) the sugar crisis and the disputes between planters 
and metayers which dislocated production and trade;
(3) lower tariffs, both because of the Union and the 
1892 McKinley tariff agreement which lowered duties 
on United States goods.
Ripon's reply made this clear to the Legislative Council
and the Financial Board, and he added:
I should be disposed, if local feeling 
did not stand in the way, to favour the 
policy advocated by Mr. Gordon in his post­
script ..., namely to complete the union 
between the two islands by converting 
Tobago into a Ward of the Colony of 
Trinidad.^
C0295/351: Broome to Ripon, 3 Mar. 1894, Enc. 2, Memorial 
of Financial Board; minutes; Ripon to Broome, 19 June
1894.
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VIII.6.4 The Tobago Dominant Class Fiahts Back
Ripon's despatch was laid before the Financial Board,
which replied that
the results to the best interests of 
Tobago since its annexation to Trinidad 
... have been so disastrous that no prac­
tical benefit whatever would accrue by 
Tobago becoming a Ward of Trinidad/"
The dominant class mobilized their forces to the fullest.
A public meeting in Scarborough on 14 August 1894, attended by
over 200 taxpayers, unanimously resolved:
That this meeting protests against Tobago 
being made a Ward of Trinidad or being 
more closely connected with the Island of 
Trinidad."
Broome did not wish to lay Ripon's despatch before the 
Trinidad Legislative Council, which was unlikely to favour 
closer union with a 'bankrupt' Tobago. Replying to Ripon, he 
drew attention to Tobago's debt (£6622 on 30 June 1894), for 
which there was no prospect of repayment. Tobago was again 
using the proceeds of money orders and its Savings Bank funds 
to pay salaries and current expenses, while its public 
services 'are and will be in a sadly starved and crippled 
condition.' Further drastic economies would realize only a 
small sum. Therefore, Broome passed the buck to the Colonial 
Office:
For assistance from within, there is but 
little scope. For assistance from without, 
what source is there? ... Tobago is an 
Imperial possession, and, if it is worth
" C0295/356: Broome to Ripon, 25 Aug. 1894, Sub-Enc. 1, 
Extract from Minutes of Tobago Financial Board meeting, 
15 Aug. 1894.
" C0295/356: Broome to Ripon, 25 Aug. 1894, Sub-Enc. 2.
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keeping, is it not worth helping?
Broome called for a £20,000 loan, with imperial guarantee, for
road making and for 'small secured loans to bona fide and
specially selected cultivators'; the debt to the Crown Agents
and to Trinidad to be also paid from the loan.^
At the Colonial Office, there was no acceptance of the
diagnosis of bankruptcy, and no willingness to consider a
£20,000 loan, since the interest would be impossible for
Tobago to bear without additional taxation. Passing the buck
back to Broome, they argued that a smaller loan could be
raised in Trinidad, without any guarantee. The consensus was
not to approve of state advances to cultivators. Wingfield
perceptively observed:
Small proprietors appear to be multiplying 
in a fairly satisfactory manner without 
such inducements and it would be more 
prudent to wait and see what effect the 
improvement of the roads may have on the 
demand for land.*
In December 1894, the Tobago dominant class made its
final thrust to dissolve the Union. The unofficials on the
Financial Board, all planters, forwarded a petition of 'Her
Majesty's Loyal Inhabitants'. Their covering letter stated:
We occupy the anomalous position of being 
members of a Financial Body deprived, 
practically, of its principal source of 
Revenue. Trinidad is absorbing most of the 
money which ought to come into our Treasury
C0295/356: Broome to Ripon, 25 Aug. 1894.
* C0295/356: Broome to Ripon, 2 5 Aug. 1894; minutes by 
Olivier, 15 Oct., Wingfield, 16 Oct.; Ripon to Broome, 
25 Oct. 1894.
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on dutiable goods consumed in this island.^
The memorial recalled the Tobago Legislative Council 
resolution of 19 January 1887, which wanted a return to the 
status quo ante, should the Union prove disadvantageous. They 
averred that the Union was 'disastrous' to Tobago, as 
evidenced by the loss of revenue, the unwillingness of the 
majority of the Trinidad Legislative Council to assist in 
remedying the customs duty issue, 'the introduction of class 
prejudice, previously non-existent' in the metayer disputes, 
and the 'want of sympathy' between the inhabitants of both 
islands, because of 'difference in religion and practically in 
nationality. ' They mentioned also that the Governor did not 
visit Tobago.
They argued against Ripon's proposal for a closer Union 
with Trinidad on several grounds. It would mean increased 
land taxes, and the application of expensive, inappropriate 
Trinidad laws; the diversion of trade to Trinidad would be 
'ruinously increased'; it would retard the development of 
Tobago's Crown lands, would expose Tobago to corrupt 
administration, and would cause a loss of 'identity and 
prestige'. Instead, they asked for Tobago to be replaced under 
the Government of the Windward Islands.
The memorial was signed by 200 persons - the leading 
planters, merchants, officials and ministers of religion,^
C0295/358: Broome to Ripon, 17 Dec. 1894, Enc. 1,
Tobago unofficials to Low, 10 Dec. 1894.
The Moravian ministers saw the Roman Catholic influence 
from Trinidad as a threat to evangelical faith. Periodical 
Accts. (2nd Series) 2 (1893):81-2; 3 (1898):556; 4 
(1900):385, (1901):529.
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some of the coloured segment of the middle strata, a few 
school teachers, labourers and artisans. Low deemed the 
petitioners 'fairly representative of the property and 
intelligence of the community.'^
Ripon, in reply, refused, on the grounds of the memorial, 
to consider any change in the Order-in-Council. He was 
persuaded that the actual loss of customs duties was 
insignificant; that the loss to the storekeepers was no loss 
to the community, and did not warrant interference. Broome was 
rebuked for 'neglect and apparent indifference', and told to 
visit Tobago, taking competent officials; and Ripon ordered 
that the laws be adjusted to suit Tobago's needs.^
The situation was more dire than the dominant class cared 
to admit. A separate administration, on which the planters, 
the merchants, and those officials who could not easily be 
transferred elsewhere, all depended for their survival and 
influence, had to be able to pay its way. The customs revenue 
hoped for was uncertain. And Low's policy of investing in 
roads to attract investors and smallholders to the Crown 
lands, while seeking a loan to make small advances to the 
planters, was unable to bring quick, direct revenue to the 
Exchequer. Since all such loans had failed to get approval, 
advances to planters were contingent on increased revenue 
which, in turn, depended on the success of the Crown lands
C0295/358: Broome to Ripon, 17 Dec. 1894, Enc. 2, 
Memorial, 25 July 1894, & Enc. 3, Low to Col. Sec., 10 
Dec. 1894.
C0295/358: Broome to Ripon, 17 Dec. 1894; Ripon to Broome,
2 May 1895.
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policy, which could only be long-term. Thus, it was a long­
term strategy, needing to produce short-term results.
The labouring class was in a far stronger position than 
the planters. Without state aid, they benefited from cheaper 
goods and access to the Trinidad market; and were rapidly 
becoming independent smallholders. Without state aid, most of 
the old planters could not survive, whether as growers of 
sugar cane or of other crops. If the Tobago administration was 
unviable, their prospects were even dimmer. For the 
merchants, closer union with Trinidad would be ruinous.
VIII.6.5 The Gathering Gloom: 1895-1896
Before Ripon's despatch rebuking him arrived in Trinidad, 
Broome visited Tobago. He reported considerable improvement 
since his last visit in September 1892, for which Low deserved 
'much credit'. Tobago had paid its debts and revenue was 
covering expenditure. Exports were increasing. However, the 
loss of customs duties was 'still a burning question', and 
Broome instituted a check on passengers' luggage from Port of 
Spain to Tobago, for the twelve months commencing 1 June
1895.^
Yet, Ripon agreed only to a £10,000 loan for public 
works, to be spent over 2 years, again considering it 
inadvisable to lend to planters.^
Broome's reopening of the issue of passengers' luggage 
did not help the Tobago dominant class. Baggage was examined
C0295/363: Broome to Ripon, 11 May 1895.
C0295/363: Ripon to Broome, 17 June 1895.
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from June to December 1895, and the duty leviable was £25 Is 
3%d, suggesting a trifling loss to Tobago.
By 1896, small capitalists had invested in Tobago estates 
and Broome, after visiting Tobago for three weeks (26 March to 
15 April 1896), reported admiringly on Low's careful 
husbanding of the finances and his 'excellent work'. The 
financial situation appeared more stable, but the Tobago 
officials were at vicious loggerheads.^
In August 1896, Broome forwarded petitions for and 
against the removal of Low. Broome and the Colonial Office 
supported Low because, in spite of his brusque manner, he 
deserved promotion. Six hundred and thirteen signatures, 
headed by those of the leading planters and merchants, were 
gathered against Low. They claimed that the apparent 
prosperity of Tobago was a mirage, since the ability to 
balance its books depended on the sale of Crown lands, on 
arrears of taxes and on speculation in postage stamps.^ 
Although Low dismissed the petition as the work of an 
obstructionist 'clique', his recovery plan was falling apart, 
and he had, indeed, speculated in postage stamps to raise 
revenue.
To crown it all. Low's report on the Crown lands showed 
little success. Between December 1894 and December 189 6, only 
155 acres had been sold, with 77 persons in arrears on 31
C0295/369: Broome to Chamberlain, 29 Jan. 1896, & Encs.
C0295/371: Broome to Chamberlain, 9 May 1896.
C0295/373; Broome to Chamberlain, 9 Aug. 1896; Enc. 1,
Sub-Enc. 2.
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December 1896. Sixteen persons had been dispossessed for non-
compliance with the Rules. Low stated:
I am forced to confess ... disappoint­
ment with the people who are willing 
enough to obtain possession of the Lots 
on the Government terms, but not to plant 
economic plants.
Despite efforts by Mr Caines, the Cocoa Instructor, the
majority of buyers had made 'little progress' with cocoa,
'preferring to plant a few potatoes, peas etc.'.
Low attributed these poor results to metayage, which gave
labourers access to estate land for provisions, and also to
the fact that planters sold land at 8s, while Crown land was
£1, per acre.* Soon after, exhausted. Low applied for six
months leave.
VIII.6.6 The Turning Tide of Official Opinion 
in Trinidad and Tobago
In March 1897, the West India Royal Commission sat in
Trinidad and Tobago. Sydney Olivier from the Colonial Office
was its secretary. Testifying before the Commission, Low
repeated his arguments that the annexation had been to
Tobago's disadvantage because of the customs union. The
minutes stated:
The labouring class in Tobago are, he 
believes, in favour of the union with 
Trinidad, but most persons capable of 
forming an opinion are against it.
However, Low conceded the difficulty of maintaining a separate
administration:
* C0295/377: Knollys to Chamberlain, 25 Feb. 1897, enc. 
Low's Rept., 18 Jan. 1897.
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Thinks a complete union might be of 
advantage to Tobago; their roads and 
their medical service would be better 
provided for if the island were treated 
fairly as compared with the rest of 
Trinidad; thinks the present system almost 
impossible to maintain.^
The apparently satisfactory Tobago revenue was, as Low's
enemies had stated, illusory. In May 1897, the Trinidad
executive wrote to S. W. Knaggs, Acting Commissioner (Low
being on leave), asking whether the public works provided for
by the loan of £10,000 should be further proceeded with, given
the falling off in the revenue. Knaggs gave a thoughtful
report, and concluded:
As regards the ability of Tobago to repay 
this loan I am forced to entertain grave 
doubts. None of the expenditure, save 
perhaps that on Crown Lands traces, is of 
a reproductive character; on the contrary 
the upkeep of the roads and works will en­
tail still further calls upon an already 
strained exchequer, and it will be cer­
tainly necessary, but for some happy 
contingency, shortly to decide whether 
Tobago shall be allowed to make her own 
fiscal arrangements or be entirely ab­
sorbed by Trinidad. The latter course I 
would strongly deprecate as being in the 
interests of neither Island.^
When asked for the reasons for his concluding sentence, 
Knaggs submitted another careful report showing, first, the 
differences in taxation, especially the land tax (5d per acre 
in Tobago, Is per acre in Trinidad), which would 'complete the 
ruin' of the planters. Secondly, he adverted to the higher 
costs which Union would involve, since Tobago's affairs were
WI Roval Com. Rept. , 1897, App. C, Pt. V, pp. 364-5.
C0295/384: Jerningham to Chamberlain, 10 Jan. 1898, enc. 
Knaggs to Col. Sec., 6 July 1897.
519
conducted with 'an economy that sometimes ... verges on
parsimony.' Thirdly, he argued that the two flaws in the
existing arrangement were the loss of customs revenue and the
forcing on Tobago of laws unsuited to local conditions. Thus,
he preferred an independent customs within a united colony.^
By then, Knaggs was the only leading local official who
thought likewise. The new Governor, Sir Hubert Jerningham,
visited Tobago in August 1897 and reported:
Capital and labour are the two needs of
the Colony. There is soil rich enough to
attract the former, the people are too 
lazy to constitute the latter, and the 
unfortunate Metayer System has helped to
create very small holdings sufficient to
give the owners their strict nourishment 
and not enough to stimulate their giving 
attention to the soil.
Stated otherwise, the labouring class, having refused to
become proletarians, maximized their advantage by paying
minimal attention to metayage (Ch. 5) . Jerningham was
persuaded that only in complete Union with Trinidad could
Tobago's prosperity be restored.^
Late in 1897, the Royal Commission reported. They firmly
recommended complete amalgamation and the abolition of
separate Treasuries, since the existing arrangement was
'unnecessary and may be mischievous'. Dismissing the
merchants' complaints, they stated:
The traders seem to fear that amalgamation 
with Trinidad would reduce their business
C0295/384: Jerningham to Chamberlain, 10 Jan. 1898, enc.
Knaggs to Col. Sec., 26 July 1897.
C0295/380: Jerningham to Chamberlain, 19 Aug. 1897. Sir
Courtenay Knollys, the Col. Sec., felt likewise. 
C0295/365: Knollys to Chamberlain, Conf., 26 Aug. 1895.
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in connexion with the import trade, and 
possibly with the export trade. This result 
might follow, but from the point of view 
of the general interest, no sound argument 
against the amalgamation can be based on it
Low, when asked, on his return from leave, to comment,
wrote an extraordinary report, advising that a separate
administration was unviable, and supporting a closer Union.
His views bear quoting at length;
By changes and reductions in establish­
ments and by a daily and hourly economy 
"verging on parsimony"[,] ... I have 
endeavoured to keep the Island solvent, 
but for some time it has been painfully 
apparent that collapse is within measur­
able distance unless external assistance 
is rendered ... The very limited revenue 
is decreasing, while essential expenditure 
becomes more and more urgent. ... I must 
candidly confess that for the first 2 or 
3 years of my residence here I was not an 
advocate for closer union with Trinidad;
... But a very anxious and careful con­
sideration of the impossible continuance 
of the existing state of things has 
induced a change of opinion ... Candour 
compels me to admit that if Tobago will 
be treated as fairly as other districts 
of the larger island opposition can no 
longer be honestly justified ... Among 
the considerations which have induced my 
change of opinion I place the fact - an 
important one - that a very large majority 
of the 20,000 inhabitants at present look 
to Trinidad as the market for their 
products and, consequently, would not ob­
ject to the closer union ... I do not lose 
sight of the fact that this very advantage 
to one section of the community seriously 
affects another - the mercantile section - 
and tends to the destruction of their 
trade ... .
But Low agreed that no sound argument against the Union could 
be based on the merchants' problems. Indeed, he admitted the 
class character of his previous views:
59 WI Roval Com. Rept.. 1897, p. 41.
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Mr. Knaggs' report ... embodies most of 
the views which I previously held in 
common with the merchants and planters, 
and are many of them cogent if Tobago is 
to be completely separated from Trinidad.
But I do not think it will be difficult 
to show that, as a separate Government, 
the present revenue would be quite in­
adequate for the efficient administra­
tion of affairs even on the most careful 
and economical lines.
The greatest obstacle to the Union he saw in the Trinidad
land tax, which would affect the Tobago planters;
Impecunious, without capital or credit, 
sugar moribund, they exist purely on the 
sufference [sic] of their mortgagees and 
they annually experience increasing dif­
ficulties in paying the present tax of 5d.
... The taxes on the estates of John 
McCall & Co. - the largest land owners 
here - have just been paid by the judgment 
creditors because the firm could not do so, 
and these estates will be up for sale in 
a short time. ... The peasant proprietors 
(who number 3,988 on Mr. Knaggs' list) on 
the contrary would be but little affected 
by the increase of the Land Tax to one 
shilling per acre; it would only be 
necessary for any of them to plant 2 or 3
extra plantain trees, to rear 3 or 4
chickens, or to sell a small pig and 
their troubles cease.
Low then outlined the priorities - steam and telegraph 
communication, more peasants, and a reduction of the price of 
Crown lands to 10s per acre. Having indicated other needs, 
particularly education, he concluded that after 'five years 
experience of the hopelessness of the struggle against 
bankruptcy', 'no other possible alternative presents itself
but ... complete amalgamation with Trinidad'
Low's 1897 Crown lands report was his final admission of
^ C0295/384: Jerningham to Chamberlain, 10 Jan. 1898, enc. 
Low to Jerningham, 10 Dec. 1897.
522
failure. One hundred acres had been alienated in 17 grants,
bringing to a total 1148 acres sold in 172 grants.
I greatly regret again to record my dis­
appointment at the indifference of the 
peasants to their own and their Island's 
future welfare.
The London officials were exuberant. They agreed to
Jerningham's proposal of a Commission, chaired by Low,
comprising residents of both islands, to advise on the best
way to effect the complete Union. Chamberlain's reply asked
that, on the Trinidad side, there should be 'a disposition to
make the terms of union as favourable to Tobago as the
representatives of that island could reasonably expect
VIII.7 COMPLETE UNION BETWEEN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Although the Low Commission apparently made generous 
suggestions for Tobago's immediate development, the British 
officials decided that such substantial expenditure should be 
spread over time.^ Steam and telegraph communication, the 
most urgent needs, were allowed to wait because of the high 
cost to Trinidad. Knollys, the Acting Governor, suggested 
that the Colony be called '"Trinidad", Tobago being a district
C0295/385: Jerningham to Chamberlain, 14 Apr. 1898, 
enc. Low to Col. Sec., 5 Apr. 1898.
C0295/384: Chamberlain to Jerningham, 22 Mar. 1898. The 
Commission's Rept., dated 14 Apr. 1898, was received in 
the Col. Office, but no copy has been found after a 
diligent search in the libraries and archives of the UK 
and Trinidad and Tobago.
C0295/385: Chamberlain to Jerningham, 28 June 1898.
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only', but Wingfield insisted that it be Trinidad and 
Tobago.^ The Tobago land tax was raised from 5d to 6d per 
acre, and the Colonial Office satisfied all classes by 
abolishing licenses for animals.
The assumption of the Low Commission was that Tobago's 
debt of £9203 (on 31 December 1897) would be borne by Britain. 
An imperial grant of £5000 was made to Trinidad to cover its 
loan to Tobago, but Chamberlain deemed any further imperial 
payments 'inadmissible'. He refused to sanction the loan of 
£10,000 for roads, and argued that the liability for the 
advance of £4500, which was made in anticipation of it, should 
be accepted by the Trinidad and Tobago Treasury.^
The new Order-in-Council“ establishing the Union with 
effect from 1 January 1899, was read, on 22 November 1898, 
from the Scarborough Court House steps, to a favourable crowd, 
by Sir Hubert Jerningham.
By 1897, in both private and official circles, it was 
envisaged that Tobago would supply the Port of Spain market 
with vegetables and meat, which were then imported from 
Venezuela.^ In 1900, the only steamer plying to Tobago was 
the Royal Mail packet, but a regular coastal steam service was
^ C0295/386: Knollys to Chamberlain, 19 July 1898, & 
minutes.
C0295/385: Chamberlain to Jerningham, 28 June 1898; 
Jerningham to Chamberlain, 3 Mar. 1898; reply, 12 Apr. 
1898.
^ C0299/157: Council Paper No. 177, Trinidad Roval Gazette. 
8 Dec. 1898.
C0295/385: Jerningham to Chamberlain, 25 Apr. 1898. 
C0295/388: Jerningham to Chamberlain, 24 Nov. 1898; 
Meaden [1898]; Howard to Selborne, 28 Nov. 1898.
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started in 1901 and the telegraph was installed in 1906. Land 
was purchased in 1899 for a Government Stock Farm and a 
Botanic Station, to promote stock rearing and agriculture.
A few months after the commencement of the Union, the 
Tobago dominant class, with a few persons from the middle 
strata, petitioned for improved roads, a coastal steam service 
linking Tobago and Trinidad, the telegraph, secondary schools 
etc. Ironically, the plantocrats, with power in their hands 
before 1876, had squandered their political and fiscal 
capital, and had effected none of these necessary services. 
Olivier minuted on the dangers of 'petting[,] coddling and 
spoiling the lesser Island out of the pocket of the larger'.^
Complaints against excessive centralization of 
administration in Trinidad, and of 'Cinderella' status for 
Tobago, began soon after. In 1901, the Tobago Warden, J. J. 
Rousseau, asked for higher status and greater independence of 
action than other Wardens. The senior Trinidad officials and 
those in London all disagreed. The Warden of Tobago was to 
have the same status as all other Wardens. Rousseau was moved 
from Government House, which was repaired and reserved for the 
Governor, the Chief Justice and Heads of Departments on 
official visits.^ However, under changed circumstances, this
C0295/392: Jerningham to Chamberlain, 5 May 1899, enc. 
petition from 'the undersigned landowners, professional 
men, and merchants resident in ... Tobago'; C0295/395; 
Howard (WI Rubber Plantation Syndicate) to Chamberlain, 
12 July 1899; Olivier's minute, 17 July. All their 
requests, except the steam service, had been discussed 
in Tobago long before 1884.
C0295/404: Moloney to Chamberlain, 26 Sept. 1901, & Encs.; 
Chamberlain to Moloney, 23 Oct. 1901.
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interpretation of the terms of the Union was challenged and 
overthrown in the latter half of the twentieth century.
VIII.8 CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the changing class configuration of 
Tobago, resulting from the joint effects of the collapse of 
sugar and the annexation to Trinidad. It shows that, between 
1884 and 1900, two major public issues - the Union with 
Trinidad, and the development strategy for Tobago - were 
integrally connected to the interests of the classes and 
strata constituting Tobago society.
The crash of sugar, the bankrupt Exchequer and the 
annexation posed several dilemmas for the dominant class. 
Decreases in all sources of revenue were disastrous for the 
viability of a separate Tobago Government, which in turn was 
critical to the survival, power and class strategy of the old 
planters and merchants, who needed to influence state policy 
in their favour. The majority of the planters, old and new, 
and the merchants, recognizing that they would be stronger 
under a separate Government, rejected the Union. The senior 
officials, whose careers and influence were threatened by the 
more numerous Trinidad bureaucracy, also preferred a separate 
administration. (New officials were appointed to head all the 
Tobago sub-departments after 1899.) The dominant class tried 
to increase production, extricate Tobago from debt and 
dissolve the Union.
If anyone was capable of doing so, it was Commissioner 
Low, whose diligence was admirable. However, even he admitted
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that the system was unviable in the short term, and he 
retreated from opinions which, with the planters and 
merchants, he had firmly held until 1897. Low's abandonment 
of his former views cannot be seen as arising out of his 
conflicts with some of the dominant class. His appears to 
have been an honest appraisal of the situation, and the Low 
Commission, appointed to advise on complete union (1898), 
seems to have negotiated terms so favourable for Tobago that 
the Colonial Office opposed such high initial expenditure.
The expanding middle strata were divided on the Union. 
Some of the coloureds sided with the planters and merchants; 
but several, along with the black segment of the middle 
strata, supported it. As Low remarked in December 1893, the 
teachers were among the main supporters of the Union. Hemmed 
in by low salaries, limited resources, and little room for 
political manoeuvre, as the Bowhill affair demonstrated, the 
teachers stood to benefit from better salaries and 
opportunities for t r a i n i n g . I n  December 1897, Low 
acknowledged that education had been grossly neglected.
It was the labouring class that emerged most successfully 
from the demise of sugar and the annexation, both of which 
were to their advantage. The collapse of sugar enhanced their 
power as metayers; by 1897, since 95% of the canes were 
ratoons, they had succeeded in occupying estate lands, while 
not planting new canes. They also gained increased ownership
The Moravian missionaries reported for 1901 that the 
schools were better staffed, inspection was regular, there 
was more supervision and 'the teachers have benefited 
considerably by the incorporation with Trinidad'. 
Periodical Accts. (2nd series) 5 (1902-4):114-5.
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of cheap cleared land, as the planters were obliged to sell in 
order to survive; and they gained access to abandoned lands 
forfeited to the Crown. Moreover, annexation allowed them 
cheaper imports via Trinidad and a large export market, of 
which they took advantage, despite the need for more frequent 
steam communication. The loss to the merchants, the planters 
and the Government was a boon to the Tobago populace.
The second major issue, the development strategy, also 
registered a gain to the labouring class, who were clearly 
bent on becoming primarily smallholders independent of the 
estates. Hay, Rayner and Low all agreed on the need to 
'create' a peasantry, as the basis of economic recovery. On 
this, even the planters concurred, though their desire was for 
a smallholding proletariat, a contradiction in terms. The 
planters saw the creation of such a class as essential in 
arresting migration, so making more labour available. The 
officials saw it as the means whereby the abandoned lands 
could be used, to produce 'economic' export crops for the 
foreign market. To the planters, this was acceptable, once 
steady labour was available to them; to the officials, it was 
the way to raise the purchasing power of the residents, 
increase trade, restore the merchants, and boost the revenue.
Thus, the Crown lands programme was pivotal to the 
survival of the dominant class. If it succeeded and revenue 
increased, the administration would survive, the merchants 
prosper, and there would have been less objection to state- 
supported loans for planters. Ironically, all sections of the 
dominant class were committed to the creation of a class,
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whose ownership of land ensured that it would not be a 
proletariat, giving steady labour to the estates. However, the 
plan could only succeed in the long term, while the short-term 
viability of the dominant class was at stake.
Between 1847 and 1897, there was a marked change in the
attitude of Colonial Office officials towards the peasantry.
Having initially considered plantation agriculture as
equivalent to 'civilization' and prosperity for the BWI, by
the 1890s they favoured the strengthening of the peasantry,
while not abandoning the planters [Lobdell 1988; Holt 1992].
They were firmly supported by the 1897 Royal Commission:
[N]o reform affords so good a prospect 
for the permanent welfare in the future 
of the West Indies as the settlement of 
the labouring population on the land as 
small peasant proprietors ...
Therefore, production by the labouring class for the Trinidad
market, begun with clandestine trade since the 1870s (Ch. 4),
received the powerful endorsement of the British officials,
and this weighed heavily in the local balance of forces.
However, to Low's chagrin, the labouring class desired to 
be peasants on its own terms. preferring cheaper, more 
accessible land to the remote Crown lands, and short-term 
crops for the Trinidad market to long-term crops for the 
métropole. The salutary lessons of development planning 
without popular consent are clear! Precisely because the 
peasants were expanding on their own initiative, depending on 
family and community labour, and not on the state, they were 
in a stronger position than the planters. Several requests for
WI Roval Com. Rent. . 1897, pp. 16-17.
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loans to planters were ignored, as was the central factory, so 
essential to profitable sugar cultivation. Thus, the demise of 
the old planters was rapid. By 1905, of 101 estates, only 33 
were owned by old planter families; the McCalls owned only one 
[Collens 1906:205-6].
The early decades of the 20th century saw the flowering 
of a peasantry, alongside estates, most of which were owned by 
recent small investors. By 193 5, 95% of the labouring
population owned or rented land, and virtually all had sources 
of income apart from wage labour on roads or on estates.^ By 
193 6, the number of properties under 10 acres had almost 
doubled from 3988 in 1897, to 7714.^ The expansion of the 
smallholders meant that far more land was cultivated than had 
been under crops in the 19th century - in 1928, 41,640 acres, 
as opposed to 10,000 acres or less.^ Cocoa replaced sugar as 
the principal export crop; but of the 12,000 acres under cocoa 
in 1939, 8000 were in holdings less than 50 acres in size
[Orde-Browne 1939, App. III]. In 1939, Orde-Browne reported 
that the main wage earners were employees in the Public Works 
Department, nearly all of whom were also agricultural 
producers, while 'a large proportion' of estate properties 
were held by 'peasant cultivators', who were 'well 
established' and 'mainly self-supporting'. Tobago presented
Rept. of the Wages Advisory Board, Council Paper No. 88, 
1936.
District Administration Repts. for 193 6, App. 1, Council 
Paper No. 78, 1937.
District Administration Repts. for 1928, Council Paper No. 
74, 1929.
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'a spectacle of former great plantation activity which has 
dwindled since the decline of sugar' [ibid.: 124-5]. Thus, 
throughout the century after 1838, the majority of the 
labouring class avoided becoming proletarians depending 
exclusively on wages [Craig 1988:8-11].
Low revenue, an unviable administration and a 
disappointing Crown lands programme allowed the Colonial 
Office to have its way in unifying Trinidad and Tobago. This 
time, the main, but unwitting, ally of the Colonial Office was 
the labouring class, rapidly becoming an independent 
peasantry.
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION
IX.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the findings of the study in the 
light of our two objectives, as stated in Chapter 1. It 
revisits the 'flight from the estates' debate briefly. It 
outlines a possible line of comparison between Tobago and 
Grenada, that is suggested by the hypothesis tested, and 
indicates other directions for further research. It assesses 
the limitations and accomplishments of this work.
IX.2 THE CHANGING SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF TOBAGO
As a case study in macro-sociological history, this work 
analysed the major social groupings in Tobago over time. 
Starting with the slavery period and the 1830s in particular, 
we described the changing social configuration as it was 
structured in the conditions following firstly, the 
Emancipation of 1838, and secondly, the collapse of the sugar 
economy in the 1880s and the annexation to Trinidad.
There was a dominant class of planters, lessees, 
merchants, and officials which, by 1862, included both 
coloureds and blacks. The rise of a monopolizing tendency 
(the McCall/Gillespie combine) within it after 1863, and the 
intra-class conflicts which this engendered, were discussed.
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The collapse of the combine and the subordination of the 
dominant class to the Colonial Office officials and to the 
Trinidad dominant class were analysed in Chapters 7 and 8.
There was clearly a central conflict between the two 
major classes - the dominant class and the labouring class. 
The former were largely capitalists without capital. The 
latter, labourers who were not proletarians, for whom the wage 
was not a wage (sole means of subsistence) , were engaged in a 
multiplicity of occupations, among which metayage predominated 
after 1855.
Chapter 5 eloquently showed that metayage was a metaphor 
for the reciprocal compromises in the struggles between the 
dominant and labouring classes. The planters introduced 
metayage to lower costs and as an incentive to production. It 
was also a means of narrowing the options of the labourers, 
who had defected to a greater extent than previously from 
regular estate labour, in the late 1840s. However, in spite 
of (and perhaps because of) the heavy burdens borne by the 
metayers in the production of sugar, the metayers used their 
position on the terrain of the estates to maximize the 
benefits to themselves from access to land for provisions, to 
minimize the benefits to the planters, and to secure a near 
complete autonomy over the labour process.
As a result, partly because of the metayers' strategies, 
partly because of the structural impediments to efficiency in 
a situation of backward technology and small-scale cultivation 
(the cost of labour for harvesting was prohibitive to most 
metayers who may have wished to increase their holdings above
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4 acres), metayage did not allow the planters to accumulate 
sufficient surplus to detach themselves from either the
stranglehold of the Gillespies, or from metayage itself.
However, metayage was one of the mechanisms which 
permitted differentiation within the labouring class; a small 
minority of 'large' metayers emerged, some of whom became 
planters by the 1880s.
In the 1880s, the metayage system reached a profound
crisis, made more pronounced by the intervention of Sir John
Gorrie, Chief Justice from 1889. The crisis of metayage 
reflected conflicts central to the social system - over class, 
colour, commerce, justice, state policy and production.
Neither the dominant nor the labouring class succeeded in 
realizing their aims by 1884. The planters, as elsewhere in 
the region, desired to create a proletariat, dependent on 
wages from the estates, on whose services they could rely. 
The labourers desired to increase their autonomy, although 
most of them were locked in a symbiotic relationship with the 
planters. This was shown, first, in their struggle to control 
their living arrangements, which is why there was an exodus 
from estate residence by 1855, and why the ownership of houses 
featured so prominently in the patterns of property ownership 
by 1882 (Chs. 3 and 4). Secondly, it was shown in the desire 
for land, either as owners or as occupiers, which runs like a 
red thread through this story. They also pursued skilled 
trades, huckstering and shopkeeping as avenues of social 
mobility.
The metayers succeeded in creating several degrees of
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freedom for themselves. They eroded the profitability of the 
estates by poor husbandry, while gaining access to land and to 
petty landowning. Though, as Chapters 3, 4 and 8 indicate, an 
independent peasantry was still rudimentary by the 1880s, the 
labouring class was poised to gain from the annexation to 
Trinidad, and succeeded in enhancing their position as 
independent producers by 1900, with minimal assistance from 
the state. The dominant class, particularly the planters 
within it, having controlled the state from 1764 (barring the 
French conquests of 1783-1791 and 1802-3), squandering its 
resources and promoting their class interests, found 
themselves after 1884 hamstrung by lack of revenue and 
consequent loss of power. The more they needed the resources 
of the state, the less could they avail themselves of them.
The dominant class was riven by a conflict between the 
larger and smaller planters. All were allies of the British 
merchants, but the smaller planters and merchants struggled 
unsuccessfully to free themselves from the galling yoke of 
metropolitan dominance. As producers, they remained, except 
for a small minority, tied to sugar, unable to finance a more 
efficient method of its production, unable to diversify, and 
dependent for their survival as planters on relationships 
which were destroying them as planters. In the political 
sphere, the larger planters were overwhelmingly prone, faced 
with the challenge from the black labourers who rebelled in 
1876, to surrender state power to the Crown; the smaller 
planters and the middle strata disagreed.
A noteworthy aspect of the dynamics of power was the role
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of the Colonial Office. Formal power did not coincide either 
with the capacity or the will to exercise it. The Colonial 
Office officials seldom used their veto power over unjust 
legislation and policies after the 1840s. As had occurred 
particularly from the 1820s, there was a recurrent, 
acrimonious conflict between the majority of the dominant 
class and the executive. The acquiescence of the Colonial 
Office, and the refusal or inability of most Lt.-Governors to 
oppose unjust laws and policies, converted the metropolitan 
rulers into the allies of the dominant class. But the London 
officials played a waiting game, opting for peace with the 
planters unless 'imperial interests' were threatened. They 
sought, by pressure on bankrupt Assemblies, and by playing on 
the fears of the whites and coloureds about the black 
labouring class, prone to revolt, to exact a change of 
constitution to Crown rule. The planters fell into this trap, 
which offered neither aid nor loans. Under Crown rule, the 
planters, merchants and the administration were allowed to 
wither away.
The irony is that after the annexation to Trinidad 
(1889), the thrust of the Hay and Low administrations was to 
place the burden of restoring the administration and the 
dominant class on the labourers' shoulders. The intention was 
to settle on the Crown lands people who would grow export 
crops, which would increase the revenue, improve local 
purchasing power and restore the merchants, whose business had 
been eroded by the customs union with Trinidad. Increased 
revenue would make the administration viable and allow it to
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arrange advances for the impoverished planters, who could not 
afford the costs of upgrading the sugar estates or of 
diversifying. It was a long-term strategy needing to produce 
results in the short term.
Once again, the labouring class did not conform to what 
was intended. Preferring cheap estate lands to remote Crown 
lands, short-term crops for the Trinidad market rather than 
long-term crops for export to Britain, and preferring the 
expected benefits of the Union to the known evils of a 
separate administration, the labourers frustrated the reform 
plan. Many remained metayers, planting no new canes, while 
advancing their own interests through access to estate land 
and increased ownership of smallholdings.
Thus, the interests of the dominant and labouring 
classes, concerning the recovery plan and the Union with 
Trinidad, conflicted. The impotence of the dominant class, the 
unviability of the Tobago administration (partly because of 
the degrees of freedom exercised by the labouring class), and 
the strong hand of the Colonial Office,^ were the chief 
factors that led to the incorporation of Tobago into a formal 
Union with Trinidad in 1899.
Wage labour is the dominant form of labour control and 
appropriation of surplus in the capitalist world economy. 
Throughout, we argued that Tobago was capitalist, although
 ^Tightened control by the Colonial Office continued in 
Joseph Chamberlain's tenure as Secretary of State (1895- 
1903). He used the need for economic relief in the Sugar 
Depression to extend Crown rule in the BWI; many hybrid 
constitutions (with elected elements in the legislature) 
were replaced by direct rule [Amery 1951, 4:247-9].
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non-wage forms predominated over wage labour after 1838, the 
metayers themselves being temporary employers of wage labour, 
usually at wages twice that paid by the planters (Ch. 5). One 
of the victories of the labourers who remained in Tobago, in 
the context of their widespread access to land, their autonomy 
over production, and capital shortage for the planters, was to 
prevent their own conversion into a proletariat. This was the 
general trend for the century after 1838 (Ch. 8). Thus, the 
labourers' strategies conditioned the ways in which capitalism 
was locally instituted, both before and after 1838.
We delineated the coloured and black blocs of the middle 
strata, some of whom succeeded, over time, in becoming lessees 
and planters, both before and after 1884. They were often the 
allies of the smaller planters before 1884. Their desire for 
greater access to state power, which was removed from their 
grasp by the constitutional changes of 1874 and 1876, was 
thwarted. After 1884, they promoted investment projects; but 
seemingly, without success. The teachers, many of them black, 
were more vocal from the 1880s; they used the power of the 
petition to record the support of the labourers for the Union 
with Trinidad, and benefited from it.
We have broken away from the view of Caribbean societies 
as typified by white, brown and black strata until after World 
War II.2 There were contradictory tendencies towards
exclusion of non-whites, and intermarriage with them, among
 ^But see the typology of stratification systems in
Lowenthal [1972, Ch. 3]; also Braithwaite [1975] who shows 
the changing class/colour patterns of Trinidad in the 
1950s.
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the leading whites in the 1830s. Because of the attrition of 
whites, an uneasy alliance between whites and coloureds was 
formed by the 1850s and consolidated in later decades. Blacks 
penetrated the upper echelons of the society, as well as the 
middle strata, and there was differentiation within the 
largely black labouring class. Closer study of other moribund 
plantation colonies may reveal the sociological importance of 
coloureds and blacks in the dominant classes.^
The central dynamics in the changing society was the 
struggle for the control over labour. It was so on the eve of 
Emancipation and it continued to be so until 1900. As the 
metayage crisis revealed, it suffused the fabric of social 
life. The class conflicts and alliances were mediated by 
colour, such that one cannot separate class and colour as 
joint factors. In the final analysis, the labouring class was 
overwhelmingly black, and expressed its grievances in terms of 
this fact. The dominant class was white and coloured, with a 
sprinkling of blacks; they saw their class interests as 
needing preservation from the blacks, which is why the leading 
planters resorted to Crown rule and keeping the blacks 
disenfranchised, after the 1876 rebellion. Henry Taylor at 
the Colonial Office correctly perceived the psychology of 
class and colour in the BWI, in devising a strategy for 
seizing state control from the planters.
The role of gender in the social process was examined. 
Gender was important to the division of labour and skill, both 
before and after 1838; it was also important in the mobility
Cf. Casimir on the 'mulatto oligarchy' in Dominica [1981].
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patterns of the coloureds. It was a powerful factor 
discriminating within the occupational groups we designated as 
Class III (corresponding roughly to the labouring class), 
between the upwardly mobile and the lowest paid; the latter 
were usually females. It is remarkable that, although married 
women were prominent among those completely withdrawing from 
estate labour after 1838, women bore the brunt of agrarian 
production in Tobago, comprising 60% of such labourers at the 
end of the century. However, by 1901, in Class II, roughly 
corresponding to the middle strata, women had made significant 
inroads, even taking into consideration the inconsistencies in 
the data (Ch. 6) . Gender was also important in
differentiating the landowners (Ch. 4) . Although there were 
marked differences between the pattern of land ownership in 
the Windward District, on the one hand, and the Middle and 
Leeward Districts, on the other, within each district, male 
ownership predominated; and as the size, number of plots and 
value of holdings increased, female ownership sharply 
decreased. Female property owning was recognized in 1879 by 
legislation to protect the rights of married women who had 
acquired property in their husbands' absence. Gender was 
therefore constitutive of the way classes were structured, 
since it was highly correlated with the possession of (and 
separation from) the most important means and conditions of 
production and distribution.
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IX.3 THE WORKING HYPOTHESIS RE-EXAMINED
Tobago's history after 1763 was constituted and shaped by 
its insertion into the changing capitalist world economy. Its 
period of profitability in the 1790s coincided with the 
decline of Haiti as the foremost Caribbean sugar producer. 
Its decline after 1800 and its marginality after 1848 were 
similarly affected and shaped by the conditions of the world 
economy of which the BWI were a part.
Our hypothesis took dependence in a global capitalist 
economy, which is generated by the literature on development, 
as the matrix and point of departure for understanding the 
trajectory of Tobago. However, we argued that dependence and 
capitalism, singly or together, could not explain why, 
although all the BWI colonies experienced the Sugar Depression 
of the late 19th century, Tobago underwent a marked crisis in 
the 1880s, unlike certain neighbouring colonies.
To explain why and how the crisis occurred, we argued 
that it was not British capital per se, but the source and 
deployment of the capital invested, that distinguished Tobago, 
a moribund sugar producer, from a more efficient producer such 
as Trinidad. Secondly, we posited that the social structure 
was also important, since there had to be a class or classes 
able, either to upgrade and restructure the sugar economy, or 
to diversify the economy, or both. We spelled out two major 
options available in the 19th century, if Tobago was to avoid 
succumbing to the crisis. Either a class of estate owners, 
resident or foreign, with the capital to upgrade estate 
technology and to pay wages, had to emerge (Option 1) ; or a
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class of planters or larger landowners, or of smallholders, or 
both, able and efficacious in diversifying, would have made 
the crucial difference (Options 2A, 2B) . These options are not 
mutually exclusive.
Chapters 4 and 7 relate Option 1 to the first factor, the 
source and deployment of capital. By 1882, the estates were 
heavily concentrated in the hands of a combine between the 
Gillespies, a small London merchant house, and the McCalls, 
resident planters, merchants, estate attorneys and insurance 
agents. These firms exercised a near monopoly over credit, 
advances, production and the transatlantic trade. Only a few 
estates, usually those owned by residents, succeeded in 
diversifying from sugar by the 1880s. The McCall/Gillespie 
combine gained the ascendancy after 1862, following the 
general abandonment of Tobago estates by the larger British 
merchants, such as James Ewing and Co. The McCall/Gillespie 
combine was facilitated by the establishment of the Encumbered 
Estates Court; and according to Beachey [1957:37-8], the new 
estate owners reduced expenditure and refused to invest in 
manor improvements. Because Tobago was marginalized in the 
world sugar economy, Gillespie, Reid and Dunn, its main 
investors, were smaller merchants, financing muscovado 
estates; because they were smaller, they all succumbed to the 
Sugar Depression, and the planters lost their source of 
credit. Since the near monopoly of Gillespie inhibited both 
diversification and technological advance, and since these 
were precisely the factors which determined the extent to 
which the colonies suffered a crisis in the 1880s [ibid.:60],
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our study demonstrates that the source and deployment of 
capital were crucial in determining the crisis Tobago 
underwent.
However, this must be amplified in two ways. Firstly, 
Chapter 5 links the planters' inability to extricate 
themselves from Gillespie to the metayage system, which 
produced insufficient surplus on most planters' account. The 
planters' loss of control over the labour process, and the low 
level of production were themselves related both to the want 
of capital and to the power which the metayers wielded on the 
estates.
Secondly, the ability to attract capital to modernize the 
estates was related to the size of the colony and to the time 
of its insertion into the sugar economy. Investors preferred 
places with large tracts of fertile land, whose soils were not 
exhausted. Tobago's small size and the fact that its leeward 
plain, the area most suited to sugar, was already cleared and 
planted, militated against it. These resource endowments need 
to be integrated into the explanatory framework, since they 
are major factors differentiating the colonies.
Since a class of foreign or local investors able and 
effective in modernizing the sugar industry never emerged 
(Option 1) , we turn to Option 2, that of diversifying the 
economy.
By the 1880s, there was no class, fraction or stratum 
effective in diversifying the economy. Though some of the 
resident planters diversified, the value of alternative
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products'* was less than 5% of the exports until 1875, after 
which it rose to 8% in 1880, and 22% in 1885 (Table 46) . 
Before 1884, therefore, the planters were unable to break the 
stranglehold of monopoly, although they tried to 'cut out' 
Gillespie as a creditor, and to strengthen their hold over the 
inter-colonial shipping trade. Although a stratum of 
landowning shopkeepers, some of them renters of coconut walks, 
emerged by 1882, they were too small, too insignificant, to 
effect the necessary diversification. So too was the stratum 
of homesteaders with plots valued between £5 and £10, and the 
owners of more than one plot among the smallholders. Although 
they were socially visible, and probably producing crops other 
than sugar, they were unable, from their size, their 
production, and their political incapacity, to effect 
diversification.
The processes by which Options 2A and 2B were not 
feasible are thus outlined in the study. Similarly, how and 
why the dominant class remained tied to the McCall/Gillespie 
combine, and to an inability to diversify, has been fully 
explained (Option 1).
The data amply support the hypothesis we offer. However, 
we recognized in Chapter 1 that these 'factors' were 
themselves the product of social action and processes, and we 
argued that, since we had not given to social classes a 
privileged position, our dialogue with the data would have to 
make clear how this social configuration was structured.
 ^We considered that the export data may have under­
enumerated the exports, particularly of smallholders.
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Chapter 7 shows the economic, political and organizational 
weaknesses of the smaller coloured and black planters, 
merchants and lessees, and of the petty shopkeepers, 
landowners etc. of the middle strata. These would have been 
the diversifying groups posited for Option 2A. Chapters 3, 5 
and 7 discuss the influence of the dominant class over state 
policy, particularly concerning taxation, land, metayage and 
immigration. Metayage kept the population near the estates, 
while abandoned lands nearby were successfully 'annexed' by 
the planters by the 1850s. The power of the dominant class 
over the state, on the punitive taxation that pressed heavily 
on the labouring class, on the availability of land for 
purchase by labourers, and on the 'truck' system, helps to 
explain why smallholders effective in accomplishing Option 2B 
did not emerge.
Thus, the thesis shows the predominant influence of the 
relative power of classes and fractions of classes, both 
metropolitan and local, in determining the nature and 
capacities of all the major classes and strata. The social 
structure which inhibited the emergence of the classes 
required for transformation was itself affected by the actions 
of classes, fractions or class alliances.
This analysis is consistent with the reforms which were 
needed after 1884. For over four decades, the planters had 
refused to sell Crown lands to labourers, on the grounds that 
it would diminish their command over labour. However, in 
1884, they urged the sale of Crown lands as the fastest way of 
'creating' a peasantry and retaining labour on the island. The
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reforms of Commissioner Low were premised on the need both to 
upgrade the sugar industry technologically, and to diversify 
agriculture. Thus, Chapter 8 is consistent with the preceding 
interpretation.
IX.4 'THE FLIGHT FROM THE ESTATES'
We considered the debate among Caribbean historians on 
the supposed 'flight from the estates' after 1838 (Ch. 3). We 
argued that the reconstruction of the post-Emancipation 
experience required a multi-faceted approach which would lift 
our vision beyond the confines of the debate, to analyse 
several distinct, parallel, but sometimes interrelated 
processes. We distinguished inter alia between the ownership 
of independent homes, the movement into villages, access to 
land, acquisition of freeholds and withdrawal from regular 
estate labour. We delineated the multiplicity of relations of 
production and land tenures that obtained before 1855, and the 
regional variations in these processes. Although the man/land 
ratio was a fundamental conditioning factor, it did not 
determine the extent of withdrawal from either estate 
residence or estate labour.
We suggest a return to the fundamental distinctions 
between motive, cause, and outcome, since this is a source of 
confusion in the debate.
IX.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Three lines of analysis follow from this study.
546
IX.5.1 Typology of Paths of Development
First, is the need to delineate a typology of 
trajectories of development in the Caribbean after
Emancipation, starting with the BWI. Best [1968] outlined a 
typology of 'mature', 'new' and 'mixed' plantation economies 
(PEs). His schema takes into account all the factors we found 
significant: (1) the degree of technological upgrading and
efficiency in sugar, (2) the extent of diversification from 
sugar, and (3) the degree to which a peasantry flourished. 
Tobago does not easily fit Best's schema, since it shared 
monocultural characteristics with the mature PEs, though most 
of its land was uncultivated. Because of the late emergence 
of its peasantry, it became a 'mixed' PE in the early 2 0th 
century.
We suggest that Best's schema be amplified to consider 
the colonies, grouped according to the phases at which they 
became sugar colonies [cf. Higman 1984a:43]. The 'mixed' PEs 
also need to be better understood, since by the 1890s there 
was considerable variation within this category. Account 
should be taken of the differing strategies of the British 
merchants investing, and of the many components in what Best 
terms the 'residentiary sector'.
IX.5.2 Comparison with Grenada
Secondly, the comparison with Grenada needs to be fully 
made. Grenada (133 sq. mis) and Tobago (116 sq. mis) are alike 
in size and topography. Grenada was annexed to France in 1674, 
and in 1763, like Tobago, it was ceded to Britain by the
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Treaty of Paris. In 1779, it reverted to French rule but, by 
the Treaty of Versailles (1783), Grenada and the Grenadines 
became British colonies. In 1795, a rebellion of coloured 
planters and of slaves took place under Julien Fedon, a 
coloured coffee and cocoa planter. Thousands of slaves joined 
the rebellion, which was helped by the French, and British 
rule was restored, only after 16 months, by Sir Ralph 
Abercrombie in 1796.
In 1763, there were 81 sugar plantations, 208 in coffee, 
and 21 fallow, but they were relatively small. Cocoa, cotton, 
tobacco, indigo and other crops were grown, and Grenada was 
the leading exporter of tropical commodities in the Windward 
Islands by 1775. By then, there were 125 sugar estates; its 
sugar exports had also trebled. But the pattern of diverse 
cultivation continued and in 1824, there were 123 sugar 
estates, 22 cocoa and coffee, 19 coffee, 4 sugar and cotton 
and 11 cotton estates [Brizan 1984:27, 93]. Cocoa production 
doubled in the 1820s, while coffee and cotton became 
insignificant by 1834 [Higman 1984a:56].
According to Higman [ibid.], the area allocated to slave 
provision grounds equalled the area under cane. This may 
indicate a relatively strong 'proto-peasant' base, which may 
have influenced peasant growth after 1838.
Sugar production and exports plumeted, especially after 
1850. By 1856, 47 estates were abandoned and a further 21 by 
1866. 'Some abandoned estates were either divided into 
peasant lots or converted into cocoa production' [Brizan 
1984:140]. In 1876, although there were 79 sugar estates, the
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technology was more backward than that of Tobago; only 6 
ploughs and 7 steam engines were employed. By 1887, the value 
of sugar exports was £2; they ceased after 1891.  ^ After 1858, 
cocoa became the principal estate and peasant crop, followed 
by spices, cotton, ground provisions and fruit.
Significantly, Momsen states that after 1855, there was
an earlier transition to tree crops in Grenada than elsewhere
in the Windward Islands [cf. Marshall 1963:328].
This came about because the peasant 
farmers ... were not only allowed but 
were positively encouraged by the planters 
to occupy former plantation land and grow 
tree crops, often on a share-cropping 
basis. The speedy development of this 
successful relationship between the plant- 
ocracy and the new peasantry ensured 
Grenada greater prosperity during this 
period than was possible in the other 
Windward Islands ... .
[Momsen 1970:348-9]
The growth of the smallholders was striking. By 1881,
out of 9000 adult males, 3000 owned lots of 1 to 50 acres
[Knight 1946:45]. D. Morris, author of the subsidiary report
on agriculture for the West India Royal Commission, stated:
The substitution of cacao for cane in 
Grenada has rendered the island entirely 
independent of sugar. This is the only 
West Indian colony of importance where 
this is actually the case. While there 
are several large cacao properties ..., 
it is a special feature of Grenada that 
the labouring classes own a considerable 
number of small holdings. There are 5,600 
holdings under 5 acres, covering a total 
area of 8,338 acres; 843 holdings from 5 
to 2 0 acres, covering a total area of 
7,231 acres; and 205 holdings from 20 to 
100 acres, covering a total area of 8,830 
acres.
WI Royal Com. Rept.. 1897, App. A, p. 110.
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Quoting a Mr Gurney, an authority, Morris showed that the 
extension of cacao had been '"mainly through the labouring 
classes obtaining by purchase small holdings of land and 
planting up the same in cacao"'. By 1893, cocoa accounted for 
£281,004 or 89.8% of the value of Grenada's exports.*
Grenada appears to have had after 1858 no consignee 
merchant house which could tie its sugar planters to moribund 
production, as occurred in Tobago. Nor was there a class of 
modernizing planters for the sugar estates. Thus, Option 1 
was not fulfilled, and investment was deployed in the 
direction of diversification.
Brizan mentions a 'rising class of merchants', estate 
attorneys, officials and professionals, who 'invariably bought 
up estates of absentee planters as well as other bankrupt 
estates, and ... could most appropriately be called the new 
planting interest'. He noted too that after 1850, 'The vacuum 
created by the exodus of White planters and attorneys was now 
being filled by the rich Coloureds, the merchants and the 
professional men' [1984:201-2].
Sketchy though this is, it suggests that Option 2A was 
fulfilled in Grenada through a local class of planters, who 
diversified abandoned estates. There was also a rising 
peasantry who, by 1897, had become the foremost cocoa 
producers, as well as growers of other crops. Thus, Option 2B 
was also fulfilled.
The marked difference in outcome between Tobago and 
Grenada during the Sugar Depression is accounted for by this
WI Royal Com. Rept.. 1897, App. A, pp. 110-112.
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outline, which gives remarkable corroboration to our 
hypothesis, in keeping with the logic of our research design. 
However, further research is needed to show preciselv how 
these processes occurred. Was the greater initial diversity 
of production in Grenada in the early 19th century a critical 
factor? Did the smaller British merchants invest in Tobago 
and not in Grenada? If so, why? The Grenada coloureds were 
more numerous than those in Tobago in the late 18th century. 
They were politically stronger, as their rebellion under Fedon 
shows. As a group, they were also wealthier. A few became 
sugar planters in the early 19th century, but many acquired 
cotton, coffee and cocoa estates, usually smaller in size than 
sugar plantations, and less dependent on overseas credit. Some 
established themselves as merchants, hucksters and shopkeepers 
[Cox 1984:62-75]. Were these the groups that produced the new 
merchant/planter class of whom Brizan writes; or did some 
emerge from among the ex-slaves? What were the mechanisms 
which allowed an earlier and stronger peasantry to emerge in 
Grenada? than in Tobago in the 19th century? Were the large 
acreages devoted to slave provision grounds a factor in this 
process? Did the free coloured peasantry which existed during 
slavery contribute to this? [ibid.:66] What were the sources 
of credit for the Grenada planters and peasants? What were 
the class/colour groupings over time? A return to the primary 
sources is needed for answers to these questions.
? The 1883 Royal Commission singled out Jamaica and Grenada 
as the places in which 'prosperous peasant proprietors . . . 
appreciably increasing the exports' were most advanced. 
Rept. of the Roval Com.....  1884, Pt. IV.
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IX.5.3 Further Research on Tobago
The third need is for a careful study of Tobago in the 
early twentieth century, delineating the class/colour 
structure, the relations of production, including their 
regional variations, and considering the character, and the 
trajectory, of the class of smallholders who became major 
producers of cocoa and food crops after 1900. More work on its 
cultural anthropology is also needed.
IX.6 LIMITATIONS AND STRENGTHS OF THE STUDY
Throughout, we indicated the limitations of the sources, 
the shortcomings of our procedures, and the questions that are 
unanswered. The major other limitation of this work is the 
lack of a clear historical anthropology. More details on 
culture building, on family life, and agrarian practices, 
particularly the institution of 'family land', would have made 
the study more complete.
The divergent interests of the dominant and labouring 
classes, and the fact that ultimately the labourers benefited 
from the crisis, while the dominant class was crippled by it, 
remind us that discussions on 'development' and 
'underdevelopment' should take account of class differentials.
The strength of this work lies in its understanding of 
the class/colour configuration through time, in its 
description of the processes which produced these structures, 
and in its attempt to explain a major crisis. It shows how the 
labouring class consistently maximized its freedom and refused 
to conform to expectations from above; and how the choices
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faced by all the actors were often, regardless of their 
desires or motives, between evils of one kind or another. It 
is gratifying to have helped to integrate Tobago more fully 
into the family of Caribbean studies, and into the field of 
historical sociology.
553
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. BOOKS. ARTICLES. THESES
Abrams, P. Historical Sociology. Stepton Mallet, Somerset; 
Open Books, 1982.
Adamson, A. H. Sugar Without Slaves: The Political Economy 
of British Guiana. 1838-1904. New Haven: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1972.
Alavi, H. 'India and the Colonial Mode of Production'. In 
The Socialist Register, edited by R. Milliband and 
J. Saville. London: Merlin Press, 1975.
Alexander, J. E. (Capt.) Transatlantic Sketches. 2 vols. 
London: Richard Bentley, 1833.
Alford, C. E. R. A Guide Book to Tobago. 1935. Reprint as 
The Island of Tobago, BWI. London: Longmans, 1939.
Amery, J. The Life of Joseph Chamberlain. Vol. 4, 1901-1903. 
At the Height of His Power. London: Macmillan, 1951.
Amin, S. Accumulation on a World Scale. Sussex: Harvester 
Press, 1974.
Amin, S. Uneoual Development. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976.
Anon. Tobago: or A Geographical Description. Natural and 
Civil History. 2nd ed. London: c. 1750.
Anstey, R. I. 'Slavery and the Protestant Ethic'. In Roots and 
Branches: Current Directions in Slave Studies, edited by 
M. Craton. Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1979.
Archibald, D. Tobago: "Melancholy Isle". Vol. 1, 1498-1771. 
Port of Spain: Westindiana, 1987.
'A Recollection of Tobago'. The United Service Journal
and Naval and Military Magazine 31, pt. Ill (1838): 
171-182.
A West Indian Proprietor. Some Considerations on the Present 
State of Our West India Colonies and on the Regulations 
which Influence their Industry and Trade. London: James 
Ridgway, 1830.
554
Aya, R. Review of Pre-capitalist Modes of Production, by B. 
Hindess and P. Q. Hirst. Theory and Society 3 (1976); 
623-629.
Banaji, J. 'For a Theory of Colonial Modes of Production'. 
Economic and Political Weekly 52 (1972): 2498-2502.
Banaji, J. 'Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of 
History'. Capital and Class 3 (1977): 1-44.
Barclay, A. A Practical View of the Present State of Slavery 
in the West Indies. London: N.p., 1826.
Beachey, R. W. The British West Indies Sugar Industry in the 
Late 19th Century. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957.
Beckles, H. McD. 'Emancipation by War or Law? Wilberforce and 
the 1816 Barbados Slave Rebellion'. In Abolition and Its 
Aftermath: The Historical Context. 1790-1916. edited by 
D Richardson. London: Frank Cass, 1985.
Beiguelman, P. 'The Destruction of Modern Slavery: A Theoret­
ical Issue'. Review 2 (1978): 71-80.
Bell, C. 'Alternative Theories of Sharecropping: Some Tests 
Using Evidence from Northeast India'. Journal of 
Development Studies 13 (1987): 317-346.
Bennholdt-Thomsen, V. 'Subsistence Production and Extended 
Reproduction: A Contribution to the Discussion about 
Modes of Production'. Journal of Peasant Studies 9
(1982): 242-254.
Benns, F. L. The American Struggle for the British West India 
Carrying Trade. 1815-1830. 1923. Reprint. Clifton, N.J.: 
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972.
Bernstein, H. 'Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study 
of Development'. Journal of Development Studies 7 
(1971): 141-160.
Bernstein, H. 'Notes on Capital and Peasantry'. Review of 
African Political Economy 10 (1977): 60-73.
Bernstein, H. 'Sociology of Underdevelopment vs. Sociology of 
Development?'. In Development Theory: Four Critical 
Essays, edited by D. Lehmann. London: Frank Cass, 1979.
Bernstein, H. 'Capitalism and Petty-Bourgeois Production: 
Class Relations and Division of Labour'. Journal of 
Peasant Studies 15 (1988): 258-271.
Besson, J. 'Symbolic Aspects of Land in the Caribbean: The 
Tenure and Transmission of Land Rights among Caribbean 
Peasantries'. In Peasants, Plantations and Rural 
Communities in the Caribbean, edited by M. Cross and A.
555
Marks. Guildford: Univ. of Surrey, and Leiden: Royal 
Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology, 1979.
Besson, J. 'Family Land and Caribbean Society: Towards an 
Ethnography of Afro-Caribbean Peasantries'. In 
Perspectives on Caribbean Regional Identity, edited by
E. Thomas-Hope. Monograph No. 11. Univ. of Liverpool: 
Centre for Latin American Studies, 1984.
Besson, J. 'Agrarian Relations and Perceptions of Land in a 
Jamaican Peasant Village'. In Small Farming and Peasant 
Resources in the Caribbean, edited by J. S. Brierley and 
H. Rubinstein. Winnipeg: Department of Geography, Univ. 
of Manitoba, 1988.
Besson, J., and J. Momsen, eds. Land and Development in the 
Caribbean. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987.
Best, L. A. 'Outlines of a Model of Pure Plantation Economy'. 
Social and Economic Studies 17 (1968): 283-326.
Best, L. 'George Beckford and the Caribbean'. Trinidad and 
Tobago Review 13 (1991): 15-22.
Best, L. A., and K. Levitt. 'Export-Propelled Growth and
Industrialisation in the Caribbean'. Centre for Devel­
oping Area Studies, McGill Univ., 1969. Mimeo.
Blakeley, B. L. The Colonial Office. 1868-1892. Durham, N.C.: 
Duke Univ. Press, 1972.
Bloch, M. The Historian's Craft. Manchester: Manchester Univ. 
Press, 1963.
Blomstrom, M., and B. Hettne. Development Theory in 
Transition. London: Zed Books, 1985.
Bolland, N. 'Systems of Domination after Slavery: The Control 
of Land and Labor in the British West Indies after 1838'. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 23 (1981): 
591-619.
Bolland, N. 'Reply to William A. Green's "The Perils of
Comparative History" '. Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 26 (1984): 120-125.
Boomert, A. 'The Oldest Place Names of Tobago'. Dept, of 
History, UWI, St Augustine, 1990. Mimeo.
Booth, D. 'Marxism and Development Sociology: Interpreting
the Impasse'. In Marxist Sociology Revisited, edited by 
M. Shaw. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985.
Bourdieu, P., and L. J. D. Wacquant. An Invitation to
Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.
556
Bowman, H., and J. Bowman. Crusoe's Island in the Caribbean. 
Indianapolis; Bobbs-Merrill, 1939.
Braithwaite, L. E. B. Social Stratification in Trinidad. 
Mona: ISER, UWI, 1975.
Brathwaite, E. K. The Development of Creole Society in 
Jamaica: 1770-1820. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
Brathwaite, E. K. Contradictory Omens: Cultural Diversity and 
Integration in the Caribbean. Mona: Savacou Monograph 
No. 1, 1974.
Braudel, F. 'History and the Social Sciences'. 1958. Reprint 
in Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe, edited by 
P. Burke. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
Breen, H. H. St Lucia: Historical, Statistical and
Descriptive. 1844. Reprint. London: Frank Cass, 1970.
Brenner, R. 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique 
of Neo-Smithian Marxism'. New Left Review 104 (1977): 25- 
92.
Brereton, B. Race Relations in Colonial Trinidad. 1870-1900. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979.
Brereton, B. 'Sir John Gorrie: A Radical Chief Justice of
Trinidad (1885-1892)'. Journal of Caribbean History 23 
(1980): 44-72.
Brereton, B. A History of Modern Trinidad. 1783-1962. London: 
Heinemann, 1981.
Brereton, B. 'Post Emancipation Protest in the Caribbean: The 
"Belmanna Riots” in Tobago, 1876'. Caribbean Quarterly 30 
(1984): 110-123.
Brereton, B. Review of Slave Women in the Caribbean. 1640- 
1838. by Barbara Bush. Journal of Caribbean History 24 
(1990): 115-120.
Brizan, G. Grenada Island of Conflict: From Amerindians to
People's Revolution. 1498-1979. London: Zed Books, 1984.
Brown, D . History of Money and Banking in Trinidad and Tobago 
from 1789 to 1989. Port of Spain: The Central Bank of 
Trinidad and Tobago, 1989.
Buckley, R. N. Slaves in Red Coats: The British West India 
Regiments. 1795-1815. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1979.
Burawoy, M. 'Two Methods in Search of Science: Skocpol versus 
Trotsky'. Theory and Society 18 (1989): 759-805.
557
Burke, P. Sociology and History. London: Allen and Unwin, 
1980.
Burn, W. L. Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British 
West Indies. London: Jonathan Cape, 1937.
Bush, B. Slaye Women in the Caribbean. 1640-1838. Kingston: 
Heinemann Publishers (Caribbean), 1990.
Byres, T. J. 'Historical Perspectiyes on Sharecropping'. 
Journal of Peasant Studies 10 (1983): 7-40.
Caldecott, A. The Church in the West Indies. 1898. Reprint. 
London: Frank Cass, 1970.
Callinicos, A. ed. Marxist Theory. Oxford: Oxford Uniy. Press, 
1989a.
Callinicos, A. 'Anthony Giddens: A Contemporary Critique'. In 
Marxist Theory, edited by A. Callinicos. Oxford: Oxford 
Uniy. Press, 1989b.
Capadose, Lt.-Col. Sixteen Years in the West Indies. 2 yols. 
London: 1845.
Cardoso, C. F. S. 'Sobre los modos de produccion coloniales 
de America'. In Modos de Produccion en America Latina. 
Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente 40 (1975a): 135-160.
Cardoso, C. F. S. 'El modo de produccion esclayista colonial 
en America'. In Modos de Produccion en America Latina. 
Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente 40 (1975b): 193-242.
Cardoso, F. H. 'Dependency and Deyelopment in Latin America'. 
New Left Reyiew 74 (1972): 83-95.
Cardoso, F. H. 'Dependency Reyisited'. Hackett Memorial 
Lecture, Uniy. of Texas at Austin, 1973a.
Cardoso, F. H. 'Associated-Dependent Deyelopment: Theoretical 
and Practical Implications'. In Authoritarian Brazil, 
edited by A. C. Stepan. New Hayen: Yale Uniy. Press, 
1973b.
Cardoso, F. H. and E. Faletto. Dependence and Deyelopment in 
Latin America. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uniy. of Calif. 
Press, 1979.
Carmichael, A. C. Domestic Manners and Social Condition of the 
White. Coloured, and Negro Population of the West Indies. 
2 yols. 1833. Reprint. New York: Negro Uniy. Press, 1969.
Carmichael, G. A History of the West Indian Islands of 
Trinidad and Tobago: 1498-1900. London: A. Redman, 1961.
Carr, E. H. What Is History?. New York: Vintage Books, 1961.
558
Casimir, J. 'Limitaciones del proyecto nacional de la
oligarquia mulata de Dominica en el siglo XX'. Boletin 
de Antropologia Americana 3 (1981): 113-135.
Cell, R. British Colonial Administration in the Mid Nineteenth 
Century: The Policy-Making Process. New Hayen: Yale Uniy. 
Press, 1970.
Chalmin, P. Tate and Lyle. Géant du Sucre. Paris: Economica, 
1983.
Chayanoy, A. V. The Theory of Peasant Economy. Edited by
D. Thorner, E. Kerblay and R.E.F. Smith. Homewood: Irwin, 
for the American Economic Association, 1966.
Cheung, N. S. The Theory of Share Tenancy with Special 
Application to Asian Agriculture and the First Phase of 
Taiwan Land Reform. Chicago and London: Uniy. of 
Chicago Press, 1969.
Chevalier, J. M. 'There is Nothing Simple about Simple
Commodity Production'. Journal of Peasant Studies 10 
(1983): 153-186.
Clarke, E. My Mother Who Fathered Me. London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1957.
Clifford, H. 'Time and Tobago'. Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 
178 (1905): 305-324.
Cohen, G. A. Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978.
Cohen, G. A. 'Reconsidering Historical Materialism'. In
Marxist Theory, edited by A. Callinicos. Oxford: Oxford 
Uniy. Press, 1989.
Coke, T. A History of the West Indies. 3 yols. 1808, 1810, 
1811. Reprint. London: Frank Cass, 1971.
Collens, J. H., comp. Trinidad and Tobago Year Book. 1899. 
Port of Spain: Government Printing Office, 1900.
Collens, J. H., comp. Trinidad and Tobaao Year Book. 1904. 
Port of Spain: Government Printing Office, 1905.
Collens, J. H., comp. Trinidad and Tobaao Year Book. 1905. 
Port of Spain: Government Printing Office, 1906.
Comitas, L. 'Occupational Multiplicity in Rural Jamaica'. In 
Work and Family Life: West Indian Perspectives, edited by
D. Lowenthal and L. Comitas. Garden City, NY: Anchor 
Books, 1973.
Cooper, A. 'Sharecroppers and Landlords in Bengal, 193 0-50: 
The Dependency Web and its Implications'. Journal of
559
Peasant Studies 10 (1983): 227-255.
Cooper, F. 'Peasants, Capitalists and Historians: A Review
Article'. Journal of Southern African Studies 7 (1981): 
285-334.
Cox, E. L. Free Coloreds in the Slave Societies of St. Kitts 
and Grenada. 1763-1833. Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee 
Press, 1984.
Craig, S. 'The Application of Oral-History Research Techniques 
in the Study of Social Behaviour'. In Methodoloav and 
Change. edited by L. Lindsay. UWI, Mona: ISER, Working 
Paper No. 14, 1978.
Craig, S., ed. Contemporary Caribbean: A Sociological Reader. 
2 vols. St Augustine, Trinidad: the editor, 1981, 1982.
Craig, S. 'Sociological Theorizing in the English-Speaking
Caribbean: A Review'. In Contemporarv Caribbean: A Socio­
logical Reader. Vol. 2, edited by S. Craig. St Augustine, 
Trinidad: the editor, 1982.
Craig, S. Smiles and Blood: The Ruling Class Response to the 
Workers' Rebellion of 1937 in Trinidad and Tobago. 
London: New Beacon Books, 1988.
Craton, M. 'Proto-Peasant Revolts? The Late Slave Rebellions 
in the British West Indies, 1816-32'. Past and Present 
85 (1979): 99-125.
Craton, M. 'The Passion to Exist: Slave Rebellions in the 
British West Indies, 1650-1832'. Journal of Caribbean 
History 13 (1980): 1-20.
Craton, M. Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the 
British West Indies. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1982.
Craton, M. 'What and Who to Whom and What: The Significance of 
Slave Resistance'. In British Capitalism and Caribbean 
Slaverv: The Legacy of Eric Williams, edited by B. L. 
Solow and S. L. Engerman. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1987.
Curtin, P. The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census. Madison, 
Milwaukee: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969.
Curtin, P. 'Slavery and Empire'. In Comparative Perspectives 
on Slaverv in New World Plantation Societies, edited by 
V. Rubin and A. Tuden. Annals of the New York Academv 
of Sciences. Vol. 292, 1977.
Cust, R. A Treatise on the West Indian Incumbered Estates 
Acts. 2nd ed. London: William Amer, 1865.
Cust, R. Supplement to A Treatise on the West Indian
560
Incumbered Estates Acts. London: William Amer, 1874.
Cutler, A., B. Hindess, P. Hirst, A. Hussain. Marx's Capital 
and Capitalism Today. 2 vols. London: Rout ledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1977, 1978.
Dadzie, S. 'Searching for the Invisible Woman: Slavery and
Resistance in Jamaica'. Race and Class 32 (1990): 21-38.
Dalton, G. 'The Development of Subsistence and Peasant
Economies in Africa'. In Tribal and Peasant Economies, 
edited by G. Dalton. New York: The Natural History 
Press, 1967.
Dalton, G. 'Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology'. 
Current Anthropoloav 10 (1969): 63-102.
Dalton, G. 'How Exactly Are Peasants "Exploited”?'. American 
Anthropologist 76 (1974): 553-561.
Dauxion-Lavaysse, J. J. Vovaae aux Iles de Trinidad, de
Tabago. de la Marguerite, et dans diverses parties de 
Venezuela dans l'Amérigue Méridionale. 2 vols. Paris:
F. Schoell, 1813.
Davies, H. R. 'Through Tribulation to Progress in Tobago'. 
United Empire 17 (1926): 553-6.
Davies, K. G. 'The Origins of the Commission System in the
West India Trade'. Transactions of the Roval Historical 
Society. 5th Series, 2 (1952): 89-107.
Davis, R. The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Newton Abbot, 
Devon: David and Charles, 1972.
Davis, R. L. F. 'Labor Dependency among Freedmen, 1865-1880'. 
In From the Old South to the New: Essavs on the
Transitional South, edited by W. J. Fraser jun. and W. B. 
Moore jun. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981.
Davy, J. The West Indies before and since Slave Emancipation. 
1854. Reprint. London: Frank Cass, 1971.
De Canio, S. Agriculture in the Postbellum South: The
Economics of Production and Supply. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1974.
Deerr, N. The History of Sugar. 2 vols. London: Chapman and 
Hall, 1949/1950.
Demas, W. G. The Economics of Development in Small Countries 
with special reference to the Caribbean. Montreal: McGill 
Univ. Press, 1965.
Dobb, M. Studies in the Development of Capitalism. 1946.
561
Reprint. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.
Domar, E. D. 'The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis'. 
Journal of Economic History 30 (1970): 18-32.
Douglin, M. Y. D. 'A History of Tobago, 1815-1854'. M. Phil, 
diss., UWI, St Augustine, 1987.
Duncan, K., and I. Rutledge, eds. Land and Labour in Latin 
America. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977.
Dunn, R . Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in 
the English West Indies. 1624-1713. London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1973.
Eggers, H. (Baron). 'The Island of Tobago'. The Scottish 
Geographical Magazine 9 (1893): 245-252.
Elder, J. D. Folk Song and Folk Life in Charlotteville. Port 
of Spain: N.p., 1972a.
Elder, J. D., ed. Ma Rose Point: An Anthology of Rare Legends 
and Folk Tales from Trinidad and Tobago. Port of Spain: 
National Cultural Council, 1972b.
Eldridge, C. C., ed. British Imperialism in the Nineteenth 
Century. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984.
Emmanuel, P. 'Crown Colony Politics in Grenada: 1917-1951'. 
M. Sc. thesis, UWI, Mona, 1967.
Engerman, S. 'The Development of Plantation Systems and Slave 
Societies: A Commentary - I'. In Comparative Perspectives 
on Slaverv in New World Plantation Societies, edited by 
V. Rubin and A. Tuden. Annals of the New York Academv of 
Sciences. Vol. 292, 1977.
Evans, P . Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi­
national. State, and Local Capital in Brazil. Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1979.
Farley, R. 'The Rise of Village Settlements in British 
Guiana'. Social and Economic Studies 2 (1953/54): 
97-103.
Febvre, L. 'A New Kind of History'. In A New Kind of History: 
From the Writings of Febvre. edited by P. Burke. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.
Fiske, A. K. The West Indies. New York: Knickerbocker Press, 
1899.
Fog Olwig, K. Cultural Adaptation and Resistance on St John: 
Three Centuries of Afro-Caribbean Life. Gainesville: 
Univ. of Florida Press, 1985.
562
Foner, E. Nothing but Freedom; Emancipation and Its Leaacv. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983.
Foster-Carter, A. 'The Modes of Production Controversy'. New 
Left Review 107 (1978): 47-77.
Fowler, J. A Summarv Account of the Present Flourishing State 
of the Respectable Colonv of Tobago in the British West 
Indies. London: A. Grant, 1774.
Fox-Genovese, E., and E. Genovese. Fruits of Merchant Capital: 
Slaverv and Bourgeois Prooertv in the Rise and Expansion 
of Capitalism. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983.
Frank, A. G. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.
Frank, A. G. World Accumulation. 1492-1789. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1978.
Fraser, P. 'The Fictive Peasantry: Caribbean Rural Groups in 
the Nineteenth Century'. In Contemporarv Caribbean: A 
Sociological Reader. Vol. 1, edited by S. Craig. St 
Augustine, Trinidad: the editor, 1981.
Friedmann H. 'Household Production and the National Economy: 
Concepts for the Analysis of Agrarian Formations'. 
Journal of Peasant Studies 7 (1980): 158-184.
Froude, J . A. The English in the West Indies: The Bow of 
Ulvsses. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1888.
Gallagher, J. A., and R. E. Robinson. 'The Imperialism of Free 
Trade'. Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 6 (1953): 
1-15.
Genovese, E. The Political Economv of Slaverv. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1967.
Genovese, E. Roll. Jordan. Roll: The World the Slaves Made. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1976.
Goodman, D., and M. Redclift. From Peasant to Proletarian:
Capitalist Development and Agrarian Transitions. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1981.
Goveia, E. Slave Societv in the British Leeward Islands at the 
End of the Eighteenth Century. New Haven: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1969.
Green, W. A. 'The Planter Class and British West Indian Sugar 
Production, before and after Emancipation'. Economic 
History Review. 2nd ser., 26 (1973): 448-463.
Green, W. A. British Slave Emancipation: The Sugar Colonies 
and the Great Experiment. 1830-1865. Oxford: Clarendon
563
Press, 1976.
Green, W. À. 'The Perils of Comparative History; Belize and 
the British Sugar Colonies after Slavery'. Comparative 
Studies in Societv and Historv 26 (1984): 112-119.
Green, W. A. 'The Creolization of Caribbean History: The
Emancipation Era and a Critique of Dialectical Analysis'. 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Historv 14 (1986): 
149-169.
Greene, J. 'Political Mimesis: A Consideration of the Histor­
ical and Cultural Roots of Legislative Behavior in the 
British Colonies in the Eighteenth Century'. American 
Historical Review 75 (1969): 337-360; comment by B. 
Bailyn: 3 61-3, and reply by Greene: 364-7.
Grey, H. G. (Earl) . The Colonial Policv of Lord John Russell's 
Administration. Vol. 1, 2nd ed. London: Richard Bentley, 
1853.
Hall, D. Free Jamaica. 1838-1865: An Economic Historv. 1959. 
Reprint. Aylesbury, UK: Ginn and Co. Ltd., 1990.
Hall, D. 'Absentee-Proprietorship in the British West Indies 
to about 1850'. Jamaican Historical Review 4 (1964): 
15-35.
Hall, D. A Brief Historv of the West India Committee. 
Barbados: Caribbean Univ. Press, 1971.
Hall, D. 'The Flight from the Estates Reconsidered: The
British West Indies, 1838-1842'. Journal of Caribbean 
History 10 (1978): 7-24.
Hall, N. 'Slaves' Use of Their 'Free' Time in the Danish 
Virgin Islands in the Late Eighteenth and Early 
Nineteenth Century'. Journal of Caribbean Historv 13 
(1980): 21-43.
Hall, S. 'Pluralism, Race and Class in Caribbean Society'.
In Race and Class in Post-Colonial Societv. Paris: 
UNESCO, 1977.
Hamilton, B. Barbados and the Confederation Question. 1871- 
1885. London: Crown Agents on behalf of Govt, of 
Barbados, 1956.
Hammond, F. H. (Rev.) A Tour around Tobaao bv Land and Sea. 
Port of Spain: Franklin's Electric Printery, 1910.
Handler, J. S. 'The History of Arrowroot and the Origin
of Peasantries in the British West Indies'. Journal of 
Caribbean Historv 2 (1971): 46-93.
564
Handler, J. S. The Unappropriated People; Freedmen in the
Slave Societv of Barbados. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press, 1974.
Handler, J.S., and F. Lange. Plantation Slaves in Barbados: An 
Archaeological and Historical Investigation. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978.
Hart, R. 'Trade Unionism in the English-Speaking Caribbean: 
The Formative Years and the Caribbean Labour Congress'. 
In Contemporarv Caribbean: A Sociological Reader. Vol. 2, 
edited by S. Craig. St Augustine, Trinidad: the editor, 
1982.
Hay, L. G. A Handbook of the Colonv of Tobago. Scarborough, 
Tobago: Government Printing Office, 1884.
Hay, L. G. A Handbook of the Island of Tobago. Georgetown: 
The Dailv Chronicle. 1899.
Henfrey, C. 'Dependency, Modes of Production, and the Class 
Analysis of Latin America'. Latin American Perspectives 
8 (1981): 17-54.
Henige, D. Oral Historiographv. Harlow: Longman, 1982.
Henry, P . Peripheral Capitalism and Underdevelopment in
Antigua. New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books, 1985.
Herring, R. J. 'Chayanovian versus Neoclassical Perspectives 
on Land Tenure and Productivity Interactions'. In 
Chavanov. Peasants and Economic Anthropology, edited by
E. P. Durrenberger. Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1984.
Heuman, G. J. Between Black and White: Race. Politics and
the Free Coloreds in Jamaica. 1792-1865. Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1981.
Higgs, R. Competition and Coercion: Blacks in the American 
Economv. 1865-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1977.
Higham, C. S. S. 'Sir Henry Taylor and the Establishment of 
Crown Colony Government in the West Indies'. Scottish 
Historical Review 23 (1926): 92-96.
Higman, B. W. Slave Population and Economy in Jamaica. 1807- 
1834. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979.
Higman, B. W. Slave Populations of the British Caribbean.
1807-1834. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1984a.
Higman, B. W. 'Urban Slavery in the British Caribbean'. In 
Perspectives on Caribbean Regional Identitv. edited by
E. Thomas-Hope. Univ. of Liverpool, Centre for Latin 
American Studies, Monograph No. 11, 1984b.
565
Higman, B. W. 'Theory, Method and Technique in Caribbean 
Social History'. Journal of Caribbean Historv 20 
(1985/86): 1-29.
Higman, B. W. 'To Begin the World Again: Responses to 
Emancipation at Friendship and Greenwich Estate, 
Jamaica'. Paper presented to the 22nd Annual Conference 
of the Association of Caribbean Historians, UWI, St 
Augustine, 1990.
Hilton, G. W. The Truck System. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 
1960.
Hilton, R. et al. The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism. 
London: Verso, 1978.
Hindess, B., and P. Q. Hirst. Pre-capitalist Modes of
Production. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.
Hindess, B., and P. Q. Hirst. Mode of Production and Social 
Formation. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977.
Historical Society of Trinidad and Tobago, Publications of. 
Port of Spain: c. 1935-1951.
Hobsbawm, E. J. Industry and Empire: An Economic Historv of 
Britain since 1750. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1968.
Hobsbawm, E. J. 'Peasants and Politics'. Journal of Peasant 
Studies 1 (1973): 3-22.
Hobsbawm, E. J. The Aae of Capital. 1848-1875. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975.
Holt, T. C. The Problem of Freedom: Race. Labor and Politics 
in Jamaica and Britain. 1832-1938. Kingston: Ian Randle 
Publishers, 1992.
Hoogvelt, A. M. The Third World in Global Development. London: 
Macmillan, 1982.
Horsford, J. (Rev.) A Voice from the West Indies. London: 
Alexander Heylin, 1856.
Howard, E. (Lord Howard of Penrith). Theatre of Life: Life 
Seen from the Pit. 1863-1905. London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1935.
Hyam, R . Britain's Imperial Centurv, 1815-1914: A Studv of 
Empire and Expansion. London: B. T. Batsford, 1976.
Ince, A. C. 'Protestant Missionary Activity in Five Southern 
Caribbean Islands during Slavery, 1765-1826'. D. Phil, 
thesis, Oxford Univ., 1984.
566
Isaac, À. 'Unequal Development in Trinidad and Tobago: A
Preliminary Study'. M. A. thesis, Carleton Univ., 1979.
James, C. L. R. The Black Jacobins. 1938. Reprint. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1963.
Johnson, H. 'Crown Colony Government in Trinidad, 1870-1897'. 
D. Phil, thesis, Oxford Univ., 1969.
Johnson, H. The Bahamas in Slaverv and Freedom. Kingston: Ian 
Randle Publishers; London: James Currey Publishers, 1991.
Karch, C. A. 'The Growth of the Corporate Economy in Barbados: 
Class/Race Factors, 1890-1977'. In Contemporarv 
Caribbean: A Sociological Reader. Vol. 1, edited by S. 
Craig. St Augustine, Trinidad: the editor, 1981.
Kiple, K. F. The Caribbean Slave: A Biological Historv. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984.
Klass, M. East Indians in Trinidad: A Studv in Cultural
Persistence. 1961. Reprint. Prospect Heights, 111.: 
Waveland Press, 1988.
Knaplund, P. The British Empire. 1815-1839. London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1942.
Knight, E. G., comp. The Grenada Handbook and Directorv.
1946. St. Georges: The compiler? in collaboration with 
the Govt, of Grenada, c. 1946.
Laclau, E. 'Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America'. New 
Left Review 67 (1971): 19-38.
Laclau, E., and C. Mouffe. Hegemonv and Socialist Strateav: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso, 
1985.
Lakatos, I. The Methodoloav of Scientific Research Programmes. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978.
Laurence, K. O. 'The Tobago Slave Conspiracy of 1801'. 
Caribbean Quarterly 28 (1982): 1-9.
Laurence, K. O. 'Tobago and British Imperial Authority, 1793- 
1802'. In Trade, Government and Societv in Caribbean 
Historv, 1700-1920. edited by B. W. Higman. Kingston: 
Heinemann Educational Books (Caribbean), 1983.
Le Franc, E. 'Social Structure, Cultivation Practices
and Food Availability'. Paper presented at Workshop on 
the Interface between Food Availability, Food Conserva­
tion and Human Nutrition in the CARICOM Region, UWI, St. 
Augustine, 1981.
567
LeRoy Ladurie, E. 'The "Event" and the "Long Term" in Social 
History: The Case of the Chouan Uprising'. In The 
Territory of the Historian by E. LeRoy Ladurie. 1973. 
Reprint in English. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press and 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
Levine, A., and E. O. Wright. 'Rationality and Class 
Struggle'. New Left Review 123 (1980): 47-68.
Levy, C . Emancipation. Sugar and Federalism in Barbados and 
the West Indies. 1833-1876. Gainesville: Univ. of 
Florida, 1980.
Lewis, W. A. 'The Evolution of the Peasantry in the British 
West Indies', 1936. Mimeo.
Lewis, A. W. Labour in the West Indies. 1938. Reprint. 
London: New Beacon Books, 1977.
Litwack, L. F. Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of 
Slaverv. London: Athlone Press, 1979.
Lloyd, C. L. Explanation in Social Historv. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988.
Lobdell, R. A. 'British Officials and the West Indian 
Peasantry, 1842-1938'. In Labour in the Caribbean, edited 
by M. Cross and G. Heuman. London and Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1988.
Lowenthal, D. West Indian Societies. London: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1972.
Mair, L. M. Women Field Workers in Jamaica during Slaverv. 
Elsa Goveia Memorial Lecture, Mona: Dept of History, 
UWI, 1987.
Mandle, J. The Roots of Black Poverty: The Southern Plantation 
Economy after the Civil War. Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
Univ. Press, 1978.
Mandle, J. 'Sharecropping and the Plantation Economy in the 
United States South'. Journal of Peasant Studies 10
(1983): 120-129.
Manicas, P. T. 'Explanation, Generalisation and Marxist Theory 
vis-à-vis Third World Development'. In Marxian Theory and 
the Third World, edited by D. Banerjee. New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1985.
Manington, G. The West Indies with British Guiana and British 
Honduras. London: Leonard Parsons, 1925.
Mann, S. A. Agrarian Capitalism in Theory and Practice. Chapel 
Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1990.
568
Marshall, A. Principles of Economies. Vol. 1. London: 
Macmillan and Co. for the Royal Economic Society, 1961.
Marshall, B. 'Society and Economy in the British Windward 
Islands, 1763-1823'. Ph. D. thesis, UWI, Mona, 1972.
Marshall, B. 'The Free Coloreds in the Slave Society of the 
Ceded Islands of the Eastern Caribbean up to the 
Decade before Emancipation'. Paper presented at the 
6th Annual Conference of Caribbean Historians, Univ. of 
Puerto Rico, 1974.
Marshall, W. K. 'The Social and Economic Development of the 
Windward Islands, 1838-65'. Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge 
Univ., 1963.
Marshall, W. K. 'Metayage in the Sugar Industry of the
British Windward Islands, 1838-65'. Jamaican Historical 
Review 5 (1965): 28-55.
Marshall, W. K. 'Notes on Peasant Development in the West 
Indies since 1838'. Social and Economic Studies 17 
(1968): 252-263.
Marshall, W. K. 'The Termination of the Apprenticeship in
Barbados and the Windward Islands: An Essay in Colonial 
Administration and Politics'. Journal of Caribbean 
Historv 2 (1971): 1-45.
Marshall, W. K., ed. The Colthurst Journal. Millwood, N.Y.: 
K.T.O. Press, 1977.
Marshall, W. K. 'Commentary One' on S. Mintz, 'Slavery and
the Rise of Peasantries'. In Roots and Branches: Current 
Directions in Slave Studies. Oxford: Pergamon Press,
1979a.
Marshall, W. K. 'The Ex-Slaves as Wage Labourers on the Sugar 
Estates in the British Windward Islands, 1838-1846'. 
Paper presented at the 11th Annual Conference of 
Caribbean Historians, Willemstad, Curaçao, 1979b.
Marshall, W. K. ''Vox Populi': The St Vincent Riots and
Disturbances of 1862'. In Trade. Government and Societv 
in Caribbean Historv. 1700-1920. edited by B. W. Higman. 
Kingston: Heinemann Educational Bks. (Caribbean), 1983.
Marshall, W. K. 'Apprenticeship and Labour Relations in Four 
Windward Islands'. In Abolition and Its Aftermath: The 
Historical Context. 1790-1916. edited by D. Richardson. 
London: Frank Cass, 1985.
Marshall, W. K. The Post-Slaverv Labour Problem Re-visited. 
The 1990 Elsa Goveia Memorial Lecture. UWI, Mona: 
Department of History, 1991.
569
Martin, R. M. Historv of the Colonies of the British Empire 
from the Official Records of the Colonial Office. London: 
William H. Allen & Co., and George Routledge, 1843.
MartInez-A11er, J. 'Peasants and Labourers in Southern Spain, 
Cuba, and Highland Peru'. Journal of Peasant Studies 1 
(1974): 133-163.
Marx, K. Capital. Vol. 3. New York: International Publishers, 
1967.
Marx, K. 'Preface' to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economv. 1859. Reprint in Karl Marx on 
Colonialism and Modernization, edited by S. Avineri. NY: 
Anchor Books, 1969a.
Marx, K. Theories of Surplus Value. 2 vols. London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1969b.
Marx, K. Pre-capitalist Economic Formations. New York: Inter­
national Publishers, 1980.
Marx, K. 'Pathways of Social Development: A Brief against
Suprahistorical Theory'. N. d. Reprint in Introduction 
to the Socioloav of "Developing Societies", edited by
H. Alavi and T. Shanin. London and Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1982.
Mathieson, W. L. British Slaverv and Its Abolition. 1823-1838. 
New York: Octagon Bks., 1967.
Maynard, G. O. A Historv of the Moravian Church. Eastern West 
Indies Province. Port of Spain: Yuille's Printerie, 1968.
McTear, J. (Dr) 'Journal of A Voyage To and Residence In The 
Island of Tobago, 1825-6', 1826. MS., Library of 
Congress, Washington DC.
McTear, J. (Dr) 'A Practical View of the Present State of 
Slavery in the West Indies', 1831. MS., Library of 
Congress, Washington DC.
Meikle, H. B. 'Tobago Villagers in the Mirror of Dialect'. 
Caribbean Ouarterlv 4 (1955): 154-60.
Merivale, H. Lectures on Colonization and Colonies (delivered 
before the University of Oxford, 1839, 1840, 1841). 
London: Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 1861.
Mill, J. S. Principles of Political Economv. Edited and with 
an Introduction by Sir W. J. Ashley. London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1926.
Mill, J. S. A Svstem of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. 
1843. Reprint. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1965.
570
Mills, C. W. 'Race and Class: Conflicting or Reconcilable 
Paradigms?'. Social and Economic Studies 36 (1987): 
69-108.
Mills, C. W. 'Marxism and Caribbean Development: A Contribu­
tion to Rethinking'. In Rethinking Development, edited by 
J. Wedderburn. UWI, Mona: Consortium Graduate School of 
the Social Sciences, 1991.
Mintz, S. W. 'Currency Problems in 18th Century Jamaica and 
Gresham's Law'. In Patterns and Processes in Culture, 
edited by R. Manners. Chicago: Aldine, 1964a.
Mintz, S. W. 'The Employment of Capital by Market Women in 
Haiti'. In Capital. Saving and Credit in Peasant 
Societies, edited by R. Firth and B. Yamey. London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1964b.
Mintz, S. W. 'A Note on the Definition of Peasantries'. 
Journal of Peasant Studies 1 (1973): 91-106.
Mintz, S. W. Caribbean Transformations. Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Co., 1974a.
Mintz, S. W. 'The Rural Proletariat and the Problem of Rural 
Proletarian Consciousness'. Journal of Peasant Studies 1 
(1974b): 291-325.
Mintz, S. W. 'The So-Called World System: Local Initiative and 
Local Response'. Dialectical Anthropology 2 (1977): 253- 
270.
Mintz, S. W. 'Was the Plantation Slave a Proletarian?'. 
Review 2 (1978): 81-98.
Mintz, S. W. 'Slavery and the Rise of Peasantries'. In Roots 
and Branches: Current Directions in Slave Studies, 
edited by M. Craton. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979.
Mintz, S. W. 'Reflections on Caribbean Peasantries'. New West 
Indian Guide 57 (1983): 1-18.
Mintz, S. W. Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in 
Modern Historv. New York: Viking Penguin, 1985.
Mintz, S. W. 'The Historical Sociology of Jamaican Villages 
and A Retrospective Note'. In Afro-Caribbean Villages in 
Historical Perspective, edited by C. V. Carnegie. ACIJ 
Research Review No. 2. Kingston: African-Caribbean 
Institute of Jamaica, 1987.
Mintz, S. W. 'Comment on Articles by Tomich, McMichael, and 
Roseberry'. Theory and Societv 20 (1991): 383-392.
571
Mintz, S. W., and D. Hall. The Origins of the Jamaican
Internal Marketing Svstem. Yale Univ. Publications in 
Anthropology No. 57. New Haven; Yale Univ. Dept, of 
Anthropology, 1960.
Mintz, S. W., and R. Price. The Birth of African-American
Culture: An Anthropological Perspective. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1992.
Momsen, J. D. 'The Geography of Land Use and Population in 
the Caribbean (with special reference to Barbados and 
the Windward Islands)'. Ph. D. thesis, Univ. of London, 
1970.
Moreno Fraginals, M. The Sugar Mill: The Socioeconomic Complex 
of Sugar in Cuba. 1760-1860. 1964. Reprint. New York: 
Monthly Review, 1976.
Morrell, W. P. British Colonial Policv in the Acre of Peel and 
Russell. London: Frank Cass, 1966.
Morrell, W. P. British Colonial Policv in the Mid Victorian 
Age. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
Morrissey, M. Slave Women in the New World: Gender Stratifica­
tion in the Caribbean. Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of 
Kansas, 1989.
Mouzelis, N. P. 'Modernisation, Underdevelopment, Uneven 
Development: Prospects for a Theory of Third World 
Formations'. Journal of Peasant Studies 7 (1980): 
353-74.
Mouzelis, N. P. 'Teleology and Uneven Development: A Reply
to Taylor'. Journal of Peasant Studies 8 (1981): 531-6.
Mouzelis, N. P. 'Sociology of Development: Reflections on 
the Present Crisis'. Socioloav 22 (1988): 23-44.
Mouzelis, N. P. Post-Marxist Alternatives: The Construction 
of Social Orders. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan,
1990.
Mouzelis, N. P. Back to Sociological Theorv: The Construction 
of Social Orders. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan,
1991.
Munck, R. Politics and Dependency in the Third World: The Case 
of Latin America. London: Zed Books, 1984.
Murray, D. J. The West Indies and the Development of Colonial 
Government. 1801-1834. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.
Nardin, J.-C. Tobaao, Antilles Françaises: 1781-1793. Fort-de- 
France: Société d'Histoire de la Martinique, 1966.
572
Nardin, J.-C. La Mise en Valeur de l'Ile de Tabaao. 1763-1783. 
Paris: Mouton, 1969.
Niddrie, D. L. Land Use and Population in Tobaao. World Land 
Use Survey, Monograph No. 3. Bude, Cornwall: Geographical 
Publications Ltd., 1961.
Niddrie, D. L. 'Kaye Dowland's Book: A Record of Mid 19th 
Century Tobago'. Caribbean Ouarterlv 9 (1963): 44-51.
Niddrie, D. L. 'Land Use and Land Settlement in the Caribbean: 
A Contribution to the Historical and Social Geography of 
the Lesser Antilles, with special reference to the 
Ceded Islands and in particular to Tobago'. Ph. D thesis, 
Univ. of Manchester, 1965.
Nieboer, H. J. Slaverv as an Industrial Svstem: Ethnological 
Researches. 1910. Reprint. NY: Burt Franklin, 1971.
Ottley, C. R. The Complete Historv of the Island of Tobaao. 
1965. Reprint as The Storv of Tobaao. Port of Spain: 
Longman Caribbean, 1973.
Padgug, R. A. 'Problems in the Theory of Slavery and Slave 
Society'. Science and Societv 40 (1976): 3-27.
Padilla, E. 'Contemporary Social-Rural Types in the
Caribbean Region'. In Caribbean Studies: A Svmoosium. 
edited by V. Rubin. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 
1960.
Paget, H. 'The Free Village System in Jamaica'. Caribbean 
Ouarterlv 1 (1964): 38-51.
Palma, G. 'Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or 
a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of 
Underdevelopment?'. World Development 6 (1978): 881-924.
Pares, R. Merchants and Planters. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press for the Econ. Hist. Soc., London, 1960.
Pares, R. The Historian's Business and Other Essavs. Edited 
by R. A. and E. Humphreys. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.
Pares, R. A West-India Fortune. 1950. Reprint. Hamden, Conn.: 
Archon Bks., 1968.
Patterson, O. The Socioloov of Slaverv. London: MacGibbon and 
Kee, 1967.
Patterson, O. 'The Structural Origins of Slavery: A 
Critique of the Nieboer-Domar Hypothesis from a 
Comparative Perspective'. In Comparative Perspectives on 
Slaverv in New World Plantation Societies, edited by V. 
Rubin and A. Tuden. Annals of the New York Academv of 
Sciences. Vol. 292, 1977.
573
Patterson, O. 'On Slavery and Slave Formations'. New Left 
Review 117 (1979): 31-67.
Patterson, O. Slaverv and Social Death: A Comparative Study. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1982.
Pearce, R. 'Sharecropping: Towards a Marxist View'. Journal of 
Peasant Studies 10 (1983): 42-70.
Pemberton, R. 'Towards a Re-evaluation of the Contribution 
of the West Indian Peasantry: A Case Study of Tobago, 
1900-1949'. M.A. thesis, UWI, St Augustine, 1984.
Pitman, F. W. The Development of the British West Indies. 
1700-1763. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1917.
Pitman, F. W. 'Slavery on British West India Plantations in 
the Eighteenth Century'. Journal of Nearo Historv 11 
(1926): 584-668.
Porter, G. R. The Nature and Properties of the Sugar Cane. 2nd 
ed. London: Smith Elder, 1843.
Post, K. Arise Ye Starvelings: The Jamaican Labour Rebellion 
of 1938 and Its Aftermath. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1978.
Post, K. Strike the Iron. 2 vols. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 
Humanities Press with Institute of Social Studies, The 
Hague, 1981.
Post, K. 'Class, Race and Culture in the Caribbean: Some
Speculations on Theory'. Paper presented at International 
Symposium on the Caribbean, Hunter College, NY, 1984.
Premdas, R. R., and H. Williams. 'Tobago: The Quest for Self- 
Determination in the Caribbean'. Canadian Review of 
Studies in Nationalism 19 (1992): 117-127.
Price, R. ed. Maroon Societies. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 
1973.
Quintero Rivera, A. 'The Socio-Political Background to the
Emergence of "The Puerto Rican Model" as a Strategy for 
Development'. In Contemporary Caribbean: A Sociological 
Reader. Vol. 2, edited by S. Craig. St Augustine, 
Trinidad: the editor, 1982.
Quintero Rivera A., Patricios v plebevos: buraueses.
hacendados. artesanos v obreros. las relaciones de clase 
en el Puerto Rico de cambio de sialo. Rio Piedras: 
Ediciones Huracân, 1988.
Ragatz, L. J. The Fall of the Planter Class in the British 
Caribbean. 1763-1833: A Studv in Social and Economic 
History. 1928. Reprint. New York: Octagon Books, 1977.
574
Ragatz, L. J. 'Absentee Landlordism in the British Caribbean, 
1750-1833'. Agricultural Historv 5 (1931): 7-24.
Ragin, C. C. The Comparative Method: Moving Bevond Qualitative 
and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. 
Press, 1987.
Ransom, R., and R. Sutch. 'Debt Peonage in the Cotton South 
after the Civil War'. Journal of Economic Historv 32 
(1972): 641-669.
Ransom, R., and R. Sutch. One Kind of Freedom: The Economic 
Conseguences of Emancipation. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1977.
Reckord, M. 'Missions in Jamaica before Emancipation: A 
Comment on "Moravian Missionaries and Slaves in the 
West Indies"'. Caribbean Studies 8 (1968): 69-74.
Reid, J. D. jun. 'Sharecropping as an Understandable Market 
Response: The Post-Bellum South'. Journal of Economic 
Historv 33 (1973): 106-130.
Reid, J. D. jun. 'Sharecropping in History and Theory'. 
Agricultural Historv 49 (1975): 426-440.
Riviere, W. E. 'Labour Shortage in the British West Indies 
after Emancipation'. Journal of Caribbean Historv 4 
(1972): 1-30.
Roark, J. Masters without Slaves; Southern Planters in the
Civil War and Reconstruction. New York: W. W. Norton and 
Co., 1977.
Roberts, G. W. The Population of Jamaica. Cambridge:
Published by the Conservation Foundation at the Univ. 
Press, 1957.
Robotham, D. 'Agrarian Relations in Jamaica'. In Essavs in 
Power and Change in Jamaica, edited by A. Brown and C. 
Stone. Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1977.
Robotham, D. '"The Notorious Riot": The Socio-Economic and 
Political Bases of Paul Bogle's Revolt'. Working Paper 
No. 28. UWI, Mona: Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, 1981.
Rodney, W. A Historv of the Guvanese Working People. 1881- 
1905. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 
1981.
Rogers, H. 'The Fall of the Old Representative System in the 
Leeward and Windward Islands, 1854-77'. Ph.D. thesis, 
Univ. of Southern California, 1970.
575
Root, J. W. The British West Indies and the Sugar Industry. 
Liverpool: Commercial Chambers, 1899.
Roxborough, I. Theories of Underdevelopment. Basingstoke and 
London: Macmillan, 1979.
Ryan, S. The Disillusioned Electorate. Port of Spain: Inprint 
Caribbean, 1989.
Salmon, C. S. The Caribbean Confederation. London: Cassell 
& Co., 1888.
Sankatsing, G. Caribbean Social Science: An Assessment. 
Caracas: URSHSLAC-UNESCO, 1989.
Satchell, V. M. From Plots to Plantations: Land Transactions 
in Jamaica. 1866-1900. UWI, Mona: ISER, 1990.
Saul, J., and R. Woods. 'African Peasantries'. In Peasants and 
Peasant Societies, edited by T. Shanin. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1976.
Schuyler, R. L. The Fall of the Old Colonial Svstem: A Studv 
in British Free Trade. 1770-1870. Hamden, Conn.: Archon 
Books, 1966.
Sebastien, R. 'The Development of Capitalism in Trinidad, 
1845-1917'. Ph. D. thesis, Howard Univ., 1978.
Senghaas, D. The European Experience: A Historical Critique of 
Development Theorv. Leamington Spa/Dover, New Hampshire: 
Berg Publishers, 1985.
Sewell, W. G. The Ordeal of Free Labor in the British West 
Indies. 1862. Reprint. London: Frank Cass, 1968.
Shanin, T. 'Introduction'. In Peasants and Peasant Societies, 
edited by T. Shanin. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976.
Sharpe, K . E. Peasant Politics: Struggle in a Dominican
Village. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press, 1977.
Shephard, C. Y. Peasant Agriculture in the Leeward and
Windward Islands. St Augustine: Imperial College of 
Tropical Agriculture, 1945.
Shephard, C. Y. 'British West Indian Economic History in 
Imperial Perspective', Lecture to Hist. Society of 
Trinidad and Tobago, 17 March 1939. In Public Lectures 
Delivered under the Auspices of The Historical Society 
of Trinidad and Tobago during the Session 1938-39.
Port of Spain: Govt. Printer, 1940.
Sheridan, R. B. Sugar and Slaverv: An Economic Historv of the 
British West Indies. 1623-1775. Barbados: Caribbean Univ.
576
Press, 1974.
Sheridan, R. B. 'The Crisis of Slave Subsistence in the 
British West Indies during and after the American 
Revolution'. William and Marv QuarterIv 33 (1976); 
615-641.
Shlomowitz, R. 'Plantations and Smallholdings: Comparative 
Perspectives from the World Cotton and Sugar Cane 
Economies, 1865-1939'. Agricultural Historv 58 (1984): 
1-16.
Silverman, M. 'Dependency, Mediation and Class Formation in 
Rural Guyana'. American Ethnologist 6 (1979): 466-490.
Silverman, S. 'The Peasant Concept in Anthropology'. Journal 
of Peasant Studies 7 (1979): 49-69.
Skocpol, T. 'Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A
Theoretical and Historical Critique'. American Journal 
of Sociologv 82 (1977): 1075-1090.
Skocpol, T. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative 
Analvsis of France. Russia and China. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979.
Skocpol, T. 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in
Historical Sociology'. In Vision and Method in Historical 
Sociology, edited by T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1985.
Skocpol, T., and H. Somers. 'The Uses of Comparative History 
in Macrosocial Inquiry'. Comparative Studies in Societv 
and Historv 22 (1980): 174-97.
Smelser, N. Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. 
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959.
Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations. 1789. Reprint. New York: 
Random House, 1937.
Smith, C. A. 'Local History in Global Context: Social and
Economic Transitions in Western Guatemala^. In Micro and 
Macro Levels of Analvsis in Anthropologv: Issues in 
Theorv and Research, edited by B. R. De Walt and P. J. 
Pelto. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985.
Smith, S. 'The Ideas of Samir Amin: Theory or Tautology?'. 
Journal of Development Studies 17 (1980): 5-21.
Stern, S. J. 'Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in 
the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean'. 
American Historical Review 93 (1988a): 829-872.
Stern, S. J. 'Reply: "Ever More Solitary"'. American 
Historical Review 93 (1988b): 886-897.
577
Sturge, J., and T. Harvey. The West Indies in 1837. 2nd ed. 
London: Hamilton Adams, 1838.
Sudama, T. 'Class, Race and the State in Trinidad and Tobago'. 
Latin American Perspectives 10 (1983): 75-96.
Taylor, F. 'The Metairie System, Tobago (1840s to 1930s)'. 
Caribbean Affairs II thesis, UWI, St Augustine, 1966.
Taylor, H. (Sir). Autobioaraohv of Henrv Taylor (1800-1875). 
2 vols. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1885.
Taylor, J. From Modernisation to Modes of Production: A
Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Under­
development. London: Macmillan, 1979.
Thomas, J. J. The Theorv and Practice of Creole Grammar. 1869. 
Reprint. London: New Beacon Books, 1969.
Thomas, J. J. Froudacitv: West Indian Fables Explained. 1889. 
Reprint. London: New Beacon Books, 1969.
Thome, J. , and J. H. Kimball. Emancipation in the West Indies: 
A Six Months' Tour in Antigua. Barbadoes. and Jamaica in 
the Year 1837. New York: The American Anti-Slavery 
Society, 1838.
Thompson, E. P. The Making of the English Working Class.
New York: Vintage Books, 1966.
Thompson, E. P. The Poverty of Theorv and Other Essavs. 
London: Merlin Press, 1978.
Thompson, P. The Voice of the Past: Oral Historv. Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1986.
Thorner, D. 'Chayanov's Concept of Peasant Economy'. In The 
Theorv of Peasant Economy, edited by D. Thorner, E. 
Kerblay and R. E. F. Smith. Homewood, 111.: Richard D. 
Irwin for the American Economic Association, 1966.
Tomich, D. W. 'Prelude to Emancipation: Sugar and Slavery in 
Martinique, 1830-1848'. Ph. D thesis, Univ. of Wisconsin- 
Madison, 1976.
Tomich, D. W. Slaverv in the Circuit of Sugar: Martinique in 
the World Economy: 1830-1848. Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1990.
Tomich, D. W. 'Une Petite Guinée: Provision Ground and 
Plantation in Martinique, 1830-1848'. Slaverv and 
Abolition 12 (1991a): 68-91.
Tomich, D. W. 'World Slavery and Caribbean Capitalism: The 
Cuban Sugar Industry, 1760-1860'. Theorv and Societv 
20 (1991b): 297-319.
578
Trouillot, M.-R. 'Labour and Emancipation in Dominica: 
Contribution to a Debate'. Caribbean Quarterly 3 0 
(1984a): 73-84.
Trouillot, M.-R. 'Caribbean Peasantries and World Capitalism: 
An Approach to Micro-Level Studies'. New West Indian 
Guide 58 (1984b): 37-59.
Trouillot, M.-R. Peasants and Capital: Dominica in the World 
Economy. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 
1988.
Vansina, J. Oral Tradition: A Studv in Historical Methodology. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973.
Vansina, J. Oral Tradition as Historv. London: James Currey, 
1985.
Wakefield, E. G. A View of the Art of Colonization. 1849. 
Reprint. NY: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1969.
Walker, J. Letters on the West Indies. London: Paternoster 
Row, 1818.
Wallerstein, I. The Modern World Svstem. 3 vols. San Diego, 
California: Academic Press, 1974a, 1980, 1989.
Wallerstein, I. 'The Rise and Demise of the World Capitalist 
System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis'. Comparative 
Studies in Society and Historv 16 (1974b): 387-415.
Wallerstein, I. 'Comments on Stern's Critical Tests'. American 
Historical Review 93 (1988): 873-885.
Walvin, J. England. Slaves and Freedom. 1776-1838. London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986.
Ward, J. M. Colonial Self-Government: The British Experience. 
1759-1856. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1976.
Wayne, M . The Reshaping of Plantation Societv: The Natchez
District. 1860-1880. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. 
Press, 1983.
Weber, M. The Theorv of Social and Economic Organisation. 
Translated by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons, Edited 
with an Introduction by T. Parsons. New York: The Free 
Press, 1964.
Wesley, C. 'The Emancipation of the Free Colored Population in 
the British Empire'. Journal of Negro Historv 19 (1934): 
137-170.
Wiener, J. M. Social Origins of the New South: Alabama.
1860-1885. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 
1978.
579
will, H. A. Constitutional Change in the British West Indies. 
1880-1903. with special reference to Jamaica. British 
Guiana and Trinidad. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
Williams, E. W. Historv of the People of Trinidad and Tobaao. 
Port of Spain: PNM Publishing Co., 1962.
Williams, E. W. Capitalism and Slaverv. London: André Deutsch, 
1964.
Wilmot, S. 'Emancipation in Action: Workers and Wage Conflict 
in Jamaica, 1838-40'. Jamaica Journal 19 (1986): 56-67.
Wise, K. S., comp, and arranger. Historical Sketches of
Trinidad and Tobaao. 4 vols. Port of Spain: Historical 
Society of Trinidad and Tobago, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1938.
Wolf, E. Peasants. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
Wolpe, H. 'The Articulation of Modes and Forms of Production'. 
In Marxian Theorv and the Third World, edited by D. 
Banerjee. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1985.
Wood, D. Trinidad in Transition: The Years after Slaverv. 
London: Institute of Race Relations, 1968.
Woodcock, H. I. A Historv of Tobaao. 1867. Reprint. London: 
Frank Cass, 1971.
Woodman H. D. 'Sequel to Slavery: The New History Views the 
Postbellum South'. Journal of Southern Historv 43 (1977): 
523-554.
Wrong, H. Government of the West Indies. 1963. Reprint. New 
York: Negro Univ. Press, 1969.
Young, D. M. The Colonial Office in the Earlv Nineteenth 
Century. London: Longmans for the Royal Commonwealth 
Society, 1961.
Young, W. (Sir, 2nd Bart.) 'A Tour through the Several Islands 
of Barbados, St Vincent, Antigua, Tobago and Grenada, 
1791-92'. In The Historv. Civil and Commercial, of the 
British Colonies in the West Indies. 4 vols., by B. 
Edwards, Vol. 3. Philadelphia, 1806.
Young, W. (Sir, 2nd Bart.) The West India Common Place Book. 
London: Printed for Richard Phillips by B. McMillan, 
1807.
Young, W. (Sir, 2nd Bart.) 'An Essay on the Commercial and
Political Importance of the Island of Tobago', 1810. MS., 
UWI Library, St Augustine, Trinidad.
580
Young, W. (Sir, 2nd Bart.) 'An Historical, Statistical and
Descriptive Account of the Island of Tobago, Introductory 
to "An Essay on the Commercial and Political Importance 
of the Possession to Great Britain"', 1812. MS., UWI 
Library, St Augustine, Trinidad.
II. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
II.1 United Kingdom
Further Correspondence respecting The West Indian Incumbered 
Estates Court. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1884. 
C.4234.
Hooper, E. D. M. Report upon the Forests of Tobaao. Madras, 
1887. (Available in C0321/104).
Lambert S., ed. House of Commons Sessional Papers of the
Eighteenth Centurv. Vol.l, Minutes of Evidence on the 
Slave Trade, 1790. Reprint. Wilkington, Delaware: 
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1975.
Orde-Browne, G. St. J. (Major). Labour Conditions in the West 
Indies. London: HMSO, 1939. C. 6070.
Papers Relating to the Proposed Union of the Islands of 
Grenada. St Lucia. St Vincent, and Tobago. London: Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1885. C. 4482.
Parliamentary Papers, 1831-32, Vol. XX. Report from the Select 
Committee on the Commercial State of The West India 
Colonies; together with The Minutes of Evidence, and an 
Appendix and Index. 1832.
Parliamentary Papers, 1847-48, Vol. XXIII, Pts. 1 & 2. Report 
from the Select Committee on Sugar and Coffee Planting, 
1848.
Parliamentary Papers, 1878-79, Vol. XIII. Report from the
Select Committee on Sugar Industries with Proceedings, 
Minutes, etc., 1879.
Report bv Colonel Crossman and George Baden-Powell on the
West Indian Incumbered Estates Court, with Letter from 
the West India Incumbered Estates Commission Commenting 
Thereon. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1884. C. 3982.
Report from the Roval Commission on Public Revenue. 
Expenditure. Debts and Liabilities of the Islands of 
Jamaica. Grenada. St Vincent. Tobago. St Lucia and the 
Leeward Islands. London: HMSO, 1884. C. 3840. Reprint. 
Shannon: Irish Univ. Press, 1971.
581
Report from the West India Roval Commission. London: Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1897. C. 8655.
Report of the Committee of Council and Assembly of the Island 
of Tobaao. on the Increase of Population, and the 
Melioration of the State of the Slaves as Amended and 
Approved bv the Colonial Assembly. London, 1799. 
(Available in Archives of Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, University of London).
Report on the Blue Book for 1887 (Tobaao). London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode for HMSO, 1888. C.5249.
Reports on Her Majesty's Colonial Possessions. In Parliament­
ary Papers, 1836, Vol. XLVIII; 1849, Vol. XXXIV, Sess. 1; 
1851, Vol. XXXIV; 1859, Vol. XXI; 1875, Vol. LI, Pt. Ill; 
1877, Vol. LIX; 1880, Vols. XLVIII, XLVIII. Pt. II; 1881, 
Vol. LXIV.II; 1884-85, Vols. LII, LII(I).
II.2 Trinidad and Tobaao
Collens, J. H., ed. Handbook of Tobaao. Port of Spain: 
Government Printing Office, 1912a.
Collens, J. H. Handbook of Trinidad and Tobaao for the Use of 
Settlers. Prepared by a Committee of the Board of Agri­
culture. Port of Spain: Govt. Printing Office, 1912b.
District Administration Reports for 1928, Council Paper No. 
74 of 1929.
District Administration Reports for 1936, Council Paper No. 
78 of 1937.
Hart, J . H . Report on the Aari-Horticultural Resources of 
Tobaao. Port of Spain: Trinidad Royal Botanic Gardens 
Bulletin No. 12, 1889.
Interim Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Racial and 
Colour Discrimination in the Private Sector. Port of 
Spain, 1970.
Judicial Inquiry Commission Report with Evidence and Apps. 
Port of Spain: Government Printing Office, 1892.
Meaden, C. W. Report on the Grazing Capabilities of Tobago, 
Council Paper No. 77 of 1898.
Papers Relating to the Commission to Enquire into the 
Metairie System in Tobago, Council Paper No. 113, 
Trinidad Roval Gazette. 23 Sept. 1891.
Report of the Wages Advisory Board, Council Paper No. 88 of 
1936.
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Tobaao Metairie Commission Report with Evidence and
Appendices. Port of Spain: Government Printing Office, 
1891.
II.3 Barbados
Imperial Department of Agriculture for the West Indies. 
Tobaao: Hints to Settlers. Barbados, 1906.
III. ARCHIVAL RECORDS
III.l UNITED KINGDOM
1. Archives of the Librarv. Roval Botanic Gardens. Kew. 
Surrev
Sundry documents on the agriculture of Trinidad and 
Tobago, including the Hart Report listed in II.2.
2. Council for World Missions Archives. School of Oriental 
and African Studies (SOAS) Librarv. London Universitv
London Missionary Society (LMS), Tobago, 1807-1813.
3. Foreian and Commonwealth Office Librarv. London
Tobago Population Censuses, 1851, 1881, 1891; Censuses 
of the Colony of Trinidad and Tobago, 1901-1931. (The 
censuses for 1844 & 1861 are in the C0285 files for those 
years; the 1871 census is in the House of Assembly 
Minutes, C0286/26, 1871.)
4. Methodist Missionarv Societv Archives. SOAS Librarv. 
London Universitv
Wesleyan Missionary Society (WMS), Tobago Letters, 
1817-1890.
5. Moravian Missionarv Society fMMS) Archives. Muswell 
Hill. London
a. Papers and Correspondence, Tobago, 1784-1803.
b. Diary of the Negro Congregation at Tobago, July 
1800-April 1802.
c. Periodical Accounts relating to the Missions of the 
Church of the United Brethren, established among the 
Heathen. First Series, Vols. 1-3, 1790-1805; Vols. 
10-34, 1826-1890. Second Series, Vols. 1-12, 1891- 
1927; Nos. 138-178, 1930-1970.
d. Sundry other newspapers and documents related to 
the West India missions.
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6. The National Librarv of Scotland. Edinburgh
a. The Ellice Papers (MS. 15137, 15138, 15181-2).
b. The Rennie Papers (MS. 19818) .
c. The Charles Steuart Papers (MS. 5027-5039).
7. Public Record Office. Kew. Surrev
Several files in the series C0285, C0286, C0287, C0288, 
C0289, CO290 (Tobago), C0321 (Windward Islands), C0295, 
C0298, C0299, C0300 (Trinidad and Tobago), C0318 (West 
Indies), 00441 (Encumbered Estates Court), cited in the 
footnotes.
8. Rhodes House Librarv. Oxford Universitv
a. MSS. Brit. Emp. S.20 El/10, Anti-Slavery Papers, 
Tobago Letters, 1838-42.
b. MSS. Brit. Emp. S.22 G73 Tobago. Correspondence of
the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society 
concerning Sir John Gorrie.
9. Somerset House, London
Calendar of the Grants of Probate and Letters of 
Administration Made in the Probate Registers of the 
High Court of Justice in England etc. (1884-1966).
III.2 ARCHIVAL RECORDS. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
1. National Archives. Port of Spain. Trinidad
a. Administrator's Despatches, Tobago, 1882-1885.
b. The News (Scarborough), 1892-1893.
2. The Red House. Port of Spain. Trinidad
Tobago Protocol of Deeds, 1889-1890.
3. Tobaao Archives. Scarborough. Tobaao
a. Lt.-Governor's Memoranda, 1832-1835.
b. Lt.-Governor's Letter Book, 1833-1835.
c. Governor's Letter Book, 183 6-1838.
d. Lt.-Governor's Letters, Tobago, 183 6-1838.
e. Fair Minutes of House of Assembly, Tobago, 1849-
1851.
f. Tobago Vote Book, 1862-1870.
g. Return of Immigrants to the Windward District, 31 
December 1877.
h. File entitled 'Prison Rules and Regulations',
including Rules of the Tobago Mutual Benefit Society 
and documents (misfiled) on the sales of land in the 
Encumbered Estates Court, 1885.
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4. University of the West Indies Librarv, St Augustine, 
Trinidad
a. M. J. Herskovits Collection of Folk Songs.
b. The Young Manuscripts (listed at I. above).
III.3 ARCHIVAL RECORDS. BARBADOS
a. Colonial Secretary's Office (CSC). Letters in Home, 
Foreign and Colonial. Miscellaneous bundles, 1854- 
66, 1863-64, 1870-71, 1874-75, 1854-69, 1876-78.
b. Barbados Newspapers (see below).
III.4 ARCHIVAL RECORDS. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The Librarv of Congress. Washington. DC
Two manuscripts by Dr J. McTear (listed at I. above).
IV. NEWSPAPERS
IV.1 The British Newspaper Librarv. Colindale
Davliaht (Scarborough), Nov. 1884-June 1885.
The News (Scarborough), Aug. 1876, 1881-1888.
The Tobaao Chronicle and Roval Gazette. Vol. VI, 1839. 
The Tobaao Gazette and West Indian News, 1839-1840.
IV.2 Universitv of the West Indies Librarv. St Augustine. 
Trinidad
Port of Spain Gazette. 1889-92 (microfilm).
IV.3 Barbados Archives
Barbados Agricultural Reporter. 1876-79.
Barbados Globe. 1876-1897.
Barbados People and West Indian Gazette. March-August 
1876.
The Official Gazette. 6 March 1876.
The Times. 1876-1885, 1887-1894.
The West Indian. 1876-77.
V. PRIVATE COLLECTIONS
The Turpin Family Papers on Charlotteville estate, Tobago 
(selected documents which the author was allowed to see 
in 1983).
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Crosby, Mrs. I. Retired store clerk and bookkeeper. 
Interview with author. Rockly Vale, Tobago, 20 July 
1993.
Dalrymple, Miss I. and Mrs A. Cameron. Retired seamstress 
and housewife. Interview with author. Scarborough, 
Tobago, 15 July 1992.
Elder, Dr. J. D. Ethnomusicologist/anthropologist. 
Interview with author. Scarborough, Tobago, 24 May 1983.
Guillaume, Mrs. E. Retired Community Development Officer. 
Unrecorded conversation with author. Scarborough, Tobago, 
22 April 1983.
Henry, Mrs. D. Retired District Nurse. Interview with 
author. Diego Martin, Trinidad, 9 July 1992.
Leacock, Mr. G. Amateur archivist and folklorist. 
Unrecorded conversation with author. Scarborough, Tobago, 
3 February 1994.
Thompson, Mrs. D. Researcher. Unrecorded conversations 
with author. St Augustine and Arima, Trinidad, 1, 9 
April 1993.
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